The methodological and metaphilosophical WP1 serves MePhiS as a whole by investigating what it is to study suffering and meliorism philosophically in the first place.
Work package 1 examines the constitutive conditions of occupying an ethical stance at all, conjoined with a historical and systematic investigation of methodologies of philosophy of suffering. The methodological discussion extends to special topics relevant to the other WPs, including the definitions of concepts such as meliorism and (anti)theodicy, as well as the relations between philosophical and other humanistic approaches in the field.
Work package 1 draws special attention to antitheodicist meliorism, showing how antitheodicy functions as a normative constraint for meliorist responses to suffering. This research builds upon transcendental antitheodicy, an approach to the problem of suffering defended by Pihlström in his earlier work, to be further examined by the scholars hired. “Transcendental” is here understood in a Kantian sense, referring to an investigation of the necessary conditions for the possibility of something that we find an actual element of our practices (e.g., cognition, meaning, or – in this case – an ethical stance to the world). The transcendental antitheodicist argues that only antitheodicy can adequately recognize the victims of suffering and their perspective on the meaninglessness of their suffering, suggesting that such recognition is constitutive of ethical sincerity, necessary for even finding something a matter of moral concern. This argument does not simply charge meaning-making theodicies of “first-order” moral failures but defends antitheodicy as a condition for the possibility of our practices of ethical argumentation.
Developing a transcendental critique of theodicies and their underlying optimism is also a pragmatist move, as pragmatism urges us to examine the meanings of concepts and theories in terms of the conceivable practical effects of their objects. The more broadly pragmatist strategy of MePhiS is manifested in our rejection of any sharp distinction between theoretical and practical/existential problems of suffering and theodicy: the issue is “practical” from the start. The integration of meliorism and antitheodicy are thus conjoined with a critical metaphilosophical investigation of the methodology of the pragmatist and transcendental argumentation developed in dialogue with historical, literary, and “real-life” anthropological inquiries; here WP1 works closely together with the other WPs. Theoretical and methodological renewal are, accordingly, inseparably entangled.
In close connection with (and practically integrated as part of) WP1, Pihlström also leads his Research Council of Finland research project, Secular Theodicies – a Pragmatist Critique. The members of this project are also affiliated with MePhiS.
WP2 explores fundamental ethical and existential problems concerning the human condition and the meaning of life in individual and social contexts. It deals with the issues of evil, suffering, and the meaning of life, which are at the core of both religious and secular worldviews.
Work package 2 examines how both religious and secular viewpoints in contemporary philosophy theorize suffering, mortality, hope, and the meaning of life. While the problem of evil has been extensively addressed in the philosophy of religion, the group is not primarily concerned with common forms of theistic theodicies and their critiques. Instead, the team is interested in the fundamental theological-philosophical and ethical problems inherent in the debate on theodicy, which have recently emerged in the schools of thought representing antitheodicy. WP2 examines how ethics and philosophy of religion might be reformulated in response to the issues highlighted by antitheodicy. Philosophical and theological traditions that reject instrumentalist views of suffering hidden in theology, philosophy of religion, and secular viewpoints are particularly intriguing in this regard. Although the group's main research focus is on contemporary debates, the earlier variations of optimism and pessimism in modern philosophy are potential research topics, e.g., how “Enlightenment optimism” and the pessimist tradition in modern philosophy are related to meliorism and antitheodicy. Can meliorism, conjoined with antitheodicy, be developed as a critical alternative to both Enlightenment optimism and the pessimist tradition, and how should Enlightenment classics be interpreted in this regard?
WP3 explores how life-threatening phenomena in history such as famine, war, and natural catastrophes have challenged ethical and legal norms and demanded not only to take seriously human and non-human suffering but to act and struggle – if necessary, at the border of law or breaking the law – to survive. We will also consider how these responses to extremes reflect the meliorist stance of suffering.
Work package 3 investigates how coping with extreme situations relate to fundamental ethical, legal and societal/political ideals such as human dignity, justice and equality, security and basic need, negative liberty and right, or well-being. When speaking about the meliorist idea of responding to extreme suffering in ethics, the focus also shifts from theory to practical moral responsibility. Both individuals and societies/institutions have roles in reducing suffering. We ask what kind of role our values and norms have in the face of predictable turmoil, extremities, and emergencies within and between societies. How are people’s distress and suffering heard?
Meliorism views suffering not as inevitable but as a condition that can be mitigated through human action. Within the legal sphere, this perspective challenges us to see law not merely as a mechanism for assigning blame or adjudicating disputes, but as an instrument for preventing harm, alleviating suffering, and reforming the structures that produce injustice. We ask how crisis situations can be anticipated and responded to in legislation or politics. What, for example, does the right to life or subsistence practically mean in such situations? What actions do these rights allow us to undertake when they are violated?
WP3 examines these questions in the history of ethics and law, particularly in the medieval and early modern periods. Using and further articulating the old philosophical and legal principle of extreme necessity (necessitas non habet legem, “necessity knows no law”) we explore how medieval and early modern jurists and theologians/philosophers responded to extreme suffering in their texts and what kind of active means they recommended to alleviate suffering. We will also consider how these responses to extremes reflect the meliorist stance of suffering.
WP4 focuses on literary studies and the philosophy of literature as routes to meliorist philosophy of suffering. We take seriously the idea that literature can articulate philosophical issues and influence people’s ways of experiencing, expressing, and managing suffering. WP4 has a strong literary-philosophical orientation, and it considers how philosophers employ literature in reflecting on ethical stances to suffering.
The literary-philosophical varieties of antitheodicy and the representations of meaningless suffering extend from the Book of Job through centuries of reinterpretations to modern and contemporary philosophy and/of literature. Wittgensteinian and pragmatist philosophers (e.g., D.Z. Phillips and Richard Rorty) employ literary analyses in reflecting on ethical stances to suffering. While classical works such as Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, Camus’s novels, and Simone Weil’s writings exemplify philosophical literature on suffering, the scope of literary-philosophical investigations will be extended to authors articulating the melioristic idea of lessening evil and increasing the good through (often barely visible) human effort and examining ways of gradually improving the world through “small good work”, respectful distance, and open-minded pluralism.
In 1877, the author George Eliot wrote in a letter to the psychologist and philosopher James Sully that she had not heard anybody use the word “meliorist” before her. The notion of meliorism is also attributed to Eliot by Sully in his book on Pessimism (1891 [1877], 399) in which he wrote:
“One line of reasoning provides us, then, with a practical conception which lies midway between the extremes of optimism and pessimism, and which, to use a term I am indebted to our first living woman-writer and thinker, George Eliot, may be appropriately styled Meliorism. By this I would understand the faith which affirms not merely our power of lessening evil – this nobody questions – but also our ability to increase the amount of positive good. It is, indeed, only the latter idea which can really stimulate and sustain human endeavour.”
Following this lead, WP4 critically examines diverging concepts of meliorism by exploring writers with links to optimism, pessimism, and/or meliorism, and analysing literature reflecting societal anxieties and human or non-human suffering caused by wars, violence, poverty, marginalisation, the climate crisis, etc.
One of our key ideas is that the experience of suffering is not only an individual response but also a cultural, interpersonal, and social condition. WP4 studies how culturally shared norms, values, and conventions influence people’s ways of experiencing suffering, and how literature as a mediating force in society can reinforce or subvert these conventions by offering revisions of the dominant representations of suffering. The persisting relevance of tragedy dealing with the limitations of the realms of reason, order, and justice will be addressed. Exploring war literature enables us to ask whether the view of humanity presupposed by pacifism is too optimist, or possibly theodicist, requiring pessimist/meliorist and antitheodicist critique.
Suffering prompts the quest for meaning for everyone. Hence it is of utmost importance to include “ordinary” or vernacular responses, and the fundamental intersubjectivity and situationality of lives they are embedded in, in a fair and comprehensive analysis of meaning-making in the face of suffering and the sense of the tragic. It is here that the traditional question of theodicy touches that of sociodicy targeting the inequality of suffering and the discrepancy between the expectations of social and technological progress and the complex realities of everyday life. Therefore, WP5 will focus on the vernacular responses to suffering as articulated and enacted by different interlocutors and actors in diverse empirical research materials.
The questions we explore include the following: What are the vernacular responses to suffering (including explanations, legitimations, imaginations, and rituals), particularly in relation to human and non-human death, climate change, loss of nature, inequality, and changes in the media landscape? Whose suffering is deemed more justified than that of others? What perspectives and tools do various religious and non-religious worldviews, standpoints, and practices offer for addressing suffering today? We are interested in the expressions of optimism, pessimism, and meliorism among caregivers of the elderly and the dying, young adults and migrants, and other groups that provide unique perspectives on suffering and potential ways to alleviate it.
The more specific research questions to be addressed by team 5 include: