A digital iron curtain? How an app is bolting Russia shut

Imagine buying a new phone, but there is a catch: a pre-installed and government-controlled app that tracks your activity and cannot be uninstalled. This is the new layer of digital control in Russia. Since September 1, 2025, the Russian messenger app Max must be pre-installed on all new smart devices purchased in the country. Marketed as a convenient domestic “super-app”, Max is planned to soon merge everyday activities (such as payments, chats, and digital government services) onto one platform. At the same time, the Kremlin is restricting access to other messengers — a clear move towards more media isolation. Is Max the final step in the state’s isolationist policies and building of a digital iron curtain, or is there still hope for free digital communication in Russia? 

is a messenger launched by the Russian media conglomerate VK in 2025 as a domestic alternative to foreign-owned messengers. The app was created as an answer to the two most popular messengers in the country: WhatsApp ( users in Russia as of July 2025) and Telegram (90 million users). The issue with the two most widely used platforms is the state’s inability to access their user data, which they to provide to the Russian authorities. WhatsApp is owned by the US company Meta, and Telegram's CEO is Pavel Durov — neither party is willing to disclose user information to the Russian government. For , the restrictions in Russia are not new, but previously, the state lacked the technological capacity to implement effective blocking. Given the heavy reliance on digital communication for private and business means, Russia has had to develop an alternative, state-controlled domestic channel for its citizens. 

The ambitious echo strikingly the idea of the “super-app” WeChat, which has become essential for daily life in China, where WeChat dominates all other social media platforms. At first glance, it may seem like a convenient way to manage all your affairs on a single digital platform. Yet, combined with the on all devices and restrictions on other popular platforms, Max seems like a forced choice, especially in a digital age with an overwhelming number of options.  

The introduction of Max marks the culmination of a decades-long trajectory toward a controlled informational space in Russia. Authors of Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century, Sergey Guriev and Daniel Treisman describe Russia as one of many modern “spin dictatorships” — a regime that rules increasingly by controlling the narrative rather than using fear tactics. The pursuit of total dominance over the media sphere reflects this logic: by controlling the flow of information, the Kremlin can dictate what people should know.  

The process was intensified by the 2019 amendments to existing laws on communication, commonly known as the “”, which enabled the state to reroute internet traffic through government servers. In other words, the system was altered to centralise Russian users’ data in one place that would be easily accessible for the state to control and monitor its citizens. What is striking is that these measures are presented as a step towards digital sovereignty, but in fact, they serve as a tool to restrict fundamental rights. As accurately points out, such changes have a decisive impact on the citizens’ rights, including freedom of speech and expression.  

With Max, the daily communications, payments, and services all blend in a single app — and conveniently under the watchful gaze of the regime. This attempt to consolidate control over the internet reveals deeper political insecurity. The strategy to isolate Russia in the digital sphere signals that the Kremlin is worried about civil unrest and opposition-minded organising happening online. Ultimately, these measures boil down to control over the sharing of information about domestic issues.  

These measures are presented as a step towards digital sovereignty, but in fact, they serve as a tool to restrict fundamental rights.

This shift in Russian domestic politics regarding the informational space can be contextualised within the global rise of . Techno-nationalism links a country’s technological development to economic and security stability. In other words, this concept assumes that technological autonomy is necessary to safeguard national interests and independence. In the Russian case, said interests are largely limited to those of the ruling elites. Techno-nationalism is not a trend specific to authoritarian countries; however, it often manifests in states that utilise digital surveillance in order to gain control. 

The idea of rising techno-nationalism, combined with the nature of the Russian authoritarian regime, provides a perfect example of Guriev and Treisman’s concept of spin dictatorship. By shaping the digital space, the Kremlin showcases both modernity and control. Here, apps like Max serve not only as domestic technology but also as symbols of Russia’s perceived independence from the Western world. Compared to China, which has always had a much tighter grip on its digital sphere, Russian citizens enjoyed a relatively free internet in the early years of Putin’s first two terms as president. In this global perspective, Russia’s example stands out for its latest extreme variation of isolation and technological self-reliance. 

More recently, the restrictions of a wide range of apps have been accompanied by mass . The large-scale blockings in Russia come amid wider internet bans in countries like Iran. Although Telegram CEO Durov that citizens have previously been able to bypass bans, it seems the Russian government is keen to speed up the process, with some predicting a total block in .  

To date, Max remains the most ambitious attempt by the Russian regime to dominate its digital space. However, there is a growing contradiction regarding total control. At first glance, the state’s grip on the information sphere seems stronger than ever, yet this very dominance reveals the fragility it seeks to hide. The need to design a domestic app, combined with the restrictions of foreign ones, suggests a fear of people seeking information from non-state actors and sharing domestic grievances.  

In reality, the digital iron curtain remains only partially effective. Many Russians continue to use VPNs, and even WhatsApp and Telegram continue to be actively used despite the state’s efforts to slow them down or even rule out their use completely. Some have resorted to using to download Max when forced to do so for work or school. Some have even taken their displeasure to the and groups like “” [Scarlet Swan] trying to organise protests against the blockings. These acts of everyday resistance demonstrate that people are still actively seeking contact with the “outside” and are willing to find alternative measures to maintain that access. Although backed by the government, Max does not yet appear to enjoy the same level of popularity as the tried-and-tested variants. Even pro-Russian actors and Russian officials are not happy with these .  

In the end, the paradox of Russia’s attempted digital iron curtain remains: the more the Kremlin tries to control, the more ways people find to go around it. The point is not strictly the resistance to the state apparatus, but rather the human need to connect and interact, even across these digital borders. So, does the digital iron curtain exist in Russia? Yes, but for now, it is still full of cracks. For now, there are still some ways around the state-implemented restrictions, but the direction of the Russian state is clear: total control over the internet.