A newborn child is recognised as a legal person. While they possess legal status and certain rights, they remain passive in this role: lacking legal capacity, they are not considered an agent capable of making binding legal decisions or being held accountable. But this perception is shifting, and children are increasingly being regarded as independent agents.
Another example of shifting agency is the gradual but steady increase in autonomy among people with disabilities, supported in part by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Rather than subjection to guardianship, they increasingly receive support to make important decisions. The question is whether it is possible to go even further in dismantling guardianship.
“One argument advanced involves the right to make bad decisions. Those of us recognised as agents do this all the time; it’s simply part of being human,” says Associate Professor of Jurisprudence
Changing concepts
Kurki leads the five-year research project
“I hope we can create a framework encompassing all types of agency in law,” says Kurki.
This theory could in turn help both courts and legislators understand how agency develops.
Alongside Kurki, the group pursuing this goal includes postdoctoral researchers
The need to analyse agency is not solely theoretical; it also stems from tangible social changes and evolving views of people and our environment. The concept of an agent, once very narrow, has become more inclusive over time.
“The concept has in many ways been elitist. Feminist researchers have highlighted that the legal person and agent has traditionally been represented by a white, middle-class man. The concept has been based on assumptions about who can be considered sufficiently rational to make decisions, and traces of these ideas are still evident in legislation and legal thought.”
Part of the project specifically aims to uncover the origins of the legal agent in the history of ideas and explore how the concept has come about and evolved over time. Other project components include analysing animals, groups and AI as agents through case studies.
“Regarding AI, the focus is not on whether it should be afforded self-determination, but rather on responsibility and whether AI might one day be recognised as a fully-fledged legal representative. If I can currently appoint a person to represent me and enter into agreements on my behalf, could AI represent me in the future? And should AI be permitted to act as an independent agent on the stock exchange?”
Children, people with disabilities, AI and animals may not seem like the most obvious combination of research topics. However, they share a common thread that Visa Kurki has identified and which inspired the project.
“While similar changes are taking place across various fields, researchers often appear unaware of one another’s work. Those interested in AI, for example, tend not to engage with developments in the perception of disability, and vice versa. They are having similar conversations but in different places and with different people.
“A key objective of the project is to bring these people together and offer a broader picture of the changes happening,” says Kurki.
The researchers have already made some progress towards this goal. In August 2025 the project organised a conference in Helsinki that convened researchers interested in agency, albeit from different perspectives, and provided a platform for them to share insights. Seminars, workshops and other smaller-scale events will keep bringing people together so they can learn from one another.
Natural world cannot be considered an agent
An obvious follow-up question arising from the evolving perception of agency over the years is how far this development can progress. Is it realistic to envisage animals or the natural world being recognised as agents?
This is not merely a hypothetical question, as practical steps have already been taken. For example, a river in New Zealand has received the status of a legal person. In practice, this means that the river, like a human being, can initiate legal proceedings.
Visa Kurki describes it as something of a trend among some researchers to stretch the concepts and categories involved. Personally he remains sceptical of this development and points out the inevitable practical limitations that accompany it.
“The river may be a legal person, but it’s still humans who act as agents and represent the river, just as a baby requires representatives.”
Some legal theorists go so far as to want to classify storms or other natural phenomena as agents.
“I don’t think this conceptualization holds up legally, as storms cannot be held accountable in any way that matters under the law. While a storm may be seen as an agent due to its consequences which the law must respond to, that’s not sufficient for me. Otherwise everything and everyone would be considered agents.”