In public discourse, conspiracy theories are often portrayed as irrational, anti-social, and harmful to democracy. In this Inequality Talk, the speaker challenges this prevailing view and argues that dismissing conspiracy theories outright may itself be epistemically unjust, and ultimately detrimental to democratic life.
The core of the presentation combines empirical research on conspiracy theories with insights from feminist epistemology. It proposes that blanket dismissal can lead to epistemic injustice, particularly toward minoritised groups, by undermining their credibility as knowers. This is conceptualised as a form of “wilful hermeneutical ignorance,” where dominant frameworks, such as the label “conspiracy theory”, are used to prematurely discredit claims about inequality and oppression.
Finally, the talk reflects on the implications for democracy, arguing that excluding certain forms of knowledge from public discourse may prevent valuable perspectives from being heard.
Dr.
Prof.
21 April 2026, 14:15–15:45.
Faculty of Social Sciences (U37). Room 1066.
Unioninkatu 37.
The Zoom link will be sent to those registered for the online event.
Please register via the following link by 15 April 2026: