Monday December 14th
4pm-5pm Anna Mahtani (London School of Economics): "The Objects of Credence and Chance"
5.10pm-6.10pm Moritz Schulz: (TU Dressden): "Relying on Uncertain Information" (pre-read)
6.20pm-7.20pm Miriam Schoenfield (University of Texas, Austin): "Can Bayesianism Accommodate Higher Order Defeat?" (pre-read)
Tuesday December 15th
3pm-4pm Bernhard Salow (University of Oxford): "Epistemology Normalized" (pre-read)
4.10pm-5.10pm Dimitri Gallow (Australian Catholic University): "Two-Dimensional Chance Deference"
5.20pm-6.20pm Jason Konek (University of Bristol): "Epistemic Value, Imprecision, and the Principal Principle"