Conference Podcast

Episode 1, podcast

Episode 1, transcript

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Katalin: Every year, around the world, millions of people are leaving their homes to seek security and a better life. While this is a difficult decision for any individual, migration has also a wider impact at the global scale: It affects societies economically, socially, culturally and not the least politically.

This podcast investigates the consequences of migration for the Eurasian development.

The series of talks leads up to our online Aleksanteri Conference, organized in October. My name is Katalin Miklóssy, Welcome aboard!

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Katalin: My first guest is Dr. Kaarina Aitamurto, who works at the University of Helsinki, at the Aleksanteri Institute which is an internationally acknowledged center of Russian, East European and Eurasian area studies. Doctor Aitamurto is scholar of religion. She's studied nationalism and migration. But I'm particularly interested in Kaarina's special expertise on Islam and muslim communities in Russia. I want to find out more about the link between religion and migration.

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Katalin: Kaarina, thank you for accepting my invitation to this podcast! You are an expert in the study of religion. First, could you tell us more about your current research? 

Kaarina: Well, actually I kind of have several research projects, but all of them are linked in one way or another to the topic of the governance of islam in Russia. I understand governance very widely, so it includes, for example discursive governance. I mean, public discussion about for example, what is good Islam, what is bad Islam; how it should be governed – or should it be governed? What kind of Islamic activities should be promoted, and what kind of less so. 

But in addition to that, the analysis of the discussions about Islam legislation, I mean, different kind of organisations, I have some other, minor projects as well. Like, for example, we had with my colleagues Anna-Liisa Heusala and Rustam Urinboyev a project about Central Asian migrants, and Islam was also one of the topics in this research project. And actually we gathered some very rich material in our fieldwork in Moscow in 2017, and even though there are some publications, actually quite a lot of that material has not yet been in a way used, or we are still in the process of publishing the findings from that project.  

Katalin: That is very, very interesting. You have, indeed, a wide and complex experience analyzing the coexistence of various religious communities and also their interaction with powerholders. Now, when we look at the European Union, we increasingly encounter arguments stating that muslim migrants and Islam by and large are threats to our societies. How is this in Russia?

Kaarina: Well, of course there are similarities but also some major differences, and perhaps the biggest of these is, that, first of all, Islam is considered as one of the so called traditional religions in Russia, so it has a very recognized position in Russian society. And, indeed, this idea that different confessions or faith groups, of religions, have had a long history of co-existence in Russia is very strong in Russia, and it guides the discussion. And in many ways it is justified. I mean, Russia has been an empire. In the Soviet Union, there were many ethnic and religious minorities. So it is a part of the national identity. And in the Tsarist regime, for example, these religious minorities were taken into account, and actually the Tsarist regime used the religious elites when they were governing these minorities. So, in this sense, muslims and Islam, are not regarded as always necessarily as the religion of migrants, as something new, as it is often in the Western Europe.

However, this -  I would like to say – myth about the peaceful co-existence of religions is also something that covers problems and power inequalities, hierarchies and oppression ans so on So, first of all the idea that there are some ethnic religious minorities that even today guides the discussion so much, kind of essentialises and homogenises these religious minorities. It also doesn’t really take into account this hybridity of identities and changes.

Also even the conceptualization of the four traditional religions reveals that it excludes many religious traditions and indeed creates that kind of power hierarchies. And it is idea that unlike in Western Europe where Islam is conceived as something new, connected to migration often seen as a social problem, in Russia it’s seen as part of our history and of our society. And this kind of lipservice to this religious tolerance actually often covers some problems. For example, it’s quite common in Russia, an often heard statement, that there is no islamophobia like there is in Russia. And, of course, that’s completely untrue. You can see islamophobia on the political level in the media, in the everyday life. So, in that sense this myths about history prevents addressing some serious problems. But of course, this idea that Islam or muslims, or especially Islam is incompatible with our way of life, or something like that, has also been heard in Russia and even in some elections or political debates this migrantofobia has often had a very central role in these discussions. But the rhetorical move, how this is done, is first of all to divide this kind of good Islam and then bad Islam, or islam from foreign countries or foreign Islam and our native moderate Islam. So, with that kind of distinctions, actually quite a lot of different ways of being a muslim or Islamic traditions or ways of life can be excluded or discriminated.

Katalin: Thank you. This is really interesting. I would like to follow up on this xenophobia and our problematic attitudes towards especially muslim migrants. When we look at the European stage it seems that migration crisis in 2015 was a gamechanger for the European Union. It transformed the political language, European unity started to erode. Ever since 2015 we have new tendencies of rising nationalism and conservatism, populism. We strengthened border controls to hinder migration. Now, all these new developents took place in Europe that still holds high democratic values. But ow about Russia? How is transnational migration assessed in a country like Putinist Russia, and what have been the consequences for the Muslim communities?

Kaarina: Well, first of all, the position of Islamic organization is in some extent more difficult than in Western Europe even though it seems they hold a very respected role in the Russian society. Because they have to balance between the ordinary believers and they needs and their interests but at the same time with the authorities and the political power so that they are considered to represent this kind of good Islam and what the authories would like to promote. So in that sense they need to be more sensitive towards the authorities than necessarily Islamic organisations in the West. Although of course, there are similar problems and challenges. So this is one thing.

And for example when the muslim community comments on various events, global events or for example social problems in the Russian society, they are often especially the most prominent ones who hold these respected positions, they are often quite careful not to lose that position in the eyes of the power elite. The other thing is that o course as has been noted, in social media discussion there are different kind of quarters and even the states that aim to guide it. But in Russia, of course, the state controlled media has a very central role in having an impact on public discussions. And here actually it is quite intriguing that the so called migration question was very high on the agenda and the discussions in the Moscow’s mayoral elections in 2013 and the alarmist portrails of muslim migrants coming to Russia and transforming the cities and so on. Muslim migrants as a social problem being a very prominent in mainstream media, in these political discussions at the time.

But 2014 owing to the annexation of Crimea and then the subsequent war in Ukraine, actually the new enemy and the new biggest threat in Russian society were Ukraine and Western powers so suddenly this whole discourse changed, or at least the kind of main point of reference changed. So, in that sense the discussions in Russia has a little bit different logic than in Western Europe.

Katalin: We relate perhaps much too often to migration as it were self-evidently a transnational phenomenon but in fact domestic migration is as significant. How does religion play a role in the context of domestic migration, in Russia?

Kaarina: Well, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the differences in living standards, in wages, in employment, they became very wide, of course between Russia and some previous Soviet states, especially in Central Asia but also within Russia. And if you look at the different regions and especially the difference between such big cities as, for example, Moscow and St.Petersburg or some prosperous areas, and, on the other hand on some less prosperous areas and country side. It’s a huge difference. It’s like looking at some of the richest countries in Europe, and some developing countries on some other continent.

So certainly there has been much internal, domestic migration, and particularly in for example Northern Caucasus. In addition to these economic reasons, there are these conflicts and in general the societal and political situation. In addition, of course, in for example Chenchnya thereare demographic reasons: there simply isn’t enough labour for the growing population. Certainly you can see some examples of religion as a driving factor. Like for example, actually some sexual and gender minorities often try to emigrate from the Northern Caucasus because of the persecution. I would say anyway, that that has a minor role.

Whereas the perception of migrants in areas like Moscow or St. Petersburg, then again religion playes a role in this discrimination. Although, of course, ethnicity and religion are very difficult to distinguish from each other especially when we analyse discrimination and racism. But the borderline between domestic and transnational migration is a bit complicated in Russia, because indeed occasionally these migrants from Northern Caucasus are perceived as migrants in Moscow even though they are, of course, citizens of Russian Federation.

But at the same time, migrants from Central Asia, especially the older generation that grew up in the Soviet Union, they never the less see the country in a way like they own. Their fore fathers fought in the Soviet army, the children from Western Soviet Union were taken to Uzbekistan to find shelter and many Uzbeks are quite proud that during the war many Russian children that were sent there were taken into families and not into orphanages. So there was that kind of hospitality. So in that sense, the case of Russia also shows the kind of fluidity of these transnational borders and in a way that maybe also challenges this kind of methodological nationalism.

Katalin: Thank you. My final question is regarding to the forthcoming Aleksanteri Conference. you are co-leading the committee organizing the forthcoming Aleksanteri Conference, which is dealing with the global migration in Eurasia. What would you assess the conference – what would you like us to remember about the conference topic?  And how would you assess the conference by and large?

Kaarina: When we were writing the call for papers that actually also helped us again to realise how multi-sited pehonomenon migration is. How it’s connected to such a huge variety of issues. I mean, cultural, currence, economy, legislation, societal trust – all these kinds of things. So of course, we are looking forward to reading all these different proposals and variety of perspectives from which people look at these issues. And of course, we are not only looking at migration as such, but also the discussions about migrants and especially the kind of critical take on these discussions. How migration is framed in different approaches.

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Katalin: Thank you Kaarina for taking the time and effort to this discuss these very very interesting questions in our first podcast. Thank you!

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Epis­ode 3, podcast

Episode 3, tran­script

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Katalin: Every year, around the world, millions of people are leaving their homes to seek security and a better life. While this is a difficult decision for any individual, migration has also a wider impact at the global scale: It affects societies economically, socially, culturally and not the least politically.

This podcast investigates the consequences of migration for the Eurasian development.

The series of talks leads up to our online Aleksanteri Conference, organized in October. My name is Katalin Miklóssy. Welcome aboard!

(jingle playing)

Katalin: The subject of migration has been targeted a lot by populists. What has made our societird receptive for anti-migration sentiments? What does this kind of populism tell about us, about the general atmosphere in our societies? I will discuss these questions and more with a young and bright scholar at the University of Helsinki. Come and meet Marina Vulovic!

Katalin: Yeah, ok, let’s start! So, Marina, thank you for accepting my invitation. First, let’s talk about your research. What do you do?                       

Marina: Thanks for inviting me, Katalin, it’s really a pleasure to be here. I’m a PhD candidate currently at the University of Helsinki. I have just yesterday submitted my thesis for pronting, so, hopefully I can defend it on the 23rd of June. I do research on Serbia – Kosovo relations, so that’s my main focus, and specifically, I focus on Serbia and Serbian politics – as kind of a wider frame. And even more broadly the Western Balcans, so I focus on political discourse, mainly on populism and things like that.  So that’s the topic of my research in a nutshell.

Katalin: Ok, so, and I know that you have a very innovative way of approaching populism. My first question concerns the changes in the political language, regarding migration especially. So, if we go back in time to 2015, the one event that got the most extensive media coverage was the so called migration crisis, and it seems that this phenomenon had a huge impact on the use of language – on the vocabulary, on the expressions… So, how do you see this transformation, or, is this just, you know, a misunderstanding, and the linguistic turn has happened much earlier and gradually, and just re-surfaced in 2015? How do you see this situation?

Marina: I think that’s a really interesting question, and one that, certainly all research that deals with the political rhetoric currently would be interested to answer. And it’s also an ongoing debate that, you know, has been going on for a while now, for some years, whether populism is something that has some specific content that is reproduced over and over again by politicians, or whether it’s more or less like a principle or a form of language.

So we have these debates currently that identify populism kind of a rhetorical style, as a way of speaking and doing politics in that manner. So, if populism is understood in that aspect, I would say that migration crisis certainly was one of those moments that would heighten the production of such language, because populism is more or less built on having these oppositions: it’s being established on language between “us” and “them”. And so this “them” can of course be shifting in relation to what is currently being debated in politics. So, if in a specific political discourse, jobs are debated or there is a particularly precarious economic situation, then of course this “the other” towards which we are kind of establishing our own identity is changing. And so, with the migration crisis, this other can then be also migrants who, you know, in these populist discourses would then come to Europe and take a way jobs or take away culturally the whole Europe.

So you know, there are many of these discourses that portray migrants as the other, and I would say in that aspect that if one understands populism as a style or as a principle of doing politics, then I would say it’s nothing novel. It has been going on for ages, basically since we have political rhetorics or since we have started engaging it in political debate. And even if one looks, for instance, back at the 1990s and the crisis that basically occurred during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, specifically during the Bosnian war in 1992 and 1993, when basically, Germany had about half a million to a million Kosovo refugees, even back then there was a specific type of rhetoric about what’s going on, that established the migrants as those who are only like, kind of temporarily being tolerated in German society. So there was this idea that they would at some point leave Germany and that through that, there was not like and invitation for them to stay there and be integrated. And after the war ended, I think about 300 000 Bosnian refugees were repatriated, so basically forcefully removed from Germany.

So, I think the very fact that that has occurred also speaks to this kind of polarizing rhetoric of populism as well. There is always this need to establish kind of clear boundaries between us and them, and migrants being a clear them that just comes from outside into any country, you know, they lend themselves very easily to be instrumentalized for such types of rhetoric, and I think that it’s really not surprising that that has also happened in 2015 specifically in some Eastern European countries such as Hungary. I think Hungary would be kind of tha best case to kind of trace this type of rhetoric there.                                      

Katalin: Ok, so this is a kind of misrepresentation, misunderstanding that due to the Yugoslavian war refugees were dealt in a different fashion from today’s migrants. It is just that we don’t remember right this history, in the West! Because it was a surprise to hear that already in the 1990s the same linguistic patterns appeared. Perhaps it has been always so, even though after the second world war there were huge migration crisis or refugee crisis, or after the first world war… so it was always a kind of fashion that how you address identity and all those who are coming into the society. But it is interesting that it is now re-framed as populism, so it is a kind of new interpretation of what’s been going on on the linguistic field.

I would like to move on from this very general topic, and zoom into this culturally and historically and politically particular area. You are an area specialist on the Western Balkans, and of course, as we just mentioned, the Western Balkans was the one most important route in at least the first phase of migration crises back in 2015. But, If you look at the Western Balkans linguistic field or rhetorical field, is this populism different than everywhere else in Europe? And, since your expertise is particularly on Serbia and Kosovo, and the relation between them, if you compare these two countries, what are the similarities or differences regarding the formal speech addressing migration?

Marina: I’d say that for Serbia, if I start with Serbia and then move on to Kosovo, because I think there is much more to be said about Serbia than about Kosovo since, as you mentioned, in 2015 the whole Balkan group went through Serbia primarily and only after that, after the main route was closed, there was some diverting pass emerging through other countries as well, and only very marginally through Kosovo. So Kosovo didn’t really have historically so huge influx of migrants in 2015, nor had to deal with a huge influx of migrants institutionally, such as Serbia had.

And so, for Serbia, one always has to see any kind of development politically in Serbia against the background of the current regime, and how they are, through more or less authoritarian style of governing, handling all these issues. And so, for instance, what one would recognize as populist othering of migrants in Hungary, this type of othering didn’t really occur in Serbia, because the regime -   yes, it’s really surprising – but the regime actually back then wanted to appear more European due to the fact that, of course, all of these migrants wanted to come to Western Europe primarily. So, in Serbia, because they knew that none of these migrants would actually want to stay in Serbia, they were just registered as migrants and potential asylum seekers that would have this intention to seek for asylum somewhere else in Europe. So Serbia has kind of positioned itself as this transitory country, and all the migrants that came through Serbia back in 2015, which hade a huge influx of migrants back then, almost none of them stayed in Serbia. So, while the route was open, they were all allowed to proceed either to the Hungarian border, before it was closed, and then to the Croatian border, to the Bosnian border etc.

And so in Serbia, I’d say that this sort of rhetoric was kind of missing since, as I said, the regime wanted to present it as something, you know, as a kind of pinnacle of achievement of the current regime, to be able to humanely treat those migrants and to kind of be in good graces with the West, which was also recognized by the West. So, Angela Merkel valued this approach of Serbia, and so for Serbia it was a political win in that aspect. And they also received a lot of monetary aid from the European Union to handle the migrant influx.

But on the other hand, a bit of kind of populist rhetoric could be recognized in the way by which Serbia and Croatia had dealt with the issue of migrants. And so, in 2015 when basically Serbia was receiving a few thousands of migrants a day, they would just let them pass through their territory towards the Hungarian border, towards the Croatian border, and when Hungary closed the border all of them now went to Croatia, and so the Croatian prome minister basically voiced concerns that that might jeopardize the current stability of Croatia, and that Serbia should spread them out a bit, so that’s basically the words that he used: that Serbia should spread them out, and send them a bit to Hungary, which Serbia, of course, couldn’t do, and this basically resulted in a politic trade war, where the whole borders between Serbia and Croatia were closed for about a week or two, after which Angela Merkel voiced concerns that the migrant crises could result in another war in the Balkans. So there was like whole kind of scenario created there of potential crisis and eruption of even armed conflict, which I thought was a good illustration of the way migrant crisis can be used to rearticulate these political otherings between Serbia and Croatia who have been historically used to this type of rhetoric about the other. So, Croatians often blame Serbia for many issues in the past, and then also Serbia – Croatia for many issues in the past. So, the migrant crisis was just another illustration that heightened these animosities of the two countries.

And then, in terms of Kosovo, as I said, it’s not really a huge issue for Kosovo currently, but to be honest there also not many figures where you kind find the amount, for example, how many refugees do reside in Kosovo. I know that there are three government sponsored refugee shelters for migrants coming from outside the Balkans, primarily from the Middle East. But Kosovo also has to be seen in light of its current economic development and in the light of its own migration crisis that it’s been experiencing. Because many people of Kosovo nationality go from Kosovo to Western countries to seek a better life, and many have done it before the refugee crisis of the 2015 through asylum. So this influx of migrants has created for Kosovo this additional problem in the aspect that anyone coming from Kosovo and claiming asulym in Europe was not considered “asylum worthy”, and so they were just sent back because Kosovo is also considered as one of the politically safe countries in terms of the European Union framework. So, everybody would just be sent back there.

But maybe to continue on that, what is also interesting about this whole kind of case about Serbia and Kosovo it the religious differences as well. So I’d say for Serbia it was one case where many migrants had been placed on the border towards Bosnia in Banja Koviljača, which currently or today harbors many former Serbian refugees from the Bosnian war who had fled the conflict back then. And so when full migration crisis started in 2015, Serbia had built a refugee center there, in Banja Koviljača, and basically the number of refugees that came to Banja Koviljača was almost as high as the number of the domestic population, and so there are many protests back then regarding this.

And one interesting aspect about this is that the Serbian government never really used terms such as asylum seekers in a negative connotation, they had always and consistently used the term refugees, and you know, Serbia was back them represented as this host country that knew what the case of refugees was, because twenty years ago we had refugees coming from all different countries of the ex-Yugoslavia. So they wanted to represent themselves as this kind of humane population. And then Banja Koviljača, when protests emerged against the refugees that were placed there by the government, kind of destabilized this nice image that the government had presented towards the outer world.

And of course, what the government did was just completely suppress any critical voices. In Serbia we have a media landscape that is predominantly owned by people and businessmen that are very close to the government, and so whatever the government might want to present as politically relevant or as politically “true”, they would place such narratives through this dominated media and basically suppress any political opposition that might occur there.

Another way to solve this issue is that Serbia is run as a semi-authoritarian state, so to speak, and these refugees were, because they did understand that it would maybe result in turbulence in some areas where there was a disproportionate amount of refugees vs the domestic population, thay just decided to build other refugee shelters somewhere they thought that such domestic turmoil would not occur. And so they built a new refugee center in Sandžak in Novi Pazar, which is a predominantly Muslim populated area.  And this is interesting because when these migrants were placed there, from the predominantly Serb Orthodox populated areas to predominantly Muslin populated area, generally there were no protests. So, in Novi Pazar there were no political protests in that manner. And I think there were also some studies trying to see whether integration was easier in these Muslim majority areas, and apparently that was so.  And so, I would say that this will of the government, which is almost infinite in Serbia, to basically position themselves in the political field the way they see fit and the way they deem would benefit them most, politically, is really what has kind of coloured Serbia’s response to the refugee crisis.

Katalin: So, a follow-up question: The refugee crisis decreased since 2015. Now, what is the situation today? If you look at it, yes there are still… interestingly , you don’t have to have refugees or migrants in order to take advantage of the populist rhetoric against them. So, how is it in the Western Balkans?

Marina: Yes, so, as I said, in Serbia they haven’t even taken advantage of them from the beginning, because, you know, it is not to say that we should trust the government, the Serbian government when they say “we are very humanitarian”. It’s more about seeing how this whole political rhetoric came to appear as such. It’s always easier for a country to claim they have no problems with migrants, if none of those migrants actually want to stay in that country. And so, from the beginning, all of these migrants have been registered as “migrants in transition”, as those migrants who, when they entered Serbia, they would declare that they have been admitted to seek asulym, and as such they would gain this legal status of asylum seekers within Serbia for fifteen days. It’s kind of the time that the Serbian government expected them to be able to migrate towards the Hungarian or Croatian border, so basically out of Serbia, after which they again became illegal, so to speak.

And so many of these migrants are even today in this illegal limbo because they couldn’t actually advance within this time span of fifteen days towards the Croatian or Hungarian border, and so they actually stayed in Serbia for three years or four years since. And so, in Serbia, eventhough there are a few hundred asulym applications per year, none or only two are always accepted. And only for unaccompanied children. So it’s not, you know, instrumentalized as a problem in Serbia, because, in fact, they don’t really see it as a problem. Because, as I said these migrants also don’t want to stay in Serbia, so for the Serbian government it’s also easier to not instrumantalize them in that way.

But, you know, there are other groups in the Western Balkans that can get instrumentalized and where a certain type of populist rhetoric is perhaps more recognizable. And those would be always be sexual minorities, those will always be Roma, in terms of Serbia and Kosovo, it’s always Kosovo Albanians, so it’s always Albanians in general. So, there are these kind of standard scapegoats that often re-surface in the Serbian political rhetoric and currently it is also very polarized, so that you have also the political opposition being somewhere there in that kind of othering spectrum, together with the other others.

Katalin: Ok, I want to go back to general philosophical questions. So as my final bit: Yes, migration is a very suitable topic because it helps polarization of society, of social atmosphere, of the language… So, do you think that populism and especially with regard this migration business and how it is addressed, is a kind of feature of our time, or just business as usual, that we just didn’t take into consideration previously? And what is your estimation, where are we heading now?

Marina: On the one hand I really think that it is business as usual, because as I said, this type of othering has always been present in politics, no matter which age we are looking at in the political discourse. But, on the other hand, I also think that some of the transformations that have occurred in our societies over a couple of decades, such as social media, which of course also follows this kind of polarizing logic. You have these echo chambers and you have these bubbles where people like to gather and exchange always similar opinions so there is rarely occasions where in those echo chambers and social bubbles can actually interact with somebody who might be of a different opinion.

So I think the current media landscape definitely exacerbates something that, you know, perhaps thirty years ago, if we speak of the Bosnian refugee crisis, wouldn’t have been possible in the same manner and to the same extent as it is today. Because, you know, it is omni-present. You have the news on your phone which you look basically at one hundred times a day. So it’s a huge influx of information for every single individual, which was perhaps not the case thirty years ago, in the 1990s. So I definitely think that there are some aspects of this political meaning making around “us” and “others” that are timeless, but there are also aspects that are definitely exacerbated through social media and these technological advances that we have experienced in the last decade or so.

So, yeah, where we are heading… so yes, you know, if any political scientist ever tells you they know what’s going to happen, they are probably lying to you. So, I of course, do not really know what’s going to happen. There’s so many variables that might impact on the situation but let’s just say that I’m not really happy about how currently we are progressing in this manner, especially after 2015, so when the whole Balkan route closed and many migrants were just left stranded on the outskirts of Europe and you have this kind of heightening of this idea of “fortress Europe”. I really do not like that trend, that’s noticeable, you know that trend of walling off Europe.

And I really recognize in that immigration is absolutely necessary for the sustainment of welfare states in basically any European country nowadays. So I think that’s a major aspect that hasn’t really been heightened in the modern discourse in Europe on migration and I think that should definitely be something that also academia get involved in more, and bring these discussions to the fore. Like, why migration is also necessary for our current societies. If one just listens to the news or just listens to the populist demagogues, you would just see it as something absolutely negative, but it is also been historiacally proven that migration is something that is absolutely essential for the economic development and the sustainment of the welfare state anywhere in Europe, and I think Germany is one really, realy good example of that. Germany is currently one of the economically strongest states in the European Union. I think that’s also partly due to migration back in the day – you know, in the 70s and 80s – and I think that is definitely something that also hast to from time to time again be brought to the fore instead of just focusing on migration as something negative.

Katalin: Thank you. This is an interesting question, because, in  a sense, different perceptions of security alight. How you understand what you need for your future society, how you understand, in his sense, societal security. But thank you Marina, for your in valuable thoughts and I really, really appreciate that you invested your time and energy in this important topic.

Marina: Of course! Thank you for inviting me. It was a pleasure to talk about these things.     

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Episode 4, podcast

Episode 4, transcript

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Katalin: Every year, around the world, millions of people are leaving their homes to seek security and a better life. While this is a difficult decision for any individual, migration has also a wider impact at the global scale: It affects societies economically, socially, culturally and not the least politically.

This podcast investigates the consequences of migration for the Eurasian development.

The series of talks leads up to our online Aleksanteri Conference, organized in October. My name is Katalin Miklóssy. Welcome aboard!

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Katalin: It seems that we are witnessing a profound conceptual change where migration and the migrants are framed as hybrid threats. Crises and wars provide an opportunity for third parties to create additional pressure in international relations.

I asked a foreign policy scholar, Ryhor Nizhnikau about this topic. Ryhor is a senior researcher of the Finnish Institute for International Affairs and area expert focusing on Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.

Welcome this podcast - finding out are the migrants the new pawns on the chessboard of geopolitics!

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Katalin: So Ryhor, thank you for accepting my invitation to this podcast. My first question is about the latest news that we started to have during the summer - about the Belarusian government using migration as a means of pressure in its foreign policy or, more particular, in its EU policy. Well, this move definitely changed its bilateral relations with Poland and Lithuania at the least. Now, you are an expert of foreign relations and you have studied Belarus. So, how would you explain, why did they start using this strategy now?

Ryhor: Yes, thank you for this question. I think the logic is quite simple. This migration issue is weaponized as a response to the EU actions. So, we currently have quite an acute crisis in relations between Belarus and the EU, I think, it's really touched or reached the lowest level in in bilateral history. And in this regard for Minsk, this is simply a symmetric response to the latest round of EU sanctions, which has been imposed in in June. The sanctions which unlike the previous ones, are quite painful, because they are economic and they can become sectoral in nature quite easily.

So in this regard, Lukashenka finds migration issue as sort of a hybrid weapon, a response, and in a sense, a signal to the West that if it continues to, in his mind, if it continues to escalate, he has means to respond. But I would put it even more than that, I would say that, besides having a function as a response to the EU, the second part of it is that it's, it's quite instrumental for Belarus—Russia relations, I think that we have to understand that Lukashenka sees very well that currently, Kremlin is also at war with the West, a different kind of war, but this is how Moscow understands the current shape of Russia—EU or Russia— West relation. So in this regard, once he puts a pressure on the West, it is recognized in Moscow, and it's actually gives him a lot of extra points as an ally. So in this regard, he understands that Moscow sees this issue very beneficial, because basically, without any cost without Moscow doing anything, Western resources are drained and West is under pressure & doesn't know what to do but to come to Moscow for a deal over Belarus.

Katalin: Okay, this is a really, really an exciting topic. Now, you mentioned Russia and Russian—Belarusian relations. I am a historian. So I just have to ask that do you know if there was a resembling situation in the in the past of Belarus, because we know that Stalin relocated the vast amount of people in the Soviet Union, but this was mostly against those people and not against the regions they were moved to. On the other hand, Stalin also supported migration of the ethnic Russians, to newly acquired Soviet territories after the Second World War, they were too hard to impose control over those areas, like the Baltic states or Moldova. So there is a history of using migrants, as pressure in the Russian case. But what about Belarus? Is there any past experience of this?

Ryhor: Yeah, it's a very good question, because it is actually quite difficult to give a straightforward answer. I think probably first we can say that no, we don't see any resemblance with the current situation. On the other hand, we have to understand that Lukashenka and his regime are very Soviet in nature. So in this regard, their understanding, basically the logic of their action is very Soviet. Actually it's rooted in Soviet institutional and also historical logic.

So, in this regard, I think we have to understand that the main idea with any action is instrumentality. So, in this regard, anything can become an instrument in foreign policy, as well as in domestic policy. So, the fact that we see interest in leap from the very Soviet mantra that borders are sacred, our external borders are sacred. — This is what the Soviet Union has been preaching throughout this history: we can look at all these different movies, different songs, which talk about borders, and that we're going to defend it to the last drop. And Lukashenka himself always likes to refer to himself as a border guard, because he served in the army on the border as, as a sergeant. I think the fact that we see this deviation— and this is what actually was the logic of the Belarusian government until 2020— that they defended it till the last bullet was dropped, and they like to report that “we didn't allow this cargo to be going through, all these people breaching the border”, and so on and so forth. But now we see a very clear break, and we see that borders become porous and become very instrumental in adding pressure, I think this makes the regime even more Soviet because this is exactly follows the logic, not the book, or the letter of the Soviet actions.

Katalin: Okay. I want to still hang on to the past for a bit longer. But I have now a question about the more recent past. Now, in 2015 and the following years, there was this rumor circulating that the massive wave of migration was… that there was a Russian hand in it. Now, whatever it whatever the truth is, nevertheless, migration became a kind of constant subject of discussion and, and even juxtaposition in in the European Union and Europe, by and large. Now, how is this discussion affected the regions you monitor, especially, not only Belarus, but also more widely Ukraine and Moldova? And how was this 2015 experience reflected upon or understood back then, in this region in, the first place?

Ryhor: I think the effect was indirect, first of all, because we know that the waves, they didn't go through post Soviet region mainly, they went through Turkey and Western Balkans. And basically, the effect was indirect and through media. And the problem, I think one of the major problems is that it went through Russian media. So, the local societies in Belarus in Ukraine and Moldova, they basically understood this crisis through the Russian lenses. And this was actually quite a big headache, quite a big effect on the public attitudes towards the EU, because they also started to think that the EU acted wrongly in allowing these migration waves… in allowing this, let's call it domestic crisis; with all this fake news about what happens in Germany, but also not only fake news, of course, but with all this incidence, and we can understand that this has been used quite efficiently. And this is a bit of a paradox because we know that for, especially Moldova and Ukraine, the EU is the main major migration destination point. So now we know that basically since mid-2010s, the waves of Ukrainian and Moldovan labor migrants is huge and they mainly aimed at the West. So in this regard, this caused a little bit of a public discussion not in the EUs favor in these countries.

Katalin: Okay. It's interesting, it is a kind of follow up question that in Poland, there are also a lot of Belarusian migrant workers, not necessarily legally but illegally at least, and they actually contribute a great deal to the Polish economy. Now, the question is of course, what will happen with them, particularly now that the EU strengthens its border line against Belarus in Poland as well. So, these bilateral relations can go really, really wrong also in this labor migration question. But how do you see, what is the Lukashenka administration's most likely next move in this migration policy for the near future?

Ryhor: I think he will continue to use it. And we have to understand that as soon as there is a demand, both in Minsk & Kremlin, but also, among the people who want to get into the EU, this is a very easy tool to use. So in this regard, it's very beneficial for him, he will continue to use it. We'll see how the Afghan problem will actually play because obviously, there will be a lot of waves coming through Central Asia to Russia. And then we remember very well the situation of a couple of years back when unexpectedly, these migrants appeared on Finnish, or the region borders. So this might be on Polish border again, and there is very little that they could do. So we can see that probably Moscow can, if it finds it beneficial, it can actually step in and help Minsk put this pressure on the West. So this will be an issue as soon as Minsk and Brussels relations are bad.

Katalin: Okay, so crisis is good  for the government in anywhere in the vicinity! Ok. My final question is, yes, you are a foreign policy expert and I would like to look forward into the future, say, how do you assess the instrumental value of migration in the future?

Ryhor: Well, I think this is the major question. I think that migration now is important, but it will become more and more important in the future. And this is inevitable, and this is that we should prepare for. And there are a lot of factors, including not only wars and conflicts, but also climate change, and so on and so forth, which will continue to increase the gap between the global South and North, and will increase the migration pressure on the EU particularly. So I guess, we will just follow it more and more, and hopefully, with our research, we'll be able to find at least some answers.

Katalin: But will this continue to become a kind of constant instrument of pressure in foreign relations?

Ryhor: I think it will come and go as any pressure, because what Lukashenka and other dictators or other governments in the region show, is that basically, as soon as you make something a constant pressure point it loses its value. So you take, let's say, you arrest political prisoners. You'd have to release them at some point to use it as a proper instrument. Otherwise, if it becomes a constant problem, its value drops. So you need to, in a sense, use the thing in cycles, and that's when it becomes a proper instrument —when it's used in the proper time. So, I think that this is a case in point the current problem that at some point, it will stop. At some point, maybe abruptly, maybe not, but it will disappear from our radars, from the agenda, bilateral agenda as well. But it will immediately reappear as soon as the relations get sour again. So we will just have to understand that when the problem disappears, it doesn't mean that the factors disappeared as well. And that's why this is the question for the policy community, for our academic community to remind the governments which tend to not see things in front of their eyes that they have to prepare and act accordingly. And not be surprised and caught by surprise by this crisis, when the crisis reappears again.

Katalin: Thank you. It was a very fine ending, actually. And thank you very much for this thought provoking and very rich discussion.

Ryhor: Thank you for inviting me.

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Episode 5, podcast

Epis­ode 5, tran­script

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Katalin: Every year, around the world, millions of people are leaving their homes to seek security and a better life. While this is a difficult decision for any individual, migration has also a wider impact at the global scale: It affects societies economically, socially, culturally and not the least politically.

This podcast investigates the consequences of migration for the Eurasian development.

The series of talks leads up to our online Aleksanteri Conference, organized in October. My name is Katalin Miklóssy, Welcome aboard!

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Katalin: We usually talk about migration in general terms, focusing on spatial or temporal factors, push or pull forces, challenges or advantages. But we seldom step back to consider how does migration affect the social, political, or economic status of women, those who migrate and those who are left behind? I will discuss this topic with a political scientist Sherzod Eraliev. Join me to learn more about what it is like to be a female migrant in Central Asia.

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Katalin: Thank you Sherzod for accepting my invitation. Your current research project is dealing with Central Asian migrant workers. We tend to overlook the fact that labor markets are not gender neutral spaces. So my first question is, when you look at this topic, gender related labor markets, how would you describe, what is the overall status of Central Asian female migrants? What is the most striking feature in your opinion?

Sherzod: First of all, thank you very much Katalin for inviting me to this podcast. And when it comes to female migration or migration in general, you are right. Especially Central Asian migration, because it's mostly dominated or at least it has been mostly dominated by male migration, the issue of female migrants has been overlooked. Overall, I should say that women from Central Asia…  I mean, what strikes me most is that women from Central Asia, migrants, represent the most vulnerable groups. They endure the worst living conditions and face major problems in terms of decent salaries, humane treatment, accessing healthcare services.

Usually, female migrants earn lower salaries compared with male migrants. Simultaneously, we must know that in Russia, Central Asian migrants, especially female migrants, are mistreated not only by the local population, but also at times by fellow migrants, including experiencing sexual harassment. In Turkey, where we have conducted extensive fieldwork with my colleague Rustamjon Urinboyev, many women we have interviewed complained about sexual harassment also by their employers, and many studies on Turkish female labor migration have also confirmed these claims. I think women are in more vulnerable position than men, not only in Russia or Turkey, but also in most of the migrants receiving destinations. And this claim is well supported by numerous studies in different contexts.

Katalin: So, just to clarify this with a follow-up question: So, does it mean that the main destination is Turkey or Russia for women to migrate to?

Sherzod: Russia and Turkey are the largest destinations, I mean, by far the largest destinations for women from Central Asia, for migrant women from Central Asia.  And also we have, I mean, inter-regional migration, I mean, where people might migrate to Kazakhstan, which is also located in Central Asia, and we have significant number of migrants going to the Gulf states, some going to particularly European countries, but I would say still for women, Russia and Turkey still remain the largest destinations.

Katalin: Are there differences?  Central Asia has different countries, right? So if you compare the countries of departure in Central Asia, are there differences?

Sherzod: Yeah, yeah, there are differences. First of all, I should say for those people who, who do not know very well Central Asia, out of these five countries, three, namely Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the major suppliers of migrant labor force, be it in Russia or other countries. So essentially, migrant communities in Russia are primarily dominated by male workers resulting in,  as I was saying, overlooking the female experience, maybe with a slight exception of Kyrgyz migrants. Since the early 2000s, labor migration from Central Asia has been primarily male dominated.

However, tendencies in recent years reveal a growing share of female migrants, and women constitute at least up to 40% of migrants from Kyrgyzstan in Russia. In this regard, we could say that Kyrgyz migrants in Russia are relatively gender balanced, while migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are mostly male dominated. These two ethnic groups represent far more large share of Central Asian migrants compared to Kyrgyz migrants. We don't have statistics, but some experts believe that 15 % - 20% of migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are female migrants. In Turkey, on the contrary, Central Asians are mostly represented by female migrants. I think this is because of the availability of the jobs on the labor market. And while we know very little about migration from Turkmenistan, which is overlooked in overall, overlooked in the migration studies, I should say that Turkey is the largest destination for Turkmen migrants, both men and women, in particularly because it's the only country where Turkmens can travel without visas.

Katalin: Okay, these differences are very, very interesting. My question regarding these differences is that does that have to do something with how traditional the societies you're talking about. So, we have this perhaps too common image of Central Asian societies that are one way or the other traditional bound, so where religion and conservative values are, in a sense, means of social control, and where women's public role is more restricted and tied to the domestic space. So I'm not sure if this perception is valid or can be generalized by and large, but if so, can we see migration as a kind of new context for women, a kind of possibility to break out from a kind of tradition bound life? So, does migration change gender roles, in your opinion, especially if, if women migrate from a traditional society to a more liberal one?

Sherzod: Yeah, I think this is a very interesting question. As we know, Central Eastern societies represent an interesting blend of modernity because of the Soviet past, the Soviet Union's modernization projects, and religious traditions. In other words, these societies have accommodated both the traditional and modern lifestyles of their populations. Although the role of Islam has significantly grown again in recent years. Hierarchies and social positions as well as gender roles in the family and community are largely defined by patriarchal and traditional values, where males are granted priority making decisions and we all know that.

However, social disruptions associated with economic decline, high unemployment rates and population impoverishment in recent decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, have changed these, as you were saying these gender roles, within a significant share of families across the region. Migration has played a significant role in these processes. Initially, as we know, men became labor migrants in early, in Uzbekistan, maybe in early 2000s. For for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan even in the 1990s. Mostly men were migrating and later, especially in the last decade, we can witness feminization of migration also, in many places across Central Asia, women, sometimes as the only breadwinner, and sometimes together with their spouse, they're also becoming migrants. In these circumstances, the gender roles and the perception of such roles is also changing. People start to see women as breadwinners, as independent individuals. And migration is, as we know, it's an experience where you face risks associated with hardships, deceit, fraud, exploitation, and you must learn how to avoid or minimize such risks. And this learning process makes migrants, I mean, not only women, but also men and women, to make independent choices. As women start to earn on their own as they start to provide for their families, they feel more empowered. And I think this is slowly… Yes, they are relatively liberal societies of - let's say, Russia or, or Turkey, I mean, compared to Central Asian societies. Of course, this is also the fact that they live and work and earn their course, the lifestyles they choose their it's, it's also affecting female migrants as well. And I think this is also slowly being replicated in in the home societies.

Katalin: Okay, but does that mean also that at the same time that the labor market is going through a structural change, where the pool effect is also, in a sense, directed towards gender related jobs towards women, where women can have a more advantages position in competition to men?

Sherzod: Hmm, well, of course, as you're saying, it depends a lot on the on the structure of labor market. In Russia, I would say for example, still, there is I mean, there are more jobs, there is a demand for labor force, of workforce, mostly in construction sites, farms and similar areas where physical strength is acquired, and consequently, these jobs are given to men. While female migrants can find jobs predominantly in trade, supermarkets, shops or catering, which includes restaurants, hotels or food factories, or domestic care or cleaning services. So this is the structure of market. On the other hand, in Turkey, for example, most of Central Asian, or I could say Uzbek migrants are females. Since the structure of labor market, particularly migrant labor market has a high demand for female workers. These include the elderly or childcare or cleaning, sweatshops, or garment factories and shops. So this high demand for female labor in a way puts women in more advantageous position than men.

Katalin: Okay, say, my next question is about history. Because I'm a historian, I just have to ask about the previous traditions in connection to labor market related migration. So if you look at the history of migration in Central Asia, how is the contemporary migration different? Or is it different in general terms? And how about the women's point of view?

Sherzod: Well, actually, I mean, by history, if you are meaning mostly most of the 20th century, I should say that there was not much migration movements back in the Soviet Union, although it was, I mean, one country, all Central Asian countries, Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union. In the 1960s, the Soviets had some migration projects, which was meant to replicate people from densely populated areas of Central Asia with high unemployment rates to Northern parts of the Soviet Union, namely Siberia or, or other areas with low levels of population and, and a large number of available jobs. But these policies did not prove successful. Because most of the young men and women in rural areas in Central Asia, I mean, who were encouraged to move, they didn't actually move. I mean, they didn't want to go there. And Soviet sociologists concluded the population in Central Asia, especially Tajiks, and Uzbeks, because of their sedentary lifestyle, are not eager to move. I mean, they don't move because they prefer staying where they live.

However, these conclusions proved to be wrong in the post Soviet period, when Central Asian people following declining living standards, high unemployment rates, and impoverishment started to find better opportunities in other countries, like again in Russia. The fact that during the Soviet period, Central Asians were not mobile, can be partly explained by the strong welfare policies of the state, or in other words, although the living standards in Central Asia were much below the level of those in the European part of the Soviet Union, the state could still provide with basic unemployment, education or health care services. Now with those welfare services, I mean, totally eradicated or, or minimized, many people have to look for better lives in mobility and migration. I mean, this is not to say there was no migration at all in Central Asia during the 20th century. A Certain number of Central Asian people moved to and worked in Russian cities during the Soviet period, I mean, be it Moscow or Leningrad, St. Petersburg, or other large cities. For example, Jeff Sahadeo has written a very good work about those migrants back in the 1980s and 70s: their lives and their coping strategies. But we don't know much about… I mean, because first of all, there was not mass migration back there. And secondly, we don't have enough data to, to speak on this issue.

Katalin: Okay. Now jumping forward in time, my last question is about the future. Migration changes the host societies, but indirectly, it also affects the countries of departure. If you look at the Central Asian context, what do you think? What are the signs of change?

Sherzod: Yeah, definitely migration as a social phenomenon has brought changes to all Central Asian societies. On the one hand, remittances sent by migrants pulled many families out of poverty, enabled them to purchase houses or other goods, elevate their social status in their communities. As a matter of fact, for example, two of the world's top 10 remittance dependent countries are in Central Asia, and that's Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. I mean, they highly rely on remittances. And it's a poverty eradication, it's a big, significant poverty eradication factor.

There is also a role of not only monetary, but also social remittances, where people bring with them skills, ideas, and values from the home society. While on the other hand, migration has also brought challenges and its problems, of course, I mean, first of all, it's children being brought up without the father or even worse, without both parents.

Secondly, it's an issue of abandoned wives, where men find wives in host society, especially in the case of Tajikistan. One study, I think, of 2016 found that every year, more than 14,000 Tajik migrants establish new families in Russia and abandon their wives in Tajikistan. So the so called missing men phenomenon has caused a situation where it's difficult for girls and women to find marriage. There are also a number of cases where women agreed to become second wife, to wealthy or powerful or religious men.

Another change I could think of now is that, I mean, sadly enough, migration has become a lifestyle for many families. I mean, in many cases, migration is not a one off case, one off movement, where you work and earn enough in other country, come back and build your, I mean, and continue your life in your home country. I mean, many people are continuously engaged in migration, because on one hand, they spend their earnings on sustaining their family expenses, socially, with prestigious events and goods, such as weddings, or houses or cars. They spend on these things. And on the other hand, there are no perspectives at least at the moment, that there will be jobs and business inducive ecosystems in the in their home societies. This means that, I mean, it's not only them, probably their children will also be engaging in migration in the coming decades. These are the main changes I can see in in the host societies in Central Asia.

Katalin: So there are long term consequences and definitely short term changes. Thank you so much for taking the time and effort to have this discussion. It was a really fascinating and I have learned a lot from your insights.

Sherzod: Thank you very much, Katalin.

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