THE PROBLEM OF EVIL REVISITED

Ari Hirvonen

'The problem of evil will be the fundamental question of postwar intellectual life in Europe', Hannah Arendt declared in 1945 (Arendt 1994, 134). Arendt herself witnessed the trial of Adolf Eichman, and based on that she wrote a renowned report on the banality of evil. In *Origins of Totalitarianism* she showed how evil was a historically and politically crystallized way to reduce men to mere superfluity with the effect that evil annihilates their spontaneity and thinking and encourages them to destroy a segment of humanity without mercy. The evil of totalitarianism perverts both law and humanity. (Arendt 2004, 134; Kristeva 2001, 143–154.)

PART ONE

1. The absence of evil

One may wonder whether the problem of evil really is the fundamental question of contemporary intellectual life. If anything, it seems that the concept of evil has faded out and has been withdrawn and watered down. Hence, the problem of evil has been, and continues to be, more or less absent not merely from natural, bio- and techno-sciences, which is self-evident, but also from philosophy, ethics, social science and law. Andrew Delbano argues that a gulf has opened up between the visibility of evil and the intellectual resources available for coping with it: 'never have our responses been so weak'. (Delbanco 1995, 3. See also Bernstein 2002, 1–2.)

Law – juridical or positive law and moral law – one could presume, deals with evil. Now, one could think that what is beyond law or against its imperatives is related to evil: evil deeds and evil motivations. Law should therefore be sensitive to the problem of evil, especially so in the case of criminal law. Isn't the subject matter of criminal law the problem of evil, since, as Andrew Ashworth puts it, '[c]riminal liability is the strongest formal condemnation that society can inflict' (Ashworth 2006, 1)? The chief concern of criminal law is to prohibit behaviour that represents a serious wrong against an individual, a fundamental social value or an institution. Criminal law and punishment are thus necessary institutions for deterring wrongdoing and are a deserved response to culpable wrongdoing (Ashworth 2006, 1, 17). However, if one flips through criminal laws or criminal law textbooks, one will

find no mention of evil. Instead, the main issue is what kind of behaviour causes harm or the risk of harm, and how criminal law can be functionalized for the purpose of minimizing risks and maximizing public security. Even if harm 'is itself morally loaded […] concept', as Neil MacCormick says (MacCormic 1982, 29), it seems that, not merely the concept of evil, but also the whole idea of evil seems to be absent from criminal law. Instead of evil persons, one confronts wrongdoers, illegal risk takers, deviants, socio- and psychopaths, the socially deprived, the economically marginalised and potential lawbreakers, who should be identified already before any act. Even if the criminal sciences still recognize moral wrongness, evil itself is a concept and idea that these sciences avoid, almost as if it would infect them with something… evil. But then again, neither does contemporary moral philosophy feel very comfortable with the problem of evil.

There are, I admit without hesitation, good reasons for this turn away from evil. According to Ottfried Höffe, evil appears to many as a metaphysical or theological concept. It is the '*malum metaphysicum* or sum total of the world's imperfections'. It is also a subject of philosophy of religion, something that is characteristic especially of monotheistic religions. Thus, it is a concept that cannot easily be accommodated by a secular ethics, Höffe concludes. (Höffe 2006, 68.) Hence, as Richard J. Bernstein argues, philosophers and political theorists are reluctant to speak about evil. They are more comfortable speaking about the violation of human rights, injustice, immorality and unethicalness. (Bernstein 2002, 2.)

Höffe's and Bernstein's arguments work without any reservation in modern law and legal science, which are purified from the metaphysics and theology of natural law. Introducing evil into criminal law, would, perhaps, mean a return to absolute moral values and the categorical justification of criminal law, which would then justify inhuman punishment. Trial by the media already shows the risks of this. The modern secularized criminal law could also open its doors at the same time to religious values and principles. There is also a risk that this would mean a turn from the liberal principle of governmental neutrality to Lord Devlin's kind of legal moralism or even to totalitarianism, which decrees what is the good or valuable life. (Then again, aren't we already witnessing these tendencies?) Moreover, evil may also be a concept that would obscure, conceal or overpower the reality of the crime, that is, the act itself, the causes of the act, the suffering and traumas it inflicts, and the different ways in which to solve conflicts and heal the wounds. Moreover, criminal responsibility and theories of punishment based on the concept of evil may be inefficient in dealing with the diversity of risks and harms in the global economy and environment. All in all, there are many reasonable arguments for why evil should be a concept that one should ditch for good.

Then again, limiting my argument here again to criminal law even if it can be generalized, with the withering away of the concept of evil, the ideas of freedom and the responsibility of the subject may fade out. A risk-oriented criminal law may come to this. At the same time, neurochemistry, genetics and socio-biology offers law a promise that the causes of crime may be reduced to neurological and biological facts. In a therapeutic state, the state without the problem of evil, criminals are subjected to 'involuntary chemical and other personality destroying intrusions in order to turn them into compliant members of the social order' (Murphy 2007, 16). Thus, if law does not recognize evil in any sense, it has already gone beyond the idea of free will, turning subjects of will and desire into manageable objects of bio-and techno-sciences. According to Klaus Lüderssen, 'the transformation to a criminal law determined exclusively by risk that discards the time-honored structures of responsibility [*Zurechnungsstrukturen*] does not leave any law in criminal law' (Lüderssen 2000, 691). Therefore, there are justified arguments for a retributive outlook on punishment and moral desert, as Jeffrie G. Murphy has said, since these theories of punishment involve a respect for the dignity of human beings as free and responsible agents (Murphy 2007, 16–17). This is all very Kantian, and one could argue that free will is as abstract and metaphysical a concept as evil. We come back to Kant at the end of this text, but let us now turn to those ways in which evil is today addressed.

Banishing evil from juridical and theoretical discourse does not mean that evil would as a matter of course disappear either from the world or from the different discourses which endeavour to make sense of the world and evil in this world. Human beings who share the world with others have to face and deal with different kinds of evils: physical evil (pain and suffering, agony and trauma, various diseases, privations, degeneration, aging and natural processes), natural evil (natural phenomena such as floods, earthquakes, global warming etc., which cause pain and suffering) and human evil (violence, war, genocide, terrorism, crimes, oppression, poverty etc., i.e., suffering caused by human being because of some 'Good' – nation, ideologue, religion – pain caused by moral evil and also evil acts done just for the sake of evil) (McCloskey 1974, 13–19). When it comes to human or moral evil, we have to face the fact that there exists, as Arendt said, an incalculable evil that men are capable of bringing about (Arendt 1978b, 236).

People do speak about evil and try to make sense of it and survive it, yet it does not mean that law, moral philosophy or techno-science should include the concept of evil in their rational discourse. If we confront the problem of evil today, it is mainly, besides the everyday colloquial usage, in the domains of theology and politics. It

seems that in contemporary discourses on evil, the problem of evil is understood as based on two different traditions.[1]

2. Two faces of evil: theodicy and dualism

Firstly, to make sense of senseless evil one may turn to some transcendent meaning of being. After natural or human-inflicted catastrophes, people may wonder where the Creator, the Supreme Good, the Ultimate Lawgiver was when the event took place. If God is both able, as omnipotent, and wishes, as good, to prevent and take away evil, why does he not do that? Why does God allow the phenomenon of evil? One of the main problems for Abrahamic religions has been how to reconcile the fact of evil with the existence of an omnipotent and benevolent God.

For Saint Augustine, since God is the ultimate good and is omnipotent, there cannot be an independent and positive force or entity of pure evil or the principle of evil. Hence, evil does not exist. Moreover, he denies the possibility that beings created by God would ontologically be mixtures of good and evil. Evil has no place in the hierarchy of being, since otherwise one should hold God responsible for evil. Of course, Augustine does not deny that people do sin or that things happen that shouldn't happen, since beings are not gods, but beings created out of nothing. Augustine takes us back to the first transgression of law: Adam and Eve fell into disobedience because of a craving for undue exaltation, when the soul abandoned God and became an end in itself, its own satisfaction. Hence it falls away from the eternal good. If the will had remained steadfast in the love of supreme good by which it was illumined, it would not have turned away to find satisfaction in itself. (Augustine 1998, XIV, 12–13.) In *Confessions*, Augustine writes of his own evil: 'It was foul, and I loved it; I loved to perish, I loved mine own fault, not that for which I was faulty, but my fault itself. Foul soul, falling from Thy firmament to utter destruction' (Augustine 1991, II, IV, IX).

The younger Augustine was influenced by Manichaeism and had thought that evil is substantive: 'For I had not known or learned that neither was evil a substance, nor our soul that chief and unchangeable good' (Augustine 1991, IV, XV, XXIV). As said, evil is not a substance, as Augustine had earlier thought, but evil was 'nothing but a privation of good', a *privatio boni* (Augustine 1991, III, VII, XII). For him, all

---

[1] There is an exception to this. During the last ten years the problem of evil is addressed more and more in a non-theological way in continental philosophy and psychoanalysis. See as examples: Copjec (ed.) 1996, Žižek 1997, Safranski 1999, Rogozinski 1999, Vetö 2000; Zupančič 2000, Neiman 2002, Badiou 2003; Kant 2004.

evil must be essentially negative consisting of the loss or deprivation of something which is necessary for perfection and which could and should be present. Hence, evil is not the fact that a human being is a finite and necessarily limited being, created out of nothing, but a privation of something that the being could have, something that it is expected to have, something that would make it good. There is thus no such thing as a bad creation and no metaphysical reality of evil.

The evil from which man suffers also has a role. For Augustine, God judged it better to bring good out of evil than to allow no evil to exist. Evil contributes to the perfection of the universe, as shadows to the perfection of a picture or harmony to that of music. Since evil is permitted for the punishment of the wicked and the trial of the good, it actually has the nature of good. It pleases God, not because of what it is, but because it is the penal and just consequence of sin.

Theology would thus convince us that the omnipotent and all-good God created the best of all possible worlds and that even evil and suffering have their rightful place, as trials and punishments, in a good order. As finite beings, we just do not understand the goodness of the totality. This is the attitude of Job, who declared: 'And after my skin has been destroyed, yet in my flesh I will see God' (Job 19:25).

Gottfried Leibniz, for whom God is a king and the world his kingdom, had, in *Essais de Théodicée* (1710), introduced the term 'theodicy' (from the Greek *theos*, god, and *dike*, justice) to name the justification of an omnipotent, beneficent and infinite Creator in the face of the evils in the world. This is his response to the question of *l'existence du Mal* to Pierre Bayle, who had denied in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1697) the goodness and omnipotence of God on account of the sufferings experienced in this earthly life (Leibnitz 1747a, 320). According to Bayle, man was wicked and unhappy. Prisons, hospitals, gibbets and beggars were everywhere. History, for him, was properly speaking nothing but a collection of the crimes and misfortunes of mankind (Bayle 1973).

When Bayle saw only misery, suffering and wickedness, Leibnitz advocated *le principe du meilleur*, 'the principle of the best' (Leibnitz 1747a, 322). God had, at the point of creation, before him an infinite number of possible worlds. In his infinite wisdom, he necessarily decided to choose this world, which is the best of all possible worlds. We, created beings, confront the greatest happiness, goodness, power and knowledge in this world. Moreover, it is constantly improving. Then again, is there not evil and suffering in this world, as Bayle argued? This Leibnitz does not deny. According to him, there is 'an infinite number of possible worlds' and 'evil may enter into many of these worlds; it had entered even the best possible world' (Leibnitz 1747b, 97). This was used to support the argument that God permitted evil, Leibnitz says. But this is not the case. The argument is that human beings, as created beings, are originally limited and imperfect beings, which is the reason for why they make

errors and commit sins. Leibnitz divides evil into three categories: 'Metaphysical evil consists of simple imperfection, physical evil of suffering and moral evil of sin' (Leibnitz 1747b, 97).

However, there is more good than evil in this world. What is more, because human beings are limited, they cannot know all. Human beings are not able to understand the goodness of the totality, the infinity of events and beings, the universal order in which nothing is out of order. For Leibniz, an imperfection in a part may be required for a greater perfection in the whole. Therefore, God permitted evil in order to bring about a greater good, the good of the universe. It was also in accordance with order and the general good that God gave human beings the opportunity of exercising their liberty, even when he foresaw that they would turn to evil.

Alexander Pope shared this optimism in his *Essay on Man* (1733–1734). For Pope, the evil that human beings may do, as well as nature's aberrations, disasters and traumas, do not disprove the idea of a reasonable God, even if some cry, 'If Man's unhappy, God's unjust' (Pope 1958, 29). In his transcendence, God ordained and keeps universal order; in his immanence, he flows through it. Inside this splendid union human being is a potential violator and threat, since human beings have not an angelic, but a human nature. 'Aspiring to be Angels, Men rebel' wishing to 'invert the laws of order, sin against th' Eternal Cause' (Pope 1958, 31). Human beings are thus subject to passion, pride and moral evil:

> All nature is but Art unknown to thee;
> All Chance, Direction which thou canst not see;
> All Discord, Harmony not understood;
> All partial Evil, universal Good
> And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite
> One truth is clear, 'Whatever IS, is RIGHT.'
> (Pope 1958, 50–51.)

This kind of theological understanding of evil is something to which human beings easily turn when faced with grievous and devastating physical, natural or human evils. As an example, after the Asian Tsunami in 2004 and the Hurricane Katrina in 2005, many started to wonder why God allowed these events to happen and why so many innocent people had to die. This is also what may come to mind when faced with the horrible events in Darfur, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Explanations of evil based on the Augustinian argumentation may make sense of evil, may give hope and relief, and may make it possible to maintain trust in transcendental justice, eternal order and/or an omnipotent and good Creator.

However, such answers to the problem of evil easily explain evil away since it is seen as something that will turn out to be good, or at least reasonable, when seen from the perspective of the supreme good. We find this in Hegel and Marx, for whom evil is but a temporary manifestation of still-hidden good. In dialectical philosophy – and the politics based on it – good may come out of evil, the power of negation may bring something positive, and negative means lead to positive ends (Arendt 1972, 155). Moreover, this attitude includes a denial of one's being-in-the-world or worldliness and one's responsibility in this world that we share with others. One turns from this world towards the horizon of atonement and redemption, from immanence to transcendence – evil is just something that one overcomes in the world to come, in the hereafter. This leads easily to a denial not only of one's responsibility here and now, but also of one's ownmost being. This is implicitly or explicitly present in different religions with their promise of the hereafter and also in theocratic state systems which promise to create the best of all possible worlds on the earth. This is present also in the various secularized utopias, in which the promised new world order will bring about the best world. From the perspective of these utopias all evils and all violence on the road to utopia are justified. After all, everything will be for the good. This is clearly seen in the two totalitarian systems of the 20th century, but one can also see elements of this, as an example, in neoconservative ideology. Evil may be also seen as a punishment for sins. God or Nature strikes back. One may even argue that various diseases are a price one has to pay for this or that sin and evil. For example, there have even been remarks that AIDS is God's punishment for immorality and homosexuality.

Manichaeism, like Gnosticism, sees things in dualistic terms. Manichaeism was based on the Persian prophet Mani's teaching. According to Manichaeism there existed no omnipotent good and infinitely perfect power. Even before the existence of heaven and earth, there were two mutually hostile principles, the Good one, called the Father of Majesty, *Ormuzd, Ahura Mazda,* dwelling in the realm of light and the Bad, called the King of Darkness, *Ahriman, Angra Mainyu,* in the realm of darkness. The universe is a stage produced for and by the fight between the two equal powers, light and darkness. In the world, each human being is also a battleground for these powers, the incorruptible soul being on the side of light, the body on the side of darkness. Hence, evil is seen as a fundamental principle or force which is run by an evil being. However, Manichean dualism promised the end of the dualistic system of Good and Evil after the ultimate triumph of Good and the destruction of Evil. This makes it possible to externalize evil: it is constructed as the other that represents the evil force. Thus, the real cause of evil and the miseries that we, the good ones, confront is always a devilish other.

We do not confront this kind of Gnostic and Manichaean dualism only in popular fiction, such as *Star Wars* or *Harry Potter,* but also in political, ideological and religious rhetoric, which are often based on theological dualism to the core. In the rhetoric, the world is defined in the terms of a battle between good and evil forces. The other is seen as an absolutely evil force, as *the* evil other. The other – a not-us – is the embodiment of the principle of evil. The enemy gives face to the phenomena of evil in the fight where the good and justice are always on our side. This kind of rhetoric of evil took, and still takes, place in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda and in Iraq, just to mention a few places. National, ethnic and religious conflicts are almost always seen in terms of Manichaean dualism. It is put to use as well by those who declare war on terrorism and by religious fundamentalists. This is the logic of racism, a logic that dehumanizes others who differ from 'us'. The contemporary world really seems to be a battleground between light and darkness. As Jarna Petman says, the rhetoric of evil has returned to international politics, and evil has thus become an instrument of politics (Petman 2004, 271).

However conciliatory or self-justificatory these two metaphysico-theological ways of dealing with the problem of evil may be, they are nothing but two different ways of avoiding a confrontation with the reality of evil. When evil is either part of the good order or on the side of the other, one is removed from the actual horrors of concrete evil. One should not let the fact or reality of evil deeds, or horrible and destructive acts, to be veiled or hidden under theological or pseudo-theological ontology, which is used either to justify or to demonize evil. Evil is something one should recognize in its concreteness and act against here and now in political and legal ways. Alain Badiou has said, in relation to suicide bombers, that we should think and act in the face of these terrible crimes according to concrete political Truths, rather than let ourselves be guided by the stereotypes of any sort of morality. 'The ethic of Truths that I propose proceeds from concrete situations, rather than from an abstract right, or a spectacular Evil.' (Badiou 2001.)

Moreover, these two include an extremely problematic element of violence. The Augustinian theodicy accepts the sacrifice of the innocent and justifies evil in the world. The Manichean dualism divides the world into good and evil forces, thus demonizing and dehumanizing the other as a representative of the principle of evil. The evil other, this despicable, vile and devilish thing, the diabolical being, can then, with all justification, be excluded from the sphere of humanity, since nation, ideology or religion is on one's own side. History is seen as a battleground between good and evil, but there is a promise that at the end of history there will be a new time, a time of good without evil. Even if the Church accepted the Augustinian idea of evil as privation, it showed a Manichaean attitude in the persecution of heretics, in religious wars, in the Crusades and in the institution of the Inquisition. This is a logic that one

finds both behind fundamentalism and terrorism and behind those who attempt to make torture legitimate. The theological concept of evil is something that is used – too often – to excuse intolerance and violence, to justify repressive political and religious systems, to destroy democracy, tolerance, the rule of law, the freedom of speech and thought, equality, and the idea of human dignity and freedom.

It may be possible to generalize that all ideological and religious utopias are combinations of Augustinian and Manichaean ways to see the problem of evil: on the one hand, the best of all possible worlds is coming; on the other hand, all those who do not share this utopia represent forces of evil.

Arendt thinks, as Peg Birmingham concludes, that the Western tradition has not faced up to our very real capacity for incalculable evil since we have preferred to see evil as a privation, as a lack of being or good, or as a deficient mode of good, or it is explained away as 'a kind of optical illusion (the fault is with our limited intellect which fails to fit some particular properly into the encompassing whole that would justify it)' (Arendt 1978a, 34; Birmingham 2003). Therefore, one should, and this seems a more and more important task, submit metaphyciso-theological concepts of evil to critical analyses, bring forth the way they are used in contemporary discourses and reveal how these discourses repeat over again theological dogmas.

Moreover, one should bring back the problem of evil in the agenda of juridical, ethical and philosophical discourses so that they would be able to truly address the question of evil. One should neither deny the problem of evil nor slip back into the theodicy and dualism of evil, neither reduce evil to juridical, technical or scientific facts or concepts nor repeat dogmatic beliefs that evil is a privation and a part of the good order or a positive principle in the fight with good. Evil should be addressed more analytically, rationally and philosophically. Moreover, a more analytical understanding of evil is a pre-condition of revealing how evil is used for various purposes in the theological and political rhetoric of evil. According to Petman, the more general the image of evil has become, the more difficult it has been to discuss evil in the political context. Without true dialogue the only thing that remains is the pathological dialectics of evil. (Petman 2004, 271.) This, together with Badiou's ethics of Truth, is the relevant way to confront evil.

To re-introduce evil in law, philosophy, ethics and social sciences and hence to make possible a critical and theoretical understanding of the problem of evil, one should firstly deconstruct the metaphysicio-theological dogma of evil. Actually, this is something that has already been done. At the same time, this deconstruction of evil is an unfinished task. I will next trace this 'beginning' of the deconstruction of evil.

PART TWO

1. Nature strikes back

On November 1, 1755, All Saints Day, at 9.30 an earthquake struck Lisbon. It was followed by rapidly spreading fires, and many buildings which had survived the earthquake burned down. About thirty minutes after the quake, a tsunami hit the city. Lisbon was virtually destroyed. Somewhere between 60 000 and 90 000 people died. Horror, fear, terror and extreme distress fell over the city.

This first modern catastrophe was a major event all over Europe. Newspapers and flysheets printed reports and engravings of the quake. In a sense, the disaster created the illusion of proximity and unity between the peoples of different nations in Europe. Voltaire even said: 'L'Europe ressemblait à une grande famille réunie après ses differences' (See Araujo 2006).

The event of Lisbon was a turning point in European history, not merely because of the enormous human suffering it caused, but also because of its political, philosophical and theological significance. Lisbon was affluent and one of the biggest cities in Europe. It was famous not only for its wealth, but also for its impressive churches and the piety of its people. It was also a major city of the Inquisition. The catastrophe destroyed almost all the important churches in this Catholic city, and what is more, it happened on a Catholic holiday, at the very moment when many were attending mass. Horrified people wondered how to make sense of the disaster. Why did God allow this to happen? Was it a sign of the wrath of God?

The Augustinian answer seemed to be the only possible way to make sense of this disaster and survive its traumatic effects. His theory of theodicy would offer an answer that would heal, perhaps not the bodily wounds, but the wounds in the soul and give a transcendental meaning to the traumatic event. An important Jesuit, Gabriel Malagrida, argued that the cause of the destruction was not any natural phenomena, but the abominable sins of the Lisboners: 'Holy people had prophesied the earthquake was coming, yet the city continued in its sinful ways without a care for future.' Hence, it was now 'necessary to devote all our strength and purpose to the task of repentance'. (As quoted in Reeves 2005, 24.) His sermons had a great effect on the people and they, together with other priests' sermons, produced a religious hysteria, and people became caught up in acts of devotion and repentance. Even though many Protestants admitted that earthquakes are natural occurrences, they saw the quake as a sign of God since nature is the ultimate reflection of God's design. To

the Protestants, God punished the sins of the Catholic Church and the Inquisition. (Reeves 2005, 21–32.)

The earthquake happened at a time when Europe was in a transitional state. The old ideals, dogmas, authorities and institutions were being questioned even as the Catholic Church still defended the order of things. The problem of evil was after Lisbon one of the main issues where the ideas of the Enlightenment attacked the old theological dogma. Hence, the event shook not merely the ground of Lisbon but also the ground of the European mind and European thinking. Philosophy, literature and science more and more took the place of theology in making sense of evil. Moreover, the optimism of Leibnitz and Pope were wrecked. The impression exerted by the quake also began to shake the foundational certainty of Descartes' philosophy and extended into the vocabulary of philosophy, which had built itself on the metaphor of firm ground, as Werner Hamacher argues (Hamacher 1999).

2. Voltaire's Lisbon

One person deeply affected by the disaster at Lisbon was Voltaire, who had been an admirer of Pope and Leibnitz. Three years before the earthquake, Voltaire still thought that there is more good than evil on earth. According to Theodor Adorno, the earthquake sufficed to cure Voltaire of the theodicy of Leibniz (Adorno 1995, 361). After the event, it was impossible for Voltaire to adhere to the optimism which was behind the prevailing ideas of the world and human beings.

After receiving the news about the earthquake, Voltaire wrote twenty letters. On November 30, 1755, he declared without hesitation that the earthquakes were 'an terrible argument against the optimism' (Voltaire 1978a, 622). On November 24, 1755, he wrote to Jean Robert Tronchin that what happened was a cruel sort of physics: 'what a sad game of chance the game of life is.' Now people will find it really difficult to define how the laws of motion bring about such frightful disasters in *les meilleur des mondes possibles*, in the 'best of possible worlds'. He cries, 'What will preachers say, especially if the palace of the Inquisition remains standing? I flatter myself at least that the Reverend Fathers, the Inquisitors, will have been crushed like the others. That should teach men to not persecute other men, since while some holy scoundrels burn a few fanatics the earth swallows up the whole lot of them.' (Voltaire 1978b, 619.)

On December 16, 1755, Voltaire published the 'Poem on the Lisbon Disaster'. In the poem, Voltaire invites all deceived philosophers, who cry *tout est bien*, to

contemplate this ruin of the world: *Ô malheureux mortels! ô terre deplorable!*[2] For Voltaire, there is no eternal law or divine retribution that would justify the disaster. He asks:

> 'What crime, what sin, had those young hearts conceived
> That lie, bleeding and torn, on mother's breast?
> […]
> 'All's well,' ye say, 'and all is necessary.'
> Think ye this universe had been the worse
> Without this hellish gulf in Portugal?'
> (Voltaire 2003, 219–220.)

If evil stalks the land, then how can we conceive a just and beneficent God, who, on the one hand, heaps his favours on beings he loves, and on the other hand, scatters evil with as large a hand? Voltaire's answer is *rien*, nothing. The human being is a stranger to himself, who does not know who he is, where he is, where he comes from or where he goes. 'The book of fate is closed to us', even if our being mingles with the infinite (Voltaire 2003, 224). For Voltaire the world, this theatre of pride and wrong, 'swarms with sick fools who talk of happiness' (Voltaire 2003, 224). It is true that sometimes pleasure may wipe away our tears, but it 'passes like a fleeting shade, / And leaves a legacy of pain and loss' (Voltaire 2003, 224). The idea that all is well is but an ideal dream, an illusion.

> Man crawls and dies: all is but born to die:
> The world's the empire of destructiveness.
> This frail construction of quick nerves and bones
> Cannot sustain the shock of elements;
> This temporary blend of blood and dust
> Was put together only to dissolve;
> This prompt and vivid sentiment of nerve
> Was made for pain, the minister of death:
> Thus in my ear does nature's message run.
> (Voltaire 2003, 223–224.)

Voltaire's satirical novel *Candide* (1759) is once again one answer to the destruction – the destruction of Leibnitz's and Pope's optimism and the dogma of theodicy. The novel starts by describing Candide: 'In Westphalia, in the castle of Baron of Thunder-Ten-Tronckh, there lived a young boy whom nature had endowed with the sweetest disposition' (Voltaire 2005, 3). In the castle we also meet Dr. Pangloss, the tutor of

---

[2] Voltaire 2003, 219. See also the English translation, Voltaire 1911.

the Baron's family, whom Candide regarded as the greatest philosopher in the world, who taught 'metaphysico-theologo-cosmolonigology'. Pangloss is an unyielding optimist, a parody of Leibnitz, for whom it is demonstrable that things cannot be otherwise than as they are, for as all things have been created for some end, they must necessarily be created for the best end. We live in the best of all possible worlds in which everything has a purpose and everything is for the best.

However, Candide gets involved with the Baron's daughter Cunégonde, and is thrown out of the castle. Thus he starts his travels around the world, which is full of evil, poverty, vice, disease, ignorance and fanaticism. Human beings turn out to be murderers, rapists, thieves, liars, traitors and hypocrites. Candide is hunted by the Inquisition and Jesuits, subjected to torture, beaten just about to death in army and threatened with imprisonment in Paris.

In Holland, Candide meets Pangloss, the old philosopher turned into a repugnant beggar, who had 'lifeless eyes, a nose that was rotting away, a mouth that was twisted, black teeth, and a rasping voice' and who 'coughed violently, spitting out a tooth every time' (Voltaire 2005, 11). Pangloss tells that the Baron's daughter was raped and disembowelled by Bulgarian soldiers, who also hacked the Baron and Baroness to pieces and destroyed the castle. 'But we were well avenged, for the Avatars did exactly the same to a neighbouring barony belonging to a Bulgar lord' (Voltaire 2005, 12–13). He himself had tasted 'the delights of Paradice' in the arms of the Baroness's maid, Paquette, who was infected with veneral disease, and this 'produced these torments of Hell' which are devouring him (Voltaire 2005, 13). Candide starts to wonder where the best of all worlds is, but Pangloss reassures that all was necessary. 'Individual misfortunes result in the general good, with the consequence that the more individual misfortune there is, the more everything is for the best' (Voltaire 2005, 15).

After being shipwrecked, Candide and Pangloss arrive in Lisbon. They have hardly set foot in the city when they are greeted by the earthquake. Pangloss consoles terrified survivors by saying that 'things could not be better', if there is a volcano in Lisbon, it cannot be someplace else (Voltaire 2005, 18). In Lisbon, they also witness *auto-da-fé* (act of faith, a ritual of public penance of condemned heretics after a trial): 'After the earthquake had destroyed three quarters of Lisbon, the sages of the land found that the only efficacious way of fending off total ruin was to give the people a fine auto-da-fé. The University of Coimbra concluded that the spectacle of a few people being burned over a slow fire with full ceremony is an infallible formula to prevent the earth from quaking' (Voltaire 2005, 19). During this, several people are burned, Candide is beaten, and Pangloss is hung. 'If this is the best of all possible worlds, what can the others be like?' asks Candide, who is bleeding all over (Voltaire 2005, 20).

In the end, Candide meets Pangloss again, who had survived the hanging to become a galley slave, and Cunégonde, who did survive the attack but had grown ugly, whom he now marries. They, together with Martin, Candide's pessimistic travelling companion, who had tried to convince Candide that human beings have always massacred each other and in the world there is little virtue, morality and happiness, settle on a little farm. Candide concludes: *Il faut cultiver notre jardin* ('We must cultivate our garden'). Does this denote a passive acceptance of evil and withdrawal from the public world into the privacy of one's own garden? Perhaps the last lines do not signify as much that as a demand to turn from metaphysical speculation to the immanence of the world one shares with other people.

3. Rousseau's answer to Voltaire

In his *Confessions* (1782)*,* Jean-Jacques Rousseau describes Voltaire's poem on the destruction of Lisbon as 'an attack' which he thought to be sent to him by the author (Rousseau 1963, 157). As a result he wrote a famous letter to Voltaire, the so-called 'Letter on Providence' dated August 18, 1756. In *Confessions* Rousseau explains that he wrote it because he was struck by seeing Voltaire bitterly crying out against the miseries of life and finding everything to be wrong. Therefore, Rousseau formed *l'insensé projet* ('mad project') of trying to turn Voltaire's attention to himself and proving to him that everything was right. He continues that Voltaire, while he appeared to believe in God, never actually believed in anything else than the devil: his pretended deity was nothing but a malicious being whose only pleasure was in evil. This absurd doctrine was particularly disgusting since it was proposed by a man who enjoyed the greatest prosperity. Rousseau himself would have a better right to calculate and examine the evils of human life and the world to prove to Voltaire that of all possible evils there was not one to be attributed to Providence. All evil, for Rousseau, had its source in the abusive use the human being made of his faculties.[3]

---

[3] Rousseau 1963, 157–158. Even if Rousseau says that he treated Voltaire in the letter with the greatest respect and delicacy possible, he, knowing Voltaire's self-love to be extremely irritable, did not send the letter immediately to him, but to Tronchin, Voltaire's physician and friend, with full power either to give it him or destroy it. Voltaire informed Rousseau that his letter is *tres belle*, but being ill he would postpone the answer until some future day (Voltaire 1967, 102–103). Rousseau concluded correctly that *Candide* was Voltaire's answer to his letter (Rousseau 1963, 158–159). Even if says that he had not read it, it is possible that he did so and concluded that when he wanted to engage in philosophical argumentation, Voltaire just made fun of him (see Cranston 1991, 31).

In the 'Letter on Providence', Rousseau writes that Pope and Leibniz do soften his pains. They convince him that the eternal and benevolent Being does want to protect human beings and chose from all possible plans a combination of minimal evil and maximal good. On the contrary, Voltaire's 'poem against the Providence' does not offer any consolation. One should just suffer and then die. This deprives Rousseau of any shattered hope and reduces him to despair. He wonders how Voltaire, who is living free in the midst of affluence and peacefully philosophising on the nature of the soul, finds only evil on earth. Instead, he himself, a poor and lonely man, tormented with an incurable illness, contemplates with pleasure and finds that all is well. Rousseau also wonders why the problem of evil drives Voltaire to uphold the omnipotence of God at the cost of the goodness of God. If one of those is in error, it is for Rousseau the omnipotence, not the goodness. To him, God was not responsible for human suffering and evil in the world. Voltaire was even worse than the Manicheans. (Rousseau 1967.)

Rousseau sees the source of moral evil in man's freedom and perfection, which is at the same time his corruption. Rousseau cries 'Madmen', instead of blaming divinity: you should realise that all our misery, crimes and evil 'proceed from yourselves' (Rousseau 1963, 100). When it comes to physical pain, pain is inevitable in a world in which human beings dwell since matter is sensible. Instead of asking why a human being is not perfectly happy, one should ask why he exists at all. Moreover, most physical pains – death is an exemption, but then again, it is hardly painful – are human beings' own work.

Rousseau takes Lisbon as an example. It was not nature that built the city. The city was so densely built up that people did not have the possibility to flee. If people had built a different kind of city, more evenly dispersed and less vulnerable, it would have better survived the effects of the earthquake. Everyone could have fled at the first shock. Moreover, many started to collect their property instead of fleeing. Because of this many perished in the disaster. Rousseau adds that if the earthquake had happened somewhere else than in a European city, nobody would blame God or be really troubled since those disasters do not cause any harm to the gentlemen of the cities, the only men of whom we take account. (Rousseau 1963, 100.)

For Rousseau, evil is not something that is inevitable in the world. Rousseau did not turn uncritically back to a theological understanding of the problem of evil or to the optimism of Leibnizian theodicy. Perhaps a benevolent God could not prevent all the suffering that human beings were responsible for. Evil was something human for Rousseau. At the same time, human beings possessed the attribute of perfectibility, that is, the capacity to make themselves more and more perfect moral subjects. Moral evil may be fought against by means of a civil religion, which would enforce a common moral core, sentiments of sociability and patriotic beliefs. The dogmas of

civil religion consist of the existence of a mighty, intelligent and beneficent divinity, the life to come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and the laws, and, most importantly, the rejection of intolerance. For Rousseau, an intolerant person was anybody who imagined that one cannot be a good person without believing what he himself believed and who damned anyone who did not think like he himself did. Hence, one could even say that, for Rousseau, all intolerant belief systems represented evil.

And as was the case in Lisbon, Rousseau thought that physical and natural evil could be avoided by political and social planning. This is how the Marquis of Pombal, a minister of Portugal's King José I, who soon after the crises took control of the government, confronted the problem of evil. Evil was not a matter of transcendence or Providence but a this-worldly subject, a political issue. Instead of echoing the sermons of priests, he turned immediately after the disaster to practical matters: how to survive and live together in this world after the disaster. One had to bury the dead and feed the living was his motto. A martial law was decreed, and Pombal demanded absolute obedience to the law. He efficiently returned order, encumbered the sermons of priests and religious zealots, ordered the disposition of the dead, designed a national survey to discover the causes and the origin of the earthquake, and proceeded to rebuild the city. Pombal turned against both the nobility and the Church in his attempts to modernize Portugal. He changed the Inquisition into merely a department of the state, issued a decree confiscating the property of the Jesuit society, exiled the Jesuits from Portugal and built the first secular education system in Europe.

4. Kant and radical evil

The news from Lisbon also reached Königsberg. Immanuel Kant, then twenty-four years old, published three articles on the subject in 1756 in a local paper.[4] He thought that the contemplation of such terrifying events is edifying and humbles man. Kant's aim was to describe the physical dynamics of earthquakes and to construct a causal explanation of earthquakes. He argued that the volcanic action was due to huge

---

[4] The articles were: 'Von den Ursachen der Erderschütterungen bei Gelegenheit des Unglücks, welches die westliche Länder von Europa gegen das Ende des vorigen Jahres betroffen hat' (Kant 1968a); 'Geschichte und Naturbeschreibung der merkwürdigsten Vorfälle des Erdbebens, welches an dem Ende des 1755sten Jahres einen großen Theil der Erde erschüttert hat' (Kant 1968b); 'Fortgesetzte Betrachtung der seit einiger Zeit wahrgenommenen Erderschütterungen' (Kant 1986c).

subterranean caverns filled with hot gases which formed combustible mixtures. If they blow up, the caves collapse, which leads to the earth's shaking. (Kant 1968a, 422.)

Determining the causes is not such an interesting question in itself. More important for our purpose is that Kant's explanation turned away from theological speculation. Kant rejects all religious, metaphysical, mystical and astrological interpretations of earthquakes. Earthquakes had nothing to do with divine punishments since we stand with our feet on the cause. We do wish that earth would be made so that we would be able to live upon it forever. We hope that we might be able to have control over nature. However, it is necessary that earthquakes sometimes happen. When people build houses upon a place filled with inflammable substances, there is always a risk that their buildings may fall down because of quakes. Instead of blaming Providence, one should ask whether it really was necessary to build houses upon that ground. 'Man must learn to accommodate himself to nature, but he wishes that he could accommodate nature to him.' (Kant 1968c, 456.)

From natural and physical evil, Kant turned later in his life to human or moral evil. In 'On the Failure of All Philosophical Attempts at Theodicy' (1791), Kant defines theodicy as 'defending the cause of God', as a defence of the highest wisdom of the Creator against charges that reason raises against it for whatever is counterpurposive in the world (Kant 1968d, 255). For Kant, all attempts to philosophically justify theodicy are doomed to fail, and thus he definitely turns away from Leibnitz. Moreover, Kant says that if God announces the intention of his will through nature, theodicy should be an interpretation of nature. Then he makes a distinction between a doctrinal and an authentic interpretation. The former means an interpretation of the declared will of a legislator, which deduces this will from the utterance of the lawgiver in conjunction with its intentions. The latter means that the lawgiver itself makes the interpretation. The doctrinal interpretation, which claims to discover the intentions of the divine lawgiver by interpreting his works, is theodicy that is doomed to fail. An authentic interpretation is actually inauthentic theodicy. It means that through our reason the divine lawgiver becomes himself an interpreter of will, as He announced through creation. This interpretation is not an interpretation by a rationalizing reason but by a practical reason with power behind it. It commands, like in legislating, absolutely without any further grounds. For Kant, we, human beings, are lawgivers.[5]

Soon after the text on theodicy Kant wrote his most important work on the problem of evil, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793). According to

---

[5] Kant 1968d, 264; see also Fenves 2003, 55–59.

Kant, human beings have a propensity (*Hang*) to evil. He distinguishes three distinct degrees. 1) The frailty, *fragilitas*, of human nature means that I adopt the good (the law) into the maxim of my will, but this good is weaker in comparison to inclination. 2) The impurity, *impuritas, improbitas*, of the human heart means that although the maxim is good and even strong enough in practice, it is yet not purely moral because it has not been adopted with the law alone as its all-sufficient incentive. The impurity is a propensity for mixing unmoral with moral motivating causes, i.e. actions called for by duty are done not purely for duty's sake. 3) The wickedness*, vitiositas, pravitas*, or the corruption, *corruptio*, of the human heart means the propensity of the will to maxims which neglect the incentives springing from the moral law in favour of others which are not moral. This propensity to adopt evil maxims is the perversity, *perversitas*, of the human heart. (Kant 1995, 41–42.) However, Kant denies the possibility of there being a devilish being and malignant reason. There is no diabolical evil, i.e., that somebody would will evil for the sake of evil.[6] This would mean that either human beings or a human being are naturally devilish or that they freely choose to defy the moral law for the sake of doing evil.

For Kant, human beings cannot be unaware of the demands of morality, and hence they do not act immorally merely out of ignorance to the moral law. Therefore, evil is related to their decisions to exempt themselves from the obligation of the moral law. Although man is conscious of the moral law, he nevertheless adopts into his maxim the occasional deviation from it. Therefore 'man is evil'. (Kant 1995, 44.) If my action is not motivated merely by the respect for moral law, but also by other incentives (selfishness, enjoyment etc.), the incentive and action will be morally evil. Moreover, my action is in that case heteronomous. In other words, if there were no other incentive than respect for moral law working in opposition, I would adopt the law into my supreme maxim as the sufficient determining ground of my free choice (*Willkür*). I would then be morally good. However, by virtue of an equally innocent natural predisposition I depend upon the incentives of my sensuous nature and (in accordance with the subjective principle of self-love) adopt them also into my maxim. Whether I am morally good or evil depends upon subordination: which of the two incentives I make the condition of the other. If I reverse the moral order of the incentives when I adopt them into my maxim, I am evil.

Moreover, Kant argues that 'man is evil by nature', that is, evil can be predicated of man as a species. Through experience one cannot judge him otherwise. Evil is subjectively necessary to every human being, even to the best. Since human beings

---

[6] Kant 1995, 51. Slavoj Žižek has made a big issue of Kant's terror in the face of diabolical evil. For Žižek, diabolical evil is the truth of radical evil which reveals that evil is an independent force and not merely a privation. Žižek 1995.

have a propensity to reverse the incentives, or a propensity to accept non-moral motives into their maxims, they have a propensity to evil. This propensity to evil must be considered as morally evil. It is not a natural predisposition (*Naturanlage*) but something that can be imputed to human beings, something for which human beings themselves are responsible (*zurechnen*, let me here remind you what Lüderssen said about criminal law). Since this propensity is rooted in humanity itself, it can be called a natural propensity to evil. According to Hent deVries, human beings are old enough for evil already since birth (deVries 2002, 103). Nonetheless, it is brought upon us by ourselves. The locus of evil is not our sensuous nature or reason but our free choice (*Willkür*). Therefore, human beings must be held responsible for it, even if it is deeply rooted in our being since it is ultimately self-caused. This evil Kant calls 'a radical evil' (*radicales Böse*) (Kant 1995, 45). It is important to keep in mind that radical evil does not mean for Kant any kind of extreme evil.

All in all, for Kant evil does not lie in sensuous nature, the phenomenal being, or in any original sin, but in free will itself. Original sin was for Kant the worst possible way to explain evil. The propensity to evil is the formal principle of all our actions against moral law and also an original act. Already in 1786, Kant had written: 'The history of *nature* begins thus from good, since it is the creation of *God*, the history of *freedom* begins from evil, since it is *accomplishment of human being*' (Kant 1973, 56). Hence, one must search for the possibility of evil from the possibility of free choice from the *Willkür*. The propensity to evil is an act, a choice, but it is not a temporal event; instead it is related to us as citizens of the nation of freedom.

Kant does not turn only against the idea of original sin but also against Rousseau's optimistic idea of an innate human goodness. Then again, he does not share Voltaire's pessimism or his turn from global to local. Because human beings are in this perilous state through their own fault, they must strive to extricate him themselves, and even if human beings had the propensity (*Hang*) only to evil, they have a disposition (*Gesinnung*) both to good and evil. This gives the possibility for a freedom-based ethical community designed as a protection against evil and for the furtherance of goodness.

PART THREE

We have now traced the deconstruction of the theology of evil, the turn from the transcendent order to the immanency of the world, from the justification of evil and the dualism of good/evil to human freedom and responsibility. Evil is something that we, human beings, do share; it is our lot and, at the same time, our responsibility. The

gods have withdrawn from the world, and we have to face and address evil here in this world. The problem of evil is all too human. These are the lessons Voltaire, Rousseau and Kant teach us. These non-theological ways to address the problem of evil signify a break, a hiatus, in relation to the dogmatic ways of understanding the world. The problem of evil is from now on addressed at the tribunal of reason.

Then again, one may wonder whether the Christian doctrine of original sin still haunts the concept of radical evil. Goethe, in his letter to Herder, already dismisses Kant's new position as a concession to Christian orthodoxy: 'Kant required a long lifetime to purify his philosophical mantle of many impurities and prejudices. And now he has wantonly tainted it with the shameful stain of radical evil, in order that Christians might be attracted to kiss its hem.' (See Fackenheim 1954, 340.)

Even if this is not the case, one may ask whether these enlightened philosophers just continue the metaphysics of evil. And if so, should we rid ourselves of these kinds of metaphysical speculations and instead confront evil in its concrete forms? Moreover, one may ask whether the problem of evil, as it was addressed during the 18th Century, has anything to give to a world that has gone through the holocaust and the evils of two totalitarian systems. And finally, do these thinkers of the Enlightenment really offer us a helping hand if we wish to bring evil back in law and philosophy, if we wish to be able to recognize and analyse evil more properly and to put it under a critical light or to the tribunal of reason?

These are questions that must be left open. Let me make just a few remarks. Firstly, Voltaire, Rousseau and Kant looked for a starting point for thinking about the problem of evil in a non-theological way. After them, there should not be a return to theological explanations of evil. This is a tradition that we should adhere to. By rethinking this tradition, we may be able to avoid banalized, totalitarian or fanatic ways of confronting the problem of evil. Secondly, this starting point, this deconstruction of the problem of evil, that we have traced here is not merely something that happened once in history. It is, of course, part of the history of ideas, but at the same time, it is something that must be started over again. In our own ways, from the perspective and standpoint of our own time, we have to start again and again to deconstruct evil, to take responsibility for the problem of evil, and to be sensitive to new forms of the phenomena of evil. At the same time, we have to think beyond the Enlightenment, keeping our eye on the terrors of the last century and our own times, which have revealed that human beings are capable of evil in a sense that those thinkers could not even imagine. Thirdly, starting again to question the problem of evil cannot avoid taking into consideration what happened once in the 18th century. It may merely mean recognizing our debt to the past, but then again, it may also mean that returning to those thinkers we have traced will lead towards more critical and profound ways of addressing the problem of evil today. It may also make us more

sensitive to all those attempts to try to bring back theodicy or dualism with all the risks they include. Fourthly, as we think about the problem of contemporary evil via a return to those thinkers of the Enlightenment, we must also submit those thinkers and their metaphysics of evil to questioning, to a critical gaze, to deconstruction. Finally, the argument I have elaborated here is that evil must be brought back to law. One way to do that, without sliding back to theological speculation, is to start, in our own particular way, from the hiatus that took place in the thinking after Lisbon. Law cannot avoid evil. It has to face evil by continuing this tradition and going beyond it.

We started with Hanna Arendt's sentence, 'The problem of evil will be the fundamental question of postwar intellectual life in Europe.' The law must take Hannah Arendt's words seriously by changing her 'will be' to 'should be'.

Bibliography

Adorno, Theodor: Negative Dialectics. Continuum, New York 1995.

Arendt, Hannah: Crisis of the Republic. Harcourt, New York 1972.

Arendt, Hannah: The Life of Mind. II. Willing. Secker & Warburg, London 1978a.

Arendt, Hannah: Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility. In Arendt: The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity Identity and Politics in the Modern Age. Grove Press, New York 1978b.

Arendt, Hannah: Essays in Understanding. Harcourt, Brace & Co, New York 1994.

Arendt, Hannah: The Origins of Totalitarianism. Schocken, New York 2004.

Araujo, Ana Christian: European Public Opinion and the Lisbon Earthquake. 14 (3) European Review (2006) 313–319.

Ashworth, Andrew: Principles of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006.

Augustine: Confessions. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1991.

Augustine: City of God. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998.

Badiou, Alain: On Evil: An Interview with Alain Badiou. By Christopher Cox & Molly Whalen. Cabinet, No. 5 (Winter 2001/02).

Badiou, Alain: L'éthique. Essai sur le conscience mal. Nous, Paris 2003.

Bayle, Pierre: Dictionnaire historique et critique. AUPELF, Paris 1973. Available in <http://gallica.bnf.fr/Catalogue/noticesInd/FRBNF35153875.htm>.

Bernstein, Richard J.: Radical Evil. A Philosophical Investigation. Polity, Cambridge 2002.

Birmingham, Peg: Holes of Oblivion. The Banality of Radical Evil. Hypatia 2003. Available in <www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-22826986_ITM>.

Copjec, Joan (ed.): Radical Evil. Verso, London 1996.

Cranston, Maurice: The Noble Savage. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1754–1762. Penguin Press, London 1991.

Fackenheim, Emil: Kant and Radical Evil. 23 University of Toronto Quarterly (1954) 339–353.

Fenves, Peter: Late Kant. Towards Another Law of the Earth. Routledge, London 2003.

Hamacher, Werner: The Quaking of Presentation. Translated by Peter Fenves. In
Hamacher: Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from Kant to Celan.
Stanford University Press, Stanford 1999.

Höffe, Ottfried: Kant's Cosmopolitian Theory of Law and Peace. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2006.

Kant, Immanuel: Von den Ursachen der Erderschütterungen bei Gelegenheit des Unglücks,
welches die westliche Länder von Europa gegen das Ende des vorigen Jahres betroffen
hat. In Kant: Werke, Band I. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1968a.

Kant, Immanuel: Geschichte und Naturbeschreibung der merkwürdigsten Vorfälle des
Erdbebens, welches an dem Ende des 1755sten Jahres einen großen Theil der Erde
erschüttert hat. In Kant: Werke, Band I. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1968b.

Kant, Immanuel: Fortgesetzte Betrachtung der seit einiger Zeit wahrgenommenen
Erderschütterungen. In Kant: Werke, Band I. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1968c.

Kant, Immanuel: Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee. In
Kant: Werke, Band VIII. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1968d.

Kant, Immanuel: Mutmaßlichen Anfang der Menschengeschichte. In Kant: Kleiner
Schriften zur Geschictsphilosophie, Ethik und Politik. Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1973.

Kant, Immanuel: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Werke in sechs
Bänden. Band 5. Könemann, Köln 1995.

Kant, Immanuel : Radikaali paha. Paha eurooppalaisessa ajattelussa. Edited by Ari
Hirvonen & Toomas Kotkas. Loki-Kirjat, Helsinki 2004.

Kristeva, Julia: Hannah Arendt. Columbia University Press, New York 2001.

Delbanco, Andrew: The Death of Satan. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 1995.

Leibnitz, Gottfried: Préface. In Essais de Théodicée sur la bonte de Dieu, la liberté de
l'homme et l'origine du mal. Tome I. Francois Changuion, Amsterdam 1747a.

Leibnitz, Gottfried: Essais de Théodicée sur la bonte de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et
l'origine du mal. Tome I. Francois Changuion, Amsterdam 1747b.

Lüderssen, Klaus: Enlightened Criminal Policy or the Struggle Against Evil. 3 (2) Buffalo
Criminal Law Review (2000) 687–700.

MacCormic, Neil: Legal Rights and Social Democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford
1982.

McCloskey, H.J.: God and Evil. Martin Nijhoff, Hague 1974.

Murphy, Jeffrie G.: Legal Moralism and Retribution Revisited. 1 (1) Criminal Law and
Philosophy (2007) 5–20.

Neiman, Susan : Evil in Modern Thought. An Alternative History of Philosophy. Princeton
University Press, Princeton 2002.

Petman, Jarna: Pahuuden patologisesta dialektiikasta. In Kant: Radikaali paha. Paha
eurooppalaisessa ajattelussa. Edited by Ari Hirvonen & Toomas Kotkas. Loki-Kirjat,
Helsinki 2004.

Pope, Alexander: An Essay on Man. In The Poems of Alexander Pope volume III i.
Methuen, London 1958.

Reeves, Robert K.: The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755: Confrontation between the Church and
the Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Portugal (2005). Available in
<http://nisee.berkeley.edu/elibrary/Text/2005121453>.

Rogozinski, Jacob: Le don de la loi. Kant et l'énigme de l'éthique. Presses Universitaires de
France, Paris 1999.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: Les Confessions II. Gallimard, Paris 1963.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: Lettre de Jean-Jaques Rousseau à Voltaire. Correspondance complète de Jean-Jaques Rousseau. IV. 1756–1757. Institut et Musée Voltaire, Les Délices, Geneve 1967, 37–50.

Safranski, Rüdiger: Das Böse oder Das Drama der Freiheit. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1999.

Vetö, Miklos: Le mal. L'Harmattan, Paris 2000.

Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de: À Élie Bertrand. In Voltaire, Correspondance IV, janvier 1754–décembre 1757. Gallimard, Paris 1978a, 622–623.

Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de: 'À Jean-Robert Tronchin'. In Voltaire: Correspondance IV, janvier 1754–décembre 1757. Gallimard, Paris 1978b.

Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de: Voltaire à Rousseau. 12.9.1958. In Correspondance complète de Jean-Jaques Rousseau. IV. 1756–1757. Institut et Musée Voltaire, Les Délices, Geneve 1967.

Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de: Poem on the Lisbon Disaster. Selected Works of Voltaire. London, Watts and Co. 1911. See <http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Poem_on_the_Lisbon_Disaster>.

Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de: Poème sur la désastre de Lisbonne. Póesis. Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2003.

Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de: Candide or, Optimism. Modern Library, New York 2005.

deVries, Hent: Religion and Violence. Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida. The Johns Hoplins Univresity Press, Baltimore 2002.

Žižek, Slavoj: Immanuel Kant als theoretiker des Bösen. In Rötzer, Florian (ed.): Das Böse. Jenseits von Absichten oder: Ist der Teufel ins System ausgewandert? Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland GmbH und Steidl Verlag, Göttingen 1995.

Žižek, Slavoj: The Plague of Fantasies. Verso, London 1997.

Zupančič, Alenka: Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan. Verso, London 2000.