Dictatus Papae (Paavi Gregorius VII, 1075)

1. That the Roman church was founded by God alone.
2. That the Roman pontiff alone can with right be called universal.
3. That he alone can depose or reinstate bishops.
4. That, in a council, his legate, even if a lower grade, is above all bishops, and can pass sentence of deposition against them.
5. That the pope may depose the absent.
6. That, among other things, we ought not to remain in the same house with those excommunicated by him.
7. That for him alone is it lawful, according to the needs of the time, to make new laws, to assemble together new congregations, to make an abbey of a canonry; and, on the other hand, to divide a rich bishopric or to unite the poor ones.
8. That he alone may use the imperial insignia.
9. That of the pope alone all princes shall kiss the feet.
10. That his name alone shall be spoken in the churches.
11. That this is the only name in the world.
12. That it may be permitted to him to depose emperors.
13. That he may be permitted to transfer bishops if need be.
14. That he has power to ordain a clerk of any church if he may wish.
15. That he who is ordained by him may preside over another church, but may not hold a subordinate position; and that such a one may not receive a higher grade from any bishop.
16. That no synod shall be called a general one without his order.
17. That no chapter and no book shall be considered canonical without his authority.
18. That a sentence passed by him may be retracted by no one, and that he himself, alone of all, may retract it.
19. That he himself may be judged by no one.
20. That no one shall dare to condemn one who appeals to the apostolic chair.
21. That to the latter should be referred the more important cases of every church.
22. That the Roman church has never erred; nor will it err to all eternity, the Scripture bearing witness.
23. That the Roman pontiff, if he have been canonically ordained, is undoubtedly made a saint by the merits of St. Peter; St. Ennodius, bishop of Pavia, bearing witness, and many holy father agreeing with him. As is contained in the decrees of St. Symmachus the pope.
24. That, by his command and consent, it may be lawful for subordinates to bring accusations.
25. That he may depose and reinstate bishops without assembling a synod.
26. That he who is not at peace with the Roman church shall not be considered catholic.
27. That he may absolve subjects from the fealty to wicked men.

To the Nobles of Tuscany (Innocentius III, 1198)

Just as the founder of the universe established two great lights in the firmament of heaven, a greater one to preside over the day and a lesser one to preside over the night, so too in the firmament of the universal church, which is signified by the word heaven, he instituted two great dignities, a greater one to preside over the souls as if over day a lesser one to preside over bodies as if over night. These are the pontifical authority and the royal power. Now just as the moon derives its light from the sun and is indeed lower than it in quantity and quality, in position and in power, so too the royal power derives the splendor of its dignity from the pontifical authority.

To King John of England (Innocentius III, 1214)

The king of kings and lord of lords, Jesus Christ, the priest for ever after the order of Melchisedech, has so established the priesthood and kingship in the church that the kingship is priestly and the priesthood is royal, as Peter in his Epistle and Moses in the Law bear witness, and he has set over all one whom he appointed to be his vicar on earth so that, just as every knee on earth and in heaven and even under the earth is bowed to him, so all should obey his vicar for the sake of God that they do not regard themselves as reigning properly unless they take care to serve him devotedly. Prudently heeding this, beloved son, and mercifully inspired by him in whose hand are the hearts of kings and who sway them as he wishes, you have decreed that your person and your kingdom should be temporally subject to the one to whom you knew them to be spiritually subject, so that kingship and priesthood, like body and soul, should be united in the one person of the vicar of Christ to the great advantage and profit of both. He has deigned to bring this about who, being alpha and omega, related the end to the beginning and revealed the beginning in the end, so that those provinces which formerly had the holy Roman church as their proper teacher in spiritual matters now have her as their special lord in temporal affairs also …

Ks. myös paavi Innocentius III:n bulla Novit ille (1204) prosessioikeutta käsittelevän luennon kohdalla!

Pyhän saksalais-roomalaisen keisarikunnan keisarin Fredrik II:n vastaus paavi Innocentius IV:n bullaan, jolla Innocentius oli erottanut Fredrikin Lyonin kirkolliskokouksessa 1245 (1245)

What is implied by our maltreatment is made plain by the presumption of Pope Innocent IV for, having summoned a council – a general council as he calls it – he has dared to pronounce a sentence of deposition against us who were neither summoned nor proved guilty of any deceit or wickedness, which sentence he could not enact without grievous prejudice to all kings. You and all kings of particular regions have everything to fear from the effrontery of such a prince of priests when he sets out to depose us who have been divinely honoured by the imperial diadem and solemnly elected by the princes with the approval of the whole church at a time when faith and religion were flourishing among the clergy, us who also govern in splendor other noble kingdoms; and this when it is no concern of his to inflict any punishment on us for temporal injuries even if the cases were proved according to law ….

But whatever our faithful subjects, the bearers of this letter, relate to you you may believe with certainty and hold as firmly as if St. Peter had sworn to it. Do not suppose on account of what we ask of you that the magnanimity of our majesty has been in any way bowed down by the sentence of deposition launched against us, for we have a clean conscience and so God is with us. We call him to witness that it was always our intention to persuade the clergy of every degree that they should continue to the end as they were in the early days of the church living an apostolic life and imitating the Lord´s humility, and that it was our intention especially to reduce those of highest rank to this condition. Those clergy used to see angels and were resplendent with miracles: they used to heal the sick, raise the dead and subject kings and princes to themselves by holiness, not by arms. But these, drunk with the pleasures of the world and devoted to them, set aside God, and all true religion is choked by their surfeit of riches and power. Hence, to deprive such men of the baneful wealth that burdens them to their own damnation is a work of charity. You and all princes, united with us, ought to be as diligent as you can in achieving this end so that, laying aside all superfluities and content with modest possessions, they may serve the God whom all things serve.

Unam sanctam (paavi Bonifatius VIII, 1302)

That there is one holy, Catholic and apostolic church we are bound to believe and to hold, our faith urging us, and this we do believe and simply confess; and that outside this church there is no salvation or remission of sins ….

We are taught by the words of the Gospel that in this church and in her power are two swords, a spiritual one and a temporal one. For when the apostles said “Here are two swords” (Luke 22:38) meaning in the church since it was the apostles who spoke, the Lord did not reply that it was too many but enough. Certainly anyone who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter has not paid heed to the words of the Lord when he said, “Put up thy sword into its sheath” (Matthew 26:52). Both then are in the power of the church, the material sword and the spiritual. But the one is exercised for the church, the other by the church, the one by the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of kings and soldiers, though at the will and sufferance of the priest. One sword ought to be under the other and the temporal authority subject to the spiritual power. For, while the apostle says, “There is no power but from God and those that are ordained of God” (Romans 13:1), they would not be ordained unless one sword was under the other and, being inferior, was led by the other to the highest things. For, according to the to the blessed Dionysius, it is the law the law of divinity ofr the lowest to be led to highest through intermediaries. In the order of the universe all things are not kept in order in the same fashion and immediately but the lowest are ordered by the intermediate and inferiors by the superiors …

LÄHDE: Brian Tierney, The Middle Ages. Volume I: Sources of Medieval History. Fifth edition. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995).

KIRJALLISUUTTA:
J. H. Burns, Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350 – c. 1450 (1988).
Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King´s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (1957).
Peter Moraw, König, Reich und Territorium im späten Mittelalter (1971).
Kenneth Pennington, Pope and Bishops: The Papal Monarchy in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (1984)
Gaines Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State (1964)
Brian Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory (1955).

Keskiajan oikeusajattelussa kysymys yksilön oikeuksista voidaan asettaa kahdella tavalla . A. Oikeuskieltä voidaan lähestyä tarkastella minkälaisia oikeuksia yksilöllä katsottiin olevan. B. Voidaan kysyä mitä tarkoittaa se että yksilöllä on jokin oikeus, toisin sanoen kysytään oikeuden käsitteen merkityssisältöä.

A. Tyypillinen esimerkki yksilöllä olevista oikeuksista olivat esineoikeudet, eli oikeudet jotka liittyivät tavaroiden omistamiseen, hallussapitoon ja käyttöön. Yleisesti voidaan sanoa että keskiajan omistusoikeuskäsitykset ja –teoriat ovat monen kerrostuman tuotoksia. Peruskäsitteistö on pitkälti roomalaisesta oikeudesta, jota yhteiskunnallis-taloudellinen kehitys ajan kuluessa muovasi. Corpus iuris civilis –kokoelma ei sisällä yhtä yhtenäistä teoriaa omistuksesta. Päin vastoin, omistusoikeuskäsitykset ovat peräisin eri aikakausilta ja saattavat olla keskenään ristiriitaisia. Omistuskäsitteistön monikerroksellisuus vaikeutti glosaattoreitten ja kommentaattoreitten työtä. Keskeiset esineoikeudelliset käsitteet olivat dominium (kontekstista riippuen omistusoikeus, ylivalta, herruus), proprietas (omistusoikeus), possessio (hallinta), ususfructus (käyttö- ja nautintaoikeus) sekä usus (käyttöoikeus). Myös filosofiset, lähinnä aristoteeliset korostukset sekä kristilliset käsitykset heijastuivat keskiaikaiseen omistusoikeuskeskusteluun nimenomaan omistusoikeuksien ja omaisuuden käyttöön liittyvissä moraalisissa kysymyksissä.

TEHTÄVÄ 1:
Määrittele oheisten Digesta- ja Institutiones-teoksista poimittujen kohtien avulla keskeisten esineoikeudellisten käsitteiden proprietas, possessio, ususfructus ja usus syntyä, sisältöä ja menettämistä koskevat periaatteet. Tarkastele myös käsitteiden keskinäisiä suhteita.

p r o p r i e t a s (ownership, property):

Digesta 19.2.
The ownership of individual articles of property is acquired by us by mancipation, by delivery, by surrender in court, by usucaption, by adjudication, and by law.

Ibid. 19.18
Moreover, property is acquired by us by means of those persons whom we hold subject to our authority, in our hand, or in servitude; hence, if they have received anything, for instance, by sale, or any property has been delivered to them, or if they have stipulated for something, it belongs to us.

Institutiones 2.1.27.
When the goods of two owners are, with their consent, mixed together, the whole resultant mass is the common property of both, as when people pour their wine into the same vessel or melt down their lumps of gold or silver. But the same applies even if the materials be different and thus a distinctive new thing is made, eg. mead from wine and honey or an alloy from gold and silver: in such case there is no doubt that the resultant product belongs to them both in common. Indeed, if it be by chance and without the consent of the owners that their materials are mixed, whether they be of different kinds or of the same kind, the same rule applies.

Ibid. 2.1.29
When someone builds on his own land with somebody else’s materials, he is held to be owner of the building, because everything which is built becomes part of the land. However, the owner of the materials does not thereby lose his ownership: but for the time being he cannot claim their return nor bring an action for their production, in respect of the materials [...] But if the building should, for some reasons, come down, the owner of the materials, if he has not already recovered twofold, can then claim their return and sue for their production.

Ibid. 2.1.30.
Conversely, if someone builds a house with his own materials on another’s land, the house belongs to the owner of the land. But in this case the owner of the materials loses his title to them for they are regarded as alienated by his will, at any rate, if he was not unware that he was building on someone else’s land: accordingly, even if the house comes down, he cannot recover his materials. Of course, if the owner of the land claim against the builder in possession that the house is his and does not pay the cost of the materials and the wages of the artisans, he can be resisted with the defence of faud, that is, if the builder were in good faith: for, if he knew the land to belong to someone else, it can be objected that he was at fault in rashly building on land that he knew to belong to another.

Ibid. 2.1.35 .
If someone buy land in good faith from a non-owner whom he thinks to be owner or if he otherwise acquire it through gift or on some other ground, it was accepted by natural reason that the fruits he gathers therefrom are his by reason of his cultivation and husbandry. In consequence, if the true owner subsequently appear and seek recovery of the land, he can have no redress in respect of fruits consumed by the possessor in good faith. There is, though, no such relief for one who knows that he is in possession of land belonging to another – and he can, accordingly, be required to return both the land and its fruits, even though they have been consumed.

Ibid. 2.1.44.
In some cases, the will of the owner is sufficient for the transfer of a thing, even without actual delivery, as when a person sells or gives you a thing that he has lent or hired out to or deposited with you. For, although he does not deliver it to you, by the very fact that he allows it to be yours, you immediately acquire ownership of it just as if it had been delivered to you on that ground.

Ibid. 2.1.47.
By the same token, it appears the correct view that, if someone take possession of a thing which its owner has abandoned as derelict, he at once becomes owner of it. A thing is regarded as derelict when the owner throws it out with the intention that it be no longer an element among his assets and, accordingly, it immediately ceases to be his property.

P o s s e s s i o (possession):

Digesta 41.2.1.
Possession, as Labeo says, is derived from the term sedes, or position, because it is naturally held by him who has it; and this the Greeks designate skatokseen.

Ibid. 41.2.1.1.
Nerva, the son, asserts that the ownership of property originated from natural possession, and that the trace of this still remains in the case of whatever is taken on the earth, on the sea, and in the air, for it immediately belongs to those who first acquire possession of it. Likewise, spoils taken in war, and an island formed in the sea, gems, precious stones, and pearls found upon the shore, become the property of him who first obtains possession of them.

Ibid. 45.2.1.2.
We also acquire possession by ourselves.

Ibid. 45.2.1.3.
An insane person, or a ward, cannot begin to acquire possession without the authority of his curator or guardian; because, although the former may touch the property with their bodies, they have not the disposition to hold it, just as where anyone places something in the hands of a man who is asleep. A ward can begin to obtain possession by the authority of his guardian.

Ibid. 45.2.1.6.
We can also acquire possession through whom we possess in good faith as a slave, even though he belongs to another, or is free. If, however, we have possession of him fraudulently, I do not think that we can acquire possession through his agency. He who is in possession of another can neither acquire property for his master nor for himself.

Ibid. 41.3.
Moreover, only corporeal property can be possessed.

Ibid. 41.3.1.
We obtain possession by means of both the body and the mind, and not by these separately. When, however, we say that we obtain possession by the body and the mind, this should not be understood to mean that where anyone desires to take possession of land he must walk around every field, as it will be sufficient for him to enter upon any part of the land, as long as it is his intention to take possession of it all, as far as its boundaries extend.

Ibid. 41.3.3.
Neratius and Proculus think tat we cannot acquire possession solely by intention, if natural possession does not come first. Therefore, if I know that there is a treasure on my land, I immediately possess it, as soon as I have the intention of doing so; because the intention supplies what is lacking in natural possession.


Ibid. 41.3.6.
When possession is lost, the intention of the party in possession must be considered. Therefore, although you may be on a tract of land, still, if you do not intend to retain it, you will immediately lose possession. Hence, possession can be lost by the intention alone, although it cannot be acquired in this way.

Ibid. 41.3.8.
If anyone should give notice that a house is invaded by robbers, and the owner, being overcome with fear, is unwilling to approach it, it is established that he loses possession of the house. But if a slave or a tenant, through whose agency I actually possess property, should either die, or depart, I will retain possession by intention.

Ibid. 41.3.9.
If I deliver an article to another, I lose possession of the same; for it has been decided that we hold possession until we voluntarily relinguish it, or are deprived of it by force.

U s u s f r u c t u s (usufruct)

Institutiones 2.4.
Usufruct is the right to use and enjoy the things of another, their substance remaining unimpaired. It is a right in a corporeal thing and so, if the thing be removed, of necessity the usufruct is ended.

Ibid. 2.4.1.
Usufruct is separated from ownership (proprietas) and arises in a variety of ways. Suppose that someone bequeath a usufruct to another, his heir will have bare title to the thing and the legatee will have the usufruct [...] it is possible to bequeath the usufruct to one person and the land, with the reservation of the usufruct, to another.

Ibid. 3.12.2.
The usufructuary can either enjoy the property itself, or transfer the right of enjoyment to another, or he can leave, or sell the latter; for a man who leases and one who sells also uses. But where he transfers it to someone to be held on sufferance, or donates it, I think that he uses it, and therefore retains the usufruct of the same.

Ibid. 3.12.5.
Julianus presents the following question in the Thirty-fifth Book of the Digest. If a thief plucks, or cuts off ripe fruit which is hanging upon a tree, who will be entitled to a suit against him for its recovery; the owner of the land, or the usufructuary? And he thinks that as fruit does not belong to the usufructuary unless it has been gathered by him, even though it should be separated from the land by another person, the proprietor has the better right to bring an action for its recovery; but the usufructuary has a right to an action for theft, for it was to his interest that the fruit should not have been removed.
Marcellus, however, is influenced by the fact that if the usufructuary subsequently obtains possession of the fruit, it will perhaps become his; and if it does, under what rule will this happen, unless that, in the meantime, it belonged to the mere owner, for, as soon as the usufructuary secures it, it becomes his, just as where property is bequeated under some condition, and, in the meantime, belongs to an heir, but when the condition is complied with, it passess to the legatee; for it is true that the mere owner is entitled to an action for its recovery.

Ibid. 3.13.4.
An usufructuary cannot make the condition of the property worse, but he can improve it. If the usufruct of land was bequeathed, the usufructuary should not cut down fruit trees, or demolish buildings, or do anything else to the injury of the property. And if the estate should happen to be one used for enjoyment, and possesses pleasure gardens, lanes, or shady and pleasant walks laid out under trees which do not bear fruit, he should not cut them down for the purpose of making kitchen-gardens, or anything else designed to produce an income.

Ibid. 3.13.7.
Where, however, the usufruct of a house was bequeathed, Nerva, the son, says that he can put in windows, and can also paint the walls, and add pictures, marbles, statuettes, and anything else which adorns a house; but he will not be permitted to change the rooms, throw them together, or separate them, or reverse the front and back entrances, or open places which are retired, or change the hall, or alter the pleasure gardens in any way; for he must take care of everything as he found it, without changing the arrangement of the building.

Ibid. 3.15.4.
Where the usufruct of clothing is bequeathed, the right not having reference to quantity; it must be said that he ought to make use of it so that it may not be worn out, but he cannot hire it as a good citizen would not employ it in that manner.

Ibid. 4.5.2.
It is established that an usufruct is terminated by a change of the property to which it belongs; for example, if a bequest was made to me of the usufruct in a house, and the house has been demolished, or burned, the usufruct is unquestionably extinguished. Does this also apply to the ground? It is absolutely certain that where the house is burned down, no usufruct remains in either the ground or the materials.

Ibid. 4.23
Where a field whose usufruct is ours is flooded by a river or by the sea, the usufruct is extinguished, since even the ownership itself is lost in this instance; nor can we retain the usufruct even by fishing. But as the ownership is restored if the water recedes with the same rapidity with which it came, so also, it must be said that the usufruct is restored.

U s u s (use, right to use):

Institutiones 8.1.
Let us now consider use and habitation. A mere use may be created, that is to say, without complete enjoyment; and this is ordinarily created in the same way as an usufruct.

Ibid. 8.2.
Where the use is left, a party can use but not enjoy. Now let us examine certain cases.

Ibid. 8.2.1.
The use of a house is left to the husband, or to the wife; where it is left to the husband, he can not only live in it himself, but can also reside there with his slaves. The question arose whether he could livethere with his freedmen. Celsus holds that he can not only do so, but that he can also entertain a guest. Moreover, I remember that the question whether he can take a tenant is discussed by labeo in the Book of his Last Works, who says that he who resides there can take a tenant, as well as entertain guests, along with his freedmen.

Ibid. 8.3.
But persons of this kind must not live in the house without him.

Ibid. 8.8.
Parties who have a right to use cannot lease the premises and give up their residence there, nor can they sell the use of the same.

Ibid. 8.12.1.
In addition to the right of residence to which the person who was granted the use is entitled, he has also the right of walking and driving around. Sabinus and Cassius state that he is likewise entitled to firewood for daily use, and also to the garden, and to apples, vegetables, flowers, and water, not however, for profit but merely for use and not to be wasted. Nerva holds the same opinion, and adds that he can use straw, but not leaves, oil, grain, or fruit. Sabinus, Cassius, Labeo, and Proculus go still further, and say that he can take enough out of what is raised on the land for his own maintenance and that of his family, in instances where Nerva denies him that right. Juventius holds that he can use these things for the benefit of his guests and the persons whom he entertains, and his opinion seems to me to be correct; for more indulgence may be accorded the usuary, on account of the respect due to a person to whom a use has been left. I think, however, that he can make use of these things only while in the house.

Ibid. 8.12.2.
Where the use of a flock is left, for instance, a flock of sheep; Labeo says that they can only be used for their manure; as he can not use the wool, the lambs, or the milk, for these are to be classed with the profits. I think that he can go still father, and use a moderate quantity of milk, as the wills of deceased persons should not be interpreted so strictly.

Ibid. 8.14.1-3.
It makes no difference whether the usufruct or the crop is bequeathed, for the use is included in the crop, but the crop does not include the use; and while a crop cannot exist without the use, still the use may exist without the crop. Hence, if the crop is bequeathed to you after the use has been reserved, the bequest is void [...]
Where the use is bequeathed and afterwards the crop to the same persons; Pomponius says that it is joined to the use. He also says that if the use is bequeathed to you and the crop to me, we hold the use in common, but that I alone will be entitled to the crop. The use, however, may belong to one person, the crop without the use to another, and the mere property to still another.

LÄHTEET:
Justinian’s Institutes, transl. P. Birkes and G. McLeod, Ithaca 1987.
The Digest of Justinian, transl. A. Watson, Philadephia 1985.

TEHTÄVÄ 2:
Ohessa englantilaisen juristin Henri Bractonin (n. 1210–1268) määritelmä käsitteestä possessio teoksessa De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (On the laws and customs of England). Miten määritelmä eroaa roomalaisoikeudellisesta lähteestään?

Addicio.
[Rights are of various kinds], for there is proprietary right and possessory right: possessory right, as of fee, where the assise of mortdancestor is applicable; and as of free tenement, as where one holds only for life, no matter in what way. Proprietary right is termed the mere right. Thus one may well have both. The proprietary right may sometimes be separated from the possessory, for immediately after the death of his ancestor the proprietas descends to the nearer heir, whether he is a minor or of full age, a male or a female, a madman or a fool, as an idiot, one who is deaf and dumb, present or absent, ignorant of the matter or apprised of it. Possession, however, is not at once acquired by such persons, though possession and the possessory right ought always to follow the proprietas. The possessory right may descend by itself to other persons and through other degrees, as where, when the proprietary right descends to the eldest brother, the nearer heir, a younger brother puts himself into seisin and dies so seised; he transmits to his heirs with the possessory right a certain proprietary right which should follow the principal proprietary [right], and so from heir to heir. The heirs of the first brother have a greater right than those of the second, but possession must always be preferred until the heirs of the first recover their right. If the younger brother has several sons and a younger son puts himself in seisin, what was said above is true of him. Thus proprietary right may descend to several different heirs [and to their heirs] ad infinitum, in such a way that though several have proprietary rights1 one or several may have a greater right.

LÄHDE: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/bracton/Unframed/English/v2/24.htm

KIRJALLISUUTTA:
BUCKLAND, W. W., A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd ed., ed. P. Stein, Cambridge 1998.
COLEMAN, J., "Property and poverty", The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c. 350–c. 1450, ed. J. H. Burns, Cambridge 1991, 607-652.
DAVIES, W. & FOURACRE, P., Property and Power in the Early Middle Ages, Cambridge 1995.
FEENSTRA, R., "Les origines du dominium utile chez les Glossateurs avec un appendice concernant l’opinion des Ultramontani", Flores legum H. J. Scheltema oblati, Gröningen 1971, 49-93.
PAASTO, P., Omistuskäsitteistön rakenteesta. Tutkimus jaetun omistusopin mahdollisuudesta ja merkityksestä omistuskäsitteistössä 1700-luvun lopulle tultaessa. Turun yliopiston julkaisuja 101, Turku 1994. [Johdannossa käsitellään keskiaikaista esineoikeudellista käsitteistöä.]
THOMAS, J. A. C., Textbook of Roman Law, Oxford 1976.
WILLOWEIT, D., "Dominium and proprietas. Zur Entwicklung des Eigentumsbegriffs in der mittelalterlichen und neuzeitlichen Rechtswissenchaft", Historisches Jahrbuch 94, ed. J. Spörl, München 1974, 131-156.
BRETT, A. S., Liberty, Right and Nature. Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought, Cambridge 1997.

B. Mitä tarkoitetaan oikeuden (ius) käsitteellä? Mitä yksilöllä on silloin kun hänellä on oikeus? Antiikin oikeusajattelun perintönä keskiajalle oli ajattelumalli, jossa oikeutta tai oikeuksia lähestyttiin yleisemmän oikeudenmukaisuuden idean valossa. Tämän ajattelumallin mukaan oikeudenmukaisuus on ensisijainen käsite, yksilön oikeus on oikeudenmukaisuuden johdannainen. Tällöin yksilöllä oleva oikeus samaistui objektiivisesti oikeaan asiantilaan tai asemaan joka tuolle yksilölle oikeudenmukaisuuden perusteella kului. Näin ymmärrettyä yksilön oikeutta voidaan luonnehtia termillä objektiivinen oikeus. Keskiajan kuluessa objektiivisen oikeuskäsityksen rinnalle syntyy myös toisentyyppisiä ajattelumalleja, joissa yksilön oikeutta ei samaisteta yksilölle oikeudenmukaisuuden perusteella lankeavaan asemaan tai jako-osaan. Oikeudenmukaisuuden ensisijaisuutta painottavan objektiivisen oikeuden sijaan nyt ollaan ensisijaisesti kiinnostuneita yksilöstä ja pyritään määrittämään yksiselitteisesti se mitä yksilöllä on silloin kun hänellä on oikeus. Tätä uudenlaista näkökulmaa yksilöllä olevaan oikeuteen on kuvattu termillä subjektiivinen oikeus.

TEHTÄVÄ 1:
Ohessa 1200-luvulla eläneen englantilaisen juristin Henri Bractonin (n. 1210–1268) ja 1400- luvun alkupuolella vaikuttaneen ranskalaisen teologin Jean Gersonin (1363-1429) käsityksiä yksilön oikeuden ja oikeudenmukaisuuden välisestä suhteesta. Miten Bractonin ja Gersonin käsitykset eroavat toisistaan?

H. Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (On the laws and customs of England), Introduction:

What is Justice?
Justice is the constant and unfailing will to give to each his right.’ This definition may be understood in two ways, according as justice is taken to be in the Creator or in the created. If in the Creator, that is, in God, the matter is clear, since justice is the disposition of God which in all things rightfully orders and justly disposes. God himself gives to each man in accordance with his deserts. He is neither variable nor inconstant in his dispositions and wills, but is constant and unfailing. For he had no beginning, nor has nor will have any end. The definition may be understood in another way, that justice is in the created, that is, in the just man. The just man has the will to give to each his right, and thus that will is called justice. His will to give each his right refers to what is intended not to what is done, as the emperor is called Augustus not because he always augments his empire but because it is his intention to do so [and] as matrimony is said to be an inseparable conjoining because the parties intend never to be separated though they may afterwards be separated for just cause. Thus justice is said to be constant, in accord with the definition. [Justice may also be understood in another way, according to the definition] which defines justice as in the created: by the word ‘will,’ ‘mind’ may be understood, and by ‘constant,’ ‘good,’ for constancy is always taken to be good; hence the saints are said to have been constant, and we say ‘O the constancy of the martyrs!’ By the word ‘unfailing,’ ‘habit’ may be understood [also by the word ‘constant’], ‘Be ye constant,’ for constancy does not admit of variation, as though the definition read ‘justice is a good habit of mind’ or ‘the habit of a mind well constituted’ or ‘justice is a willed good,’ for it cannot properly be called good unless will plays a part. Remove will and every act will be indifferent. It is your intent that differentiates your acts, nor is a crime committed unless an intention to injure exists; it is will and purpose which distinguish maleficia. As for the words ‘his right,’ they mean his merited right, for because of delict or a pact broken or the like one is [de jure] deprived of his right. Or say ‘to each’ means to him, that he live virtuously, and to God, that he love God, and to his neighbour, that he not harm him.

What ius is?
Jus is derived from justice and is used in a number of different senses. For it is sometimes used for the ars boni et aequi itself, or for the written body of jus. It is called the art of what is fair and just, of which we are deservedly called the priests, for we worship justice and administer sacred rights. Jus is sometimes used for natural law which is always fair and right; sometimes for the civil law only; sometimes for praetorian law only; sometimes for that which results from a judgment, for the praetor is said to do jus even when he does it unjustly, the word referring not to what he in fact did but what he ought to do. Jus is sometimes used for the place in which law is administered, sometimes for the tie of personal connexion, as when we speak of the jus cognationis or affinitatis. Jus is sometimes used for an action, sometimes for an obligation, sometimes for an inheritance, as for the proprietas of a thing, sometimes for the possession of goods. Sometimes it signifies potestas, as when it is said ‘He is sui juris.’

LÄHDE: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/bracton/Unframed/English/v2/23.htm

J. Gerson, De potestate ecclesiastica, consideratio 13:

Accordingly is described justice, which is continuous and lasting will to assign everyone his ius. This description fits principally to the divine Justice in relation to His creatures. Indeed God is the only one who by continuous and lasting will gives every single thing what is his; his—I say—not due to a rigour obligation but to the most free and dignified donation by the Creator.

Ius is aptly described in this way. Ius is proximate power of faculty falling to someone according to the dictate of primary Justice. Then, this dictate is called law, because law is the rule which is in conformity with the dictate of right reason. And the dictate of right reason and primary Justice come together in God synonymously.

J. Gerson, De vita spirituali animae, lectio 3:

Ius is proximate faculty or power that pertains to someone according to the dictate of right reason.... Faculty or power is put down in the description, for many things fall to someone according to the dictate of right reason which are not to be called their rights, as suffering of the damned, as punishment of the vicious, for we do not say that someone has a right to his injury.

TEHTÄVÄ 2:
Keskiaikainen oikeusdiskurssi oli monimuotoinen. Oikeuksista keskusteltiin useissa konteksteissa. Subjektiivisen oikeuskäsityksen muotoutumisen kannalta yksi merkittävimmistä keskusteluista käytiin kiistoissa jotka koskivat fransiskaanista köyhyys- eli omistamattomuusoppia . Kiistat muodostivat pitkäaikaisen jatkumon (1250–1340) ja tuottivat runsaasti kirjallista materiaalia ja käsitteistöä, jonka jälkivaikutus oli huomattava. Myöhemmät kirjoittajat 1400 -luvulla käyttivät Fransiskaanisen köydyyden kiistassa luotua oikeuskieltä omien teorioidensa formuloimiseen.

Kontrovessin keskuksena oli Fransiskaanien apostolisen köyhyyden ideaali. Fransiskaanit väittivät, että he elävät ilman minkäänlaisia omistusoikeuksia pelkän tosiallisen käytön (usus facti) varassa. Ajatus esineiden legitiimistä käyttämisestä ilman oikeuksia oli juridisesti omintakeinen ja herätti se myös vastustusta. Fransiskaanien position kannalta keskeinen kysymys oli: missä mielessä esineitä voi käyttää ilman oikeuksia esineisiin (iura in re) ? Tämä kysymys oli sidoksissa toiseen kysymykseen: mitä tarkoitetaan termillä oikeus (ius) esineiden käytön ja omistamisen kontekstissa? 1300-luvun alussa jälkimmäisen kysymyksen relevanssi tiedostettiin ja kirjoittajat pyrkivät nyt suoraan määrittelemään yksilön oikeuden käsitteen merkityssisällön.

Oheiset tekstit liittyvät Fransiskaanisen köyhyyden kiistaan. Fransiskaani Bonaventura (1217-1274) määrittelee apostolisen köyhyyden ideaalin juridisin käsittein teoksessaan Apologia pauperum. Dominikaani Hervaeus Natalis (k. 1323) kuului Fransiskaanien arvostelijoihin ja kritisoi teoksessaan De paupertate Christi et apostolorum voimakkaasti Fransiskaanien elämäntavan oikeutusta. Miten Bonaventura määrittelee ja perustelee Fransiskaanisen köyhyyden? Miten Hervaeus puolestaan arvostelee Fransiskaanien oikeudetonta elämäntapaa? Mitä Hervaeuksen mukaan tarkoittaa se, että henkilöllä on jokin oikeus?

Bonaventura, Apologia pauperum, cap. XI:

We should understand that since four things are to be considered in temporal goods – ownership (proprietas), possession (possessio), usufruct (ususfructus) and simple use (simplex usus) - and since the life of mortals is possible without the first three but necessarily requires the fourth, no profession may ever be made that renounces entirely the use of all kind of temporal goods. But that profession which implies the wilful vow to follow Christ to the extremities of poverty most fittingly calls for renouncement of dominium over anything whatsoever, and must be content with the limited use of things belonging to others and conceded to it.

LÄHDE: Bonaventure, Defense of the Mendicants, J. de Vinck (transl.), Works of Bonaventure IV, Paterson N. J. (1966).

Hervaeus Natalis, De paupertate Christi et apostolorum, q. 2, art. 1:

Whether the right to and dominion over temporal things can be separated from their use?

Three points must be treated to clarify this question. The first is to determine what is meant by dominion [dominium], right [ius], and ownership [proprietas] with respect to temporal things. The second is to distinguish the different ways of having a right to and dominion over things. The third is to respond to the question.

With regard to the first point, it should be noted that the words 'dominion', 'right', and 'ownership' signify the same thing in reality. They signify nothing other than the power over something by which one is able licitly to use a thing or transfer it -either in giving it away, selling it, or in some other manner. Thus, it should be noted that there are two powers by which someone can do something with a thing. First there is power in fact [potestas facti] or power of action. For example, a person can in fact eat food or drink a beverage whether or not it is his in regard to use and dominion. The other power a person may appropriately have over something is that by which he can not only in fact use or transfer a thing but also can licitly use and transfer it as his own. We call this power the power or right.

It is evident that this is the case, since a person does not have dealings with the things that come into use in human life except by means of these two powers: namely power in fact (by which a person can use something in fact, whether licitly or not) or the power to use things licitly. Power only in fact does not signify the power of right to a thing. Therefore, the power to use something licitly signifies the power of right, or right itself. The major premise is evident, since a person is not able to have some power over a thing except as an absolute power in fact or as a licit power. The minor also is easily proved, since what is common to the licit and illicit use of a thing cannot be called the power of a right to it, since what is done by means of a right is done licitly.

However, power in fact is common to both the licit and illicit use of a thing. Therefore, power in fact is not the power of right. Thus we have sustained the positionthat the power of right is the power to act licitly.

However, suppose we ask whether the licit use of a thing can be separated from a right, at least with respect to its very use, so that someone could use something to which he has no right in any of the senses whe have previously set forth: namely, [he does not have the right to the thing] in his own name, nor in the name of someone else, neither as principal owner nor through a favor or a conditional gift, nor in any of the other manners mentioned. But this is impossible, and the impossibility can be proved through two arguments. The first argument is drawn from the meaning of the term 'right', since, as has been said, a right to a thing is the power to use it licitly or to transfer it. Consequently, to have a right to the very use of a thing is to have the power to use it licitly. Because of this it follows that there can be no licit use of something without the power to use it licitly, as this would imply a contradiction: namely, the use of the thing is licit, although the person using it does not have the power to use it licitly. Yet, to have the power to use something licitly is to have a right to the very use of the thing. Therefore, it is impossible for licit use to be separated from the right to the very use of a thing.

LÄHDE: Hervaeus Natalis, The Poverty of Christ and the Apostles, John D. Jones (transl.), PIMS, Toronto (1999)

KIRJALLISUUTTA:
KILCULLEN, R. J. (transl.), William of Ockham, A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, eds. A. S. McGrade & J. Kilcullen, Cambridge 1995.
KILCULLEN, R. J., 1996, http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/wqvr.html
McGRADE, A. S., The Political Thought of William of Ockham, Cambridge 1974.
McGRADE, A. S., "Ockham and the Birth of Individual Rights", Authority and Power: Studies in Medieval Law and Thought, Presented to Walter Ullman on His Seventieth Birthday, eds. P. Linehan & B. Tierney, Cambridge 1980, 149-160.
MÄKINEN, V., Property Rights in the Late Medieval Discussion on Franciscan Poverty, Leuven 2001.
TIERNEY, B., The Idea of Natural Rights. Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150–1625, Atlanta 1997.
TUCK, R., Natural Rights Theories. Their Origin and Development, Cambridge 1979.
VILLEY, M., "La genèse du droit subjectif chez Guillaume d’Occam", Archives de Philosophie du Droit 9 (1964), 97-127.
VILLEY, M., La formation de la pensée juridique moderne, 4th ed., Paris 1975 (1968).

LUENTOKERTA 6: Koronkiskonta

Keskiajalla taloudellista toimintaa normittavaa oikeusajattelua hallitsi oikeudenmukaisuuden korostus. Sen mukaisesti taloudelliseen vaihdantaan liittyvissä sopimustilanteissa hyödyn tuli jakautua tasapuolisesti molemmille osapuolille. Tällä sopimustasapainoa korostavan oikeudenmukaisuuden vaatimuksella oli kaksi erityistä teoreettista ilmentymää: korkokielto ja oikeudenmukaisen hinnan teoria. Oheinen tekstikatkelma belgialaisen teologin Henri Ghentiläisen Quodlibet-kokoelmasta tiivistää osuvasti keskiaikaisen ajattelutavan.

Henri Ghentiläinen, Quodlibet IV, 22:
And it is strict justice that the hightest degree of equality be observed between that which is given and that which is received in every interchange, either in lending by taking back nothing beyond the thing lent whether in itself or in its value, or in exchange by way of buying and selling or any other kind of contract, so that there be in every way equality of things given and received...

LÄHDE: Odd Langholm: Economics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money & Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350, E.J. Brill, Leiden 1992, p. 259.

Ehkäpä leimallisesti keskiaikaisin taloudellista toimintaa normittanut oikeusjattelun ilmentymä oli korkokielto. Läpi keskiajan rahan lainaaminen korkoa vastaan miellettiin synnilliseksi toiminnaksi, jota oli syytä sanktioida. Korkokiellon juuret olivat agraarisessa käyttöyhteisössä, jossa koron periminen näyttäytyi ensisijaisesti hädänalaisen tilan hyväksikäyttönä ja häpeällisenä voitontavoitteluna (turpe lucrum). Keskiajalla korkokysymyksen ympärille kehkeytyi monitasoinen talouseettinen ja oikeudellinen keskustelu, jossa hyödynnettiin yhtä hyvin Raamatun tekstikohtia, Aristoteleen käsityksiä kuin kanonisen ja roomalaisen oikeuden käsitteistöäkin.
Kanoninen oikeus tuomitsi rahan lainaamisen korkoa vastaan. Gratianuksen Decretumissa, joka ilmensi patristisen ajan käsityksiä, kaikenasteinen korkolainaus määriteltiin koronkiskonnaksi (usura). Koron suuruus ei siten ollut ratkaisevaa, koronkiskonnan tunnusmerkistö täyttyy kun pyydetään takaisin enemmän kuin on annettu lainaksi (C 14, q. 13, c. 4). Tämä käsitys pysyi vallitsevana läpi keskiajan. Oman erityispiirteensä keskiajan korkokeskusteluun toi roomalaisen oikeuden neutraali suhtautuminen korkolainausta kohtaan. Vaikka Corpus Iuris Civilis ei sisältänyt korkolainauksen kieltäviä tekstikohtia keskiajan oikeusteoreetikot käyttivät roomalaisen oikeuden käsitteistöä argumentoidessaan koron ottamista vastaan.

Laajalti käytetty teksti keskiajan korkokeskustelussa oli Gratianuksen Decretuminiin sisältyvä Palea Ejiciens (D. 88, c. 11). Monet keskeisistä korkokieltoa tukevista argumenteista voidaan palauttaa Palea Ejiciensin formulaatioihin.
Roomalaisen oikeuden käsitteistöistä tärkeimmiksi tulivat velaksiannon (mutuum) sopimustyyppi (Inst. 3.14, D. 12, 1), sekä luokittelu, jossa esineet jaetaan esineisiin ja lajiesineisiin (Inst. 3.14, Inst. 2.4, 2).
Tuomas Akvinolaisen (1224-1274) argumentaatio korkolainausta vastaan (Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, q. 78, a. 1, ja myös De Malo, q. 13, a. 4) oli jälkivaikutukseltaan huomattava. Tuomaan pääargumentti oli luonteeltaan luonnonoikeudellinen ja se perustui käsitykseen rahan luonteesta ja käyttötarkoituksesta.
Johannes Duns Scotus (1265-1308) esitti myös luonnonoikeudellisia perusteita korkokiellolle (Ordinatio IV, d. 15, q. 2), mutta ei hyväksynyt Akvinolaisen pääargumenttia.

TEHTÄVÄ:
Lue kaikki tekstikohdat ja mieti miten Akvinolaisen ja Scotuksen argumentaatiot 1.) hyödyntävät kanonisen ja roomalaisen oikeuden käsitteistöä, 2.) eroavat toisistaan korkokiellon perusteiden osalta.

Decretum, D. 88, c. 11:
Of all merchants, the most cursed is the usurer, for he sells a good given by God, not acquired as a merchant acquires his goods from men; and after the usury he reseeks his own good, taking both his own good and the good of the other. A merchant, however, does not reseek the good he has sold. On will object: Is not he who rents a field to receive the fruits or a house to get an income similar to him who lends his money at usury? Certainly not. First, because money is only meant to be used in purchasing. Secondly, because one having a field by farming receives fruit from it; one having a house has the use of inhabiting it. Therefore, he who rents a field or house is seen to give what is his own use and to receive money, and in a certain manner it seems as if he exchanged gain for gain. But from money which is stored up you take no use. Thirdly, field or a house deteriorates in use. Money, however, when it is lent, is neither diminished nor deteriorated.

LÄHDE: J. T. Noonan, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1957.


Institutes, 3.14:
One case where an obligation is contracted by conduct is when a loan is made, of the kind called mutuum. This arises only with things identified by weight, number or measure, such as wine, oil, corn money, bronze, silver and gold. when we lend such things by number, measure, or weight we intend that they should become the property of the recipient and that when the time comes for getting them back we should receive not the very things we gave but others of the same kind and quality. This is the origin of the term 'mutuum': I give so as to make my property your property: 'ex meo tuum'.

Institutes, 2.4, 2
There can be a usufruct in slaves, beasts, and other things, as well as land and buildings. But not in things used up by being used. Logic and law argue against the possibility of a usufruct in these, for instance wine, oil, corn, and clothes. Money is a similar case, which is in a certains sense used up by the continual exchange involved in using it. But convenience led the senate to resolve that it should be possible to arrange a usufruct even in these things, subject to the heir's being given security. So a legacy of a usufruct in money means the money becomes the legatee's and he gives security for the return of the same amount in the event of death or status-loss. Other things in this category are also handed over so as to become the legatee's with him giving security at a valuation. This means that if he dies or suffers a status-loss money to the amount of the valuation must be returned. In fact the senate did not actually create a usufruct in these things, something it could not do. It introduced a quasi-usufruct based on this security.

LÄHDE: Justinian’s Institutes, transl. P. Birkes and G. McLeod, London 1987.


Tuomas Akvinolainen, Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae, q. 78, a. 1.

Whether it is a sin to take usury for money lent?

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for money lent. For no man sins through following the example of Christ. But Our Lord said of Himself (Lk. 19:23): "At My coming I might have exacted it," i.e. the money lent, "with usury." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury for lending money.

Objection 2. Further, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted," because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is allowed in the Divine law, according to Dt. 23:19,20: "Thou shalt not fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to the stranger": nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the observance of the Law, according to Dt. 28:12: "Thou shalt fenerate* to many nations, and shalt not borrow of any one." ['Faeneraberis'--'Thou shalt lend upon usury.' The Douay version has simply 'lend.' The objection lays stress on the word 'faeneraberis': hence the necessity of rendering it by 'fenerate.'] Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.

Objection 3. Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil laws. Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to be lawful.

Objection 4. Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But, among other counsels we find (Lk. 6:35): "Lend, hoping for nothing thereby." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.

Objection 5. Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.

Objection 6. Further, silver made into coins does not differ specifically from silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not in itself a sin.

Objection 7. Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the usury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries."

I answer that, To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to justice. On order to make this evident, we must observe that there are certain things the use of which consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore in such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend things of this kin is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling the same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. On like manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the other, the price of the use, which is called usury.
On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist in their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for instance, one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house while reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he may grant the use of the house, while retaining the ownership. For this reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his house, and, besides this, revendicate the house from the person to whom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a house.
Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3) was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful to take payment for the use of money lent, which payment is known as usury: and just as a man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money which he has taken in usury.

Reply to Objection 1. In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for the increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He wishes us ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and this is for our own profit not for His.

Reply to Objection 2. The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand that to take usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to treat every man as our neighbor and brother, especially in the state of the Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said without any distinction in Ps. 14:5: "He that hath not put out his money to usury," and (Ezech. 18:8): "Who hath not taken usury [Vulg.: 'If a man . . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase . . . he is just.']." They were permitted, however, to take usury from foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to avoid a greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which they were prone according to Is. 56:11, they should take usury from the Jews who were worshippers of God.
Where we find it promised to them as a reward, "Thou shalt fenerate to many nations," etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense for lending, as in Sirach 29:10, where we read: "Many have refused to fenerate, not out of wickedness," i.e. they would not lend. Accordingly the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth, so that they would be able to lend to others.

Reply to Objection 3. Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account of the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but lest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence it is that in civil law [Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu] it is stated that "those things according to natural reason and civil law which are consumed by being used, do not admit of usufruct," and that "the senate did not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct to such things, but established a quasi-usufruct," namely by permitting usury. Moreover the Philosopher, led by natural reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that "to make money by usury is exceedingly unnatural."

Reply to Objection 4. A man is not always bound to lend, and for this reason it is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept not to seek profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of counsel in comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some kinds of usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a matter of counsel. Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain, but of the hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do any good deed through hope in man, but only through hope in God.

Reply to Objection 5. He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid according to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.

Reply to Objection 6. The principal use of a silver vessel is not its consumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining one's ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver money is sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its use and at the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent. It must be observed, however, that the secondary use of silver vessels may be an exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. On like manner there may be some secondary use of silver money; for instance, a man might lend coins for show, or to be used as security.

Reply to Objection 7. He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply, but under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow money which the owner is unwilling to lend without usury.

LÄHDE: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/307801.htm
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Online Edition Copyright © 2000 by Kevin Knight


Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, distinctio 15, questio 2:

[3. –Contracts about lending money]

[Conclusion 4] The fourth conclusion of this article concerns this last contract about giving a money loan. 'To make the contract just it is necessary to observe without qualification equalit as to number and weight except for certain exceptional cases stated at the end.'
The rationale given for this by one doctor is that, since the use of money represents its consumption, to give it to another as a loan is to consume it. –An objection to this, however, is the fact that, according to the Exiit qui seminat, [of Pope Nicholas III] (incorporated today into Book Six of the [Decretals] under the title De verborum significationibus), the use of certain things is separated forever from their ownership.

Therefore, this sort of reason can be assigned. It is because, in giving a loan, the ownership itself is transferred; for this is what the word mutuum (meum/tuum) means: 'I make mine (meum) yours (tuum).' Therefore, he who makes the loan does not remain the owner of the money loaned, and as a consequence, if for that money he receives something beyond the principal owed to him, he receives it for something that is not his, or sells what does not belong to him.

Another reason is this; let us grant that the money remains his but still admit that money has no fruit of its nature as some other growing things have. Rather, it only bears fruit because of some one's industry, namely that of the user. But the industry of this user does not belong to the one who loaned the money; hence, to want to receive the fruit of the money is really a desire to have the fruit of another's industry but which the other has not given to him. And that is why, by contrast, the fruit of borrowed things that are fertile is reckoned as part of the principal.

LÄHDE: Duns Scotus' Political and Economic Philosophy, Latin Edition and English Translation by Allan B. Wolter, Old Mission Santa Barbara 1989, p. 59-61.

KIRJALLISUUTTA:
BIRKES, P. & MCLEOD, G. (transl.), Justinian’s Institutes, Duckworth, London 1987.
BUCKLAND, W. W., A Textbook of Roman Law. From Augustus to Justinian, rev. ed. by P. Stein, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1963.
GREGORY OF NYSSA, Against Those
LANGHOLM, O., Econimics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition 1200-1350, E.J. Brill, Leiden 1992.
NOONAN, J.T., Scholastic Analysis of Usury, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1957.
NELSON, B., The Idea of Usury. From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1949.
TANSKANEN, K., Luther ja keskiajan talousetiikka. Vertaileva tutkimus, STKS, Helsinki 1990.
THOMAS, J. A. C., Textbook of Roman Law, North-Holland publishing company, Amsterdam 1976.
TOLONEN, H., Korko, raha ja sopimus. Korkokielto ja sen häviäminen rahan sekä pääoman syntymisen ongelmana, lakimiesliiton kustannus, Helsinki 1992.
WOLTER, A. B. (transl.), Duns Scotus' Political and Economic Philosophy, Latin Edition and English Translation by Allan B. Wolter, Old Mission Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara 1989.

LUENTOKERTA 7: Reilu kauppa

Keskiajan oikeusajattelu tunsi eräänlaisen reilun kaupan ideaalin. Kaupankäynnin reiluuden määrittäjä toimi ensisijaisesti myytävän tuotteen hinta, jonka tuli olla oikeudenmukainen. Oikeudellisena terminä käsite oikeudenmukainen hinta (iustum pretium) on peräisin roomalaisesta oikeudesta. Roomalaisen oikeuden iustum pretium-oppiin voidaan liittää kaksi tunnusomaista piirrettä. 1. ajatus oikeudenmukaisesta hinnasta liittyi poikkeustapauksiin, se ei ollut yleinen hintasäätelyn periaate. 2. Oikeudenmukaisella hinnalla oli suuri vaihteluväli. Keskiaikainen iustum pretium-oppi ei seurannut kumpaakaan näistä roomalaisoikeudellisista piirteistä.

Roomalaisen oikeuden iustum pretium-käsite liittyi poikkeustapauksiin sillä yleispiirteenä roomalainen oikeus ei pyrkinyt säätelemään hintoja vaan lain henkenä oli suosia vapaata hinnanmuodostusta. Keskeisenä periaatteena oli kuitenkin että tavaran kauppahinnan tulee noudattaa yleistä ja julkista hintatasoa. Samalla suljettiin pois petoksen ja hyväksikäytön mahdollisuus. Corpus Iuris Civiliksessä termi iustum pretium esiintyy maakauppaan liittyvän laesio enormis- periaatteen yhteydessä. Myyjän voidaan katsoa kärsineen poikkeuksellista vahinkoa (laesio enormis) mikäli hänen saamansa kauppasumma on vähemmän kuin puolet oikeudenmukaisesta hinnasta. Laesio enormis-tapauksessa myyjä on oikeutettu kaupan purkuun jos ostaja ei suostu korvaamaan puuttuvaa kauppasummaa (Codex 4, 44, 2).

Käsitteen iustum pretium keskiaikainen käyttö ilmentää roomalaisten vaikutteiden sijaan sopimustasapainoa korostavan oikeudenmukaisuuden periaatetta. Roomalainen oikeuden iustum pretium sisälsi varsin suuren vaihteluvälin: hintaa voitiin pitää oikeudenmukaisena mikäli se poikkesi vähemmän kuin puolet oikeudenmukaisesta hinnasta. Skolastikot hylkäsivät tämän käsityksen pitäen sitä virheellisenä tulkintana oikeudenmukaisuudesta. Useat kirjoittajat korostivat kuitenkin samalla, että oikeudenmukainen hinta ei ole tarkka vaan sillä on tietty, joskin suppea vaihteluväli (esim. Tuomas Akvinolainen, ST 2a2a, q. 77, a.1). Corpus Iuris Civiliksen henkimä vapaan hinnanmuodostuksen periaate muotoutui keskiajan oikeusoppineiden käsissä maksiimiksi: 'esineen arvo on se, jolla se saadaan myydyksi.' Skolastikot eivät kuitenkaan hyväksyneet tätä periaatetta sellaisenaan vaan tulkinnoissa pidettiin kiinni luonnonoikeudellisen vaihtotasapainon ensisijaisuudesta (esim. Henri Ghentiläinen, Quodlibet I, q. 40).

Keskiaikaisen iustum pretium-opin kannalta tärkeä taustateksti on Aristoteleen esitys oikeudenmukaisuuden lajeista Nikomakhoksen Etiikan viidennessä kirjassa. Skolastikot sovelsivat Aristoteleen kuvaamaa oikaisevan oikeudenmukaisuuden periaatetta taloudellisiin vaihdantatilanteisiin (commutatio) ja nimesivät tämän oikeudenmukaisuuden lajin termillä iustitia commutativa.

Aristoteles, Nichomachean Ethics, Book V, 2:
Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding sense, (A) one kind is that which is manifested in distributions of honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one man to have a share either unequal or equal to that of another), and (B) one is that which plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man. Of this there are two divisions; of transactions (1) some are voluntary and (2) others involuntary- voluntary such transactions as sale, purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for use, depositing, letting (they are called voluntary because the origin of these transactions is voluntary), while of the involuntary (a) some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness, and (b) others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult.

Ibid., 4:
(B) The remaining one is the rectificatory, which arises in connexion with transactions both voluntary and involuntary. This form of the just has a different specific character from the former. For the justice which distributes common possessions is always in accordance with the kind of proportion mentioned above (for in the case also in which the distribution is made from the common funds of a partnership it will be according to the same ratio which the funds put into the business by the partners bear to one another); and the injustice opposed to this kind of justice is that which violates the proportion. But the justice in transactions between man and man is a sort of equality indeed, and the injustice a sort of inequality; not according to that kind of proportion, however, but according to arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it. Therefore, this kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge tries to equalize it; for in the case also in which one has received and the other has inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the other been slain, the suffering and the action have been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to equalize by means of the penalty, taking away from the gain of the assailant. For the term 'gain' is applied generally to such cases, even if it be not a term appropriate to certain cases, e.g. to the person who inflicts a woundand 'loss' to the sufferer; at all events when the suffering has been estimated, the one is called loss and the other gain. Therefore the equal is intermediate between the greater and the less, but the gain and the loss are respectively greater and less in contrary ways; more of the good and less of the evil are gain, and the contrary is loss; intermediate between them is, as we saw, equal, which we say is just; therefore corrective justice will be the intermediate between loss and gain.

LÄHDE: http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/projects/digitexts/aristotle/nicomachean_ethics/book05.html

Henri Ghentiläinen, Quodlibet I, q. 40:
In accordance with the equity of natural justice a thing ought to be sold and bought for as much as it is worth, and if someone wittingly sells it for more than it is worth at the time and place, or buys it for less, this is unequal and it is unjust even if he is permitted to do so and his neighbour, with whom he deals, does not oppose it, either because he does not know or because necessity compels him to accept what is less just. For I do not say that a thing is always worth as much as it can be sold for at a given time and place either because of ignorance or because of the buyer's necessity, but for as much as it ought to be sold for, so that the common saying: 'A thing is worth as much as it can be sold for', is to be understood not in terms of what is possible in fact but in terms of what is possible in law, that is, for as much as it ought to be sold for at the place and time according to law.

LÄHDE: Odd Langholm: Economics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money & Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350, E.J. Brill (1992), p. 259.

TEHTÄVÄ:
Tutkijat ovat erimielisiä siitä miten keskiajan oikeusajattelijoiden mukaan oikeudenmukainen hinta käytännössä määräytyi. Eräät tutkijat ovat korostaneet, että oikeudenmukainen hinnan ymmärrettiin käytännössä vastaavan markkinahintaa, edellyttäen että tuotteelle oli olemassa todelliset vapaat markkinat. Tätä tulkintaa on puolestaan vastustettu vedoten sopimustasapainon periaateeseen, joka hallitsi sopimusoikeudellista ajattelua läpi keskiajan. Vapaan hinnanmuodostuksen on katsottu edellyttävän sopimusvapauden periaatetta, jota ei tunnettu keskiajan oikeusajattelussa. Joka tapauksessa voidaan sanoa, että tavaran oikeudenmukainen hinta määräytyi osaksi sopijapuolista riippumatta, mutta he saattoivat myös itse vaikuttaa hinnanmuodostukseen, ainakin jossain määrin. Miten nämä kaksi puolta näkyvät seuraavissa teksteissä? Kirjoittajina teologit Johannes Duns Scotus ja Tuomas Akvinolainen.

Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, distinctio 15, questio 2:
[conclusion 3] Concerning the first transfer, namely, the exchange of things there is this conclusion, which is the third of this article: 'The ownership of things is justly exchanged if in the things exchanged equality of value according to right reason is observed and there is no fraud involved,...

[Second requirement] What follows in that rule is that equality of value must be observed. this is proved form Augustine's De Trinitate XIII, ch. 3: 'To want to buy what is vile and sell what is dear is truly a vice.' And this must be understood of things that are vile and dear so far as use is concerned, because frequently a thing which in itself is more noble in its natural being is less serviceable for the practical for human use and on this score is less precious, according to what Augustine says in De civitate Dei XI, ch. 16: 'In the home bread is better than a mouse'. Nevertheless, every living thing is more noble by nature than what is not living. And because of this it is added: 'according to right reason,' namely one must attend to the nature of the thing in relation to human use, which is the reason why this exchange takes place.

[Equality allows for a certain latitude] This equality accoarding to right reason, however, does not consist in what is indivisible [and hence precise], as a certain doctor [Richard of Mediavilla] maintains, motivated by this that justice alone has a real mean whereas the other virtues have only a conceptual mean. But this is false, as was pointed out in Bk III. Indeed there is great latitude in this mean that communative justice regards or looks to, and withing this latitude one does not attain an indivisible point of equivalence between one thing and another, because so far as this is concerned, it is impossible as it were to bring about an exchange [that is precisely equivalent] and it becomes just in any degree between there extremes.
But what this latitude is and to what it extends is known sometimes through positive law, and at other times through custom. For the law rescinds a contract where the one contracting is deceived about an average price that is far above what is just. But if it is so far below what it should be that an injustice is done restitution must be made.
At times, however, it is left to those making the exchange that, after weighing their mutual needs, they decide as to what equivalent must be given and accepted here and there. For among men it is hard for contracts to exist where the contracting parties do not intend to set aside something of that exact or indivisible justice owed to one another, so that to some extent a donation accompanies every contract. And if this is the manner in which these persons engage in the exchange, based as it were, upon this law of nature: Do to another as you would wish done to you, it is sufficiently probable that when they are mutually satisfied, if there is any deficiency in regard to what justice requires, they mutually intend to waive the difference.

LÄHDE: Duns Scotus' Political and Economic Philosophy, Latin Edition and English Translation by Allan B. Wolter, Old Mission Santa Barbara (1989), p. 53-6.

Johannes Duns Scotus, Lib. IV Sent. Opus oxoniense, d.15, q.2, 22:
But he who transports and conserves goods, serves the state honestly and usefully, and therefore he ought to live by his labour. Nor is this all, but anyone can justly sell his industry and solicitude, and great industry is required of one who is to transport goods form country to country, in that he must have information about what a country can supply and what it needs. Therefore, he may justly receive a fee for his industry, over and above the necessary support of himself, and of his family included in this necessity, and thirdly beyond this something corresponding to his risk. For since he transports at his own risk if he is a transporter of goods and sotres at his own risk if he is a custodian of goods, for such risk he can with tranquillity receive a recompense, and especially if he sometimes through no fault of his own in such service to the community suffers a loss; as for example, a merchant engaged in transport sometimes loses a ship laden with highly valuable commodities and another one sometimes loses in an accidental fire the most precious things which he stores for the state.

LÄHDE: Odd Langholm: Economics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money & Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350, E.J. Brill (1992), p. 411.

Tuomas Akvinolainen, Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae, q. 77, a. 1:
Whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth. On the commutations of human life, civil laws determine that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just for buyer and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 8,15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than its worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than its worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth.

Objection 2. Further, that which is common to all would seem to be natural and not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a certain jester was accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to sell at a premium," which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away, then he will boast." Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth.

Objection 3. Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on utility, the amount of the recompense for a favor received should depend on the utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility sometimes is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the receiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the purpose of avoiding a danger, or of deriving some particular benefit. Therefore, in contracts of buying and selling, it is lawful to give a thing in return for more than its worth.

On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 7:12): "All things . . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them." But no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore no man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.
I answer that, It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this is to deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says (De Offic. iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from double-dealing: the seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the buyer upon one that bids against him."
But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two ways. First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of view, buying and selling seem to be established for the common advantage of both parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to the other, and vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). Now whatever is established for the common advantage, should not be more of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all contracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured by the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented, as stated in Ethic. v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the quantity of the thing's worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the equality of justice: and consequently, to sell a thing for more than its worth, or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful.
Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as accidentally tending to the advantage of one party, and to the disadvantage of the other: for instance, when a man has great need of a certain thing, while an other man will suffer if he be without it. On such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will be lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though the price paid be not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the one man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other man's property, and the seller be not at a loss through being without that thing, the latter ought not to raise the price, because the advantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not his, though he may charge for the loss he suffers.
On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.

Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (I-II, 96, 2) human law is given to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not given to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit whatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats other matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but by not punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be too great, because then even human law demands restitution to be made, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half the amount of the just price of a thing [Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 2,8.
On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and selling: and he who has received more than he ought must make compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be considerable. I add this condition, because the just price of things is not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of justice.

Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking into himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since in reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination." And then he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book to a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is evident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.

Reply to Objection 3. In commutative justice we consider chiefly real equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we consider equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend on the usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to the thing bought.

LÄHDE: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/307701.htm
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas,Second and Revised Edition, 1920. Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Online Edition Copyright © 2000 by Kevin Knight

KIRJALLISUUTTA:
ARISTOTELES, Nikomakhoksen etiikka, suom. & selit. S. Knuuttila, Gaudeamus, Helsinki 1989.
ARISTOTELES, Politiikka, suom. A. M. Anttila, selit. J. Sihvola, Gaudeamus, Helsinki 1991.
BUCKLAND, W. W., A Textbook of Roman Law. From Augustus to Justinian, rev. ed. by P. Stein, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1963.
LANGHOLM, O., Econimics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition 1200-1350, E.J. Brill, Leiden 1992.
LANGHOLM, O., Price and Value in the Aristotelian Tradition. A Study in Scholastic Economic Sources, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1979.
NOONAN, J.T., Scholastic Analysis of Usury, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1957.
TANSKANEN, K., Luther ja keskiajan talousetiikka. Vertaileva tutkimus, STKS, Helsinki 1990.
THOMAS, J. A. C., Textbook of Roman Law, North-Holland publishing company, Amsterdam 1976.
TOLONEN, H., Korko, raha ja sopimus. Korkokielto ja sen häviäminen rahan sekä pääoman syntymisen ongelmana, lakimiesliiton kustannus, Helsinki 1992.
WOLTER, A. B. (transl.), Duns Scotus' Political and Economic Philosophy, Latin Edition and English Translation by Allan B. Wolter, Old Mission Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara 1989.

LUENTOKERTA 8: Avioliitto ja kihlaus

Katolisen kirkon vaikutus avioliitto-oikeuteen oli huomattava. Lue paavi Gregorius IX:n dekretaalikokoelman Liber Extra (v. 1234) luku 4:n alla olevat kohdat ja pohdi, millaista muutosta kirkko tavoitteli ja mistä syystä.

Liber Extra: 4.1.1., 4.1.5, 4.1.25 ja 4.1.30-32

CAP. I.
Matrimonium solo consensu contrahitur, nec invalidatur, si consuetudo patriae non servetur. Ex concilio Triburiensi. De Francia nobilis quidam homo nobilem mulierem de Saxonia lege Saxonum duxit in uxorem, tenuitque eam multis annis, et ex ea, filios procreavit. Verum quia non eisdem utuntur legibus Saxones et. Francigenae, causatus est, quod eam non sua, id est Francorum lege desponsaverat, vel acceperat, vel dotaverat, dimissaque illa aliam superduxit. Diffinivit super hoc sancta synodus, ut ille transgressor evangelicae legis subiiciatur poenitentiae, et a secunda coniuge separetur, et ad priorem redire cogatur.

Kappale I.
Avioliitto solmitaan vain yhteisellä suostumuksella, eikä sitä mitätöidä, vaikka maantapaa ei olisikaan noudatettu.
XX kirkolliskokous.
Ranskalainen aatelismies solmi avioliiton saksilaisen aatelisnaisen kanssa Saksin lain mukaan ja piti tätä vaimonaan monia vuosia sekä sai hänen kanssaan lapsia. Kuitenkin koska saksilaisten ja ranskalaisten lait eivät ole samanlaisia, tästä seurasi, ettei mies ollut kihlannut, ottanut vaimokseen eikä antanut naiselle myötäjäisiä omansa, so. ranskalaisten lain mukaan. Jätettyään naisen mies meni naimisiin toisen kanssa. Pyhä kirkolliskokous päätti asiassa niin, että kanonisen oikeuden rikkoja joutui kärsimään rangaistuksen. Hänet tuli erottaa toisesta avioliitosta, ja hänen oli palattava ensimmäiseen.

CAP. V.
Si sponsus de futuro ante copulam ad remota se transfert, sponsa libere cum alio contrahit: si tamen per eam stetit, quo minus matrimonium perficeretur, sibi poenitentia imponitur. Idem Panormitano Archiepiscopo.
De illis autem, qui praestito iuramento promittunt, se aliquas mulieres ducturos, et postea eis incognitis dimittunt terram, se ad partes alias transferentes, hoc tibi volumus innotescere, quod liberum erit mulieribus ipsis, si non est amplius in facto processum, ad alia se vota transferre, recepta tamen de periurio poenitentia, si per eas steterit, quo minus fuerit matrimonium consummatum. Si vero etc. (cf. c. 3. de cond. app. IV. 3.)

Kappale V.
Jos tulevaisuutta varten avioliittolupauksen antanut mies muuttaa ennen makaamista kauas pois, naispuolinen kihlakumppani on vapaa lupautumaan toiselle. Jos kuitenkin naisesta on johtunut se, ettei avioliittoa ole täytetty, kärsiköön nainen rangaistuksen.
Samoin arkkipiispa Panormitanus.
Niiden osalta taas, jotka ovat valalla lupautuneet menemään naimisiin jonkin naisen kanssa, ja sen jälkeen lähtevät tuntemattomina maasta, haluamme tulevan tietoosi, että kyseisellä naisella olkoon vapaus, jos tosiasiassa ei ole edetty jo pidemmälle, siirtää lupauksensa toiselle. Nainen saakoon kuitenkin väärästä valasta tuomion, jos hänestä oli johtunut, ettei avioliittoa ollut täytetty.

CAP. XXV.
Solo consensu legitimo contrahitur matrimonium, sed verba requiruntur quoad probationem, et intellige: vel alia signa aequipollentia. H. d. secundum intellectum, quem tenet Panormitanus. Idem Brixiensi Episcopo.
Tuae fraternitati (Et infra: [cf. c. 10. de eo, qui cogn. IV. 13.]) Postulasti insuper edoceri, utrum ex solis verbis, et ex quibus matrimonium contrahatur, quum ab aliquibus dubitetur spirituale contrahi solis verbis. Nos igitur inquisitioni tuae taliter respondemus, quod matrimonium in veritate contrahitur per legitimum viri et mulieris consensum; sed necessaria sunt, quantum ad ecclesiam, verba consensum exprimentia de praesenti. Nam surdi et muti possunt contrahere matrimonium per consensum mutuum sine verbis, et pueri ante annos legitimos per verba sola non contrahunt, quum intelligantur minime consentire. [Dat. Romae etc. 1206.]

Kappale 25.
Avioliitto solmitaan ainoastaan laillisen yksimielisyyden perusteella, mutta asiasta on sovittava näytön vuoksi suullisin lausumin, ja huomaa: tai muin yhtä selvin tunnusmerkein. Näin lausutaan yhtäpitävästi Panomirtanuksen käsityksen kanssa.
Samoin Brixian piispa.
Olet pyytänyt lisäksi opastusta sen suhteen, voidaanko avioliitto solmia pelkästään yhteisen suostumuksen perusteella ja millaisin sanamuodoin, sillä jotkut ovat epäilleet, voidaanko avioliitto hengellisessä mielessä solmia pelkällä sopimuksella. Vastaamme tiedusteluusi siten, että avioliitto todellakin solmitaan miehen ja naisen yhteisellä suostumuksella; kirkko kuitenkin edellyttää, että yksimielisyys muotoillaan tätä hetkeä koskevaksi. Kuurot ja mykät voivat kuitenkin solmia avioliiton ilman suullistakin suostumusta, kun taas alaikäiset eivät voi solmia avioliittoa pelkästään suullisesti, sillä heidän ei katsota olevan kelpoisia antamaan asiaan suostumusta. (päivätty Roomassa jne. 1206)

CAP. XXX.
Sponsalia de futuro transeunt in matrimonium per carnalem copulam subsecutam, sed non per nisum carnalis copulae tantum. H. d. cum c. fin. infra eodem. Idem Episcopo Cenomanensi. Is, qui fidem dedit M. mulieri super matrimonio contrahendo, carnali copula subsecuta, etsi in facie ecclesiae ducat aliam et cognoscat, ad primam redire tenetur, quia, licet praesumptum primum matrimonium videatur, contra praesumptionem tamen huiusmodi non est probatio admittenda. Ex quo sequitur, quod nec verum, nec aliquod censetur matrimonium, quod de facto est postmodum subsecutum.

Kappale 30.
Tulevaisuudessa solmittavaan avioliittoon suostuneet siirtyvät avioliittoon suostumuksen antamista seuraavan makaamisen kautta, mutta eivät pelkän makaamisyrityksen johdosta.
Samoin Cenoman piispa.
Miehen, joka on antanut naiselle avioliiton solmimista koskevan lupauksen, jota on seurannut lihallinen yhteys, vaikkakin vie toisen kirkossa vihille ja makaa tämän, on palattava ensimmäiseen avioliittoon. Tämä johtuu siitä, että ensimmäinen avioliitto oletetaan ensisijaiseksi, eikä tällaista olettamaa vastaan saa esittää näyttöä. Mistä seuraa, että avioliittoa, joka todellisuudessa on pian toisen jälkeen solmittu, ei pidetä totena eikä minkäänlaisena.

CAP. XXXI.
Sponsalia de praesenti non solvuntur per sequens matrimonium, etiam carnali copula consummatum; sed sponsalia de futuro etiam iurata solvuntur per sequentia de praesenti. Idem. Si inter virum et mulierem legitimus consensus interveniat de praesenti ita, quod unus alterum mutuo consensu, verbis consuetis expresso, recipiat, utroque dicenti: "ego te in meam accipio," et: "ego te accipio in meum," vel alia verba consensum exprimentia de praesenti, sive sit iuramentum interpositum sive non: non licet alteri ad alia vota transire. Quod si fecerit, secundum matrimonium de facto contractum, etiamsi sit carnalis copula subsecuta, separari debet, et primum in sua firmitate manere. Verum si inter ipsos accessit tantummodo promissio de futuro, utroque dicente alteri: "ego te recipiam in meam," et: "ego te in meum," sive verba similia, si alius mulierem illam per verba de praesenti desponsaverit, etiamsi inter ipsam et primum iuramentum intervenerit, sicut diximus, de futuro: huiusmodi desponsationis intuitu secundum matrimonium non poterit separari, sed eis est de violatione fidei poenitentia iniungenda.

Kappale 31.
Nykyhetkessä solmittu kihlaus ei purkaudu sitä seuraavan avioliiton vuoksi, vaikka avioliitto olisi lihallisesti täytetty; mutta tulevaisuutta varten tehty kihlaus, vaikka olisi valalla vahvistettu, purkautuu myöhemmin tehdyn, nykyhetkessä solmittavan kihlauksen vuoksi.
Sama.
Jos miehen ja naisen välille syntyy tätä hetkeä koskeva laillinen, tavanomaisin ilmauksin lausuttu yksimielisyys siitä, että he ottavat yksimielisesti toinen toisensa aviopuolisoikseen sanoen kumpikin "otan sinut miehekseni / vaimokseni", tai muilla tässä hetkessä olevaa yksimielisyyttä ilmaisevilla sanoilla, oli ne vahvistettu valalla tai ei, kumpikaan ei saa siirtää lupaustaa muulle henkilölle. Jos kuitenkin niin menetellään, että toisesta avioliitosta sovitaan, ja vaikka se olisi makaamisella vahvistettu, toisesta avioliitosta on erottava, ja ensimmäinen avioliitto jää voimaan. Mutta jos heidän välillään on tehty ainoastaan tulevaisuutta koskeva lupaus siten, että molemmat ovat sanoneet toiselle: "tulen ottamaan sinut miehekseni / vaimokseni", tai muin vastaavin ilmauksin, ja jos toinen mies on sitten kihlannut saman naisen nykyhetkessä, vaikka naisen ja ensin mainitun miehen välillä onkin ollut, kuten sanoimme, tulevaisuutta koskeva kihlaus: tällainen lupaus huomioon ottaen toisen avioliiton ei olisi pitänyt purkautua, vaan miehelle ja naiselle on määrättävä uskon loukkaamisesta rangaistus.

CAP. XXXII. Nisus ad copulam non facit sponsalia de futuro transire in matrimonium. Idem. Adolescens, qui desponsatam sibi per verba de futuro, licet saepe nisus fuerit, carnaliter non cognoscens, cum alia postmodum per verba de praesenti contraxit, non primam, cum qua nec fuit verum matrimonium ex forma contractus, nec praesumptum, quum conatus non habuisset effectum, sed secundam debet habere uxorem.

Kappale 32.
Makaamisyritys ei muuta tulevaisuutta varten tehtyä kihlausta avioliitoksi.
Sama.
Jos nuori mies, joka on tulevaisuutta varten kihlaamansa naisen kanssa usein yrittänyt tuloksetta makaamista, solmii avioliiton nykyhetkessä toisen naisen kanssa, hänen on otettava toinen nainen vaimokseen eikä ensimmäistä, jonka kanssa todellista avioliittosopimusta ei ollut olemassa eikä myöskään sitä koskevaa olettamaa, koska makaamisyritykset eivät olleet tuottaneet tulosta.

LÄHDE :http://www.gmu.edu/departments/fld/CLASSICS/gregdecretals4.html

KIRJALLISUUTTA:
James A. Brundage: Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (1987).
Mia Korpiola, "An Uneasy Harmony: Consummation and Parental Consent in Secular and Canon Law in Medieval Scandinavia", 125-150 in Mia Korpiola (ed.), Nordic Perspectives in Medieval Canon Law (1999).

LUENTOKERTA 9: Oikeudenkäynti, inkvisitio ja kidutus

Neljäs Lateraanikonsiili (1215) mullisti kanonisen oikeudenkäyntimenettelyn. Todistusoikeus muuttui merkittävällä tavalla, ja konsiilin hyväksymät kaanonit loivat perustaa rationaaliselle oikeudenkäyntimenettelylle. Muutosten merkitys ei rajoittunut vain katolisen kirkon oikeudenkäyttöön vaan ulottui aikaa myöten myös maalliseen oikeuteen. Mieti miten todistusoikeuden murros näkyy oheisessa kaanonissa 18 ja miten kaanonit 35-49 ilmentävät oikeudenkäytön rationaalistumista!

Neljäs Lateraanikonsiili 1215: kaanonit 18, 35-49.

Constitution 18. Clerics to dissociate from shedding-blood
No cleric may decree or pronounce a sentence involving the shedding of blood, or carry out a punishment involving the same, or be present when such punishment is carried out. If anyone, however, under cover of this statute, dares to inflict injury on churches or ecclesiastical persons, let him be restrained by ecclesiastical censure. A cleric may not write or dictate letters which require punishments involving the shedding of blood, in the courts of princes this responsibility should be entrusted to laymen and not to clerics.
Moreover no cleric may be put in command of mercenaries or crossbowmen or suchlike men of blood; nor may a subdeacon, deacon or priest practise the art of surgery, which involves cauterizing and making incisions; nor may anyone confer a rite of blessing or consecration on a purgation by ordeal of boiling or cold water or of the red-hot iron, saving nevertheless the previously promulgated prohibitions regarding single combats and
duels.

LÄHDE: http://www.ewtn.com/library/COUNCILS/LATERAN4.HTM#35


KIRJALLISUUTTA:
Hermann Nottarp, Gottesurteilstudien (1956).
John H. Baldwin, "The Intellectual Preparation for the Canon of 1215 Against Ordeals", Speculum 36 (1961), 613-636.
Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water (1985).

LUENTOKERTA 10: Rikos ja rangaistus

1000- ja 1100-lukujen murros, "gregoriaaninen vallankumous", merkitsi rikosoikeuden kehityksen kannalta sitä, että kirkko erotti osan maallisten tuomioistuinten alaisista rikoksista oman, uuden tuomioistuinkoneistonsa tuomiovallan alle. Jotta näin voitiin menetellä, synti ja rikos oli käsitteellisesti erotettava toisistaan. Maallisen rikosoikeuden ja synnin väliin muotoutui eräänlainen välikategoria, kanoninen rikosoikeus. Petrus Abelardus panos synnin ja rikoksen erottelussa oli tärkeä. Kirkon tuomiovalta ulottui sen rikosoikeuden piiriin kuuluvissa asioissa koko kristikuntaan.
Miten nämä seikat näkyvät oheisissa tekstikatkelmassa?


Petrus Abelardus, Ethica, s. 61-71:
Some sins are said to be venial and, as it were, light, others damnable or grave. Again, some damnable sins are said to be criminal and are capable of making a person infamous or criminous if they come to the hearing of other people, but some are not in the least. Sins are venial or light when we consent to what we know should be consented to, but when, however, what we know does not occur to our memory. We know many things even whe asleep or when we do not remember them. For we do not lay aside our knowledge or become foolish when sleeping or become wise when awake. And so sometimes we consent either to boasting or to excessive eating or drinking, yet we know this should by no means be done, but we do not remember then that it should not be done. So such consents as we fall into through forgetfulness are said to be venial or light sins, that is, not to be corrected with a penalty of great satisfaction such as being punished on account of them by being put outside the church or being burdened with a heavy abstinence. Indeed to have such carelessness forgiven by repenting, we frequently resort to the words of the daily confession in which mention should by no means be made of graver faults, but only of lighter ones. For we should not say there: I have sinned in perjury, in murder, in adultery, and such like, which are said to be damnable and weightier sins. We do not incur these like the other through forgetfulness, but commit them with assiduity, as it were, and with deliberation, and are made abominable to God also, according to the Psalmist. ´They are become abominable in their ways´, as if execrable and exceedingly hateful for what they have knowingly presumed. Others of these sins are called criminal which, known through their effect, blot a man with the mole of a great fault and greatly detract from his reputation; such are consent to perjury, murder, adultery which greatly scandalize the church. But when we indulge in food beyond what is necessary or in vanity adorn ourselves with immoderate dress, even if we presume this knowingly, these are not classed as crime and among many receive more praise than blame.

LÄHDE: Petrus Abelardus, Ethica, 1130-l. D. E. Luscombe, Peter Abelard´s Ethics (an edition with introduction, English translation and notes), Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1979, s. 69-71.



Paavi Innocentius III:n dekretaali Novit ille (1204), X 2.1.13:
Kirkollinen tuomari voi evankelisen tai oikeudellisen ilmiannon johdosta aloittaa oikeustoimet ketä tahansa syntistä, myös maallikkoa, vastaan, erityisesti väärän valan tai rauhanrikkomuksen vuoksi.
Tietää hän, jolta mikään ei jää huomaamatta, joka on sydänten tutkistelija ja salaisuuksista selvillä, että pidämme arvossa kuuluisaa poikaamme Kristuksessa, ylhäistä frankkien kuningasta Filipiä, jolla on puhdas sydän, hyvä omatunto ja tosi usko, ja että pyrimme tehokkaasti lisäämään hänen kunniaansa ja menestystään. — Koska kuitenkin tuo Jumalan siunaama kuningaskunta on aina ylistänyt Häntä, eikä ole milloinkaan, niin uskomme, tuosta ylistyksestä luopunut; koska, vaikka joskus pahat enkelit tätä häiritsevätkin, niin me kuitenkin, jotka olemme saatanan viekkaudesta tietoisia, pyrimme tämän piiritystä välttämään uskoen, ettei myöskään edellä mainittu kuningas anna saatanan valheiden vietellä itseään. Älköön siis kukaan luulko, että pyrkisimme häiritsemään tai vähentämään kunnioitetun frankkien kuninkaan tuomio- tai muuta valtaa, koska hänkään ei tahdo eikä hänen pidä meidän tuomio- tai muuta valtaamme estää. Kun emme kykene täysin omaakaan tuomiovaltaamme käyttämään, kuinka haluaisimme väärinkäyttää muiden valtaa? Mutta kun Herra sanoo evankeliumissaan (Matt. 18:15-17): "Jos veljesi tekee syntiä, ota asia puheeksi kahden kesken. Jos hän kuulee sinua, olet voittanut hänet takaisin. Mutta ellei hän kuule sinua, ota mukaasi yksi tai kaksi muuta, sillä 'jokainen asia on vahvistettava kahden tai kolmen todistajan sanalla'. Ellei hän kuuntele heitäkään, ilmoita seurakunnalle. Ja jos hän ei tottele seurakuntaakaan, suhtaudu häneen kuin pakanaan tai publikaaniin." Ja kun Englannin kuningas, kuten hän väittää, on valmis osoittamaan, että frankkien kuningas on tehnyt häntä vastaan syntiä ja on ryhtynyt itse oikeustoimiin tätä vastaan evankeliumin sääntöjen mukaan, ja vihdoin, kun hän ei ole asiassa mitenkään edistynyt, sanoo kirkko: Miten me, jotka olemme yleismaailmallisen kirkon hallituksen ylimmälle järjestelylle omistautuneet, emme kuulisi jumalallista käskyä emmekä toimisi sen käskyn muodon mukaisesti, paitsi ehkä jos meille tai lähettiläällemme osoitetaan riittävästi päinvastaista näyttöä? Emme nimittäin aio tuomita feodaalisen oikeuden mukaan, jonka piirissä tapahtuva oikeudenkäyttö koskee feodaalista järjestelmää itseään, jollei ehkä yhteistä oikeutta erityisen erioikeuden taikka vastakkaisen tapaoikeuden nojalla jossain määrin karteta. Sen sijaan aiomme tuomita sen perusteella, mikä on syntiä. Tällainen arviointi kuuluu meille epäilyksittä missä tahansa asiassa. — Nojaamme nimittäin paremminkin jumalalliseen kuin ihmisten lakiin, sillä valtamme ei ole ihmisestä vaan Jumalasta: kukaan, joka on täysissä järjissään, ei jätä huomiotta, että meidän tehtävämme on moittia kuolemansynnistä ketä tahansa kristittyä, ja jos tämä suhtautuu moitteeseen välinpitämättömästi, rangaista häntä. ---- Että voimme ja meidän myös pitää rangaista, käy ilmi siitä, mitä Herra sanoo Profeetalle: "Ecce constitui te super gentes et regna, ut evellas et destruas, et dissipes, et aedifices, et plantes." On todellakin yleisesti tunnettua, että jokainen kuolemansynti on poistettava, tuhottava ja hajotettava. Sitäpaitsi kun Herra antoi taivaan avaimet Pyhälle Pieterille, hän sanoi (Matt. 18:18): "Totisesti: kaikki, minkä te sidotte maan päällä, on sidottu taivaassa, ja kaikki, minkä te vapautatte maan päällä, on myös taivaassa vapautettu." Mutta kukaan ei epäile, ettei jokainen joutuisi kuolemansynnistä Jumalan edessä vastuuseen. Jotta siis Pietari voisi jäljitellä taivaista tuomiovaltaa, hänen on saatettava vastuuseen maan päällä ne, jotka joutuvat myös taivaassa vastuuseen. Mutta ehkä sanotaan, että kuninkaiden kanssa on meneteltävä yhdellä tavalla, ja muiden suhteen toisin. Kuitenkin tiedämme, että Jumalan laissa sanotaan (Deut. 1:17): "Älkää tuomitessanne olko puolueellisia, vaan kuunnelkaa alhaista samoin kuin ylhäistäkin.---- Näin siis voimme menetellä minkä tahansa kuolemansynnin suhteen, jotta saisimme syntisen kääntymään paheesta hyveeseen, erehdyksestä totuuteen; erityisesti kuitenkin, kun syntiä tehdään rauhaa vastaan, sillä rauha on rakkauden side.

KIRJALLISUUTTA:
Stephan Kuttner, Kanonistische Schuldlehre von Gratian bis auf die Dekretalen Gregors IX (1935).
Willibald Plöchl, Geschichte des Kirchenrechts II (1956), s. 329-354.