Colonial Settler Economies in Africa

Claude Lützelschwab

Swiss National Science Foundation (Bern, Switzerland)
School of Oriental and African Studies (London, United Kingdom)
University of Neuchâtel (Switzerland)

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The history of settler societies and economies is a unique chapter in the history of human settlement. From a temporal and spatial point of view, although the arrival of non-native foreign populations (African, Asian or European) who contributed directly or indirectly to the development of farming in as yet sparsely inhabited regions with available fertile and exploitable lands, largely outstripped European overseas expansion (think of China or Russia), the 19th century in particular, saw a surge in this phenomenon.

According to Paul Bairoch, one major feature serves to differentiate the experience of modern settler societies (États-Unis, Canada, Australie, Nouvelle-Zélande, Argentine, Chili, Uruguay) from other waves of population settlement: their very existence, that is to say their settlement, has its roots in the Industrial Revolution that swept through Western Europe (Bairoch 1997, I, 450-4). These ‘Neo-Europes’ (Crosby 1986) were established in regions with temperate climates where a population of European origin came to supplant an originally sparse indigenous population. From the 1830s onwards, the massive influx of European immigrants gave rise to the production and export of a range of agricultural products similar to those cultivated in Europe. However, the burden of high transport costs made it difficult to export these commodities, whose cost price was fairly close to that in Europe, to the old continent. So it was not until 1850–1870, with the development of steam ships and the drop in transport costs, that the export to Europe of significant quantities of agricultural commodities, such as cereals, began in earnest. Thanks to a massive investment of capital (destined primarily to improve the transport infrastructure), these territories were able to base their development on the export of agricultural commodities (while at the same time not neglecting the importance of industrialisation). The combination of all these elements led to rapid economic growth which in turn yielded high standards of living.

Alongside these well-known examples, we also find the African experiences of European settler societies or economies which distinguish themselves from pure European settler colonies by their geographical location, the density of the pre-colonial population, the demographic impact of colonial penetration, and the number of immigrants. According to Mosley (1983, 9), these settler economies in Africa had three features in common: the settlers were reliant on indigenous labour, they were in direct competition with the local population for the production of food, and finally, they were represented in the local government which enabled them to protect their interests. Four territories in particular fit with this profile: South Africa, Algeria, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya.

This paper seeks to present an, as yet incomplete, discussion of the settlement and farming of these territories. It is driven by the following hypothesis: that all colonisation, in the strictest sense of the word, that is to say settlement by colonial farmers, is dependent upon the ratio of “man : cultivable land”. The higher this ratio, the greater the constraints or obstacles to colonisation. The colonisation of sparsely populated territories, where the indigenous population did not disappear during the colonisation process but on the contrary showed a marked rate of growth, was the result of different mechanisms from those used in the “classical model” of settler colonisation. The predominance of large farms and the failure of small agricultural settlements were brought about by the forced coexistence of European settlers with the indigenous populations and their resultant competition in the agricultural sector. Low indigenous production costs led to the failure of the small settler farm. To palliate this, the only course of action open to the Europeans was to establish or move towards a capitalist model of agricultural exploitation which combined the farming of large estates with indigenous labour. In this model, the land is “shared” and European and indigenous
populations cohabit within the agricultural sector.

The aim of this paper is to attempt a comparative analysis through an examination of the differences and similarities presented by the four African colonies mentioned above. Following an assessment of the geographical location of the colonies and of the extent of European settlement, the analysis will then focus primarily on the appropriation of land, the mechanisms put in place by the settlers to acquire access to land, and the methods used to secure indigenous labour. In the case of South Africa, given the upheavals brought about by the development of the mining industry and its importance in the economy, the analysis will be restricted to the period which precedes the 20th century.

**Geographical location**
The settlement of Europeans in Africa was made possible by the geographical location and the climates of the lands on which they settled. Situated respectively at the southern and northern extremities of the African continent, South Africa and Algeria both enjoy a Mediterranean climate on part of their territory. In South Africa, the area of land that enjoys a warm temperate climate characterised by winter precipitations, is very small. It is limited to the coastal area to the southwest of the Cape and to a thin band of territory in the east of the country. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify three regions under intensive or semi-intensive cultivation: the coastal strip stretching from the southwest to the southeast of the Cape, the Natal Coast, and finally, the region extending from north of the Orange Free State to the south of the Transvaal. The areas devoted to pasture are much more widespread, and this despite the fact that practically one-third of the territory is arid or semi-arid (Feinstein 2005, 260-268). In northern Algeria\(^1\), farming is determined by rainfall patterns. As you move from north to south, there is a relatively sharp drop in the level of precipitation which is characterised in turn by a succession of different types of cultivation. Beyond a distance of some hundred kilometres from the coast, the climate only allows for extensive agriculture.

In the tropics, the establishment of European colonies in temperate agricultural areas was only possible under specific geographical and climatic conditions. To begin with, a significant portion of the colony had to be situated above 900–1,000 metres; next, it had to enjoy more than 500 millimetres of rainfall, and finally, it had to be devoid of the tsetse fly, which is responsible for spreading sleeping sickness (tripanosomiasis) in humans and the tsetse disease in livestock (Mosley 1983)\(^2\). In Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, for the most part, the Europeans settled in the Highlands which were more clement and enabled them to practice intensive farming.

**Settlement**
Unlike “genuine” settler economies, these African territories did not attract huge numbers of European immigrants; those that did settle, far from outnumbering the indigenous populations, remained largely in the minority. In 1913 and 1938, settlers accounted for approximately 20% of the total population of South Africa and, 14.3% and 12.8% respectively of the Algerian population (Etemad 2000, 264-5)\(^3\). At the height of their

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1 It is standard practice to consider only northern Algeria, which represents only a 10th of Algerian territory, and to exclude the area covered by the Sahara.
2 That said, the regions with a rainfall in excess of 1,000 millimetres are suited to plantation agriculture (tea, rubber, palm oil), but not to temperate agriculture such as the cultivation of cereals or animal husbandry.
3 For Algeria, the European population also includes the Jewish population.
presence, round about 1960, Whites in Kenya accounted for no more than 1.0% of the total population, while those in Southern Rhodesia represented either 5.4% or 7.1% of the total population\(^4\).

These proportions, however, are somewhat misleading. In South Africa, European settlement, which was not the original objective of the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC)), was very slow until the arrival of the British at the beginning of the 19\(^{th}\) century\(^5\). In 1700, half a century after the establishment of a Dutch base in the Cape by the VOC, the European population numbered 1,300 individuals; by the end of the 18\(^{th}\) century there were 22,000 people. In comparison, in 1700 the white population of New England numbered more than 90,000 and by 1780 it had reached 700,000 people (McCusker 1985, 103). In South Africa, two years before the discovery of the first diamonds in 1867, the white population was believed to number about 252,000 inhabitants (Feinstein 2005, 24, 257). Indeed, it was only after the mineral revolution that European immigration increased significantly and became about more than simply strengthening the British hold over the land: in 1913, the white settler population was only slightly more than 1.3 million, while by 1938, it had risen to close to 2.1 million\(^6\).

In Algeria, the French authorities believed that in order to conquer the entire territory, a decision adopted around 1840, they needed to implement an active settlement policy. This colonisation was characterised by two distinct tendencies: on the one hand, the “spontaneous” arrival of very poor settlers from Mediterranean Europe, Spanish, Italians, Maltese, and on the other hand, the more or less “organised” arrival of French, German or Swiss settlers from modest backgrounds\(^7\). In 1841, the European population numbered a little more than 35,000 people; by 1851, the population exceeded 131,000 and by 1866 it had reached 217,000 (Kateb 2001, 187). Thus, by the 1860s, both South Africa and Algeria were home to significant populations of European settlers. However, despite the adoption in 1870 of a land policy that favoured the settler population (see below), the rate of growth of the European population in Algeria bears no comparison with that observed in South Africa. In 1913, there were 760,000 European settlers in Algeria, by 1938 their numbers had risen to close to a million (960,000) (Etemad 2000, 264).

One feature in particular distinguishes European settlement in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya from that in South Africa and Algeria: its limited scope. In 1911, the European population of Kenya numbered 3,200 individuals against close to 24,000 in Southern Rhodesia. This population growth was very slow at first, but increased considerably after the Second World War. In 1939, the white settler population in Kenya numbered 21,000 individuals, this grew to 66,000 by 1966 (Zwanenberg (von) 1975, 14; Mosley 1983, 7; Kennedy 1987, 197; Iliffe

\(^4\) These figures relate to 1960; they are subject to greater or lesser variations because historians disagree about the numbers for the total populations of Kenya and Rhodesia in 1960. The highest estimates (Maddison 2001, 330 and 333) tend to downplay the density of the white settler population, while the lowest estimates (Yudelman 1964, 5; Mosley 1983, 7) tend to give the colonial population a greater numerical value. For Kenya, the two estimates are 0.8% and 1.0%. Marks, on the other hand believes that the colonials never accounted for more than 5.0% of the population of Southern Rhodesia (Marks 1999).

\(^5\) It is quite likely that some 300-350 people were brought to the Cape by the VOC as farmers to grow food and supply the ships.

\(^6\) For figures relating to European immigration to South Africa, spread over five-year periods starting from 1845, see Christopher 1984, 3.

\(^7\) By way of illustration, by 31 December 1845, these six “nationalities” made up 98% of the European settlers (Ministère de la Guerre, Tableau de la situation des établissements français dans l’Algérie. 1844-1845, Paris, Imprimerie royale, May 1846, p. 64. For further information, see Liauzu 1996, 61-111 ; Lützenschwab 2006a, 101-103 ; Temine 1987.
1997, 309). A similar phenomenon was observed in Southern Rhodesia, albeit on a different scale: in 1941 there were 69,000 Europeans and by 1961 there were 221,000 (Yudelman 1964, 36 and 39; Kennedy 1987, 197).

Southern Rhodesia and Kenya differed from one another through the geographical and social origins of their immigrants. The majority of settlers in Southern Rhodesia did not hail from Great Britain, but from the white community of neighbouring South Africa. To quote a popular adage from British Africa, “Kenya was the officers’ mess and Rhodesia the sergeants’ mess” (Kennedy 1987, 92).

According to Kennedy, and it is a distinctive feature, the core of the white settlers in Kenya was made up of people from the gentlemanly stratum, a group for whom the necessity to belong and social status outweighed their financial resources and who, by emigrating to and settling in Kenya, saw an opportunity to maintain, or at the very least prolong, a social order that was condemned to disappear back in the home country. But this small group was not the only one in a diverse colonial population made up of middle class or working-class immigrants.

The majority of the white community in Southern Rhodesia was from the lower-middle or working classes. While these immigrants shared a common desire for social advancement, they were motivated first and foremost by a desire to achieve economic success. Although largely dominated by settlers hailing from the lowest social classes, the white settler population of Southern Rhodesia was more complex and stratified (divided) than that of Kenya. Thus, there was a second level gentlemanly stratum and, of course, a number of people hailing from the liberal professions.

How, then, did these populations gain access to and acquire land?

**Land: seize and redistribute**

In South Africa, the appropriation of land was a long-term process which, unlike in the rest of Africa, was actually led in part by the European settlers themselves. It can be split into three distinct phases. During the first phase, which lasted from 1652 until the end of the 18th century, settlers from the Cape annexed a vast swathe of territory which stretched for more than 300 kilometres to the north and, in the east, to the banks of the Great Fish River. The appropriation of land took the form of a gradual whittling away of the territory belonging to

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8 Using censuses and the places of birth of the settlers in Southern Rhodesia, it becomes clear that those born in South Africa accounted for the largest section of this population, contrary to the situation in Kenya (Kennedy 1987, 200-201).
9 For more information on this group, see Cannadine 1992, 438-443.
10 This and the subsequent paragraph were taken from Kennedy 1987, chapter 5.
11 The geographical location of the two colonies also goes some way towards explaining the establishment of a numerically important Indian community in Kenya (66,000 Indians in 1939 as opposed to barely 21,000 Europeans). By occupying an intermediate strata of society (traders, construction workers, railroad builders, office clerks, craftsmen, etc.), the Indian community served to limit the arrival of white immigrants from poor backgrounds in these sectors of activity. The comparatively weak presence of Indians in Southern Rhodesia (a few thousand in 1939) is the result of a different geographical location and history, but also of the hostile attitude displayed towards them by the administration and the settlers.
12 This period was strongly characterised by the image of the squatter (“someone who violates formal rules to occupy land in order to originate an interest”), and/or the landhunter (“someone who searches for good land and marks it, for himself, his partner, or his backer”) on the frontier (Weaver 2003, 76-77).
the Khoisan\textsuperscript{13}. Although this led to regular skirmishes (raids, punitive expeditions, cattle thefts), it never concluded in full-scale wars. The second phase lasted from the beginning of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century until the discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1884). During this period, British and Dutch settlers engaged in a far more systematic process of conquest and expropriation, made partially possible (at least in the case of the former) by the support of the British authorities\textsuperscript{14}. As a result, tensions on the frontiers between the indigenous populations and the European settlers tended to lead increasingly to conflict or war. During the course of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, British imperial policy gradually evolved towards complete domination. The discovery of diamonds to the northeast of the Cape, followed by the discovery of gold in Witwatersrand (in the Transvaal), hailed the start of the third phase. Settlers, mining interests and the British government united around a common goal: conquest and dispossession (Feinstein 2005, 35)\textsuperscript{15}. The process of land expropriation that began in the middle of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century reached its height on the eve of the First World War (see below)\textsuperscript{16}. In 1913, the Natives’ Land Act made it illegal for Africans to purchase or rent land outside existing reserves (with the exception of the Cape).

Throughout this protracted process, numerous legal provisions and different systems were adopted, aimed at governing the distribution of lands or acknowledging their expropriation. Some major features stand out. In general, the plots of land granted to the settlers or recognised as theirs were big or very big (tens or hundreds, or even thousands, of hectares). The most arid lands, which were unsuitable for agriculture but rather used for large-scale cattle rearing, were granted in the form of huge concessions\textsuperscript{17}. The provisions governing acquisition tended to vary depending on the possible use that could be made of the land concession. Use rights for the cattle-rearing land situated within the Cape and Natal provinces, for example, were either granted on a system of free quit-rent grants\textsuperscript{18}, or subject to a licence system of annual leases, while agricultural lands close to the coast, which were generally smaller, were more often than not sold at auction (freehold tenure with sales by auction). The system was relatively flexible and it was not unusual for land granted on a lease to be converted to freehold or perpetual quit-rent tenure. In the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, the colonisers began by settling on unoccupied lands, before registering land titles and subsequently paying a quit-rent\textsuperscript{19}.

In Algeria, land appropriation took place largely after the conquest of the territory. Certainly, during and immediately after the conquest, the French government, considering itself to be the rightful heir, declared itself the owner of the lands of the Turkish beylick, took possession of lands it considered to be uncultivated, seized \textit{habous}\textsuperscript{20} assets (1844), and confiscated and

\textsuperscript{13} For a reminder of the terminology relating to the populations of South Africa and the populations that pre-dated the arrival of the European settlers, see Feinstein 2005, p. xix-xx, 13-21.
\textsuperscript{14} This, despite the fact that they were critical of the settlers’ desire for expansion right up until the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Galbraith 1963, 227-29, 242-76; Weaver 2003, 74 and 385).
\textsuperscript{15} For more information about conquest and dispossession during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, see Keegan 1996, and also (for more limited lands) Bonner 1983, Crais 1992, Delius 1983, Guy 1979, Murray 1992 and Shillington 1985.
\textsuperscript{16} In the history of land expropriation, there are a few examples of the purchase of lands or land-use rights by Africans, however, they were relatively insignificant.
\textsuperscript{17} The original system put in place required the future land owner to walk for half an hour on horseback starting from the centre to each of the four extremities of a square, this tended to give rise to land concessions of approximately 2,500 ha (Christopher 1984, 9).
\textsuperscript{18} Land was granted in exchange for a nominal quit-rent for a period of fifteen years.
\textsuperscript{19} Given that the right had to be paid for as soon as the title was granted, the settlers tended to delay the registration of their land for as long as possible, which gave rise to considerable confusion (Davenport & Saunders 2000).
\textsuperscript{20} Mortmain assets, or assets belonging to religious foundations where the revenues are used to maintain
sealed off the lands of those tribes that had taken up arms against France\textsuperscript{21}. However, in order to acquire the necessary lands for development by the “small settler”, the French administration nonetheless had to accommodate pre-existing land provisions which it combined with a variety of innovative methods including, expropriation\textsuperscript{22}, verification of traditional land titles, as well as the unilateral adoption of laws that advantaged the settlers.

It is worth dwelling for a moment on the last two tools described. At the beginning of the 1860s, under the impetus of theoreticians who favoured a policy of association with the Muslims\textsuperscript{23}, the colonial policies and practices that had hitherto been followed were being reoriented. The Senatus Consult of 1863 declared the tribes to be the life-long owners of their traditional lands. For its authors, the thinking behind this policy and its implementation (verification of land titles) was to put a brake on the expansion of rural settlement. Nonetheless, however, under the influence of colonist pressure groups, this census of what was essentially a fraction of the tribal lands, resulted in an increase in the area of land that passed into State ownership. Halted in 1870, this policy was revived in 1887 right up until 1899, this time with the deliberate objective of extending State ownership.

Meanwhile, the tactic favoured by France was the introduction of private property (in the Roman sense) on indigenous lands, and the creation of a free land market between the European and the indigenous populations\textsuperscript{24}. In order to achieve this, France opted to integrate elements of French law into existing Muslim and customary land law. A number of laws were passed (in 1873, 1887, 1899 and 1926); but it was the 1873 Warnier law that best symbolised this practice\textsuperscript{25} and which led, at the end of the 1920s, to the constitution of a free land market.

Meanwhile, during most of the colonisation process, it was the French administration in Paris and Algiers that was responsible for distributing land and shaping the population centres. On the whole, the main objective was to create a “rural democracy of small owners” (Rivet 2002, 177). The conditions under which land was granted changed somewhat over time, but on the whole, land concessions consisted of small plots (four to twelve hectares in size)\textsuperscript{26}, initially granted free, but under condition precedent\textsuperscript{27}. Over the years, some changes were made to the mosques or other religious establishments.

\textsuperscript{21} At the beginning of the 1870s, the quashing of the indigenous uprising of 1871-72 provided the pretext to confiscate other lands for colonisation.

\textsuperscript{22} During the 1850s in particular, the administration began to confine certain tribes to a more restricted land area, that it considered adequate. This was the policy of quartering (cantonnement); it was practised without any legal basis (see Nouschi 1961, 267-284; for a recent example, see Lützelschwab 2006a, 62-71). This policy was practised independently of the law of 1851 which reaffirmed the principle of the inviolability of indigenous landowners and recognised both melk land (family-held lands) and arch lands (tribal-held lands) as defined by Muslim law.

\textsuperscript{23} Up until that point, French policy tended to advocate assimilating the indigenous population with the French populations.

\textsuperscript{24} This represented a hardening of the colonial legislation following the introduction of the Third Republic (1870) in France. For Algeria, this political change meant a return to the civil regime and the adoption of a policy of integration with France, particularly at the political level. The settlers were subsequently represented by a parliamentary delegate based in Paris. Most historians refer to this period as one of “triumph for the settlers”.

\textsuperscript{25} Under this law, indigenous lands came under the jurisdiction of the civil code, and in particular Article 815 which stipulated that “no-one is obliged to maintain their property undivided” (Rivet 2002, 180). Concretely, this meant that sometimes it was enough for the head of a family to decide that he wanted to sell his property, to drag all the tribal lands into a legal dispute. These changes tended to result in extremely long procedures and generally enabled the settlers to purchase lands at very low prices.

\textsuperscript{26} The size of the colonial land concessions increased in the last quarter of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, when the administration realised that large tracts of land were necessary to cultivate the semi-arid areas.

\textsuperscript{27} This means that the settler cannot dispose freely of his concession/land (sell it, or mortgage it, without the
original conditions: starting in 1845, a permanent annual rent was introduced (one franc per hectare per year) and charged to the settlers, later, by the decree of 1851, the leasehold system was replaced by the introduction of resolvent clauses. Subsequently, free concessions were replaced by fixed price sales, and by auctions.

At the same time as land was being distributed, either free or at a price, sales of land began to take place by agreement between Europeans, and subsequently between Europeans and the indigenous populations. It is difficult to estimate precisely how much land passed into the hands of the settlers through one or other of these two systems. According to Droz (2001, 54-55), official colonisation provided the settlers with 15,000 km² of land. If we choose to accept this figure, the proportion of land acquired by the settlers on the property market through transactions between Europeans and indigenous populations stands at no more than 44% – the total area in private European hands reached 27,000 km². However, if we divide the 12,000 km² of land, purchased from the indigenous populations, by the 77,000 km² that were expropriated from them as a result of colonisation (by the State and the settlers), the indigenous populations were only paid, and sometimes very little, for about 16% of the land.

Conquest and land appropriation went hand in hand in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya. Colonisation was carried out by two commercial companies, the British South Africa Company (1889) and the Imperial British East Africa Company (1888), both of whom received Royal Charters to administer and exploit these territories. The decision to attract settlers was born to a large extent of the failure of the original ambitions of these companies. In Mashonoland, the extent of the mineral resources proved to be a disappointment and this, coupled with the frequent confrontations with the Ndebele at the frontier, forced the Company to turn its attention to Matabeleland which it conquered and a fraction of whose lands it subsequently appropriated. In Kenya, the decision to attract settlers came in part as a result of the bankruptcy of the Imperial British East Africa Company, which, in 1895, forced Great Britain to declare the territory a protectorate; but above all because of the financial abyss created by the construction of the railway line (1896-1901) linking Mombasa to Uganda. As a result, the decision was taken to attract British settlers who the government believed would

prior consent of the administration). The land concession is provisional (the settler merely has land-use rights) and only becomes permanent once certain conditions, such as the execution of work (construction of a house, land-use requirements, etc.), required by the administration have been fulfilled within a given time-frame. As a general rule, concession-holders were provided with construction materials, ploughing equipment, seeds and the loan of a beast of burden (working animal) or a cow.

28 From now on, concession holders were allowed to obtain mortgages using their plots of land as collateral.
29 Starting in 1904, free concessions were once again granted, but only to those French settlers who were considered under-privileged.
30 The latter were first and foremost melk lands (family-held) that benefited from less protection, and subsequently arch lands (community-held). On a few occasions, during the 20th century, the balance of land transactions between the Europeans and the Muslim population leaned towards the latter, between 1918 and 1920, and again during the 1950s, but without ever really affecting the division of land between the two communities.
31 Rivet (2002, 262) believes that 75% of settler land-holdings were allocated as a result of official colonisation, this implies an area of some 20,250 km². In these circumstances, land transactions between the settlers and the indigenous population would only have accounted for 9% of the total lands appropriated as a result of colonisation (State and settlers).
32 A similar figure can be arrived at using the data provided by Pervillé (2002, 65).
33 It took until 1897 for the British South Africa Company to succeed in crushing the resistance of the Ndebele and some Shona.
34 Great Britain spent more than £6.5 million on this project and brought in more than 30,000 Indians to work on its construction. One third of them perished. In Great Britain, this train line became known by the unfortunate nick-name “Lunatic Express” (Elkins 2005a, 2).
be capable of developing export agriculture (Sorrenson 1968).

In both territories, appropriation of the land took place in a relatively short space of time (over some forty years) through a process that combined colonial penetration, wars, repression, the signing of treaties and, occasionally (forced) purchases. However, it was not long before the sale of land between the settlers and the indigenous populations was forbidden in Kenya (in 1902) to prevent the “exploitation” of the Africans. In Southern Rhodesia, even though such transactions remained legally possible (right up until 1930), they were socially prohibited (Mosley 1983, 16). The boundaries of the areas reserved for the white and African populations respectively were formally defined during the inter-war period. In Kenya, the boundaries, decreed in 1934, were restricted to the White Highlands and the African reserves, urban lands remained part of a free market; in Southern Rhodesia, for the first time, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 created a zone reserved exclusively for the European population and, with a few exceptions, the entire urban land area became a European zone.

In Southern Rhodesia, the first land concessions were granted during the 1890s, while in Kenya, these only sprung up in the early years of the 20th century. Gradually, and more or less openly, the acquisition of land by wealthy individuals or large companies was encouraged to the detriment of the “small settlers” who lacked adequate financial resources. These lands included huge swathes of territory sold at low prices: the lands acquired by the companies ranged from 26,000 to 500,000 ha. In 1921, the average size of the plots granted in Southern Rhodesia was about 2,100 ha, while in Kenya, it reached 2,200 ha in 1903-5. On the eve of the First World War, half of the land acquired in these two territories was in the hands of companies (Mosley 1983, 14-15).

In both territories, concessions were originally granted free, on condition that they be inhabited, or at very low prices, well below those applied in South Africa during the same period. As in South Africa, land for livestock was leased and occasionally sold to large concession-holders (Mosley 1983, 14-15). During the 20th century, settlers arriving in the two territories were able to acquire land, either at low cost from the colonial government or the British South Africa Company, or, alternatively, on the “European” market from the first large landowners and at considerably higher prices. After 1912, faced with the absurdity of a dual price system, the British South Africa Company and the government in Kenya allowed the price of “Crown territories” to rise (Mosley 1983, 18-19). But what proportion of land was in the hands of the white minority?

The hold on the land

Establishing the proportion of landholdings and cultivable lands in European hands in these four territories on a comparative basis, no matter how limited, throws out a whole host of methodological difficulties. It is however, possible to propose some rough estimates.

If we compare the hold that the Europeans had on land on the eve of the Second World War,

35 In Kenya, the prices paid were very low, while in Southern Rhodesia, the British South Africa Company refused to pay for anything in cash, preferring to provide other land by way of compensation and on its own terms (Mosley 1983, 16).

36 For a more detailed description, see Mosley 1983, 21-29.

37 The estimates vary even for a single territory, as do the criteria used, and few authors describe clearly the various stages used in their calculations. In addition, an indicator such as agricultural or cultivable lands is, by definition, subject to variation and therefore weak when used for comparative purposes. See Lützelschwab 2006b, annexe on methodology.
there are very marked differences. The extent of the white hold on South African lands is in strong contrast with the much-reduced level of dispossession observed in Kenya; Southern Rhodesia, and northern Algeria, in many ways represent an intermediate situation.

One point needs to be made about Algeria. Experts generally estimate that one quarter of private property was in the hands of the settlers. However, this figure does not account for all European private property in northern Algeria, but only for the European share of the European and indigenous-owned property; thus it ought not to be considered here. By that same token, if the proportion of land that the colonial State appropriated and chose not to redistribute is not taken into account, then it can be estimated that the Europeans owned 12.3% of the lands in northern Algeria. A rate that is surprisingly similar to that in Kenya. This unique means of calculation deserves consideration inasmuch as these large landholdings do not appear to be agricultural (they include, among others, forests). Furthermore, in the classifications used for Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, there are lands which have been designated “unassigned”, “undetermined”, as well as forests that figure neither in the European-held land areas nor in the Native Reserves. These have therefore been left aside.

Table 1: European hold on the land (as a percentage of the total) and population density (in km² per inhabitant). These are rough estimates.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Southern Rhodesia</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Northern Algeria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Share of land in European hands</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>27.0-34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Share of cultivable lands in European hands</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Population density</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.9-9.4</td>
<td>13.8-18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Population density</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Sources: See annexe on methodology (please ask the author).
Notes: (a) For 1913, the data for 1 and 2 are respectively 93.0% and 79%.

Seen in these terms, a calculation of the proportion of cultivable land in European hands provides a better indication of the colonial hold over the land. It can be seen that
approximately 60% of the cultivable lands were in white hands in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia against approximately 30% in Kenya and Algeria\(^{38}\).

The particularly high level of land appropriation seen in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia can be explained in part by the low population densities in these territories at the time of the arrival of the European settlers (1.3 inhabitants per km\(^2\) at the start of the 20\(^{th}\) century in Southern Rhodesia and 1.2 at the dawn of the 19\(^{th}\) century in South Africa\(^{39}\)), and in part also by the existence of a mining sector, principally in South Africa. It is worth remembering that these are simply rough estimates, given the vague nature of the demographic history of sub-Saharan Africa\(^{40}\).

The “pre-colonial” population density of Kenya was higher, about 6.9 to 9.4 inhabitants per km\(^2\)\(^{41}\). However, this territory saw a marked decrease in the African population due to the spread of epidemics caused by the intrusion of the white man and, by 1921, population density (including Africans, Europeans and Indians) was only in the order 4.3 to 7.3 inhabitants per km\(^2\)\(^{42}\). Even if we take the lower of these two figures, Kenya remained much more densely populated than Southern Rhodesia. Unsurprisingly, in Algeria, the figures are much higher. A drop in the indigenous population – similar to that observed among the Khoisan in South Africa with the arrival and conquest of the Europeans during the 17\(^{th}\) and 18\(^{th}\) centuries – was also observed in Algeria.

On the whole, and provided we remain aware of its limitations, the value of this table lies in the fact that it does demonstrate a certain correlation between population density at the time of the arrival of the Europeans and the portion of the land assets that were appropriated.

**Labour**

As pointed out in the introduction, the economic reliance of African settler economies on indigenous labour was a very strong factor that emerged in South Africa long before the development of the mining economy. This reliance tended to give rise to a situation characterised by “an excess of land and a shortage of labour” to which Evsey D. Domar (1970) devoted considerable attention over thirty years ago. Indeed, he succeeded in demonstrating, and his ideas have recently been seized upon again by Feinstein (2005, 33) in relation to the South African case, that land-owners in agricultural economies characterised by a relative abundance of land and a shortage of labour, are unable to make a profit from the

\(^{38}\) On the other hand it is extremely dangerous to calculate the share of the best lands appropriated by the Europeans. My own calculations for Southern Rhodesia, based on Yudelman (1964, 77) put it at three-quarters (73 %); John Iliffe (1990, 106) for his part, estimates it at 86%. My own calculations, based on Feinstein (2005), lead me to suggest an estimate of 49% where South Africa is concerned. I was not able to undertake a similar calculation for Kenya. Finally, all Algeria experts, following the example of Daniel Lefeuvre (1997, 63), highlight the correlation between the location of the best lands and the pattern of European settlement: “The map of the European hold on agricultural lands corresponds to the map of Algerian agriculture”.\(^{39}\)

\(^{39}\) It was not possible to go further back in time and important uncertainties remain.

\(^{40}\) When applied to the cultivable area, indications of population density are even more tenuous, because they are based to an even greater extent on rough estimates. They nonetheless enable us to take into account the existence of the huge non-cultivable land areas in South Africa.

\(^{41}\) According to the sources consulted (Wolff 1974, 107 ; Palmer 1977, 12 ; Mosley 1983, 112-113 ; Etemad 2000, 13).

\(^{42}\) If we subscribe to Wolff, the African population went from 4.0 to 2.5 million people between 1900 and 1920 – that is a decrease of close to 35% of the total (Wolff 1974, 107). Kjekshus, on the other hand talks of a decrease from 5.0-6.0 million to 4.0-4.5 between 1890-1920 (Kjekshus 1977, I, 359 quoted by Etemad 2000, 133 and 137, note 23).
land. Indeed, in an economy where there is a low population density, so long as there is an abundance of land available elsewhere, the dispossessed farmer will always be able to avoid having to work for someone else by moving to another plot of land and is only likely to come and seek employment if the salary on offer is at least equivalent to that he can earn as an independent farmer. What is more, the payment of such a salary would leave the land owner with an insufficient income (Feinstein 2005, 51).

How, therefore, did the settlers deal with this situation in South Africa prior to the 19th century, at a time when the process of land expropriation was not sufficiently advanced to generate labour? The first means was through the introduction of slavery to the colony. Foreign slaves were introduced to the colony in 1658 and rapidly became an important source of labour in the two principal agricultural activities practised in the Cape, cereal production and wine growing. When slavery was abolished in 1834, there were some 36,000 slaves43. The second source of labour was provided by the Khoikhoi. In this particular case, it was not the scale of dispossession which forced them to seek employment on the white farms, but rather the loss of access to sources of water. For these nomadic pastoralists, the loss of access to already sparse shared water resources, led to the destruction of their society and their economy, and eventually forced their proletarianisation (Guelke et Shell 1992).

During the 19th century, the intensification of colonisation, the increase in the European population and the acceleration of the process of dispossession, led to the development of different tools to secure labour. According to Feinstein (2005, 34-35), the first response to the dilemma raised by Domar was “closure of the escape route to free land”. Continual dispossession became the tool of choice to deprive Africans of all means of survival other than the sale of their labour. But other tools too were used. In 1775, the system of indentured child labour was introduced in the Cape, before being applied, in conditions of quasi-slavery, in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In these two territories, the children, who were captured during raids, were given food and lodging but were not paid. The girls were employed in domestic chores, while the boys were used as herdsmen or hunters. In the Transvaal, girls were theoretically freed from this servitude at the age of 21 while boys were released at 25, however, in reality, it often lasted much longer (Feinstein 2005, 53).

It is also worth mentioning the introduction in the sugar cane plantations of Natal, in 1860, of indentured labourers imported from India, thereby emulating the policy adopted in the West Indies after the abolition of slavery. Between 1860 and 1911 (when the import of workers ceased), this Indian labour accounted for about 70% of the labour in the sugar plantations (Feinstein 2005, 54 ; Richardson 1986, 129-175)44. A system of labour tax or tribute, as well as the use of prison labour also provided labour for civil engineering works, as well as for farm work.

In the absence of means of coercion such as slavery, forced labour or temporary servitude, other tools needed to be developed to force people to sell their labour. Two further means were developed in South Africa. The first was the implementation of taxation in the form of

43 This figure may appear derisory – and Feinstein (2005, 51) is right to stress that the servile population in the United States numbered nearly 4 million on the eve of the Civil War (that is grosso modo 35% of the total population) – but when compared with the size of the European population (66,000 people in 1832) and given the absence of a suitable staple crop for export, the size of this population seems a little less ridiculous.
44 Once they had completed their terms of work, most of the Indian labourers chose to remain in South Africa. At the start of the 20th century a similar experience of short duration (1904-1906) was attempted in the mining industries of Witwatersrand, but using labour imported from China.
hut or poll taxes. The first hut tax was introduced to Natal in 1849, and doubled in 1875. At first, these taxes were levied in the reserves or territories granted to Africans, later they were extended to the “squatters” living on lands to which the Europeans staked a claim, as well as to those living on land belonging to the Crown. The second was the introduction of strict controls on the movement of labour through the introduction of the pass laws. Originally intended as a means of keeping tabs on and limiting the migration of people into the Cape province, the pass laws were later extended to the whole of South Africa to tie workers to their employers. They were reinforced by the adoption of the Masters and Servants Acts which made breaking a contract a criminal offence. The first Masters and Servants Ordinance, passed in 1841, was in many ways a response to the abolition of slavery. However, it was the new Masters and Servants Act adopted in the Cape in 1856 which served as a model for the laws that were subsequently introduced in Natal and the Boer Republics (Feinstein 2005, 56-57; Chanock 2004, 338-364).

During the 19th century, the Africans who worked on settler farms, did so according to three principal modes of exploitation: rent tenancy, sharecropping and labour tenancy. Under the rent tenancy system, also known as ‘kaffir farming’, a usually absent landlord allowed an African farmer to work his land in exchange for rent. This system of rental of European land was very widespread at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Under the sharecropping system, the tenant (sharecropper) agreed to farm the land on condition that he share the fruits of his labour with the owner. In the South African case, the sharecropper provided all the means of production, barring the land (which is usual) and handed over half or more of the harvest to the landowner (40% in Algeria). The third means of exploitation, the labour tenancy, consisted of a “type of feudal relationship” in which the landowner allowed the farmer and his family to live on his land, cultivate a small plot and put his livestock out to pasture, in exchange for a certain amount of labour. The tenant was paid a small fee either in cash or in kind.

Little by little, the sharecropping and labour tenancy systems gave way to the rent tenancy system which became the dominant means of exploitation from 1913 until the end of the Second World War when, with the mechanisation of agriculture, salaried labour became the norm (Feinstein 2005, 60-62).

Many of the tools elaborated in South Africa to reduce the utility of the African farmers were also in place in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya. However, it is worth pausing for a while and talking about the creation of reserves, which were conceived partly for protection purposes (in order to reserve lands for the exclusive use of the Africans and partly to maintain pre-colonial structures), but also partly with more vested interests in mind (to free up a portion of the African labour force). The first reserves were established in Southern Rhodesia in 1896, while in Kenya, they were tabled for discussion in 1905 and the governor received the go-ahead to create them in 1915.

The colonial governments also introduced a series of taxes which were partly aimed at

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45 Utility in this context means the level of satisfaction achieved by an individual whether he is toiling on his own land or on that of a European landowner.

46 The role of the reserves and the vision that the colonial administration had of them were often ambivalent. Provided they were small, the reserves could also be seen as a potential source of labour for white farming. See on this subject (Palmer 1977, passim; Berman 1990, 150-151). This ambivalence or ambiguity also reflects the tensions which existed within the State or colonial government which was torn not only between European and African interests, but also between the interests which divided the settlers themselves.
financing colonial infrastructures, and partly aimed at subjugating the African populations, but which also aimed to encourage African farmers to enter the labour market (Berman 1990, 149). Hut tax was introduced in Kenya in 1901-02 and doubled in 1914. Poll tax (a local tax on each inhabitant) was levied for the first time in 1905. Hut tax was introduced in Southern Rhodesia in 1894 and replaced in 1904 by the poll tax which doubled the amount levied (Arrighi 1970, 208; Kosmin 1977, 274).

It is also worth mentioning the hardening of working conditions on the European farms and the increasing control over the movement of workers. Draconian conditions were imposed on the workforce. Between 1915 and 1946 in Kenya, and 1902 and 1958 in Southern Rhodesia, Africans who left the reserves were forced to carry a pass book (pass laws) (Mosley 1983, 135). The aim of this was to keep African wages as low as possible, at a time when the shortage of labour would tend to push them up. For Berman and Lonsdale, this was the cornerstone to controlling labour (Berman 1992, 112-113). In Southern Rhodesia the pass laws were applied above all to the mining sector. The pass laws enabled the authorities to control paid labour. A similar system was put in place to control the “sharecroppers” in the event of a shortage of labour (Deininger 1995, 509).

Along with the salaried workers, who tended to be employed on the coffee plantations of the Eastern Highlands and on the sisal plantations at low altitudes, squatters constituted a second source of labour for the Europeans in Kenya. These were workers who came to live with their families on the European properties and who, in exchange for a fixed term period of work in the fields of the settlers, and for very low wages, were granted the right to cultivate a small tract of land for themselves and to graze their livestock. Squatters constituted the largest workforce in the White Highlands where settlers without huge amounts of capital cultivated corn and raised cattle.

Right up until the end of the First World War the conditions of squatters appeared more enviable than those of the populations of the sometimes crowded reserves. However, the adoption in 1918 of the Resident Native Labourers Ordinance led to a hardening of working conditions. To begin with, *kaffir farming* (a type of sharecropping system), which was widespread among the poorer settlers, was made illegal amid fears that it might lead to a recognition of the rights of African farmers to white lands. The 1918 law abolished the rights of squatters to occupy the lands and relegated them to a position of servitude. Thereafter, they were required to work at least 180 days per year at about two-thirds of the salary paid to employees under contract (this was valid for all adult males from the age of sixteen). In 1937, a new ordinance further seriously eroded the conditions of squatters: the land area given over to cultivation by the tenant was reduced as was the number of cattle they could graze.

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47 For more information about African labour, see Clayton et Savage, 1974 ; Anderson 2004, 498-528.
48 In Kenya, the *Registration of Natives Ordinance*, passed in 1915, but only implemented as of 1919-20, required every African male over the age of fifteen to register with the Administration. In exchange he received a certificate (*kipande*) with his personal details as well as those of his job, his salary and any rations received. The *kipande* had to be carried at all times when an African left the reserve. By the end of 1920, 194,750 certificates had been delivered, by 1931 this figure had risen to 1,197,467. This registration system affected practically the whole of the African adult male population.
49 For reasons of space, I will not discuss the question of recruited labour here; as an issue it is less central to my argument.
50 During the 1920s, attempts were made to substitute servitude for the tenancy system. Despite the refusal of the Supreme Court in 1923 and a rejection in 1924 by the Colonial Office, under a Labour government, and laws to forbid this, in 1925, a Conservative minister authorised the adoption of a new Resident Native Labourers Ordinance which simply reinforced the servile status of the squatters (Berman 1990, 148-149).
furthermore, the number of days owed to the landlord rose to 270 per year.

According to Deininger and Binswanger, the existence in Southern Rhodesia of an important mining sector reliant on cheap labour, required much more stringent measures to discourage \textit{kaffir farming}, including the forced registration of tenants, and the imposition of limits on the number of tenants allowed to work in farming. Landowners were also taxed for each person they employed, the taxes were increased for absentee landlords (Palmer 1977, 89-90; Mosley 1983, 20; Deininger 1995, 509).

Once again, it comes as no surprise to note that the situation in Algeria differed markedly from the “South African model”. Without a doubt the increase in the rate of land expropriation that started in the 1870s certainly had a strong impact on the availability of indigenous labour (Lützelschwab 2006a, chapter 7). However, it is more difficult to claim that there was a definite policy that aimed to seize the land with the express aim of freeing-up a pool of indigenous labour for the settlers; even if this is what some of them undoubtedly hoped for. In Algeria, the need for labour was not as huge as in South Africa following the mining revolution. Furthermore, towards the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century the Muslim population began to increase significantly. Finally, but above all, Algeria was very much more densely populated than South Africa.

During the first decades of its presence in North Africa, France’s policies were aimed at encouraging the settlers to cultivate the lands themselves, and the French authorities did not look kindly upon those settlers who turned to indigenous labour to farm their land. Despite this apparent hostility, there were nonetheless a number of tax incentives put in place to encourage indigenous farmers on to the estates of the settlers. In 1849, the government decided to exempt of Arab taxes all indigenous farmers employed as sharecroppers on the European estates, living in houses and working under the supervision of the European landowners or their foremen (Bennoune 1988, 56)\textsuperscript{51}. It would appear that in addition, a further decision, taken in 1858, exempted all the indigenous workers (be they sharecroppers or tenants) working on settler lands of the \textit{achour}\textsuperscript{52} (Lützelschwab 2006a, 289-290)\textsuperscript{53}. Here, the Algerian case was in stark contrast with those of Kenya, Southern Rhodesia or South Africa where it was impossible for Africans to escape the taxes, or at least some of them, by going to work on European farming estates (Deininger 1995, 507).

The mechanisms for domination put in place in Algeria need to be examined from a more general perspective. The establishment of a settler economy implies the implementation of a whole series of measures that discriminate against the colonised populations, and which reflect the evolution of social relationships and tensions in the colony, not only between the settlers and the indigenous populations, but also within these two “blocs”. The mechanisms put in place to ensure a position of dominance in Algeria, while not as radical as those adopted by the “South African model”, were nonetheless no less discriminatory or effective. Without a colonial legal apparatus, the settler farms would have been incapable of competing

\textsuperscript{51} According to Pervillé, starting in 1851, the Ministry of War approved the general use of indigenous labour (either as sharecroppers, \textit{khammès}, or salaried workers) during the harvests or large-scale land clearing operations because of the high costs of French labour (Pervillé 2002, 34).

\textsuperscript{52} Koranic tax on cereals.

\textsuperscript{53} According to Claude Collot (1987, 269), this decision only affected the \textit{khammès} working on European estates; in 1872, the natives who were cultivating European lands were once again subject to the \textit{achour}. At the same time, (that is to say, beginning in the 1870s) there was an increase in the number of taxes levied on the indigenous populations (Ageron 1968, I, 256-265). The discussions that took place during the 1850s are the only ones of which I am aware.
against those of the indigenous farmers, because of higher production costs. Four major mechanisms were therefore required: (1) a reduction in the amount of land available for indigenous farming (including livestock); (2) differential taxation; (3) limited access to markets; and (4) restriction of agricultural goods and services to the settlers. By reducing the utility of the indigenous farmers or the produce resulting from their exploitation of the land, these four mechanisms, which generally had their basis in legal or customary rules, also ensured a ready supply of voluntary indigenous labour for the European estates starting from the 1840s-50s. Obviously, all these mechanisms which were in place in Kenya, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa deserve a more in-depth examination than I am able to engage in here.

Conclusion
A number of features distinguish modern settler economies from settler economies in Africa. First, the geographical location of the African colonies clearly limited the farming possibilities open to the settlers as compared with those available in the Neo-Europes, be it because of the tropical climate or the excessive aridity of the land. Second, the level of European immigration was much lower. It is worth remembering that the two African territories which played host to the highest number of European settlers were situated outside the tropical zone. But history may also help to explain this. Indeed, by the mid-1860s, South Africa and Algeria had each welcomed more than 200,000 settlers, who likely as not had taken advantage of the huge upsurge of overseas migration that gripped Europe during the 19th century. The colonisation of Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, on the other hand, which took place later, excluded them from this movement to a large extent. The low rate of European immigration can probably be explained by the afore-mentioned factors, to which can be added the forced coexistence with the native populations.

Third, the higher population density recorded in these territories on the eve of colonisation (in contrast to that in North America, for example), also altered the process by which land was appropriated. With the exception of South Africa, the figure of the frontier pioneer is all but absent. Despite this, only a very small fraction of the land grabbed by the Europeans was purchased from the native populations, virtually all of it in Algeria.

Finally (and fourth), it is worth highlighting certain aspects relating to the indigenous population. The “forced” cohabitation of the indigenous and European populations led almost inevitably (and this is something that I intend to develop further at a later stage) to the use of the former as labour for the latter. It follows therefore, in the first place, that these economies are not strictly speaking settler economies in the strictest sense of the term, where it is the European himself who works the land or raises livestock; in many ways it would be more accurate to describe it as a mixed system (where the intensity varies depending on the lands and the era). In the second place, the less densely populated the territories, the harder it is to secure indigenous labour (unlike in the case of landholdings). From this point of view, the cases of South Africa and Algeria and in perfect opposition to one another.

Finally, the forced cohabitation of the settlers with the African populations gave rise to

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54 For a similar approach to that touched on in this paragraph, see (Binswanger 1995, 2673-2677).
55 Free labour as opposed to servile or forced labour.
56 Let us not forget the desire of the State to limit the immigration of underprivileged people to Kenya and Southern Rhodesia.
57 For reasons of cost and competition.
periods of violence, especially at the time of decolonisation. We need only to think of the Mau-Mau uprising in Kenya or the Algerian war of independence to be reminded of this.\footnote{These are by no means the only incidents of their type, see Elkins 2005b, 203-22.}

Let us pause and consider the four African territories:

“Nobody can possibly consider exterminating the 3 million indigenous people in Algeria, or banishing them to the desert, as the North Americans did with the Indians; we have to live with the Arabs and mould them to our laws, get them used to our domination, and convince them of our superiority, not only through the use of our weapons, but also through our institutions [...] Pacification of the Arabs is therefore an absolutely necessary step on the path to colonisation, and seeking the means through which to achieve this, is to put European interests first.”\footnote{Lettre sur la politique de la France en Algérie adressée par l’empereur au maréchal de Mac Mahon duc de Magenta, gouverneur général de l’Algérie, Paris, Imprimerie impériale, 1865, p. 10.} (Napoleon III, 1865)\footnote{Ministère de la Guerre, Tableau de la situation des établissements français dans l’Algérie. 1844-1845, Paris, Imprimerie royale, May 6, p. 222.}

“Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty’s Government thinks it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if and when those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail.” (declaration by the British Government in the famous White Paper entitled \textit{Indians in Kenya}, 1923, \textit{loc. cit.} in Porter 2004, 264).

It was not by chance that voices like that of Napoleon III came to be heard in Algeria, as a reminder that adopting the North American model of colonisation was out of the question. It was probably no coincidence either if at the start of the 1920s the British Government reminded the settlers in Kenya of the rightful place of the Africans in the colony. Indeed, at the time when these two territories were conquered, both of them had considerably larger native population densities than either South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. This contrast becomes apparent again if we look at the proportion of landholdings appropriated by the Europeans. It would appear that geographical and demographic considerations play an important role not only in the distinction between modern settler economies and African settler economies, but also within African settler economies.

However, if we look at the methods used for colonisation, it is clearly possible to differentiate between the “South African model” – which is in many ways equally applicable to Southern Rhodesia and Kenya – and the example of Algeria. To begin with, in Southern and East Africa, the appropriation of a proportion of the landholdings was part of an attempt to prolong the conquest; in Algeria on the other hand, the appropriation of land by the settlers was much more gradual and only really took place in earnest after conquest, and particularly between 1870 and 1920. Second, the image of the pioneer or the squatter, which was all but absent in Algeria, played a vital role in South Africa, and only a more less important role in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya. Third, the French authorities wanted to intersperse the European settlers with the indigenous peoples. “In the interests of our domination, it is vital that we find a place for both these elements, European and indigenous, by integrating the Arabs among our ranks and assigning them to cantonments where they can trade in their precarious existence as users and become owners.”\footnote{Contrary to the other three territories where the settlers repelled the indigenous peoples using frontiers, and where colonial policy consisted of establishing clearly}
demarcated zones for the Africans and the Europeans. Following on from these three fundamental differences, a fourth difference can be cited: the desire, in Algeria, to create a market for the free trade of land between the Europeans and the indigenous populations, while the opposite philosophy dictated the policy of the “South African model”.

This fundamental difference between Algeria and Kenya, in both of which the European hold on cultivable lands was much weaker than in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, and both of whom had higher indigenous population densities, may seem surprising. All the more so given that Kenya, along with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, shared many of the institutions or mechanisms used to “create” the pool of labour required by the large European agricultural estates (or by the mining sector). Should we therefore devote greater importance to the institutions put in place by the settlers, or draw a link between the more coercive nature of colonial policies in Kenya (than those used in Algeria) and the small number of European settlers, both in absolute and in relative terms? There is no doubt that the role played by these institutions is deserving of further study. This will form the basis of the second part of this research project which will endeavour to undertake a comparative analysis of the development of settler farming in these four territories.
REFERENCES


