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Alice in Wonderland? Portugal and the attempt to enlarge the EEC, 1961-1963.

This paper explains the position of Portugal during the first attempt to enlarge the European Economic Community (EEC), 1961-1963.

The first section describes the Portuguese motives for seeking associate membership of the Common Market, after Britain in August 1961 applied for negotiations with the Community. It begins with a description of the Salazar regime and its European policy, in particular why Portugal was initially opposed to negotiating any agreement implying membership of the Common Market. Next, it analyses the economic reasons that led Portugal to change its policy option in favour of seeking to become an associate member of the Community, while initially excluding the colonies from this option. The section then concentrates on the political and colonial difficulties faced by the Portuguese with their application – and the ingenious solution found for the latter problem. Finally, it explains the three important objectives Lisbon sought to guarantee with association agreement and future membership policy option: economic development, the satisfaction of domestic public opinion and the safeguard of Portuguese foreign policy.

The second section analyses the attitude of the EEC members and Portugal's European Free Trade Area (EFTA) partners to Portuguese policy option of EEC associate membership. It highlights the delicate international situation of Portugal and the embarrassment caused by the February 1962 Spanish request for associate

membership of the Community. Next, the section explains that the cause of the delay of the Portuguese request for negotiations was due to the implementation of a free trade area with the colonies and entry in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Finally, it will try to evaluate the reaction within the Common Market and the other EFTA members to the Portuguese request – reactions varied from acceptance by Germany to rejection by the Dutch parliament.

The third section concludes that Portugal would probably have to accept signing a provisional rather than an association agreement.

I

This paper should be read in the context of the 1961-1963 overall negotiations between Britain and the Common Market and the flanking negotiations by the remaining EFTA countries (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland) as well as other requests for negotiations such as Ireland and Spain. The main literature on this period has emphasized that the flanking negotiations were dependent on the main negotiations between Britain and the Common Market, with the exception of Denmark, and had barely begun before they were suspended in January 1963. Overall the negotiations can be divided between the countries seeking entry (Britain, Denmark, Norway, Ireland), those seeking association status due to their neutrality (Austria, Sweden, Switzerland) or due to their political and colonial problems (Portugal, Spain). The main literature has provided a full coverage of the overall negotiations and of the individual countries with the exception of Portugal.¹ This paper seeks to fill this gap.

Portugal was ruled by the dictator António Oliveira Salazar from 1932 to 1968. The Salazar regime was an archetypal catholic nationalist right-wing dictatorship with certain affinities with fascism, like other southern and eastern European regimes of the inter-war period, though it survived until 1974 and became the longest dictatorship in Europe. In 1950 Salazar delegated European trade policy, although major decisions were taken at Foreign Trade Cabinet meetings presided by the Portuguese ruler. Consequently, Salazar could concentrate on the main political and colonial issues while continuing to have the final say on the European front. José Gonçalo Corrêa d'Oliveira was directly responsible for trade policy from 1955 to 1969, including the failed OEEC Free Trade Area (1956-58) and EFTA (1959-1960) negotiations. Previously a senior trade official, Corrêa d'Oliveira believed that isolation from developments in Europe

would have disastrous economic consequences for Portugal. Similar to the above negotiations, Salazar would take a backstage but decisive role presiding at the crucial May 1962 cabinet meeting that decided the European policy option adopted by Portugal during this first attempt to enlarge the EEC. Contrary to his negative views on political integration, Salazar was in practice remarkably flexible in European negotiations to safeguard Portuguese interests.ⁱⁱ

One of the objectives of EFTA was to negotiate as a block with the Common Market. Following the lack of response of the Common Market to this initiative, Britain from autumn 1960 onwards let her EFTA partners know that it would be seeking membership through direct negotiations with the Six. Portugal's total exports and imports from the Common Market for 1957-1958 were over 32% and 44% of foreign trade. With the entry of Britain, these figures would rise to over 49% and 68%. According to these official figures, imports and exports from the other EFTA countries were not significant.ⁱⁱⁱ Alongside the other members of EFTA, Portugal's future was very much at stake with Britain's change of European policy. All would have to negotiate agreements with the Common Market due to the importance of the combined EEC/UK market.

Prior to its 11 August 1961 request for negotiations with the Common Market, Britain requested the other members to make clear their views on the Community. The Portuguese position was made known to the other EFTA members prior to the June 1961 EFTA Council meeting in London. Corrêa d'Oliveira informed the other members that Portugal would not be seeking EEC membership because the 'multi-continental structure of Portugal (the Portuguese constitution decreeing that Portugal and her colonies were a single nation state), and the national guidelines behind the constitution and the administration made it difficult for the country to enter a supranational organisation'. In economic terms, Corrêa d'Oliveira considered that even if the favourable EFTA concessions were maintained, the EEC social policy would have more negative effects on the Portuguese economy than if the country remained outside the customs union. Despite these objections, Corrêa d'Oliveira accepted that an agreement between Portugal and the EEC needed to be negotiated and that the Portuguese government was prepared to compromise on common tariffs, specific harmonisation policies and the acceptance of majority decisions in areas where 'national interest and (sovereign) rights' were not involved. The objective of the memorandum is clearly spelt out at the end - 'the Portuguese Government is convinced the negotiation between the

two blocks is a path that we cannot abandon' because Lisbon was frightened of its weak bilateral negotiating power with the Common Market.^{iv}

At the EFTA Council meeting in London, the newly promoted Presidency Minister,^v Corrêa d'Oliveira, alongside the Swedes and the Swiss, once again attempted to defend block negotiations between EFTA and the Common Market. Failing to convince the British, these countries accepted the compromise that none of the EFTA members would sign an agreement before making sure that its free trade area partners were also in a position to do so. The so called 'London Compromise' agreed that 'the members of EFTA should co-ordinate their activities and should maintain themselves united during the negotiations... until satisfactory arrangements have been worked out ... to meet the various legitimate interests of all members of EFTA, and thus enable them all to participate from the same date in an integrated European market'.^{vi}

On 4 August 1961, less than two months after the EFTA meeting in London, the Presidency Minister publicly acknowledged that, to guarantee its economic development, Portugal could not afford to remain isolated from developments in Europe and was ready to join or become an associate member of the Common Market.^{vii} Corrêa d'Oliveira justified the change of policy by considering that the prestige of a government was not the result of persisting in policies that were patently wrong, but by its capacity to correct them, giving as an example Britain's decision to negotiate with the Common Market when the same British government had refused the same policy option three years previously. Corrêa d'Oliveira repeated that in political terms Portugal faced two particular difficulties – the colonial empire and the Portuguese non-democratic constitution, making it more difficult than for other European countries to accept a supranational organization. The Portuguese government was analysing a solution to these problems but already envisaged that entry would be restricted to Portugal, although the colonies had to be taken into account. In economic terms, Portugal had to guarantee a specific regime to safeguard its economic development. The swift somersault executed by the Portuguese government in relation to Common Market entry resulted from the fact that, despite its misgivings so vehemently expressed in June, it did not have an alternative European policy option to following the British lead. On 12 September 1961, the Economy Minister Ferreira Dias, echoed Corrêa d'Oliveira and considered that Portugal would probably have to follow the British lead and seek Common Market membership.^{viii} At the November 1961 EFTA Council meeting in Geneva, Corrêa d'Oliveira repeated to his colleagues that, although the Foreign Trade

Cabinet had not taken a definite position on the Common Market, his prediction was that the main line of Portuguese policy would be full membership of the Common Market, accepting the tenets and obligations of the Treaty of Rome.^{ix}

The Portuguese Foreign Trade Cabinet based its Common Market policy on a government report that was ready by the end of March 1962. Corrêa d'Oliveira charged a senior trade expert, José da Silva Lopes^x, to write the report. With the help of a former pupil of his in Economics, José Manuel Passeiro, Lopes completed the report in six months (October 1961-March 1962).^{xi} The report was in favour of seeking a treaty of association, as it was already the privileged policy of the government, the best policy option for Portugal and the best negotiating option. The major conclusion of the report backed Corrêa Oliveira: reaching an agreement with the Common Market was a *sine qua non* condition for Portuguese economic development, even if a heavy price had to be paid, as Portugal could not afford to be economically isolated. Repeating the warning of previous government reports on Europe, the 1962 edition repeated that the Portuguese economy was heavily dependent on foreign trade, Portuguese exports were heavily dependent on the European markets and an enlarged Common Market would have negative effects on Portuguese exports.^{xii} Given the less developed state of the Portuguese economy, the report concluded that association was the best policy option for Portugal.^{xiii}

The report argued that seeking association rather than entry would lead the Common Market to accept a 'partial European state', i.e. the report considered that a request for entry caused problems because of the European geographical requirement but that this problem did not occur with a request for association. Similarly, as the political criteria were less defined in relation to association than to entry, Portugal (although a dictatorship), by declaring that it accepted the political principles of the Common Market, stood a better chance of negotiating association than the EFTA neutral countries (Austria, Sweden, Switzerland) because it was a member of NATO. The report acknowledged that association was a transitory step prior to full membership. The final advantage for Portugal in seeking association rather than entry in the Common Market was that this policy option did not require the formal consultation of the EEC associated countries (i.e. the former colonies of the Six) – avoiding therefore their opposition to the Portuguese colonial policy.^{xiv}

The 1962 government report considered that negotiations with the Common Market were conditioned by the specific regime Portugal had negotiated under Annex G

of the EFTA convention, by the conditions negotiated by Greece and by the eventual negotiations with Spain and, above all, by the London Compromise. In line with previous thinking, both within the government and within the industrial associations, the report concluded that Portugal had weak bilateral negotiating power; therefore, the best trump card was the London Compromise.^{xv}

In May 1962, the Portuguese Foreign Trade Cabinet accepted the conclusion of the government report. The ministers agreed that full entry was not politically and economically feasible and that a trade agreement, under Article 111 of the Treaty of Rome, would not adequately protect Portuguese interests. Consequently, the Portuguese Cabinet decided to negotiate EEC association, under Article 238, and future membership after a transition period that could go up to fifteen years.^{xvi} Worried that the EEC faced difficulties in negotiating successfully with Portugal, due to the authoritarian nature of its government and its colonial policy, the Portuguese Cabinet determined, according to Corrêa d'Oliveira, that the 1961 Greek Association Agreement 'offered a suitable basis [for negotiation], but Portugal would be asking less', and therefore did not seek any financial aid.^{xvii} Furthermore, the Portuguese government would attempt to negotiate an agreement that would only cover Portugal during the proposed transition period, after which the initial exclusion of the colonies was to be reviewed. During the interim period, the Portuguese government sought a waiver in order to avoid the application of the common external tariff to the colonies.^{xviii}

By postponing the colonial issue for up to 15 years, the Portuguese government satisfied the Portuguese constitution, allowed for the maintenance of the colonial trade preferences (if the waiver in applying the common external tariff to the colonies was accepted) and sought to make unnecessary any formal consultation between the EEC and its African associates. A further major advantage of postponing the issue for so long was that probably by then circumstances within the Common Market or in Portugal would be different. Corrêa d'Oliveira believed that after the transition period the EEC would accept either that the Portuguese colonies, alongside Portugal, could become a full member 'or the problem (would have) ceased to exist' (i.e. decolonisation would have to occur), an implication that Corrêa d'Oliveira was certainly aware of. It should be emphasized that Corrêa d'Oliveira sought to maximise Portugal's chances of successfully negotiating with the Common Market, leaving the colonial issue to a future date where in all probability circumstances, not necessarily positive for the regime, were different.

Even in an overall timeframe of fifteen years, entry of the Portuguese colonies with Portugal as a full member of the Common Market was highly implausible.^{xix} Either Corrêa d'Oliveira sincerely believed that circumstances could change radically within the EEC, which was unlikely or, more probably, that he would have to defend future entry of the colonies in the Common Market to uphold the constitutional unity between Portugal and its colonies.^{xx} In fact, the problem ceased to exist within the overall timeframe of the proposal: in 1968, the Portuguese dictator, Salazar, was forced to leave office due to illness; in 1975 the Portuguese colonies became independent after the Democratic Revolution of the previous year; and in 1977 Portugal applied to become a full member of the EEC.

In seeking associate membership of the Common Market, Portugal was seeking to achieve three important objectives – guarantee economic development, satisfy domestic public opinion and obtain foreign policy benefits. Throughout the period, government, industrial associations and independent analysis came to the conclusion that economic development was linked to Europe – leading the Portuguese government, when forced to choose, between taking part in developments in Europe and standing aloof, backed by the colonies, to systematically choosing the European option. This policy option had already been adopted during the 1956-58 Free Trade Area negotiations and the 1959 EFTA negotiations, and would be repeated in 1962, with the policy option in favour of associate membership of the Common Market – each time excluding the colonies from this option. The reason why the Portuguese government so avidly sought to guarantee economic development, even at the cost of sacrificing hitherto sacrosanct political principles, was to increase the standard of living and thereby social stability and the survival of the Salazar dictatorship.^{xxi}

The Salazar diagnosis leads us to the second objective of the Portuguese government in seeking an agreement with the Common Market: the need to satisfy Portuguese public opinion. The regime led by Salazar was noticeably weaker, having faced widespread opposition during the 1958 presidential campaign and an attempted military coup in 1961 by the Defence Minister, Botelho Moniz. Although an authoritarian ruler, Salazar was an able politician seeking to maintain his power base. In early May 1961, the head of the Lisbon Trade Association, Conde de Caria considered that Portuguese public opinion was in favour of European integration, and probably more relevantly, that there 'was great interest in (influential) private circles in his country' in reaching an agreement with the Common Market and adopting a pragmatic

approach to the supranational issue.^{xxii} On 19 April 1962, Salazar himself recognised that Portugal had to apply for negotiations with the Common Market, even at the risk of a negative reply, or the ‘Portuguese Government places itself in a very difficult position in relation to the public opinion of the country’.^{xxiii} Certainly, even the non-Communist opposition to the autocratic regime of Salazar appeared to be in favour of Common Market membership as a means of forcing the democratisation of the country.^{xxiv}

Although the most important reasons for seeking associate membership were internal – economic development and public opinion, accepting the limitations of the latter within the dictatorship – the external political objectives were also relevant. Similar to EFTA, associate membership of the Common Market meant that Portugal would be tied to an organization of industrially advanced nations – and therefore the country could justify its colonial role as seeking to develop its colonies. By the time of the Common Market negotiations this objective was even more important for it broke the international isolation Portugal increasingly suffered after the outbreak of war in the colonies in 1961. Furthermore, Lisbon would certainly try to claim that associate membership represented acceptance by the Common Market of the Portuguese colonial policy, as it construed that entry in GATT represented international recognition of the political unity of Portugal and her colonies.^{xxv} The second major political advantage of the Common Market was that Lisbon, and indeed the other members of the Seven, hoped the entry of EFTA members would lead the Common Market in the direction of the de Gaulle concept of an Europe des Patries, i.e. the Community, in practice, would become an intergovernmental organization. The third major political advantage of membership of the Common Market was probably the most important of all, and still applies today. Even if an Europe des Patries was not to come about, it was a better policy option to be a minor member of the supranational Common Market than to remain outside, and be subject to the organization’s decisions in the light of Portuguese foreign trade dependence on the enlarged Community.

II

Portugal was in a delicate international position. In January 1961, the hijack of the Portuguese liner Santa Maria by a joint Spanish-Portuguese opposition group, had drawn attention to the authoritarian nature of the Iberian countries. On 4 February of the same year, war broke out in Angola. On 17 December, India invaded the Portuguese colonies in India. Portugal’s colonial policy was very much in evidence, and the authoritarian nature of its regime was further highlighted by Spain’s request for

negotiations with the Common Market on 9 February 1962. The attention drawn to Franco's regime within the Six reflecting unfavourably on the Salazar regime next door.

Diplomatic circles in Brussels attributed the delay in the Portuguese request for negotiations (4 June 1962) to the furore caused by Spanish request for talks (9 February 1962) reflecting negatively on the Portuguese negotiating position. Unquestionably, the Spanish request for negotiations had embarrassed the Portuguese, as it indirectly drew attention to the fact that Portugal was also a dictatorship, when international attention was focused on the country due to the outbreak of war in the colonies. Moreover, both economies and the level of economic development were similar, further linking the position of both countries in future negotiations with the EEC, when Portugal was seeking to benefit from the London Compromise and be a part of the EFTA wave of negotiations. There was the perception both among the Six and Lisbon that Spain sought to obviate its own negotiating difficulties by demanding similar treatment to Portugal.

However, Portugal had different reasons for being the second from last EFTA country to apply for negotiations with the Common Market (Norway handed in its request ten days later, on 14 June 1962).^{xxvi} First, the Portuguese cabinet was concerned with the outbreak of the colonial war in Angola and with the loss of Goa to India, leaving little opportunity to discuss Portugal and the Common Market. Second, the slowness, disorganization, in fighting and lack of resources of the government and of the bureaucracy were a serious problem. Corrêa d'Oliveira was not only responsible for Common Market negotiations, but simultaneously for the implementation of a free trade area between Portugal and her colonies (known as the Portuguese Single Market), as well as negotiating entry in GATT. On the other hand, the lack of efficiency of the government bureaucracy resulted, for example, in Portugal only having a diplomatic representative to the Common Market from 1 June 1962, three days prior to the request for negotiations and almost a year after the British request for negotiations. The Portuguese ambassador was Calvet Magalhães, who continued to be the Portuguese OEEC delegate in Paris. This lack of efficiency was compounded by the fact that until January 1962, Portugal did not have diplomatic staff in Brussels dealing exclusively with the negotiations. From that date onwards, until the end of the negotiations, there was only one full-time diplomat in Belgium for this task, initially without any expertise on the Common Market.^{xxvii} Third, the Portuguese request for negotiations was delayed by the implementation of the Portuguese Single Market on 1 January 1962 and the

adhesion to GATT on 6 May 1962. By setting up a free trade area with the colonies and being accepted as a member of GATT, Portugal thought that it was able to maintain its colonial trade preferences without the Common Market (and indeed any other member of the Agreement) seeking to demand similar concessions. In propaganda terms, Lisbon argued that the implementation of the Portuguese Single Market - planned for within ten years – meant that the Portuguese colonies would eventually be in economic condition to become part of the Common Market.^{xxviii} Portugal was also concerned that were it not a member of GATT it might be forced by the Common Market to negotiate concessions that were unlikely as a member of a multilateral trade agreement. On the other hand, membership was also considered to facilitate negotiations, and indeed had been an exigency of the other EFTA members, as they wanted the Stockholm convention recognised by GATT.^{xxix}

Contrary to the other EFTA members that were invited to make their opening statements, the Portuguese request for negotiations only received a formal acknowledgement. The cool reception from the Commission and majority of Foreign Ministers of the Six stemmed from the recent outbreak of war in the colonies rather than from Portugal's non-democratic regime. In fact, when visiting the capitals of the Six in October and November 1962 to counter this negative reaction, Corrêa d'Oliveira was warned by the head of the Commission, Walter Hallstein, and individual governments of the Six to avoid any reference to the colonies in future talks.^{xxx} On 19 December 1962, the Common Market Ministers agreed to an exploratory meeting with Portugal on 11 February 1963, although they made clear that it did not constitute the start of negotiations. The opening statements by Norway and the EFTA neutrals had taken place by September 1962 (reinforcing the analysis that the Common Market was distinctly cool towards Portugal).^{xxxi} The meeting with Portugal was postponed after president de Gaulle, fearful of losing the overriding influence of France within the Common Market, vetoed British membership leading to the collapse of all other flanking applications.

In January 1962, the Common Market parliamentary assembly laid down the conditions for membership for a candidate country: geographically part of Europe; a minimum degree of industrialisation; political guarantees including democracy and participation within western defensive organisations; and acceptance of the Treaty of Rome. In particular, the majority of parliamentarians were vehemently opposed to association with countries unwilling to share the political ideas inspiring the Rome Treaty. Portugal presented problems virtually in all fronts, in particular, the continued

colonial policy that was increasingly unpopular among the general public opinion and the socialist parties of the Six.^{xxxii} On the positive side, the developing Portuguese economy could be adequately protected by seeking an association treaty similar to that of Greece; the country was a member of NATO, the Portuguese government was prepared to fully accept all the obligations of the Treaty of Rome,^{xxxiii} and the London Compromise meant that the other EFTA members, in particular Britain, were morally bound to ensure that adequate terms were negotiated with Portugal.

Hallstein believed that the Six were unable to ignore the opposition from important sectors of their public opinion – and that the outbreak of the colonial war, in particular, was prejudicial to Portugal. This sceptical attitude was matched by other sources within the Commission, who pointed to the authoritarian regime and the continued colonial policy. The Community would not accept that after a transition period the Portuguese colonies became part of the Treaty of Rome. Near the end of the negotiations, on 11 December 1962, the Ministers of the Six considered that prospects were good for Denmark and Norway if negotiations with Britain were successful, but that the neutrals and Portugal faced considerable difficulties.^{xxxiv}

Opposition to Portugal and Spain arose mainly from among the Socialist and Communist parties and trade unions, in particular in Holland, Belgium and Italy, with an attempt by April 1962 to organize a common front against Iberian membership. That same month, the Portuguese dictator, Salazar, accepted that the main opposition came from these quarters. In July 1962, the executive committee of the European Trade Unions was also opposed to establishing any negotiations with Spain and Portugal.^{xxxv}

In Holland, the overwhelming opinion within parliament, the trade unions and the press was opposed to any agreement with Spain and Portugal. During a debate in the lower house on 13 and 14 June 1962, a socialist motion was soundly approved calling on the Dutch government to consider that democracy was a pre-condition of membership. During the debate, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, only admitted that he was conscious of the difficulties posed by the candidatures of Spain and Portugal, although he was privately in favour of negotiations. British diplomatic sources had considered that the Dutch government was not opposed to reaching an agreement with the Portuguese. On the economic front, the Central Body of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries (representing the trade and industry, agriculture, banking and transport sectors), on 15 November 1962 welcomed Spain's request for association with the Common Market, following intensive pressure from Spanish

authorities (threatening, for example, to pull the plug on profitable Dutch investments in Spain, in particular against Philips).^{xxxvi}

Although the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, was also privately in favour of negotiating a treaty of association, by June 1962 there was obdurate opposition within parliament, both from the Christian Democrats and the Socialists, as well as opposition from the Catholic and the Socialist trade unions. According to British sources, the socialist members of the Belgium coalition government found it difficult to support entry or association of the Iberian countries. Luxembourg gave little or no consideration to the issue of Iberian membership. British officials judging that the country was opposed to membership but might be prepared to accept associate membership.^{xxxvii}

The prevailing mood in Italy was contrary to Portugal, with demonstrations against membership in front of the Portuguese Embassy. Within the government the Foreign Trade Minister, Luigi Pretti, and the Budget Under-Secretary were firmly opposed to peninsular membership on political grounds. The Italian government also appeared to oppose membership on economic grounds, as Portugal and, in particular, Spain represented serious rivals to their agricultural produce. Rome also sought with this opposition to reap economic benefits in Africa and within the third world in general. In the Italian parliament, the left was firmly opposed while the prevailing mood amongst the Christian Democrats was also negative. However, EFTA diplomats in Rome believed that the final attitude of the Italian government depended on the position adopted by France and Germany.^{xxxviii} Throughout the negotiations, the threat of the African countries pressuring the Six against Portugal was also a distinct possibility. Spaak warned the Portuguese that the African countries could threaten with economic sanctions against European investment. An unlikely event, as these countries were dependent on external investment to develop their economies.^{xxxix}

Within the Common Market, the main support for Portugal and Spain came from France and Germany. In 1957, the head of the European Integration Policy section of the German Foreign Ministry, Hartlieb, promised full German support were Portugal to seek to join the Common Market.^{xl} During the 1961-1963 negotiations, German support was reiterated. In July 1962, the German Finance Minister, Ludwig Erhard, publicly backed entry of all Western European countries to the Common Market, including Spain and Portugal. 'I am convinced that these countries should be included in the EEC'.^{xli} From the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the German government was in favour

of including within the Common Market the countries of Western Europe even in the face of political or economic difficulties. Although there were altruistic motives behind this policy and an attempt to seek redemption for World War II, other important motives were that the Germans believed that in political terms western unity was the best policy in the face of the Soviet threat, and in economic terms that their economy benefited from an expanded Common Market. In the case of the Iberian countries, the Germans thought Common Market membership would inevitably result in the liberalization of their authoritarian regimes. The Germans were clearly and unequivocally in favour of Spanish and Portuguese membership of the Common Market, although warning the Portuguese in January 1962 that Common Market membership was not open for the Portuguese colonies.^{xlii} In fact, German policy in favour of Portugal becoming a Common Market member changed in the second half of the 1960s, with Erhard, by then German chancellor, considering by August 1966 that Common Market membership was impossible for Portugal due to its continued colonial policy.^{xliii}

The French also appeared to support Portugal. On 6 May 1961, French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, informed Salazar that, if Portugal was not successful in Africa, the country could count on French backing in favour of a European policy option. That same month, the director for Economic and Financial Affairs in the French Foreign ministry, Olivier Wormser, believed that Portugal did not face particular difficulties, although some special arrangements might be necessary on the lines of the Stockholm Convention. Couve de Murville informed Corrêa d'Oliveira in May 1962 that he did not predict that Portugal faced particular negotiating difficulties and in June, as President of the Common Market Council, he was favourable to the Portuguese request for negotiations. In November, the French also urged that the Portuguese request for a meeting should be accepted and equally pressed for the Spanish to be heard. Despite this apparently favourable attitude, the French would only take a definitive position in relation to the Iberian countries once the negotiations with Britain had been settled.^{xliv} On the other hand, after de Gaulle's veto there appeared to be a French drive for Spanish and Portuguese friendship and military co-operation.^{xlv}

Within EFTA, the Norwegian government had initially considered that it faced no domestic problems in accepting Portugal as a member or associate of the Common Market and that the London Compromise covered the country. Public opinion in Norway was contrary to Spanish membership of the Common Market and, from May 1962 onwards, following the signs of internal opposition in Portugal, also came to

oppose membership for the smaller Iberian country, leading the Norwegian government to reserve its position on the issue. The Norwegian left-wing parties believed, contrary to the attitude adopted by Germany, that by refusing Iberian membership they pressured the authoritarian regimes to liberalize. According to its Foreign Minister, Bruno Kreisky, Austria did not take sides in relation to the issue of Portuguese membership. For Denmark and Sweden, the Portuguese application did not create any problems; senior officials from the foreign ministries considering respectively that membership of NATO and the London Compromise justified their favourable attitude.^{xlvi}

The main support for Portugal within EFTA came from Britain and Switzerland. Throughout the negotiations, the Swiss were prepared to help the Portuguese negotiate with the Common Market, as they had done during the 1959 EFTA negotiations in Stockholm. The Swiss Foreign Minister, Traugott Wahlen, believed that the problem of Swiss neutrality posed greater negotiating problems than the Portuguese colonies, although he also believed that the latter would become a serious problem for Portugal.^{xlvii}

Britain abode by the London Compromise throughout the negotiations. The promise by the British not to reach an agreement with the Common Market without the other EFTA members reaching suitable arrangements was maintained throughout the negotiations. Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, would reiterate this compromise on 11 December 1962.^{xlviii} The British acknowledged that it was to the advantage of the Portuguese to be treated as a member of EFTA because of the London Compromise.^{xlix} Like other EFTA members, Portugal was also kept fully informed of the British negotiations. Corrêa d'Oliveira sought the help of the British in the negotiations and received in turn the offer of technical advice from Heath. The Portuguese presentation to the Common Market on 11 February 1963 was to be discussed in detail with senior British officials.^l The British were concerned with making the detailed Portuguese negotiating position as realistic as possible, because of the country's weak political and economic position, to avoid delay in the British negotiations. According to British Foreign Office, 'the problem so far as metropolitan Portugal is concerned becomes one of cutting the Greek type agreement down to make it negotiable within a matter of a very few months' – namely in relation to the transition period, agriculture, industry, and the movement of labour. The British believed that the Portuguese would be unable to negotiate a tariff waiver for their colonial goods and, like Greece, had to accept the common external tariff.^{li} The British were satisfied that the Portuguese were pursuing

the correct negotiating tactics by not seeking as many concessions as the Greeks - in particular financial assistance - to develop the economy, as the Six, and indeed most of the OEEC countries, considered that Greece had obtained over-generous conditions.^{lii}

Two strands of British thinking on Portugal's chances of negotiating successfully with the Common Market can be found. On 10 April 1962, Sir Patrick Reilly of the Foreign Office reported, 'the Six are likely to view Portugal's application favourably as far as metropolitan Portugal is concerned. As a member of NATO and various European organisations, the Six are already closely associated with her and the economic grounds for her inclusion are strong'.^{liii} Heath told the Commons on 23 July 1962 that he did not expect major difficulties in the entry negotiations of Portugal, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, although political difficulties were to be expected for Austria and Switzerland. The EFTA Secretary-General, Sir Frank Figgures, reflected Heath's optimism judging, on 19 September 1962, that Portugal did face difficulties in reaching a similar agreement to Greece, although the Portuguese Single Market with the colonies could create difficulties.^{liv}

However, other senior British officials were sceptical given Portugal's authoritarian regime and colonial policy. In fact, the view from the British negotiating delegation in Brussels was that negotiations with Portugal would be more difficult than between the Common Market and the EFTA neutrals. The British delegates considered that it was highly improbable that the Community would accept the terms put forward by Corrêa d'Oliveira. A problem worsened by the fact that the Portuguese politician had publicly stated that his government would not accept less favourable terms than the other EFTA members (Britain, Norway and Denmark were seeking full membership while the EFTA neutrals were, similar to Portugal, seeking associate membership).^{lv}

French President Charles de Gaulle's veto on British EEC accession on 14 January 1963 led to the collapse of the attempt by EFTA members to reach an overall agreement with the Common Market. However, even the veto did not conceal the fact that the British policy remained Common Market membership and, when London was successful in attaining this objective, Portugal and other EFTA members inevitably had to reach an agreement with the Community.

III

Throughout the 1961-1963 Common Market enlargement negotiations, Corrêa d'Oliveira was noticeably upbeat with his EFTA counterparts, in particular the British,

on the chances of Portugal being able to negotiate a treaty of association with the Common Market. In public, Lisbon argued that GATT had condoned the Portuguese Single Market, the London Compromise safeguarded negotiations with the Common Market and membership of NATO weighed significantly in favour of Portugal. Furthermore, certain diplomatic sources within the Six appeared to indicate that seeking an association agreement was a realistic option. In private, both Corrêa d'Oliveira and the Portuguese government in general were deeply pessimistic. Oliveira believed that Portugal would be unable to sign an association agreement and had to be prepared to accept any agreement the Common Market was prepared to offer. Meeting in May 1962, the Portuguese cabinet concurred with Corrêa d'Oliveira that the Portuguese request for negotiations had to be deliberately vague - for if the objective of associate membership were made clear, the Common Market would reply negatively.^{lvi}

Moreover, negotiations were extremely complex. As the British were to find out, six favourable answers given individually by each government did not necessarily result in a Community yes – as the Six meeting amongst themselves did not have to obey diplomatic niceties. Second, the Portuguese request for negotiations on 4 June 1962 was not fully analysed by any of the Six as they were concentrated on the negotiations with Britain. In fact, in December 1962 Couve de Murville warned that there was no agreement: ‘that all these countries (i.e. the three neutrals, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland; and Portugal) should take part in an integrated European market The Six had not discussed this among themselves and did not know what solution they would propose, whether a customs union or trade agreement or something in between’.^{lvii} Although in private Spaak was optimistic in relation to Portugal, it appears reasonable to argue that his views on negotiations with the EFTA neutrals (shared by the French, the United States, the Commission and Jean Monnet) also applied - ‘complex, lengthy and not guaranteed to end in success.’^{lviii}

Third, whatever preliminary analysis undertaken by the Six, the decisive factor was ratification by their respective parliaments – the lack of ratification by one of the legislative bodies spelt doom for the Portuguese request. The evidence suggests that the Common Market parliamentary assembly, although only an advisory body at the time, and the Dutch and Belgian parliaments opposed associate membership, as probably did the Italian parliament. Further, despite the London Compromise, opposition from Norway might emerge, as all evidence seems to indicate that it would enter the Common Market prior to Portugal. Finally, history demonstrates that both Spain in

1970 and the EFTA neutrals plus Portugal in 1972, in fact signed trade and not association agreements – in the case of Portugal after again trying to sign an association agreement. Therefore, it appears to be conclusive, had the first attempt to enlarge the Common Market not failed, that Portugal would have ended up by signing a trade agreement. The only problem with this option was that the Treaty of Rome stipulated that a trade agreement could only be signed after the Common Market transition phase had ended – planned for 1 January 1970 but in practice brought forward to 1 July 1968. Therefore, a provisional agreement was probably the solution to the conundrum.

ⁱ See in particular: Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward, eds., *Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961-1963* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1996); Ludlow, N. Piers, *Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); George Wilkes, ed., *Britain's Failure to enter the European Community 1961-1963* (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Anne Deighton and Alan S. Milward, eds., *The European Community 1954-63: Deepening, Widening, Enlargement* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999); Alan S. Milward, *The UK and the European Community, Vol. I: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945-1963* (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2002).

ⁱⁱ For a digest of Salazar's views on European integration see Maria Fernanda Rollo, 'Salazar e a construção europeia', *Penélope*, no. 18 (1997), 51-76. For overviews on Portugal and European integration see (with the exception of the 2005 article, all fail to refer that in 1970 Portugal again attempted to negotiate an Association Agreement with the Common Market, opting for a Trade Agreement after the Six made plain their opposition to this policy option, due to the authoritarian nature of the Portuguese regime and in particular its continued colonial policy): Nicolau Andresen Leitão, 'Portugal's European Integration Policy 1947-1972', *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol. 7, no. 1 (2000), 25-35; António Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, 'From Africa to Europe: Portugal and European Integration', in António Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, eds., *Southern Europe and the Makings of the European Union, 1945-1980s* (Boulder: Social Sciences Monographs, 2002), 3-40; António Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, 'From Atlantic past to European destiny', in Wolfram Kaiser and Jurgen Elvert, eds., *European Union Enlargement* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 112-130; Nicolau Andresen Leitão, 'Um Jogador Europeu. O Estado Novo e a CEE, 1957-1974', *Relações Internacionais*, no. 6, (2005), 107-118. For a survey of the literature see: Nicolau Andresen Leitão, 'The Reluctant European. A survey of the literature on Portugal and European integration 1947-1974', *e-journal of Portuguese History*, vol. 3, no. 1, (2005), 1-12.

ⁱⁱⁱ EFTA, *Building EFTA, a Free Trade Area in Europe* (Geneva: EFTA, 1966), 21-26; *Diário das Sessões*, Nº170, 22-23 Apr. 1960, 738.

^{iv} ANTT, AOS/CO/EC-30, Pt. 2: Portuguese Delegation Memorandum, Annex to EFTA 82/61, 5 Jun. 1961, 38-42; Sérgio Rodrigues, 'Le Portugal face à la construction européenne, 1960-1974. L'amorce d'une conscience continentale', PhD thesis (Université de Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne, 2002), 97.

^v In Portuguese the full title was ‘Ministro de Estado Adjunto do Presidente do Conselho’. For reasons of brevity this has been shortened to Presidency Minister.

^{vi} ANTT, AOS/CO/EC-30, Pt. 2: Telegram Corrêa d’Oliveira, 29 Jun. 1961; Rodrigues, ‘L’amorce’, 99, 108.

^{vii} Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome reads ‘the Community may conclude with one or more States or international organizations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures’.

^{viii} Telegram Sir J. Walker, 21 Oct. 1962, FO 371/164721, Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office, London. *Diário de Lisboa*, 4 Aug. 1961, 1, 3; *Diário de Notícias*, 12 Sep. 1961, 2; *Diário de Notícias*, 5 Jun. 1962, 1-2.

^{ix} EFTA 36th Meeting at the Ministerial level, 20-21 Nov. 1961, FO 371/158243; Sir E. Cohen, 21 Nov. 1961, FO 371/158243; Sir E. Cohen, 6 Jan. 1962, FO 371/164735.

^x Silva Lopes was the senior Portuguese trade expert from the 1959 EFTA negotiations to the 1972 trade agreement.

^{xi} Interviews J.M Passeiro, Estoril, 1 Feb. 2002 and 20 Mar. 2002. British sources quoted by Rodrigues place the government decision prior to 23 Feb. 1962. Rodrigues, ‘L’amorce’, 128.

^{xii} The motives for Spain seeking negotiations were remarkably similar, as Guirao points out - ‘The Spanish decision to seek an arrangement with the EEC did not come out of conviction of future benefit, but from the necessity of avoiding the disadvantage of trade discrimination. It represented more the desire for continuity than for change’. Fernando Guirao, ‘“Solvitur ambulando”: The Place of the EEC in Spain’s Foreign Economic Policy, 1957-1962’, in Deighton and Milward, eds., *Deepening, Widening, Enlargement*, 358.

^{xiii} J.M. Passeiro private papers: Relatório sobre as negociações com a CEE (unsigned), undated (Mar. 1962), I-3/I-4.

^{xiv} Passeiro, Relatório, II-1/II-2.

^{xv} Passeiro, Relatório, IV-2/IV-3.

^{xvi} Sir Robin Barclay, 22 Jun. 1962, FO 371/164716.

^{xvii} . Greece was the first country to sign an Association Agreement with the Common Market (Treaty of Athens, 9 July 1961). The Agreement made explicit reference to full membership at a later date. EFTA/C.SR 18/62, 12th Meeting at Ministerial Level, 21-22 Jun. 1962, FO 371/164741.

^{xviii} ‘Record of Conversation with Dr. Corrêa de Oliveira, Portuguese Minister of State’, 21 Oct. 1962, FO 371/164722; Telegram Sir J. Walker, 21 Oct. 1962, FO 371/164721; interview with Figueira, 21 Jan. 2003; interview Adriano Moreira, Lisbon, 22 Jan. 2004.

^{xix} The only ‘colonies’ that are part of the Community are the French Départements d’Outremer (DOMs). Their small size and the fact that they possess limited rights within the Community do not make them a comparable example to the Portuguese colonies. The EEC, for example, would turn down the entry of Morocco, because it lies outside the European perimeter.

^{xx} Telegram British delegation to the Brussels Conference, 9 Oct. 1962, FO 371/164719; Telegram British delegation to the Brussels Conference, 9 Oct. 1962, FO 371/164722; Portugal and the EEC, 20 Nov. 1962, FO 371/164725.

^{xxi} The political motives behind Spain's application for negotiations were similar, 'Maintenance of economic growth, the goal desperately pursued by the Spanish political regime, imposed the choice. The terms of the official request of February 1962 reflects the demands of the politics of stabilisation ... that were considered necessary to provide growth with minimal social and political turmoil'. Guirao, 'Solvitur', in Deighton and Milward, eds., *Deepening, Widening, Enlargement*, 358.

^{xxii} Record, EFTA Consultative Committee, 9-10 May 1962, FO 371, 158237.

^{xxiii} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 210: Telegram Salazar 19 Apr. 1962.

^{xxiv} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 210: Lobão de Carvalho, 16 Jan. 1963.

^{xxv} On 8 April 1962, the *Diário de Notícias* would headline, 'the acceptance of Portugal as a member of GATT is regarded as international recognition of the political unity of the Portuguese territories'. *Diário de Notícias*, 8 Apr. 1962.

^{xxvi} Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge O. Pharo, 'The Common Market issue in Norway, 1961-1963', in Griffiths and Ward, *Courting the Common Market*, 237.

^{xxvii} Interview with Figueira, 21 Jan. 2003; Marcelo Caetano private papers: Letter from the Portuguese ambassador to Belgium – Eduardo Brazão, 29 Sep. 1967.

^{xxviii} The state-owned newspaper, *Diário de Notícias*, spells out clearly that the Portuguese government wanted to implement the Portuguese Single Market and negotiate GATT membership prior to seeking negotiations and that this was the motive for the delay in seeking negotiations. *Diário de Notícias*, 5 Jan. 1962, 1-2; Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático - Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (AHD-MNE), Lisbon, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: Telegram Calvet Magalhães, 1 Jun. 1962; interview with Figueira, 21 Jan. 2003; Passeiro, Relatório, IV-4/IV-5; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 210: MNE, 7 Dec. 1962; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 210: Telegram Portuguese Ambassador to Belgium – Vieira Leitão, 30 Nov. 1962; Telegram UK Embassy to Portugal, 2 Apr. 1962, FO 371/164705; *International Herald Tribune* 29 Mar. 1962; *Diário de Notícias*, 8 Apr. 1962, 1,5.

^{xxix} For GATT to recognise EFTA, all member countries had to be part of the Agreement.

^{xxx} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 28 Mar. 1962; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 3 Sep. 1962; *The Daily News*, 9 Aug. 1962; AHD-MNE, EOI 682: Corrêa d'Oliveira, 9 Jan. 1969.

^{xxxi} Opening statements: Norway, 4 Jul. 1962; Austria and Sweden, 28 Jul. 1962; and Switzerland, 24 Sep. 1962. Stuart Ward, 'United house or abandoned ship?', EFTA and the EEC membership crisis, 1961-1963', in Griffiths and Ward, *Courting the Common Market*, 209; *Maroc Information*: Press release from the EEC Council of ministers, 22-23 Dec. 1962; *The Times*, 5 Jun. 1962; Telegram UK Delegation to the Brussels Conference, 9 Oct. 1962, FO 371/164719.

^{xxxii} The Report of Mr. Birkelbach and the debate in the European Parliament on the political and institutional aspects of membership and association, 30 Jan. 1962, FO 371/16470; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 210: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 28 Mar. 1962.

^{xxxiii} On 28 February 1962, Corrêa d'Oliveira would write that 'the acceptance of the political and economic objectives of the European Economic Community appear to be ... a sine qua non condition for successful negotiations. AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 210: Telegram Corrêa d'Oliveira, 28 Feb. 1962.

^{xxxiv} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 205: Albano Nogueira, 29 Mar. 1962; *The Sun* (Sidney) 6 Jun. 1962; UK Delegation to the Brussels Conference - Barclay, 3 May 1962, FO 371/164709; Conversation JE Galsworthy with de Schacht, 8 Jun. 1962, FO 371/164744.

^{xxxv} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 16 Apr. 1962; Telegram Vieira Leitão, 27 Jun. 1962; Telegram from Salazar, 19 Apr. 1962; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 196, PT. 10b: Portuguese ambassador to UK – Rocheta 15 Aug. 1962; EOI 196, PT. 11a: MNE 29 Jun. 1962; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 214: Discussion of Application of Article 234 of the Rome Treaty, 11 Dec. 1962; UK Delegation - Barclay, 3 May 1962, FO 371/164709.

^{xxxvi} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: Portuguese Ambassador to the Netherlands – Ferreira Fonseca, 30 May 1962 and 4 Jun. 1962; EOI 210: MNE, 11 Jun. 1962; EOI 195: Ferreira Fonseca, 13 Jun. 1962 and 15 Jun. 1962; EOI 195: Rapport de l'application de la CEE (L'Espagne et le Portugal), débats dans la Chambre des Députés les 13-14 Jun. 1962; EOI 210: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 27 Jun. 1962; EOI 195: Ferreira Fonseca, 28 Jun. 1962; EOI 210: Telegram Ferreira Fonseca, 6 Oct. 1962; EOI 210: Ferreira Fonseca, 6 Oct. 1962 and 19 Nov. 1962; Telegram UK Embassy to the Netherlands, 25 May 1962, FO 371/164711.

^{xxxvii} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: MNE, 13 Apr. 1962; EOI 210: MNE, 17 Apr. 1962; EOI 210: MNE, 19 Apr. 1962; EOI 210: MNE, 15 May 62; EOI 210: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 18 May 1962 and 6 Jul. 1962; *La Libre Belgique* 2 Jul. 1963; UK Delegation to the Brussels Conference - Barclay, 3 May 1962, FO 371/164709; Telegram UK Embassy to Belgium, 22 May 1962, FO 371/164709; Telegram UK Embassy to Luxembourg, 25 May 1962, FO 371/16411.

^{xxxviii} UK Delegation to the Brussels Conference - Barclay, 3 May 1962, FO 371/164709; Telegram UK Embassy to Italy, 25 May 1962, FO 371/16411; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal, M212: Portuguese ambassador to Italy – Eduardo Brazão, 7 Aug. 1961; EOI 210: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 3 Sep. 1962; EOI 210, Pt. 11a: Brazão, 27 Sep. 1962; EOI 207 Pt.a: Portuguese ambassador to Italy – Lobão de Carvalho, 18 Dec. 1962; EOI 207 Pt.a: Telegram Lobão de Carvalho, 22 Nov. 1962; Rodrigues, 'L'amorce', 162.

^{xxxix} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 25 Jul. 1963

^{xl} Presidência do Conselho de Ministros (PCM), Lisbon, Estado Novo, CMCE, PRC 115: MNE, 22 Jul. 1957.

^{xli} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: Telegram Portuguese ambassador to Norway – Xara Brasil, 5 Nov. 1962; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: Pt. 11c: Xara Brasil, 5 Nov. 1962.

^{xlii} The warning was made by Muller-Armack, senior official of the German Ministry of the Economy, to Corrêa d'Oliveira. AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: MNE, 28 Feb. 1962.

^{xliii} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 445: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 31 Aug. 1966.

^{xliv} In Apr. 1962, Couve questioned about Portugal was reported to have said, 'it is not worth thinking about'. Sharman, 16 Apr. 1962, FO 371/164707.

^{xlv} Rodrigues, 'L'amorce', 74, 204; Franco Nogueira, *Salazar: A resistência (1958-1964), Volume V*, (Porto: Livraria Civilização, 1984) 232-233; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 196: UK Aide-

Mémoire, undated (10 May 1961); EOI 199: CTCEE, 11 May 1961; EOI 210: Telegram Portuguese ambassador to France – Marcelo Mathias, 25 May 1962; EOI 210: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 2 Jun. 1962; EOI 210: Telegram Lobão de Carvalho, 22 Nov. 1962; Telegram UK Embassy to France, 5 Jun. 1962, FO 371/164710; Portugal and the EEC, 18 Nov. 1962, FO 371/164725; *The Guardian* 1 Feb. 1963.

^{xlvi} Telegram UK Embassy to Norway, 24 May 1962, FO 371/164711; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 209: Xara Brasil, 2 Nov. 1962; EOI 210: Telegram Xara Brasil, 5 Nov. 1962; Telegram UK Embassy to Austria, 23 May 1962, FO 371/164711; Telegram UK Embassy to Denmark, 30 May 1962, FO 371/164711; Telegram UK Embassy to Sweden, 11 Jun. 1962, FO 371/164711; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 210: Telegram Vieira Leitão, 25 Jul. 1963.

^{xlvii} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 200: Telegram from Portuguese ambassador to Switzerland – Teixeira Guerra, 7 Aug. 1961.

^{xlviii} Portugal and the EEC - Richardson, 18 Dec. 1962, FO 371/164725.

^{xliv} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 210: Telegram Salazar, 19 Apr. 1962.

ⁱ Call by the Portuguese Minister of Finance on the Lord Privy Seal on September 4 [1962], FO 371/164718; Ross, 12 Oct. 1962, FO 371/164718; 'Record of Conversation', 21 Oct. 1962, FO 371/164722; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 214: Discussion of Application of Article 234 of the Rome Treaty, 11 Dec. 1962; Ross, 31 Dec. 1962, FO 371/164718.

ⁱⁱ During the negotiations in Brussels, the British had accepted abandoning their preference system at the behest of the Common Market. Although the timescale of this abandonment was disputed. Portugal and the EEC - Richardson, 18 Dec. 1962, FO 371/164725.

ⁱⁱⁱ Portugal and the EEC - Richardson, 18 Dec. 1962, FO 371/164725.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ Portugal and the EEC - Richardson, 18 Dec. 1962, FO 371/164725.

^{lv} Portugal and the Common Market - Sir Patrick Reilly, 10 Apr. 1962, FO 371/164709; AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, Portugal 1961/64, EOI 207: Rocheta, 25 Jul. 1962; EOI 207: Portuguese ambassador to USA – Theotónio Pereira, 20 Sep. 1962.

^{lvi} Telegram FO to UK Embassy to Portugal, 30 Mar. 1962, FO 371/164739; UK Delegation to the Brussels Conference - Barclay, 3 May 1962, FO 371/164709; Ross, 22 May 1962, FO 371/164711; Ross, 17 Jul. 1962, FO 371/164716; Gallagher, 28 Sep. 1962, FO 371/164719; Portugal and the EEC - Richardson, 18 Dec. 1962, FO 371/164725.

^{lvii} Interview with Figueira, 21 Jan. 2003; Telegram Ross, 12 Apr. 1962, FO 371/16476; Passeiro, Relatório.

^{lviii} AHD-MNE, Mercado Comum, EOI 210, PT 7a: Discussion of Application of Article 234 of the Rome Treaty, 11 Dec. 1962.

^{lix} Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain*, 105-106.