After the Russian military assault on Ukraine, launched in February 2022, numerous international observers raised many questions regarding the weak domestic resistance to the Kremlin’s actions. Explanations for this phenom enon ranged from the harsh repressiveness of the Russian political regime to the wholehearted endorsement of these actions by many Russian people. However, the problem is much broader: one needs to explain not only the pernicious consequences of authoritarian militarism in Russia but also its causes.
Indeed, the militant personalist authoritarian re gime in post-Communist Russia did not emerge just before 2022. Its political and institutional foundations were laid as early as the 1990s, with its major institutions and practices being developed and elaborated during the 2000s. By the 2010s, the authoritarian regime had become increasingly consolidated. Both domestic and international resistance to these tendencies remained insufficient throughout these decades. Milestones in Russia’s authoritarian trajectory – the elimination of the parliament in 1993, the subsequent adoption of a constitution without serious checks and bal ances, the heavily manipulative 1996 presidential race, two bloody Chechen wars, and the curbing and emasculation of major democratic institutions like elections and political parties – met rather limited objections from the Russian elites and society at large. They mostly overlooked the country’s non-democratic trends in exchange for improve ments in living conditions. Meanwhile, organised efforts to convert public demand for change into political protests (such as initiatives led by Alexei Navalny) were pressured and coerced by the Russian state machinery. As a result, by February 2022, there were no political actors in Russia ca pable of preventing the assault on Ukraine, as all the major sites of potential resistance lacked the capacity to do so.
On the international stage, Western governments, after the end of the Cold War, paid little attention to the growing militancy and assertiveness of the Kremlin. Although Yeltsin requested that Clinton “just give Europe to Russia” in 1999, and Putin lambasted the Western-led international order during his Munich speech in 2007, the response was sluggish and indecisive. This inaction paved the way for the five-day war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the attacks on Donbas in 2014–2015. Despite some minor sanctions and symbolic gestures from the US and EU countries, a “business as usual” approach prevailed in their policies toward Russia. The economic benefits of cooperation with Russia out weighed security concerns in the eyes of Western elites, leading them to turn a blind eye to the growing Russian militarism or even to endorse Russia’s claims regarding its exclusive spheres of influence. At best, such an approach was short-sighted and misleading, signalling to the Kremlin that it could act with impunity. Only after February 2022 did some European governments (though not all) change their foreign policies – however, the response was much delayed and rather inconsistent.
The lessons from this experience of failed resistance to Russian authoritarianism are threefold. First, there is no such thing as a “good autocracy”: every autocracy, regard less of its socio-economic performance, is dangerous to other countries and to its own citizens. Second, when elites focus on their short-term interests and benefits at the ex pense of long-term efforts to build democracy and security, they may open the door to violence and tragedy. Third, resistance to authoritarianism should not be abandoned or postponed; otherwise, it may come too late and prove too little.