Listen to Professor of Gender Studies Tuija Pulkkinen’s talk from the workshop Europe and the Crisis of Reason: “Exceptional Reason: Kant, Husserl, and Derrida.”
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Transcription:
Just a reminder of the topic we were given in advance of this event — crisis of reason. And more specifically, we were informed, and I quote, that "The event aims to explore the philosophical responses to the crises of 20th century, and how these philosophical discourses have influenced the post-World-War-II European project". I think it was a bit cryptic, slightly, and we have all taken some cues and interpreted it in our own ways in these presentations.
I will not talk so much about European project, and I will say hardly anything that has to do with EU or Europe in terms of EU, or about projects in terms of future. Rather, I will concentrate on European intellectual history, acknowledging, of course, that history is never far away from the future. When we tell stories of the past, we usually simultaneously are giving shape to the present and to the future. I will concentrate on the concept of reason, and the philosophical response is part of the assignment.
However, when I first read the assignment, I somehow understood that philosophical responses to the crises of 20th century had been written with specific crisis in mind, and that is exactly Husserl's famous 1936 book, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. And I'm not in particular a Husserl scholar at all myself, and I haven't taken part in the discussions about this particular text of Husserl, but I took this as an invitation to have a quick look. Particularly, a quick look then at the work of the previous speaker, Timo Miettinen, who has written a lot on this particular issue. His volume, Husserl and the Idea of Europe, which came out from Northwestern University Press in 2020, is a very helpful volume in this task. Timo Miettinen brings also Europe, Husserl, and reason briefly into contact with Derrida. So, I was also drawn to reflect on the relation of these two thinkers, Husserl and Derrida, a little bit too. However, my own special field in European intellectual history is German idealism, Hegel in particular. And recently I've returned to Kant's texts again, and have written something on Kant's concept of reason, particularly on its traces in feminist traditional thought. Looking now at Husserl and Derrida, I realised again how incredibly closely both of these thinkers in their own ways relate to Kant's concept of reason. And Kant's concept of reason, which I maintain, it's always not seen in its exceptionality.
With these thoughts in mind, I stitched together this presentation, and I apologise already for the sketchy and rather imprecise form it has, with the title Exceptional Reason. Basically, I'd like to argue that reason in its Kantian form is exceptional, which both Husserl and Derrida seem to very well recognise. In its exceptionality, this reason is weirdly simultaneously exclusive, lacking of inclusivity, and also limited, restricted, even marginal. Basically, I argue that what we learn from this particular bit of European intellectual history is that perhaps there is no need to declare a crisis of reason. In order to explain what I mean, I will revisit first very basic things of Kant's concept of reason, meaning Vernunft, which is then in his texts and in later German idealists' texts remains very clearly differentiated from its close counterpart, Verstand. My message here is that it's crucial to realise that the speculative reason in these texts is very different from rationality. And I will then add some thoughts on Husserl and on Derrida's approach, with respect to this Kantian concept of reason and on their respective understandings of its exceptionality. I argue that each of them is very Kantian in terms of reason, but each of them emphasises very different aspects of this exceptional reason, exceptionality of the reason.
So, I will start with Kant. I think it's surprising to see how little attention is generally paid to the very clear distinction between these two concepts, Vernunft and Verstand, in the massive number of texts on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Verstand in his texts refers to something much closer to that which is generally understood as rationality, like rational skill, even logic, and could also be translated as 'intellect', sometimes 'understanding' is used, whereas Vernunft, actual reason, which then lives on in other German idealists' works, is something quite different. It is complicated, and I will try to highlight several aspects of it in the following. But to put it very concretely here in the beginning, what I would like to say is that reasoning in Kant's use refers much more than to any general skill, human skill of rationality, to very exceptional field of thinking, which involves engagement with particular tradition that is preserved in the texts of European philosophers. So, using reason refers to taking part in the speculative discussions of European philosophy. This is a very exceptional discussion and tradition initiated in the classical Greece, and it deals with a particular set of problems and thoughts. Also, in the book, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant uses the concept Verstand when he writes about transcendentalist ethics and transcendental logic. And then, when he moves to what he calls the transcendental dialectic, then the term Vernunft is in use. And this is the part which starts with Plato's concept of idea.
When Kant writes of reason, he refers, of course we know, above all, to speculation a priori. As we know, Kant is very preoccupied with the status of empirical sensory knowledge, the sense experience, which is so crucial for modern experimental science, natural science. He is definitely against dogma; the validation of knowledge through sense experience is clearly the crucial backdrop in all his philosophy. Also, in philosophical speculation, he is very strongly against the dogmatic, hence the title 'Critique' on his work on reason. Nevertheless, Kant's position is that both sense experience and thinking activity, which is independent of senses, are necessary for our knowing. In the introduction of Critique of Pure Reason, he emphasises, I quote, that "There are two roots to human knowledge, that is the senses (Sinnlichkeit) and reasoning, or intellect (Verstand). Through the first one, objects are given to us. Through the second one, they are thought". And it is the concept of Verstand that he uses here, the general rationality, intellect, thinking, which is the other source of knowledge.
Kant's Transcendental philosophy starts from establishing that there is indeed also knowledge a priori, which is independent of senses, as well as knowledge a posteriori, which is verifiable through the sense experience. In Critique of Pure Reason, he then proceeds to argue even more significantly that this a priori knowledge is not only analytical, it's not only mathematical or logical, but also synthetic, that it does not only unfold as conclusions of that what is already known.
Consequently, in Kant's philosophy, there are kind of three layers of knowledge. There is the three layers of the object of knowledge. First, there is the transcendent reality, the thing in itself which we cannot know, unless we claim so dogmatically. Second, there is the knowledge gained through the senses, which provides us with phenomena as they appear to us. And as if between these two objects of knowledge, between the not knowable and the sensorially known, there is however also a third type of object of knowledge. And this type of knowledge, which is not transcendent and not evident, that is the one that in Kant's text is related to reason, Vernunft. This a priori knowledge includes speculation about the conditions of knowledge, the philosophical speculation. Perhaps the broadest characterisation that Kant provides is that of the reason, it's a quotation, "Reason is the capacity to provide the principles of knowledge a priori". This a priori knowledge in Critique of Pure Reason seems to refer to not only speculations about the conditions of our knowledge such as notions of time and space, which we always hear about, but also a large set of other notions debated and discussed within past philosophers' and theologians' texts. This not only includes ideas and concepts, but also principles, and it also includes statements like Grundsätzen, Kardinalsätzen, as well as deduced conclusions.
The three basic statements (Grundsätzen) presented by Kant are the freedom of will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. All these of course have been debated philosophically at length, and Kant shows very clearly that they cannot be conclusively proved to be true or false by any reasoning. Yet, the Critique of Pure Reason defends this type of knowledge practice — speculation, — which is to say that he defends speculation. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant actually is very defensive of speculation a priori. He says there is also this kind of knowledge in addition to empirical knowledge. And I feel this defensiveness is not always emphasised in those readings of Kant in which reason and rationality is considered as a skill which kind of rules over all knowledge, and when that takes upper hand in the interpretations concerning reason. Neither is it always emphasised that in Kant's argumentation, that the type of knowledge that he refers with the term 'reason' is uncertain. It's clearly crucial for Kant that this type of knowledge reason is not revealed truth, it's not dogma, and it is something that either sense experience or reasoning can prove to be true or false. The main message is that reason remains uncertain, debatable, and this uncertainty is also not emphasised when the language of universalities and necessities, which are also present in Kant's texts, take the front seat in interpretations.
So, what is reason in Kant's texts? First of all, all the above makes the term 'reason' (Vernunft) quite different from what is commonly included in that concept today. Most importantly, reason cannot simply be equated with rationality or use of intellect. Rather, reason (Vernunft) refers to the process of speculation that occurs within the tradition, and to the capacity to share in it, to take part in the speculation. And as such, I argue, it involves a particular tradition and community that is European philosophy. Therefore, reason is exceptional. Reason is not at all the quality that all human people possess in different degree. Only very few people take part in it. I think it's also very good to notice that when, for example, we write about the fact that practically all women and all non-Europeans have been excluded from the area of reason in the texts of German idealists, which I have recently talked about a lot in feminist philosophy, where the interpretations of German idealists have been given a lot of this kind of attention, it's good to remember that these exclusions in this text, it actually reflects the actual history of exclusions and arrangements of European intellectual life. So, interestingly, these accounts tell more about the history of exclusion from an exceptional group, philosophers, than they tell about the exclusion from the general capacity of thinking. The issue concerns a particular discussion, that of philosophers.
Given those exclusions, it is worth thinking for a moment what Kant might be referring to when he speaks of the capacity of reason, as he does always, as being ours, that it belongs to us, or us as reasonable people (vernünftige Wesen). The us, the reasonable people, beings, have been quite commonly interpreted as all humans or humanity. I would emphasise that this abstracted term, reasonable beings, or even the abstraction of human beings, as the subject of the transcendental speculation, does not self-evidently refer, as we would now understand, to all human beings, or to the capacities of human minds in general. I would argue that it's worth considering that in Kant's thought, human reason is an abstraction. It's represented primarily by those who engage in a particular discussion within the philosophical tradition, which is European. So, reason is clearly representative of humanity in Kant. But this is very different from saying that reason would be a skill shared by all humans. In a way, rationality is considered as a skill that is shared by all. Reason is exceptional.
There is yet another aspect of Kant's thought on reason, though, which is much more inclusive. And that is his linking of reason to human freedom. With freedom of will, Kant basically means that humans, exceptionally in nature — he thinks, — have moral capacity, which is the capacity to reflect their actions in terms of good and bad, right and wrong. Kant famously expresses this autonomy by writing that humans are not only part of natural causality but also the causality of freedom. So, reason and autonomy are intimately linked. And more precisely, reason actually serves human freedom. This is evident in Critique of Pure Reason. In that, Kant writes of reason, that is Vernunft, using teleological language. Reason has a final, end cause (Endabsicht). We are talking here about, in terms of Aristotelian teleology, this is the idea of end goal or purpose, telos, which works as a final cause instead of an anterior cause. The final cause from which the transcendental reason springs, while being simultaneously the why it is, for which purpose it is, expressed in teleological fashion, is expressed in these basic statements (Grundsätzen): the freedom of will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. These ideas as final causes are crucial elements of reason and all transcendental philosophy.
Freedom, or the claim that there is, apart from the causality of nature, also the causality of freedom, plays a most important role in Kant's notion of reason. Simultaneously, Kant is very clear about the status of this theosis from which reason springs. He writes that they do not belong to the area of knowledge (Wissen). Instead, they are crucial recommendations of reason for the purpose of the practical. And with the phrase 'practical' Kant refers to the world of human will, action, and engagement in moral and social life. So, in the end, the main purpose of reason and speculative transcendental philosophy lies in its practical purpose, telos, which is in the realm of freedom.
So, in sum, reason is exceptional activity, and only few take part in it. It does not produce any verifiable knowledge. It's speculation, and yet, crucially, it is there for the purpose of human freedom. That is for moral and social life. And it is evident that for Kant, philosophical speculation a priori is worth an effort, both in the study of nature and the study of ethics, and that it contributes to knowledge, along with the knowledge generated by empirical studies. He defends such speculation, field of speculation. So, one could say that what he defends is an exceptional field.
But then, subsequently, in the history of others following up on Kant's transcendental philosophy, the German idealists, they quite eagerly developed philosophical systems such as Hegel's, which elevated philosophy from an exceptional field into quite total science. Total in the sense that it includes, in a way, and in a way rules over all other knowledge. The exceptional activity of speculative reason becomes in these systems the ruling reason. Philosophers are more or less seen as the elite who see better or are able to express more totally. So, there is kind of no sign of Kant's defensiveness here in Hegel, for example. This a priori knowledge becomes rather hyperbolic. In Hegel, speculative reason provides the best and the most true description of all there is. Also, at the same time, the status of philosophy as a discipline, among other disciplines, actually grew in German academia from the time of Kant to the time of later German idealists. Yet, it is very clear that when Hegel writes of reason, he is not talking about rationality either. He is talking about reason exactly in this Kantian fashion, that he is primarily referring to the traditions of European philosophical speculation.
However, then, within European intellectual history, despite of this one period of very high confidence in philosophy, this particular tradition starting from the classical Greek texts, the general trend over the centuries has been that experimental science and the validation of knowledge through senses has been triumphant, more or less. Towards the end of the 19th century, the speculative version of knowledge becomes less and less attractive. And ever since that time, it is probably right to say that philosophy, philosophical speculation has become more and more not only exceptional, but one could say even marginal in the Euro-Atlantic world, a trend which continues today. And this is, if I understand correctly, exactly the crisis of European Wissenschaft that Husserl was concerned with during the early decades of the 20th century. Because Husserl speaks of the crisis of European humanity and crisis of European sciences, or simply crisis of Europe. But as Timo Miettinen also often rephrases in his work, "The crisis of scientific reason". And it is evident that the crisis for Husserl is the crisis of reason in the Kantian sense. A loss of the status of the a priori speculative knowledge, the transcendental philosophy, which he felt was threatened by empirical sciences, in particular empirical psychology. So, in the crisis text, Husserl paints a picture of dangers of the future and writes of the possible, I quote, "Rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy through heroism of reason that will definitely overcome naturalism".
Here is where I come to Timo Miettinen's interpretation. He maintains that in this late text, this crisis text, Husserl transforms or rather announces phenomenological philosophy as normative undertaking. If I've understood him correctly, Miettinen maintains that what Husserl worries and is defensive about in the issue of reason actually points to reason's purpose in Kantian sense. That reason is there for the purpose of, because of, and for the sake of human autonomy. However, Husserl also seems to place philosophers in the exceptional position, an exemplary position as the representatives of humanity. He writes that philosophers cannot abandon their vocation as functionaries of mankind. True philosophers are charged with the responsibility of guarding the telos that was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy. In this sense, I would point out that Husserl seems to be very Kantian in that he also writes about reason that is exceptional reason and not the general rationality, but instead, it's present exactly in the practice of particular traditional philosophical texts based on Greek antiquity. I would add though that overall, in his phenomenological philosophy, Husserl is making philosophy into rigorous science. And in a way, he is in a business of providing philosophical speculation certainty, or to make it appear more certain. So, there is much less uncertainty of speculation present in Husserl than there is in Kant, in my view. Clearly, the Husserlian project to make philosophy rigorous and to make it science also provides a reminder of Hegel's totalising view, lifting this exceptional tradition in a way above all others. So, in other words, of the various aspects of Kant's concept of reason revisited earlier, Husserl seems to take very seriously the Kantian thought of reason's telos as practical, that reason springs from human moral capacity and is there for that purpose. Yet, he also seems to take less seriously the aspect of exceptionality of philosophical knowledge and is more willing to grant reason a kind of leading role. Also, he seems to be less invested in the status of philosophical speculation as uncertain.
Miettinen also mentions Jacques Derrida's Husserl readings. Derrida famously reads Husserl both in his early Origin of Geometry and to a degree, also, in the Of Spirit, and then later in the other heading, L'autre cap, which we have already heard here of. I cannot go through all that, but Miettinen particularly discusses Derrida's attention to Husserl's Eurocentrism in the crisis. There's been discussion about that. And he is slightly critical of Derrida's reading of Husserl and points out that, I quote Timo Miettinen here, "For Husserl, Europe was never in the first place a specific continent, a group of people, or a title for a set of shared values, habits, and customs, but what he called a spiritual form (geistige Gestalt) defined by the rigorous and critical task (Aufgabe) that Greek philosophy had set forth". End of quotation. So, my point here would be that, yes, that's obvious, and also that this traditional philosophy based on Greek philosophy is exactly the Kantian exceptional reason. And in recognising it as exceptional, Derrida, in his own way, is very Kantian as well.
Derrida also comes back to another feature of Kant's exceptional reason. In his text, there is no doubt that in discussing within this European philosophical tradition which started in ancient Greece, we are speaking of knowledge which is not certain. Derrida emphasises this constantly, it's in his language use even. He fills his text with 'perhaps', every second sentence — expression 'perhaps'. So, there is no doubt that Derrida also, along Kant and Husserl, defends speculative reason as knowledge practice, so to say. This is very clear in his text on university, for example, but also, obviously, in anything he writes. His defensiveness, however, is performed with a certain recognition of the marginality of this exceptional reason. European philosophers know a lot of texts, but he also clearly sees it as one among other traditions of knowledge and thinking. Derrida's texts, his own texts, mix different other thinking traditions: there is literary analysis, psychoanalysis. He deals with Christian and Jewish traditions, and even if he does not include Confucian, or Islamic, or Hindu, or original, or Bantu thought, it's clear in his texts that the European philosophical tradition is not the only traditional thought and thinking in intellectual life.
In other words, of various aspects of Kant's concept of reason we visited earlier, Derrida seems to take the Kantian thought that the status of philosophical speculation is uncertain very seriously. He also seems to take seriously the aspect of exceptionality of philosophical knowledge and is less willing to grab a reasonably leading role among other traditions of thought. And he also seems to recognise reason's telos as practical. The reason springs from human moral capacity and is there for that purpose.
So, I will end here. I think in the end of this workshop, which has the word 'reason' in its title, I hope it's been good to come back to Kant and look at one trace of his peculiar concept within this European history of thought. Clearly, Husserl and Derrida, both in different ways, continue in the footsteps of this exceptional concept of reason, a reason which is not human rationality but a particular European textual tradition which has adopted a particular notion of humanity and declared itself as the representative of it. And yet, it is an exceptional particular group of humans exactly doing that. Kant defended this reason as exceptional and good for practical ends. And both Husserl and Derrida defended, in their different meanings of exceptionality. Husserl perhaps as more exemplary, although marginal, and Derrida perhaps as more marginal, yet important. But both also clearly defended as expression of human freedom. And just because of its exceptionality, which I've tried to explicate here, though I think there is no reason to declare a crisis of reason, for it will remain among other expressions of human freedom, although perhaps not ruling, but exceptional.