Working Power over Production:

Labor History, Industrial Work, Economics, Sociology, and Strategic Position

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June 2, 2006
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Introduction: Reasons, Consequences, Previews

Who will read this book?

Its subject is labor in conflict with capital in the modern world. Many who have picked the book up will now put it down. “…labor in conflict with capital in the modern world.” Just nine words, and already such sleepiness. Why read on?

The subject is so old, so rarely now on the mind of educated readers anywhere, so tiresome. Intellectuals figure they have heard it all before, and now that “the modern world” means “the American world,” they are sure the story is finally over: labor lost, forever. Capital does not read, but its big owners and managers do, and while they keep an eye on the conflict, they figure they have bureaucratized it, discounted it, hedged against it, and will always move a jump ahead of any serious problem. Labor does not read either, but workers living from regular paychecks do, and while they pay close attention to the conflict, they cannot agree any longer what to do about it, or if there is anything to do about it, but just suffer it. The labor movement, organized labor, unions, in the United States the AFL-CIO, insists on the conflict, but promises cooperation with capital in return, and seems able to do little more now than express indignation at its continual losses. As for the casuals, on-calls, and temps working at part-time jobs and part-time wages, and those who work at home or out on a job, but not for wages, housewives, freelances, independent contractors, the self-employed, and beyond them the marginals, informals, illegals, undocumented, the clandestinos, hustling a living however they can from day to day, and beyond them the unemployed, and prisoners, all labor’s own dreaded reserves, they all have other kinds of struggles to fight. How could a book on labor and capital interest them?

Besides, having written this book, I know it is not easy to read. It is mostly history, in pieces, as examples, and inevitably unresolved. It offers neither entertainment nor rebirth, neither survey nor instruction. It is as clean as I could get it of romance or illusion, about persons, causes, and ideologies, a book intended for serious students of a serious matter. It takes concentration to understand. It is an argument, as tight as I could make it (almost), to move the reader to recall or recognize the force of certain tiresome but mighty facts, above all labor and capital in the modern world, and to see through them, in the old idea of the division of labor, a new meaning of great, real power. The subject of labor in conflict with capital may be dead, but if not, if it is live, it is dangerous to the actually existing order of the world. The
argument here comes into focus on a now almost entirely forgotten concept, that modern divisions of labor, however they change in modern economies, have some technically “strategic positions” in them. Wherever these positions may be, shifting as they may, what makes them strategically important is that work there (skilled or not) matters much more than work in other positions (skilled or not), because it holds a division of labor technically together, in production. If work there stops, this forces extensive disruption of work elsewhere. And if the disruption happens in an industry “strategic” in production at large, this forces disruption across the entire economy, even internationally. Such power seems strange in the modern world. It is a power civil, invisible, and at work (of all places), not everywhere at work, but at certain, special places there, often not the obvious places, and if not obvious, not easily discovered either, and often not the same places for very long. Vastly ignored, it is a power of vital material importance in every country, the power to refuse vital force at particular places of urgent material necessity, in some cases to inactivate production essential to the national productive system, and let inertia force material disconnection and spread economic paralysis. Its reality is not easy to understand, much less believe.

Whoever may still be reading may well sigh, “Hard to read, and hard to believe? You bet. This is just a big strike, the old ‘general strike,’ only now he’s calling it the ‘strategic strike.’ May Day, shmayer day. Get over it. And if it’s such a BFD, why has everybody but him ignored it? Never happened.” So another potential reader puts the book down and moves on.

That would get wrong what the book is for. Let me offer two short explanations, like in a prospectus. The “strategic” concept here is not of an event, an experience, of reliving old, wild excitements or anticipating dramatic new crises, End Times for CEOs, CFOs, and CSOs, an Anarchist Rapture. Its premises are the actually engineered structures of leverage in a country’s productive installations, including its means of transportation and communication. Ideas of “strategic position” even at work will vary, so that there may be legally strategic, politically strategic, morally or culturally strategic, commercially strategic, financially strategic, or labor-market strategic positions, or several such positions at once; but these are strategic advantages brought from the outside to work, not built into the work. The strategic idea here is of positions at work on which the work at many other positions technically depends. The concept of a technically strategic position at work is of a position engineered into a material structure for collective labor, a position from which the technical leverage over the collective output is powerful, working power
over production. “Technical” in many circles has now come to mean something trivial, boring, superficial, procedural, something important persons need not waste their time on, should leave to underlings. I want to show it may instead mean something very important. The argument here, to show this strangely ignored, specifically technical power, which is also the power to stop production, is not about law, politics, morality, culture, commerce, finance, or labor markets. It does not resort to any such field to advocate any general or particular use of working power over production. Its concern is not to promote experiences, but to explain an obscure but always present ability to force material breakdowns and social crises.

Second, although vastly ignored now, workers’ technical power over production continually alarmed the public from its early applications in the 19th century until the Cold War. Because workers actually used this power often to broad effects, the notion of technically strategic positions emerged in public discussion in the 1890s. Because these positions matter most in strategic industries, a concept of them, the suggestion of a theory of the power in them, first appeared explicitly in the United States during World War II. And precisely because the practice of such power and the thinking about it go back so far, this book is mainly a history, to show how the thinking (through much fogginess and vacillation) reached a moment of clarity in the 1950s—then pretty much faded away. The reasons for the concern fading are easy to see. Since World War II much legislation and public policy have been to limit the use workers make of technically strategic positions, and much private investment has gone to abolish established positions by the adoption of new technology. Meanwhile the professionals on whom the serious public depends to form its views, the critics, intellectuals, and academics who might have analyzed the changes in technical power, have concentrated serious public attention on government and business. This is largely why the ignorance of workers’ technical power is now so vast: Mystified by the power of state and capital, the public does not recognize, neither does labor, that while the new technology keeps eliminating old strategic positions, it also keeps creating new strategic positions, if not as many, maybe more powerful positions, in the same place or elsewhere. But the workers in these positions, skilled or not, usually know their advantages. They may quietly apply them for special deals, and management, which knows them too, makes the special deals, until capital moves the operation, or trashes its technology for a new one, or goes into another line of business. If such workers in a strategic industry hold to broad commitments, they may so threaten “national
safety” and international business that they gain collective control of all work in the industry’s new technology, for broad general benefits, as they did on the U.S. Pacific Coast in 2002.¹

But I want the book to do more than make its contention about labor and tell the history of the concept key to understanding it. This argument about an ignored, invisible, vital working power of massive force may have the consequence that its readers, any of them left, will begin to think differently about labor’s conflict with capital. If they can conceive of technically “strategic positions” in production, in a plant, an industry, an economy, even globally, they may develop a capacity for generally “strategic thinking” about labor and capital. I must emphasize that “strategic positions” are only places, objects, or objectives, whereas “strategic thinking” is evaluation of them in the context of conflict. Just thinking about “strategic positions” does not amount to “strategic thinking.” Only if you think how one side or the other in the conflict could use these positions, to prevent a battle, or to fight to deceive the other side, or weary it, or flat destroy it, are you beginning to think strategically. I must emphasize too, “strategic thinking” does not mean the public agitation over “strategy” embroiling major U.S. unions for the last several months.

“Strategic thinking” (private or public) is not making lists of tasks or goals or hopes, which is so far all that have appeared for the AFL-CIO to resolve at its national convention in July 2005.² Debates over “what we must do” will not yield a strategy, but at best an agenda. Anyway a strategy is not a plan you simply think up and apply while the other side sits still. “Strategic thinking” means calculating the most probable powers and fields of the forces in conflict for the period you intend to fight, calculating what you can win or lose, deciding among your prospects what you most want to win in the conditions before you, what you have to win, and what you cannot risk losing, and devising a strategy, a general plan of operations, to gain all you can and avoid all the damage you can from a foe doing likewise. But as a way of thinking it means more. It requires at the very start that you think about the nature of the conflict, figure what kind of conflict it is, whether you can change its nature, or have to take it as it is. This is the biggest question about labor in conflict with capital, what kind of conflict it is, because it may be any kind involving free labor at a wage. It may be an individual worker against an individual employer. It may be several small groups of workers

each fighting for its particular claim against a small company, or a combination of such groups fighting for a common claim against three or four big companies. Or it may be many different sorts of groups coordinated in a large organization fighting for various claims against a huge corporation. Actually it is all these kinds and others, every day, in every country. And at its most general it involves much more, because, workers being human, free labor at a wage actually happens (has to happen) in the midst of all their other social connections and arrangements, involving many people who are not working for wages, or working at all. Ultimately labor’s conflict with capital is like a war of resistance against occupation, a great, long war in which there are several sides, frequent disputes on all sides, shifting alliances, but always the two great original enemies, ever developing new weaponry, intelligence, reserves, strategies, fronts, operational missions, orders of battle, tactics, for a war maybe without an end.

The metaphor is far from perfect, but not too much of a strain. Think of a war in a modern country occupied by a global power, where probably 80% of the 16-to-65 population support the occupation (at least accept it), banking on its promises of safety and happiness. Probably two thirds of the 16-to-65’s could not serve in the resistance anyway, for lack of the proper qualifications, most of the third who could serve stay clear of it, too worried about their individual situations to do more than grumble, and most of the rest are just struggling for a better deal under the circumstances, leaving only a remnant in militant action, who often endanger their families, friends, and fellows, but are continually recruiting, continually losing members, continually operating to defeat the occupation. On the other side are the occupiers, masters at distracting and reassuring the occupied, unable to defeat the resistance because they cannot abolish or destroy its source, on which the occupation also depends, but continually changing circumstances to undo struggles for a better deal, and continually attacking the continually regenerated militants. The war may end in a miracle: The occupiers’ promises of safety and happiness come true, and the militants give up; the occupiers mellow, so does the resistance, and they all live in pursuit of happiness ever after; all the occupied unite in support of resistance, overthrow the occupation, and make the country their own again; the militants find the right strategy, apply it, liberate the country, and put it right. Secular projections of the war tend to the grim: The war goes on practically forever, the occupation more or less in control indefinitely; the occupiers so mismanage the occupation that they lose control, the resistance takes charge, and mismanages the liberation; the occupiers so ruin the country that neither they nor the resistance can run
It, and among the ruins new, improvised organizations emerge, some to plunder far and wide, others to defend their local territories, maybe in time to confederate them. Without wonders force is inevitable, whether or not it comes to any resolution.

This is generally strategic thinking about labor’s conflict with capital, when you think technically as well as otherwise how both sides engage in contention so serious. But this kind of thinking has its consequences too, and they may be troubling. As you think how to fight such an occupation, or such a resistance, how to use labor’s technically and otherwise strategic powers, or capital’s power to divide them and leap ahead, as you think how at least not to lose the struggle, maybe to win it, even technically to win for good, as otherwise you could not win, and think what this winning would mean, you may ask new questions—decidedly not technical questions. You may ask as you would about a war, what the conflict is really for, who is it that the fight is for. You may ask, if labor could ever win such a conflict, how it could not mismanage the liberation, what it would have to do right, what its responsibilities in liberation would be, for whom is it ultimately fighting. You may then begin to ask in this great, long conflict who you are, where do you belong, to whom do you belong, which is your side, which side are you on, who is on the other side, who is alien to you, to whom are you alien. These are old questions in the conflict between labor and capital, questions of “consciousness,” as they used to call them, before they confused them with questions of “identity.” With whom do you share most in your clearest sense of a world in conflict? Your family? Your friends? Your fellows at work like you at home, or in your trade or profession, or at work where you work, the sisters and brothers there, or your colleagues? Or is it your company? Your business or industry? Your club? Your church, mosque, tabernacle, or temple? Your fellow faithful (or unfaithful) everywhere? Or are you closest to your neighbors? Your townspeople? Your fellow citizens? Or fellows under oath, in uniform. Or fellows on the street, or out of a job, or in prison? Or your color of people? Or fellows of your language or dialect? Do you line up with people healthy and sound, or with people disabled somehow? The young, or the old? The educated? The uneducated? Men? Women? Gays? Lesbians? Working people anywhere who may never be more than working people, however they work, wherever they work, whoever they are? Or the relieved, the protected, the established, the privileged? Insiders or outsiders? In this great, serious conflict, who are your comrades, to whom will you be true? And for whom will you and your comrades fight, only for yourselves, or for others? Who are your people? Who are “we”??
It is not an idle question, cheap introspection, if you have comrades. Having comrades, being a comrade, the word so hard to hear now demands reflection. One on active duty testifies: “It’s harder to be a comrade than a friend. It’s different than being a brother,” or a sister. “Friends and brothers” and sisters too “forgive your mistakes. They are happy to be with you. You can relax and joke with them. You can take your ease with them—tell them tall tales. Comrades are different. Comrades forgive nothing. They can’t. They need you to be better. They keep you sharp. They take your words literally.” They count on your words, act on them, and are frank in return. As the comrade here has lately praised another, now gone, “You never had to chase your answer. He said it to your face.” They have to trust each other, absolutely, because the stakes are so high, not their individual lives, not only their personal honor, but above all their collective honor, the good of their company and that of the people for whom they fight.

The serious question then remains, who are your people, the people to whom your comrades and you commit yourselves? In this great conflict, which capital cannot win (although it may never lose), but labor might win, who are “we”? And what difference do “we” make? If “we” are only family or friends, or other sorts of forgiving, mutually devoted folk, together you already have all you need, or can have, and will make no difference to the conflict either way. Bless your stars. Enjoy the mutual devotion; let your comrades go, let labor and capital fight for themselves; survive.

But if your people are a broader group or a movement of the kind typically formed in modern society, they may make a difference. It is a classic modern relationship, an association of passing acquaintances or e-correspondents or distant strangers who share some particular fear, interest, duty, purpose, grievance, creed, or culture, who cooperate from calculation or solidarity, maybe both, and are trying to move the occupying power to better a particular condition. Altogether these associations make a definitive difference. Struggles to move power to better particular conditions are democracy. In occasional coalitions and continual rivalry with each other, they benefit one group or movement or another. The gains divide the beneficiaries, and always rouse new movements from new fears, interests, grievances, and so on, more democracy. If a movement begins to cost capital too much, as technically strategic workers demanding more for themselves sometimes do, capital moves, leaves that area, and develops another, democracy’s freedom. These struggles are schools where your comrades and you pay to learn capital’s

power in perpetuity, its tight margins on hope and satisfaction, its end to history, because now there can be nothing really new under the sun, except in the market, then only to consume. You go to schools of magic and tragedy. The difference your people make, accepting the occupation, being grateful for investment, free in a world impossible to change, is to contribute to capital’s power. Not unless a movement technically powerful in production decided to better conditions at large could it threaten to reopen history.

If your people, the “we” you have at heart, are a uniformed civil or armed service, they have their associations too. But mainly they have their department, or their corps, and their unit, their company. And there they already have their comrades, among them yours and you. Between labor and capital these official groups make a great difference. Their struggles are somewhat like ordinary struggles, but in part radically different, because of their sworn public missions and essential duties. The services struggle with the public for the direction and resources necessary for them to do their missions, and against each other for public support and sometimes in the very performance of their duties and critical tasks. Since capital’s modern democratic societies cannot reach a consensus even on building codes, police discretion, or who takes charge at a big fire, much less on war or peace, the public cannot give the services clear, consistent directions or reliable budgetary projections. But the struggles between the services teach your comrades and you to respect capital, resent the public, stick tight to your own service, and institutionally distrust the others. These feuds cannot abate (except in public relations) through any Regional Emergency Management Plan, or even a declaration of war. In the civil services and the military your comrades and you witness the public’s abuse of the oath you swore, using your shared selflessness to cover its selfish schemes. You go to schools of loyalty and tragedy. Under the occupation the great difference “we” make is to protect capital’s safety, peace, and quiet. It is a difference strategically much less technical than political and moral. To take it away need not disturb production, but would disable capital’s government.

Think again: What if this occupied country’s society is alien to your people, or “we” are alien to it, because of color, language, customs, ideas, values, religion? For now, like family and friends, they make no difference to capital or labor, but in a crisis between them they may make all the difference. They struggle to survive against integration into modern society, to avoid dissolving into democracy’s movements, to keep their own integrity. Their struggles encourage alienation, are schools of estrangement from the regular rivalry for better conditions, schools where your comrades and you learn to make coalitions beyond
democracy's borderline. Your people will not join the resistance either. But they live near danger. On their reservations, concentrated in their territory, neighborhoods, communities, in their own movements, underground or up in the open, occasionally edging here into regular movements, there into the resistance, but never for long, they are at once more isolated, more exposed, more suspect, stronger, and more independent. In prison, where many are, some train together for bigger, more dangerous projects later, as mercenaries or pirates; others heal together, deepen their alienation, and turn like prisoners of war to organize their units, subvert official command of them, and leave them only according to a collective plan, militants of an alien cause. Most of your people cannot help contributing to capital’s profits, but insofar as they do not gather in technically strategic positions or merge their struggles into the others, they contribute nothing to capital’s power or to labor’s. Among them your comrades and you learn independent faith and hope. For now this matters only for the survival of deliberately alien communities. But in a great crisis this commitment to something beyond occupation and resistance, not stuck in the market, not for consumption private or public, but something different from the past, some alternative for the future, this would weaken capital’s defenses materially and morally. And if a major coalition of alienated forces allied with the resistance, they would have territorial bases and disciplined communities to support its taking charge. Most of all, more than any other of labor’s allies, they would provide the best guarantee that the resistance in charge would not botch liberation by settling back into that old democracy, inviting capital’s restoration, but fight beyond the end of an old history, into a new history. The difference “we” may make here, not from any technical position, but because of their independence, now allied as they are in the struggle, but not of it, confident that they can change history, would be to turn liberation into the making of a new world.

But what if your people are who they are only because of some objective criteria, people in principle and maybe all in practice unknown to each other except objectively? What if in particular “we” are one side or the other in the great conflict, capital or labor? Neither side is an association, although both feature associations, Citigroup, for example, or the International Transport Workers’ Federation. Your people are in categories, and in these in particular, capital or labor, not because of their feelings or thoughts or status or standard of living, but according to their connections to production in modern economies, either owning finances, means of production, hired labor’s effort at work, and the resulting product, or owning abilities to work and the compensation for it. Each side needs the other materially to be what it is. The
relationship between them, an alternating current of dependence and conflict, is there whether the people in the relationship know it or not; it is their condition and their situation regardless of their sense of it. Oddly, to know who “we” are objectively requires some subjectivity, independent thinking.

If your people are capital, the occupying power, they now dominate the so far existing modern world. Since private businesses are all theirs (saving weird exceptions), they own besides all their other means of production all the technical positions in production, including the strategic ones, and financially they can change technology or reduce or shut down an entire industry, annihilating massive strategic power, by a click on “send.” Their order is normal, which means democracy is normal, maybe perpetual (if not eternal), and resistance, being inevitable, is normal as well. That capital has protection is normal too, because of militants and aliens, but since history has ended, life without deep change is the norm, and it can stay so. To the degree “we” keep promoting leaders who are sound, canny, prudent, and enterprising, this regime will continue. Its two essential premises are capital’s freedom, to come, go, and make its own rules, and the labor market, or employment for a wage, unemployment, or self-employment. Your comrades and you, thinking for yourselves, may have time to observe capital’s virtues, its stupendous power to deliver things and action for sale, its sunny spirit, its dynamic energy, mobility, and short memory, its standardized measurements, its capacity to plan, motivate, concentrate, and innovate, its censuses, its pragmatic grasp of facts and details, its drive, determination, honesty, and accounting systems. To the degree “we” fall apart, swindle and defy each other, go hog wild, and promote slick or stupid leaders, this regime will crack, and your comrades and you may observe capital’s vices, its stupendous waste, its duplicity, greed, flightiness, and ignorance, its evasion of the costs of the damage it does, its awesome inequalities, its dazzling corruption of public and private affairs, its contempt for dupes and suckers, its absolute shamelessness. In the deep crises where capital might lose to labor, however, “we” figure “we” could soon return to rule, for another long round of democracy. This is capital’s difference in the great conflict, that your people will not lose for good unless they destroy the world, or let their enemy, labor, believe the world could work better without them.

If your people are labor, which most adults under occupation are, they mostly accept capital’s domination and continual divisions of them, to which they add their own divisions. The fattest and sassiest, “we” who own two homes, an SUV, and a sweet car or two, and a camper and a boat, still live only a few
paychecks from one house and a junker, and only three months more from a foreclosure notice and the repo man. But they are typically indifferent to the ranks of the less bully, “we” who live but five paychecks from the street, who are themselves typically indifferent to the unemployed, who look down on the homeless. As a labor-backed U.S. president once (reportedly) remarked, “It’s a recession when your neighbor loses his job; it’s a depression when you lose yours.” Without any union, bad or good, as most of labor worldwide now stands, “we” organize against each other to grab the lesser evil. In bad unions, rackets, “we” hold onto the lesser evil. In good unions “we” cut deals against each other, poaching contracts, trashing pensions, or taking two-tiered wages. An old story: To the degree labor remains divided, not technically or industrially, but by wealth or income, or politically, racially, or ideologically, or by religion, language, sex, or gender, so that fellow workers fight each other, some gaining, others losing, labor’s typical story, it remains in subjection. To the degree it unites, pulls capital into collective bargaining, and applies its united powers for a comprehensive good deal, it approaches economic democracy--full employment, low wage differentials, general insurance, investment in science, health, housing, education, and information--until capital gains more power, and reneges on the deal. To the degree the resistance uses strategic power in strategic coalitions to fight capital, for example, in alliance with consumer cooperatives, it removes production from capital’s to labor’s control--well, to some workers’ control, those in this production, managing themselves in league with their allies--until capital from elsewhere delivers better goods for less. In labor’s feuds, deals, and resistance your comrades and you may witness its virtues, its natural power to work, its pride in work, its capacities for organization, encouragement, and solidarity, its fortitude and long memory, its creativity, curiosity, inventiveness, and discipline, its discriminating sense of justice, its indignation at unfairness. So too you may witness labor’s vices, its resignation to the world, its touchy modesty beyond work, its passive, plaintive resentments, its nostalgia, grudges, sacrifices, and irresponsibility, its fears of militants and worries (whatever the movement says) about aliens, its fear of anything very different. In deep crises the resistance wants only to take charge, so that labor stays labor, except in charge; “we” would prefer capital’s return than not to be labor. What else but alien influence could move the resistance to coordinate strategic operations to change history? This is labor’s difference in the great conflict, that your people will not win for good until it dawns on them they do not need capital, they end their relationship
with it, and act on alien support and their own power to make the world new and better for all, even the wretched of the earth.

If you are still reading, if you have thought through these possibilities (maybe others too), and know who your people are, you may know more about your “identity.” And having seen who “we” are, you may begin to think, in this conflict, which neither side may ever win, but which labor in changing might conceivably win, what do you do about it? The issue here is action, not how I act, but what action I take. It is another old question, which they used to call “free will,” or “initiative,” or “choice,” and now call “agency,” although it is actually a question of fidelity, obligation, and commitment. It is a question to resolve among comrades, who will remind you what commitment means.

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Books of history vary in the kinds of stories they tell for the arguments they make. This one is a story of searches, my search into past searches for ways to explain, support, or overthrow the modern world’s economic order, my argument being that in the modern world labor (largely unawares) has the material power necessary to make a new order, so that if it decided to (some “if”), it could. At the end is a loaded suggestion about labor history, its use for the present and so for the future too.

My own search started for a practical purpose. I needed to resolve a question in my work on the country of my main professional concern, Mexico. This is the reason for Chapter I: Trying to teach modern Mexican labor history and write about it, I read for guidance maybe 200 modern labor histories about countries all over the world (as well as Mexico); missing from almost all of them was what workers technically, systematically, did at work. Here I show these histories’ typical concentration on “culture,” as if that alone defined workers. Even excellent books skimped on matters of production. The few that went seriously into them treated them like a ritual; they missed the technical relations. Until I understood how these happened and what they meant, there was much I could not explain to my students or myself. And I did not understand them until I understood an argument by one of the great U.S. labor economists, John T. Dunlop, about “the technical context” and “strategic position.”

Hence Chapter II: I wanted to know where Dunlop got such an idea, how he formed it into a concept crucial to explaining modern labor history and contemporary labor movements, what it meant and how it had affected labor economics. This search took me back into 19th-century Western Europe and
United States, when people began thinking of war when they discussed conflicts between employers and workers. Since I was searching printed sources, most of the virtual belligerence I found came from professionals at ideas, intellectuals, academics, public social scientists, private pundits. But often they were lifting the language of war from business and labor, and some of the language came directly from labor leaders. Typically the references were to “strategic strength” in the labor market, seldom to “strategic position” in production. About power in labor markets, Dunlop learned studying economics. About workers’ power over production he learned most as director of research at the U.S. National War Labor Board during World War II, when he had to report how strategic actual (or potential) labor disputes were to U.S. production and military operations. All his professional life, which lasted until he died in 2003, Dunlop taught at Harvard University about power in law, institutions, and values as well as in the market and at work. He claimed a theory that these different kinds of power meshed into an “industrial relations system,” but the lessons he always taught, from practice, were about the disharmony among them, the incompatibilities, friction, discrepancies, conflicts, obstruction, and the wise (and stupid) moves to overcome them or go around them. In practice he proved a masterly strategist in collective bargaining and arbitration, not only because he knew (or could find) where strategic positions of all kinds were, which powers either side could use against the other, and if either could win or both had better settle, but above all because in any dispute he knew what he wanted, to return workers to production at the highest levels of security and compensation the business could afford. So when Dunlop said “strategic plan,” he did not mean a wish list. He would have scoffed at a plan without a definite purpose, an accurate reading of all the “contexts” of power, agreement on where and when to engage the enemy, provisions for support, and leadership able to use the engagements for the determined purpose. Strategy in theory and practice is to change the balance of forces, maybe just a little, for a few, maybe hugely, for multitudes. Dunlop (to my knowledge) never considered the following prospect, but from his perspective it is nevertheless clear: Well-combined operations, if they included technical stoppages in the right order at the right time, could change the entire structure of power; technically strategic workers could change the legal, moral, and economic rules. No surprise, Dunlop’s concept of technical power went nowhere in labor economics.

From the Dunlopian perspective and respecting his rules, various notions now flying around the U.S. labor movement look naïve or worse. For instance, “density,” union membership in any workforce. Of
course the labor movement wants it, but density in general, unspecified, is like numbers in war, too vague to measure the power necessary to concentrate at decisive points. Where is the density technically? How strategic is the industry where it is? Is this density connected to others in strategic departments and industries? What makes these densities an effective alliance? What supports them, protects them? For another instance, reform of the law to favor the labor movement. The notion begs the question. If the movement is weak enough it needs the law in its favor, how can it hope to change the law? Appeals for justice against great propertied interests are not famous for swift or just results. Unless the labor movement will use labor’s technical power, its major power now, it will not gain the political power to force its legal changes, which moral appeals will then justify. For yet another instance, an economy with more “manufacturing,” in other words, more workers of the kind the labor movement used to organize by the millions. Quite aside from this notion’s fantastic quality, that by petition or command history (but just one stream of it!) will repeat itself, regardless too of the fog around these manufacturing plants (restored to make steel, more cars, rubber, or updated to make nuclear plants, digital servers, probiotics?), no matter the real costs most working people everywhere would pay for U.S. manufacturing dominance now, and forgetting the issue of just who would do these jobs, it is again begging the question. Actually, worse, in the United States in 2005, it is begging business, or the government, or both, for investments to rebuild the labor movement. This is otherworldly. And “otherworldly” is the right word. Campaigns to hog manufacturing (old or new products) in the United States pull the labor movement here politically and morally away from labor movements elsewhere in the world, even as tighter international economic connections offer the U.S. and other movements more powerful opportunities (especially in transport and communications) for technically strategic international cooperation. It is otherworldly of the U.S. labor movement now--whatever its members think--to act as if “we” were only U.S. labor. It would be still worse if it began to act as if it represented the world’s workers. But since modern production, including logistics, transport and communication, is now to a critical degree international, the U.S. movement in the interest of its own members (maybe despite them) must make international commitments, or betray its members, allowing them to betray themselves.

Dunlop himself did not enter these kinds of international questions. But he did compare several countries’ industrial relations systems, to explain how cultural, political, and economic factors, including
industrial and technical factors in production, go together differently in each country to make its characteristic “web of rules” for conflicts between capital and labor. For an example (particularly useful to me) of how his explanation runs, here in Chapter II I briefly compare the United States and Mexico between 1900 and 1950, to show why industrial and technical powers mattered even more in Mexican than in U.S. labor organizations until World War II, but splintered for political reasons at the outset of the Cold War, a disaster for Mexican labor. In tighter focus I try to show how Dunlop’s conception of strategic positions at work helps me understand my particular Mexican concern, modern labor history in the Gulf-Coast state of Veracruz between 1900 and 1950. This is a history of several struggles, of workers in several different industries fighting different kinds of companies, in different cultures of business and resistance, with different ideas of struggle, on different political leads, in different organizations of struggle. Without Dunlop I could give no more than a social explanation of these different struggles for power. But from him I can also tell which industries in the state were nationally strategic in the economy, which were key in politics, which unions were industrially strategic, which were politically strategic, where the technically strategic workers (skilled or not) were, and how they used their power, for broad causes or only for themselves and their racket. I can distinguish between social forces and material forces.

Studying where Dunlop’s concept came from, I saw the trouble scholars deep in the background had suffered over the idea of power in economics. For them, theoretically, power could not happen in markets or production. If power did happen, they argued, it fouled the economy; the market was no longer free exchange, production no longer a firm’s transformation of inputs into outputs for maximum returns. Of course they granted power really did happen, but they insisted their theory explained the essence of economic reality best if it ignored the appearance of economic reality, power included. I could see their logic, but it meant in effect they were explaining figments of their imagination. Power really has been essential to modern markets, in capital’s great corporations. And it really has been essential to modern production, in technically and industrially divided labor’s cooperation at work. Since there really are strategic positions at work, I wondered how far back before Dunlop social science had been denying them, and how much Dunlop’s argument, if almost completely wasted on historians and economists, had enlightened other social scientists over the last 50 years.
This is the reason for Chapter III. The first half is the story of my search through the most reputable theories of society from the conscious beginnings of sociology in the 1830s to World War II, hunting for any sort of concept of workers’ power in production, their power over production, because they can stop it. I myself was not trying to theorize anything, only trying to find anticipations of Dunlop’s argument. The second half is the story of my search through standard European and American sociology from World War II to the start of the current century, trying to trace the effects of Dunlop’s argument on contemporary sociologists, to indicate its influence on them. Like the stories of most searches, these are stories mostly of frustration, of finding one after another some of the highest-powered social scientists in the modern Western World staring right at the technically strategic point, but looking right past it, or confusing it with another, or wandering intellectually around it, almost stumbling over it, but missing it, or even getting the point, then losing it. After Dunlop explained the concept, for a while some labor sociologists took his point, but before long forgot where it came from, began to think it was theirs, forgot what it meant, and eventually let it go to pursue other problems. A few others caught the point themselves, even framed Dunlopian arguments, but to no enduring effect. That interested me too, why neither Dunlop’s nor any other argument about workers’ technical power went far in the field before it faded away. In part, less than labor economists, but still to a remarkable extent (and not on principle), labor sociologists generally avoided any question of power. In part, as Dunlop himself observed, workers staged fewer dramatic displays of their technical power. Because of the Cold War, legal, political, and moral constraints on labor increased, while the market promised jobs in reward for obedience, a promise labor largely accepted. But closer to the point here, the mainstream sociologists who grasped labor’s technically strategic power could not see (any better than the labor movement) what positive use labor might ultimately make of it, what a final objective might be, only more of the same. They focused on the question as long as it seemed scary, then turned to more interesting concerns. On Dunlop’s special turf, “industrial relations,” a kind of economic sociology, a few specialists remarked on the technically strategic angle, but without his argument’s point, or any vision of what labor could win. If a deal is the alpha and the omega, why think how far conflict can go?

It had already dawned on me that I needed to know if the Reds, European or American, had ever thought of technically strategic work. I set to reading them, and found they had, which explains Chapter IV.
The first to write about it was not Karl Marx, or Friedrich Engels, but a young intellectual in the German Social-Democratic Party in the 1890s. He did not call these positions “strategic,” but he certainly saw them that way, and foresaw capital’s “technical development” enabling European labor’s technically strategic workers to force revolutionary conditions. He was clearer than anyone else (but Dunlop) I had read on the subject, clear particularly about the strategic importance of transport and communications, above all railroads, the key to European production and politics then, and he certainly had a vision to far horizons. Following him I found European Social Democrats continually discussing strikes, not just for labor’s ordinary causes (higher wages, shorter hours…), but for radical political demands, mass action, social upheaval, bringing down the government. Social Democratic leaders debated strikes involving railroads explicitly in terms of strategy, “the strategy of overthrow” vs. “the strategy of exhaustion,” right up to 1914, the eve of World War I. I cannot enter their debate, but I do try here to show how they saw the issues of technical, industrial, and political power. Far more than any university then their organizations were the best in the world for teaching a grip on these questions. It is strange (though not for me to pursue) how after the war they lost their focus on them, as if they left them to the sociologists to answer, or not.

But what about the Russian Reds? After all they actually made a revolution. If I had read the West Europeans debating strategic industrial action, I had to see if the Russians had thought of it so explicitly, before or during their political action in 1917, or afterward. Hence another search, hence Chapter V. The short story is, no, the Russians did not think of it so explicitly, at least not until the 1920s. Before 1917 Vladimir Lenin had a very strategic understanding of railroad strikes, and to make the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 he dealt with the Russian railroad unions. But when he wrote “strategy,” it was always about armies or politics. So far as I can tell, not until 1921 did he write about production in literally “strategic” terms. Trotsky too understood about railroads, but he never came as close as Lenin in discussing them “strategically.” Of all the Bolsheviks, Stalin probably best understood how railroad unions worked strategically. But he kept (at least in print) to the line of “political strategy and tactics.” I make no judgments here on Bolshevik strategies. I am only trying to show the strategists themselves often acting on labor’s power in technically strategic positions, sometimes putting their ideas in (literally) mechanical terms, but rarely (if ever) describing power or force in any terms but political. This is interesting here, not for whatever it may suggest about the labor history of power in the Soviet Union (a matter of interest now
only to professional historians), but for what it suggests about old-time Communist organizing outside the
Soviet Union, which reflects some light on other ideas of organizing. At the Communist International’s
Lenin School in the 1920s and early ’30s foreign Communists, some of them Americans, studied (among
other subjects) labor and the labor movement in their country, learned the technical and industrial places
(and others) where it made most strategic sense to organize, and learned why, always to the political point--
to overthrow capital and make their party’s revolution. When they went into practice, they stayed focused
on the strategic places, and over and over again used them strategically, because unlike most other sorts of
organizers (not to mention sociologists) they suffered no confusion as to their objective.

The best evidence of Communist strategic thinking about labor then I found in the public record
not of the Comintern (a political organization), but of the Comintern-run Red International of Labor
Unions. This is the reason for Chapter VI, to show the evidence, because it comes more openly and more
direct from the RILU than from anywhere else I know, and because hardly anyone else has publicized it or
studied it. The thinking at the RILU congresses and conferences was not high theory. The delegates were
not scholars or intellectuals; they were left-wing labor leaders, workers used to fighting for power, most of
them Communists, but some radically and on principle independent of any party. They did not attend these
meetings to discuss Marx or Lenin or any doctrine, but to talk shop about strategic organization for their
cause, labor worldwide in a Red labor movement. Their ideas were practical. Their language was plain.
And their sense of labor’s technically and industrially strategic bases, battles, and operations was explicit
and extensive (already 20 years before Dunlop put the concept in writing). The point here is again not the
history, although it might interest historians, or the motive doctrine, which is debatable, but the remarkable
example of sustained focus and continued effect. The organizers who learned their lessons in the RILU
could keep thinking strategically because they knew where they wanted to go. Despite the tremendous
terrors through which the survivors among them lived, worst of all the long Nazi-Fascist-Japanese war on
the world, especially on people like them, they kept their strategic sense, and many of them whether they
stayed in their old party or not kept fighting for labor for decades, and from technical and industrial as well
as other perspectives kept fighting strategically. Some organizers now and some intellectuals who abhor
Communist ideas occasionally allow their admiration for old Communists organizers, for their
“dedication.” Their remarks usually seem to be about morale, in praise of a dedicated spirit. More
interesting, more practical, and what I emphasize here is their mental dedication, that because their minds were on a purpose they were always thinking how to connect means, actions, and ends.

As soon as I decided to search the Red literature, I knew I would need to come up close to the present. I expected to begin the last part in 1945, for the context of the Cold War and its aftermath. But I found it needed to start in 1935, when the only Communists in the world then in control of a country, considering the Nazi-Fascist-Japanese threat to them, decided they could live with capital’s democracies, which they did for the next 50-odd years. This explains Chapter VII. There are a lot of threads, because there are a lot of different Reds in the second two-thirds of the 20th century, including the various New Lefts of the last third of the century. But mainly I try to show two lines of trouble through that long history. First is the difficulty Communists had all that time in publicly debating any “strategy” for labor, because coming from them the word would appear to signal a plot against established authorities, democratic, despotic, or Communist; if they had plots, they were not going to discuss them in public. The second line, more open to study, is the difficulty other Reds and Leftists Old and New had in distinguishing between labor’s technically strategic power and its social and political power, to the extent that (like sociologists then) they typically did not see or soon forgot the former, and pushed only the latter. Yet again my point is not historical, whatever its historical interest. It is to indicate the long lapse in the Left’s public attention to workers’ strategic power in production, working power over production, its continual concentration instead on civic movements and elections. Looking hard, I found a few brilliant exceptions, but the Left’s general neglect of them makes my point clearer.

The Left could well have geared technical questions into politics in the 1970s, but (as I trace here) missed the chance. An old American Red, using technical cases, argued that capital’s progress in technology (“automation”) was subdividing modern labor in detail, deskill ing it, thereby degrading it. His argument drew the Left, especially the New Left, into a major international debate. Critics mostly attacked his technological resignation. Few noted (I mention some) that capital’s new technologies also meant newly combined labor and new skilled positions, or that the increasing technical division of labor could actually increase the power at remaining and new technically strategic positions. No one (I read) noted that in a new coordination of labor some unskilled and deskilled positions could remain or become technically strategic. Instead, the New Left for the most part concluded that in capital’s domains the labor movement’s old
fortresses were the only strongholds labor could ever have, which meant either defending them forever, or assuming labor’s irrelevance in any new society. Technically, industrially, this made no sense; if railroads in some countries and soon wired phones everywhere were losing their old importance, transportation and communication mattered more than ever. But it became a common view on the Left, especially in the United States and Britain, that the new industrial terrain (which very few reconnoitered) would probably be hopeless for labor, impossible for a labor movement. Consequently American and British Leftists had precious little but cultural or political advice for unions still struggling over technologies far from new by the 1990s. I try to show here how a serious, coordinated movement could conduct technically strategic operations for labor at large—and not only labor, but many whom capital has now cut from its payrolls. But anyone who wants a map or a manual for such operations has totally misconceived strategic planning and thinking.

It is worth recalling that Red literature on labor’s strategic positions in production early featured international designs against capital’s rule. The contemporary Left remains as sharp as ever at financial, commercial, and political analyses of labor’s international troubles, national, racial, cultural prejudices, foreign companies ripping off national resources, or from another angle immigration, from yet another trans-border or overseas outsourcing. But it has hardly any technical or industrial analysis to offer labor movements for international cooperation to resist capital, much less go on the offense. Now that the Left’s cultural and political strategies for “another world,” in their liveliest expressions at the World Social Forums, are evidently useless against capital’s projects for the world, its lack of strategic thinking about capital’s technical and industrial vulnerabilities worldwide (greater than before because of globalization) leaves labor movements to improvise all their international operations. I emphasize here the thanks capital owes the Left for leaving it so free after the Cold War to expand deunionization everywhere, speculate in pensions and social insurance wherever still funded, whiplash labor markets toward perfection, and if possible implode within a generation.

On the really biggest particular international question, China, the American Left now urges the AFL-CIO to establish relations with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. (The AFL-CIO is currently about one-tenth the size of the ACFTU.) This turn would be in the obvious interest of the AFL-CIO. If the ACFTU were to persuade the Chinese government to induce Wal-Mart (which buys 70% of its
merchandise from China) to accept unions in the United States, it would give an enormous boost to the U.S. labor movement. If the Left anywhere could persuade the U.S. movement to give the ACFTU technical support against, for example, Monsanto’s or Cargill’s agro-bio-chemical exports to China, it would do the ACFTU, Chinese labor, and Chinese peasants some good, and maybe win the U.S. movement some colossal allies. But nowhere does the Left appear so engaged. Unless it at least starts politically and technically strategic cooperation between the AFL-CIO and the ACFTU, the two most important labor organizations in the world now, it will fail its main cause in the building century.

Finally Chapter VIII. Here I trace the history of the notion of “strategy” in business. This notion is probably as old as trading outside the tribe. The use of the words, “strategy,” “strategic,” and so on, to mean a plan or operation or advantage for beating other businesses, probably dates back to the 1830s. It has been popular among businessmen, journalists, and economists in the United States for the last hundred years. (Weirdly, economists one after another have written as if they themselves had just come up with the idea, as if they did not know the idea’s history.) At the end I note that among a business’s various strategies is its labor strategy, that while it needs to contend strategically with its rivals and enemies in the market, precisely in order to succeed against them it also has to contend with its inevitable enemy in production, its “associates,” “partners,” employees, or simply workers. It is continuously struggling with them, over differences large and small. And sometimes, to avoid a critical defeat by a rival or an enemy in the market, or gain a critical victory there, it will (if it can) take the risk of installing a new plant or process or system of work, thereby destroying its workers’ strategic positions at work. The modern conflict between capital and labor happens then both from day to day in every way it can and in episodic crises that are specifically technical. Understanding it has to involve considering it in time, has to be historical. Acting on it, taking a side in the conflict, fighting for capital or labor, takes specific historical understanding, particularly of the technical matter, but has to fail unless it looks forward.

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Ten years ago the U.S. government’s concern “to enhance work-place productivity through labor-management cooperation and employee participation,” as per the Dunlop Commission, failed. Ten years ago the AFL-CIO finally dumped its long-established Cold-War leadership. Ever since the U.S. labor movement has been debating “strategy,” to try to find the right “strategy” to stop its decline and regain its
old influence on national economic and social policy. For the last several months the debate has been urgent, involving threats to break the AFL-CIO apart from inside if it does not put much more assets into unionizing campaigns. Proposals and rebuttals have been earnest, but rarely very informed, consistent, or even clarifying. Preparations look poor for the resolution due at the AFL-CIO convention just next month.

Most dubious in the debate is the assumption that major labor organizations anywhere can change anything fast or much by any particular act. Most destructive is the attitude therefore that the less done, the less effort wasted. Most confusing, however, is the use of the word “strategy.” Excited debaters will roll a list of several aims, aspirations, a condition, three approaches, a prospect, and a plan (assuming moreover a totally passive opponent) all into a single “strategy.” They do not distinguish between different strategic fields, morality, markets, politics, social movements, and production. They show no sense of multidimensional operations (as if they could fight a modern war without a joint staff). Worst, as usual, they have no focus on what they want to win. Getting bigger or stronger is not a strategic goal.

Consider two atypical previews of the AFL-CIO in 2015. (a) Despite fierce uproars in July 2005 hardly anything changed in structure or strategy. Passionate demands for more organizing continued. Passionate denunciations of China for repressing democratic unions there increased. Service unions almost disappeared, as Wal-Mart expanded into the hotel, restaurant, and care-taking industries. Unions in manufacturing, transportation, and communications shrank to nubbins. Firefighters and police unions disappeared by conversion into National Guard units on permanent active duty in the War on Terror in Northcom, the U.S. Northern Command. Republican Congresses, presidents, legislatures, governors, mayors, and courts restricted application of labor laws to maybe half of the once eligible working population. Nationally, union membership declined to 8% of the remaining eligible workers. The AFL-CIO’s 60th national convention resolves, “…these trends cannot continue.” (b) In militant outbursts 60-odd unions at the convention in 2005 merged into one general workers’ union, the GWU-USA, to organize everyone in the United States who works for a living. It at once established international relations with the ACFTU, which in 2006 committed funds to the GWU to unionize Wal-Mart in the United States. The GWU collapsed in 2008. From a lockout then at U.S. and Canadian Pacific ports and almost simultaneous

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For a recent helpful discussion, see the short articles by Jonathan Tasini, Jack Metzgar, Kate Bronfenbrenner, and Juan Gonzalez, “Labor at the Crossroads,” New Labor Forum, XIV, 2 (Summer 2005), 9-37.
truckers’ strikes at Wal-Mart distribution centers in California, Texas, Indiana, Florida, and Georgia, the ILWU, independent owner-operator trucking organizations, and the Teamsters organized a new U.S. Transport Workers Association, which by 2010, on credit from the ACFTU and defying impotent federal injunctions, National Guard units refusing orders, forced Wal-Mart to sell its superstores (at cost less depreciation) to a consortium of the USTWA, Wal-Mart’s “associates,” and the towns where the stores were. Other associations then organized likewise in the energy, communication, health-care, child-care, food, sanitation, construction, and custodial industries, and made similar acquisitions there. In July 2015 these consortia send locally chosen delegates to the first convention of the new World Federation of Globalized Labor, Villages, and Exchanges, meeting in Shanghai, representing an estimated 300 million people in some 300 organizations in 50 countries, aiming to “abolish exploitation everywhere in our common, enduring struggle for peace and justice worldwide.”

Neither (a) nor (b) is a prediction. Together they are only exaggerated (?) examples for readers to test their own strategic thinking, in particular about labor’s technically or industrially strategic positions, and what use they could be, for whom they could be used.

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But the footnotes! If you have come this far, you have noticed them. They are many and long. But do not quail at them. As historians and professors know, but innocent readers do not, you do not have to read them. But do not think they do not matter. Think of them like a foundation. Your house has a foundation; under your apartment’s weight-bearing walls are others, all the way down to the building’s basic, weight-bearing beams. You do not need to study them, but there would not be a structure without them. The footnotes matter here, not because they contain part of my argument, but because they are the direct sources and evidence for it. They show I am not fooling, not making the story up. If what I am arguing makes sense to you, ignore the footnotes. If you doubt my claims, look at my sources, and check them yourself. But why the different languages? Because where English translations from other languages exist for these sources, they are often “free translations,” interpreting the author’s thought, for example, inserting “strategic” where the author did not actually write it. I did not want someone else’s interpretation, but as close a translation as I could get from the actual words the author used, being very careful about the originals. If you can read the originals, you can check them; if you cannot, because you have had more
important things to do than learn to read other languages, ask someone who can to check them for you. I worked hard on these notes, because my argument about labor in conflict with capital depends on them, and I want the reader to see the dependence in all its depth and breadth.
Chapter I. Doing Labor History: Feelings, Work, Material Power

The industrial revolutions in Mexico between 1880 and 1910 were strong and manifold in the rich Gulf-Coast province of Veracruz, politically the country’s most important state. British, American, French, Spanish, and Mexican entrepreneurs organized big new businesses there with the then latest technology in transportation, construction, electricity, textiles, sugar, distilling, brewing, coffee, garment-making, flour milling, tobacco, and oil (including refining). In conflict with them, workers in certain industries there—transportation, textiles, and tobacco—formed between 1900 and 1910 militant organizations to demand their collective recognition, improve their working conditions, reduce their hours, and raise their wages. During the political and social revolutions in Mexico from 1910 to 1920, the violence of which was minor in Veracruz, workers in unions there gained more than in any other state. For the next 25 years the country’s strongest and most combative labor movements were most often the movements in Veracruz, ordinarily fighting each other, but always fighting business for power. In 1946-47, still hostile to each other, they led organized labor’s national struggle against the government’s post-war pro-business turn. The struggle’s failure in 1948 opened a new epoch in Mexico’s development, its Cold-War dedication to business.

In 1968 I started research on a history of industrial workers in Veracruz, 1880-1948. I little knew even how to think about this history, a labor history. But the best guide, I thought, was E.P. Thompson, and I went looking for Mexican proletarian poets, popular traditions in Veracruz’s industrial towns, customs in workers’ resistance to exploitation there.5 I soon found some (Fernando Celada, Virgencitas in the factories, San Lunes). But the more I learned about my subject, the less Thompson helped me understand it; the moral power that memory of old struggles gave in England, I could not find, not in Veracruz. I kept remembering a famous old peroration about “the working class schooled, united, and organized by the mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself,” so finally able to expropriate its expropriators.6 Ever more often I thought of two other labor historians I had read, David Brody and Eric Hobsbawm. Their focus on capital and workers in modern industries, their attention to technology and workplaces, and their analyses of labor’s migrations and divisions, although far from matters Mexican, did help me understand


6 Karl Marx, “Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Oekonomie [1867, 4th ed., 1890],” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, 43 vols. (Berlin: Dietz, 1957-90), XXIII, 790-791. All translations herein are mine, unless otherwise noted.
Veracruz. Besides, Brody’s “very great” debt to Oscar Handlin struck me, for it reminded me of “voluntary associations,” the struggle for which seemed to me then the key to my subject; and Hobsbawm’s Leninist Marxism deeply impressed me, first for its assumption of the primacy of imperialism in the 20th century. Maybe this was why I also began studying industrial companies in Veracruz, 1880-1948, at which I spent as much archival time as I did studying workers for the next 10 years.

Meanwhile labor history was booming. More than that, it was seriously exciting, as the stress of waiting for the biannual *European Labor and Working Class History* and then the *International Labor and Working Class History* newsletters proved. Among the best new books on industrial workers post-1880, relatively few were of the field’s old kind, “institutional,” as the new critics called it (meaning, I later realized, “no longer inspirational to the young”). Most were about the field’s usual questions, e.g., working-class organization, strikes, socialism, communism, but in newly and indefinitely thick social contexts, less labor history than labor’s “social history,” many of them (touted so by their authors or not) “history from below.” Of these new “social histories” only a few recalled Brody's and Hobsbawm’s attention to economic stakes, social systems, technology, and structures of work. Most concentrated on “culture,” how workers acted in their communities or neighborhoods, in strikes, riots, festivals, and bars, in love, feuds, protests, families, cliques, lodges, clubs, or church, in rituals of rank, deference, and solidarity,

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especially in regard to ethnicity, race, and religion. I admired these histories, their emphasis on dramatic action and its implicit meanings. But I noted that three-quarters of them stopped by 1914, and I wondered if the new masters of the field, Michelle Perrot, e.g., or Joan Scott, or Herbert Gutman, had more than Thompson to teach about the questions before me in Veracruz. I still preferred Brody and Hobsbawm, plus the new (to me) David Montgomery, especially after I spent several months studying 30 years of a Mexican textile company’s 20th-century payrolls. I wanted to learn the history of industrial technology in Veracruz, of industrial occupations there, and what industrial workers “actually did” at work, in order to tell how it affected their “daily lives” off work.

Even grander then was the Gramsci Boom. Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), young Socialist teacher in industrial Turin, Socialist opponent of World War I, Leninist from 1917, chief proponent of industrial soviets in Italy in 1919-20, co-founder of the Communist Party of Italy in 1921, party delegate to the Communist International in 1922, secretary-general of the party from 1923, head of the party’s delegation in Italy’s Parliament 1924-26, preparing the party to go underground 1924-26, leading “bolshevization” of the party in 1926, arrested, tried, and convicted of treason by a Fascist court in 1926, author in prison between 1929 and 1935 of 2,848 manuscript pages on history, politics, and culture, broken in health from 1935, surviving his sentence’s expiration in 1937 to die in hospital six days later, this original Antonio

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Gramsci became in death many “Antonio Gramsci.” In 1957 one arose in Italy, to point to “an Italian way of advancing toward socialism” and 20 years down the road “Eurocommunism.” In 1967 another “Gramsci” arose in the United States, to inspire hundreds of young leftist academic intellectuals through the 1970s to try to organize a new American Marxist socialist party, an American Eurocommunism, a last effort at which appeared in *Marxist Perspectives*. Yet another arrived in 1967 in Mexico, first to suffer Mexican Marxist scorn for his “historicism” and “reformism,” then through the 1970s to justify a new Marxist political and cultural criticism. In new translations Gramscian ideas, notions, and words circulated fast on the U.S. and Mexican academic left in the ‘70s. The idea of “hegemony” proved especially exciting to these (us) “organizers of culture.” If the original Gramsci, thinking of class-divided societies, had meant the public order of socially cultivated consent, domination by cultural action, not official force, the new U.S. and the new Mexican “Gramsci” often seemed to mean simply the prevailing culture, regardless of the struggle to keep it prevalent. The Gramsci Boom greatly encouraged social histories of labor. It certainly affected my effort. Studying a labor movement that came out of three or four (competing) revolutions, I tried to stick (mainly) to a “Gramsci” reflecting on “the function of Piedmont,” or “relations of force,” to follow “class struggle over a long run,…the working class, unions, parties, and the state.” But I also recognized a new (or old Thompsonesque?) duty to dwell on popular culture and moral appeals. In 1980 I decided I had done enough research, for I felt pretty sure of my story. Argued from the systems and structures in contention in Mexico, it would be about workers in migration, ethnicity, and

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localism defeating political ideology, but losing to political bureaucracy, an explanation of their culture to explain their politics. Once I drafted chapters on Mexico’s development and Veracruz’s industrial enterprises particularly, 1880-1910, I got to the industrial workers there, 1880-1910. On them I decided to write first a chapter about their work, which was what they actually did most of their waking lives. I did not expect it would take long, an introductory bit on Genesis (the curse Adam caused), a short section on technologies and occupations, another on job histories, and finally a big section on the social relations of the workers at work, in their workplaces, their culture in production. The next chapter would be about their towns, strikes, and rambling, gambling, and staying out late at night. From these two cultures I would later derive their politics.

I thought I held three aces on culture in production. One was Herman Melville, for how he wrote on work in *Moby Dick*; the other two, academic specialists on labor, John T. Dunlop and Benson Soffer. Of Dunlop’s “acute comments” on labor history I had first made note years before in rereading Brody. Criticism of Dunlop’s “theoretical framework,” which put me off it, I had read soon after in Soffer’s theory of skilled workers as “autonomous workmen,” whose “particular technical and managerial skills” gave them a “strategic” role in unions (which seemed to me a revelation). Lately, however, I had found new, respectful references to Dunlop, paired with respectful references to Soffer, and in this double light had finally read Dunlop on “industrial relations.” His idea of a “web of rules” at the workplace, in the creation of which markets, power at large (political and cultural), and “the technical context” of the work were all “decisive,” much impressed me. Skilled workers had some control at work, special bargaining power, because of their “strategic position” there, their “indispensability” in production. This was just what Soffer

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19 Brody, *op. cit.*, x; Benson Soffer, “A Theory of Trade Union Development: The Role of the ‘Autonomous Workman,’” *Labor History*, 1, 2 (Spring 1960), 141-163, Dunlop at 141 n1, 148. Dunlop, professor of Economics at Harvard University since 1950, U.S. secretary of labor 1975-76, was then (1980) Lamont University Professor at Harvard. Soffer, an alumnus of Princeton University’s Industrial Relations Section, Ph.D. in Economics, ’56, was an assistant professor of industry in the School of Business Administration at the University of Pittsburgh in 1960. To my knowledge he published nothing else academic; from 1966 to 1981 he was an economist at the U.S. Department of Commerce. For this information I thank the Princeton University Alumni Records Office and Archives.


(citing Dunlop) had claimed, what Brody, Hobsbawm, and lately David Montgomery too had argued, and which I thought gave me the key to Veracruz industrial workers’ social relations, in production and in their communities.\textsuperscript{22} Because skilled workers held “strategic positions,” were “vital,” or “key,” they were the source of organization, Hobsbawm’s “labour aristocracy,” Montgomery’s “manly craftsmen,” and so they would be my grupo acción, the strategic minority necessary for Veracruz workers’ voluntary associations.

But I could not get my chapter on work right. To describe Mexican Railway Company workers at work, moving freight and passengers between Mexico City and the port of Veracruz, I could not simply list the jobs they were doing; I had to narrate their action or operations (which proved much harder than I had expected). And as I narrated the work job by job, department by department, including repairs and maintenance, I kept finding the actions and operations connected, the departments connected, interdependent, often in direct cooperation. Individuals at work were only contributing to the collective work of locomotion. Whoever did the jobs, in “autonomy” as per Soffer or not, they were all necessary, all indispensable for the work to happen. How could I narrate thousands of acts simultaneous and continual, not in a Tolstoyan battle, but making trains run? And why did “skilled” or “autonomous” mean “strategic”? If the engineer was “strategic,” why not as well the fireman, the conductor, and the brakemen, or the machinists, the other shop men, and their helpers, who prepared the engine and cars for their run, or the trackmen, or the telegraphers, or the car loaders? (For want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of car loaders the freight did not move….) If not “autonomy,” or “indispensability,” what made a particular position “strategic”? Rereading Dunlop, I found a warning: “The rules most dependent upon the technical and market contexts require much grubbing [to find]….\textsuperscript{23} After two years of much grubbing, confusion, and frustration I had an entire chapter on Mexican Railway workers at work, and a notion of which positions were more “strategic” than others, but only a notion. Two more years, and I had a chapter on dock workers in the port of Veracruz, but no “strategic” explanation of their work either. The eight industries I eventually did did before I quit grubbing took me almost 20 years on the calendar.

Whatever I was after, I was pursuing it in analysis of matters I never expected to have to understand. At first, narrating Mexican Railway workers’ work, I wrote much about their attitudes, toward

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 50-52; Soffer, op. cit., 144-155; Brody, op. cit., 50-91, 125-134, 214-218, 256; Hobsbawm, op. cit., 321-370, 374-385; Montgomery, op. cit., 9-27.

\textsuperscript{23} Dunlop, op. cit., 97.
their supervisors, each other, and the railroad’s customers. I soon stopped that, to try to write only about their physical and mental engagement in industrial locomotion. If only for the exercise, out of curiosity, I would set aside values, deals, deference, solidarity, jealousy, and such, in order not to confuse them with pure collective production. I wanted to see industrial transportation not with an economist’s eye, or a political scientist’s eye, or a sociologist’s or anthropologist’s or psycho- or cultural historian’s, but with an engineer’s eye (or an old syndicalist organizer’s): work=Fs, force times space. Then about work on the docks in the port of Veracruz, I tried to focus just on the ships, the cargo, the means of moving it, and how workers used them to load and unload it. So I continued through the other industries, trying to avoid the workers’ wages, income, and geographic or social origins, their subjective connections, customs, or identities at work, or their thoughts or dreams there of anything but their work. I would identify the workers only by sex, maturity, job, and skill. My only metaphors and similes, which I resisted as much as I could, were physical, mechanical, or chemical. Despite the venerable Ronald Fraser and blessed Studs Terkel, I would not write about a particular worker’s work, or a particular occupation, trade, or craft, but about all the work necessary in an industry.\footnote{Ronald Fraser, ed., \textit{Work: Twenty Personal Accounts}, 2 vols. (London: Penguin, 1968-69); Studs Terkel, ed., \textit{Working: People Talk about What They Do All Day and How They Feel about What They Do} (New York: Pantheon, 1974).} One chapter grew into several, for each industry took its own, and industry by industry they grew severally into a very odd project. From a constant effort at abstraction, a deliberate turn away from culture and class, in order to concentrate strictly on production, I would get different industrial structures of constant capital in motive power, equipment, machinery, and tools of production, industrial divisions of labor, and coordinations in industrial labor processes, industrially specific organizations of many various labor powers for the cooperative extraction of labor in collective production, for without this cooperation, there would be no production. An innocent reader might well wonder, among so many concrete details of work on a railroad, on the docks, for an electric company, in textile mills, on a sugar plantation, in a brewery, in a cigar factory, and for an oil company (in exploration, production, pipe-line construction, pipe-line operation, water transportation, and refining), where the analysis or the abstraction was. But precisely because the stories were (at least attempted) resolutions only of industrial work, they were to show for each industry only all its necessary mechanical, manual, and
mental details. And from them I could tell in each industry which positions were “strategic.” Even so I still
could not explain what made them strategic.

Along the way I kept reading new labor histories, looking for a conceptual break. But the more I
wrestled with industrial work, the more other labor historians seemed to be missing what I knew still
eluded me, the terms in which strategic workers had power. The U.S. historians most exercised over the
field, in conclave at DeKalb in 1984, barely blinked at “the labor [or work] process,” in industry or
elsewhere, and sought modern workers’ power only in politics, not my subject. Some of the best new
books were about industrial work, but not about workers at it, which was fine, but not my subject either.
Others variously excellent were about workers, but about them (mostly) not at work, at other activities
instead, strikes, more politics, “living,” mugging scabs, fighting for racial equality, again fine, but again not
my subject. The ones that frustrated me were (at least considerably) about workers at work, “at the point
of production,” as some authors wrote, or “on the shop floor.” I often wondered where “the point of
production” was, considering how many workers contributed somehow or other to making any industrial
product. If there was not one point, were there many points, connected? Or were there no points, only
connections, circuits? Where did they run? And outside manufacturing and maintenance, where was the
shop floor? Most of these books represented work only by the title of an occupation, or the names of

25 J. Carroll Moody and Alice Kessler-Harris, eds., Perspectives on American Labor History: The Problems
26 E.g., David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York: A.A.
Knopf, 1984); Sanford M. Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Transformation of
27 E.g., Bryan D. Palmer, A Culture in Conflict: Skilled Workers and Industrial Capitalism in Hamilton,
Ontario, 1860-1914 (McGill-Queen’s University, 1979); Serge Bonnet and Roger Humbert, La ligne rouge
des hauts fourneaux: Grèves dans le fer lorrain en 1905 (Paris: Denoël, 1981); Nelson Lichtenstein,
Labor’s War at Home: The CIO in World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1982); Andrew
University, 1985); David Tamarin, The Argentine Labor Movement, 1930-1945: A Study in the Origins of
Peronism (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1985); Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the
Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 1985); Michael Kazin, Barons of Labor: The San Francisco Building Trades and
Union Power in the Progressive Era (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1987); Daniel James, Resistance and
Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University,
1988); Juan Luis Sariego, Enclaves y minerales en el norte de México: Historia social de los mineros de
Cananea y Nueva Rosita, 1900-1970 (Mexico City: La Casa Chata, 1988); Joel Horowitz, Argentine
Unions, the State, and the Rise of Peron (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1990); Ava Baron,
ed., Work Engendered: Toward a New History of American Labor (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1991); Ardis
Cameron, Radicals of the Worst Sort: Laboring Women in Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1860-1912 (Urbana:
Veintiuno de España, 1993).
several, a kind of census of occupations in a particular place, or by only some (never all) individual job descriptions, or by isolated functions in production. They gave no sense of all the work it took even in a particular firm (or institution) for its production to happen. Yet more frustrating were excellent books often about their subjects at work and often reading as if they were going to explain the work, how it all actually happened, but not ever delivering. Most frustrating (because most promising) were those that would sometimes give the sense of workers in an industrial production, all (practically all) the particular operations, job by job, department by department, similar, different, simultaneous, continual, all connected, all (or 95%) indispensable, some “strategic,” but would then confuse this sense. Some sort of contradiction kept getting into the story, obscuring an important question, power at work.

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The better I did my stories, however, the more they too frustrated me. Hobsbawm had written of “a body of workers technically quite capable of strong collective bargaining.” I did not know how to think about this “technically.” It was a special kind of connection among workers in industrial work, which some historians were getting right, but (it seemed to me) as if inadvertently, so that they then let it go without noticing, conceptualizing it. The historians who came closest, whom I kept rereading for clues, wrote of who knew whom at work and how they felt about each other, a “network of personal relationships…on the shop-floor,” “social relations within the work place,” workers’ “lives at work,” “workplace culture,” “a skilled-trade subculture.”

A few of a more theoretical mind argued over a specific history of work for labor history. Others argued for integration of the history of technology and labor history, or did examples of it. But these historians as well, except for one casual reference to “work and technical relations,” called workers’ cooperation in production “social relations” or “a socially constructed” relationship or “social practice” at work. And I could do no better: “social relations in production,” or “social relations at production.” This was still social history, sociology, which was essential, but not engineering. I wanted to conceptualize the engineering of social production, the mechanics of it, the forces and motion in it.

Meanwhile I kept thinking about “strategic positions” at work, places somehow of special consequence there. I reread Brody and Hobsbawm about them and “strategic,” “vital,” “key,” “indispensable” workers. Looking again, I found most of the best labor historians of organizations wrote about “strategic position” or “key” workers and their “strategy,” in the economy at large or in certain

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31 Hobsbawm, op. cit., 201.
industries or particular plants.\textsuperscript{35} Two of them even cited Soffer on “autonomous workmen.”\textsuperscript{36} But I could not tell for sure what most of them meant by “strategic.” Sometimes they skipped the position, and described only the workers’ “strategy,” as if position did not matter to a plan or a course of action, offensive, defensive, or evasive. And often, mistaking a strategy’s results for obvious, they gave no sign of how the results happened, economically, socially, politically, or culturally (or all at once). More problematic, they sometimes argued as if the position made the workers strategic, at other times (about the same position and same workers) vice versa. And they were vague on what made either a position or particular workers strategic. Some argued generally an industry’s or an entire sector’s importance in the economy at large, without linking the general argument to particular positions. Others claimed a position’s extraordinary consequence in “the process of production,” or “the labor process,” a technical connection, which often, however, they barely sketched. Yet others argued workers’ “skills,” their technical capacities, often with a disclaimer for exceptions, e.g., dockers. A few argued both technicalities: “strategic” work meant important to production and skilled; it was certain functions, certain jobs, which only particularly skilled workers could do. But what about dockers, or teamsters? Was “strategic” work primarily a sociological or a technical question?

My two clearest new guides were social historians who professed to take technical factors seriously, and did. One, a young historian of industrial labor in Argentina, gave a concise, precise


explanation of a light-and-power union’s technically “strategic” power. But he did not explain how he
distinguished “strategically” among the country’s other important unions, or which jobs in an electric
company or an automobile plant were technically or otherwise strategic. 37 The other, theoretically the most
learned, ambitious, and discriminating of all, a young historian of German and American steelworkers,
found “strategically important positions” in German and American steel production, and specified that the
“production process” (sometimes the “labor process”) was not “social,” but through “technical
organization.” 38 He explained “strategic positions” as giving technical power, Störmacht, “disruptive
power,” the potential to disrupt production throughout a plant. 39 And he vividly described these positions
and “technical conditions” of strategic work. 40 But for all his analytical energy he kept losing the
distinction between social and technical. The only “relations” (Beziehungen) he allowed among workers at
work were “social relations”; even “paratechnical relations” were “social relations.” 41 Specifically
“relations at work” (Arbeitsbeziehungen) in the “production process” were “social”; only the relation
between a worker (or a work group) and the plant’s raw materials and productive equipment was
“technical.” Regardless of Störmacht he made much of Soffer’s “autonomous workmen,” and continually
had the power of workers in strategic positions coming from a social condition, “functional autonomy.” 42

The relations among workers at industrial work remained inconceivable then except in sociology,
even to the best labor historians. But my mind would not rest there. I still wondered about that “body of
workers technically quite capable of strong collective bargaining,” again about “work and technical
relations,” about “workplace relationships determined [in part] by…technology,” about “work relations,”
even if entirely “social,” somehow “stamped” by technically “specific labor processes.” 43 I could not grasp

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43 Hobsbawm, *op. cit.*, 201; Scranton, *op. cit.*, 738; Brennan, *op. cit.*, 54; Welskopp, *op. cit.*, 52.
these connections only in terms of “social relations in production,” or “social relations at production,” or “social relations at work.” I still wanted to conceive Veracruz’s forces of industrial production timed in space, an engineer’s idea of industry and industrial plants like a general’s idea of geography and junctions, an industrial map a syndicalist warrior might have drawn for strategically important positions, or a communist central committee used to decide on strategy.

In 1994 I taught the history of Mexican industries and industrial labor for the first time. I had to think what “industrial” meant, and I went back to Saint-Simon—extensive, consciously divided, consciously organized, technical interdependence in production. I had to conceive the workers industrially, in the technical divisions and integrations of their labor, in order to explain the subject to the students. This was my break. Before long I had found new terms specifically for industrial workers’ connections at work, and it seemed to me imperative to finish my abstract histories in all the stationary, motive, moving, dead, and live details they required.

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But who would care? Any fool culturally or professionally awake knows that for 20 years or more the hot historical issues of Western Civilization have been race, gender, ethnicity, sex, heroes, and signs, and now, finally, right there up front, “self.” Why on earth would anyone now (or still) try to do an industrial sort of history, of modern industrial work (!)? Scholarly appearances aside, is what I propose a only a Borgesian exercise, a maniac’s scheme for an endless, ever updated, ever more complex encyclopedia of industrial archeology? Could it make any useful sense, now, ever?

One indication that it cannot is how few labor historians have lately come close to it, or (so far as I know) are now trying to do anything like it, for just one industry, much less several. As before, among the

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best new books in the field are some about modern industrial work, but not about workers at it. Others are about modern industrial workers, but about them (mostly) off work, on strike or in politics or at meetings, and so on. Those that do treat workers at work almost all treat only particular departments or operations, and are not so much about the work as about workplaces, or about race or gender or some other “identity.” Two richly conceptualized histories of the labor movement in the United States, by experts on “social relations” at work, convey a clear strategic sense of power on the job, but do not distinguish its different sorts, commercial, political, industrial, or technical, or (being general studies) explain anything technical. Only one book, on Mid-Western U.S. packing plants, gives a strategic sense of that work’s technical organization, in explicitly “strategic” terms. But for all his insights this author mistakes the

workers in his “strategically important” department (the killing floors) for “skilled,” and neglects the really most important department, power and refrigeration. Numerous historical studies whose declared subject is work are actually about other subjects. Surveys of the history of modern work, however useful, are largely about labor markets, social conventions, occupations, working conditions, regulations, and emotion, not about variation in industrial systems. In a newish historical anthology on work the editor, a masterly English historian, includes nothing by a historian on any industrial work. He quotes a distinguished historian of the 19th- and 20th-century British working class: “…we know little enough of people’s attitude to work at the best of times and have almost no accurate knowledge for the period before the 1930s.” In other words, let us confess our ignorance of “attitudes”; never mind our ignorance of what industrial workers actually did systematically, simultaneously, consecutively, and together at their work, before or after 1930. Some selections in the anthology, from 19th- as well as 20th-century authors (e.g., Richard Henry Dana, Melville, Zola, F. W. Taylor, Robert Frost, Orwell), are on slices of work in industrial operations. But however interesting they all (except the one from *Germinal*) read as if the venerable Fraser or blessed Studs had chosen them. They are not about coordinated labor power in production, but about individual, personal experience, not work, but the feeling of a self at work.

Any history of industrial production now would run against prevailing historical concerns, popular and professional. The anthology’s editor could tell “obviously what most people thought” of his project on work: “What a dreary subject!” I guess so; by July 4, 2004, the book’s Amazon.com sales rank was 49


50 Typical is Jacqueline Jones, *American Work: Four Centuries of Black and White Labor* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), which is about unemployment and “race relations.”


When the formidable Gen. Reader (if not watching Simon Schama re-runs) can lay hands on a new David McCullough or Paul Johnson, or an old Stephen Ambrose, he is not likely to look for choice historical readings on work, much less “historical studies of industrial work,” anytime, anywhere. Neither are scholarly professors of history, now interested (traditionally or speculatively) in almost anything but industrial work. If Harvard University library acquisitions through the last 10 years represent their concerns, they publish and read nearly three times as much about war as about gender, one and a half times more about gender than about race, more than twice as much about gender as about labor, 25 times as much about labor as about industrial work, 18 times as much about sex as about industrial work, and one-third more about pornography than about industrial work. 54 Maybe no less significant: The brilliant young historian of German and American steelworkers has written a second excellent book, a political, social, cultural history of “brotherhood” in pre-industrial German Social Democracy. 55 Established old American masters of labor history, following Saint Edward and Saint Herb, without thinking twice, would still take work for a valid subject, but only as if it were a school, or an ethical test, important in forming workers’ community and culture. Among elder European labor historians one of the sharpest, worried that the field had “become quite boring,” lately suggested improvements including remarkably “a history of work,” but he evidently means only a social history of “concepts,” “meanings,” and “practices of work.” 56 The still youngish Anglo-North American avant-garde in labor history, never having had confidence in quantification, or old classifications of historical objects, notions, or categories, would certainly not turn now from the cultural history of labor to anything as extra-literal as a full set of actual material constructs, matrices of modern production. Probably 95% of the papers at recent North American Labor History

54 Harvard OnLine Information Service (HOLLIS), Union Catalogue of the Harvard Libraries, July 4, 2004: “Extended searches” of the “full catalogue” of holdings in all languages, all locations, all formats, published from 1995 to date, show for keywords in titles (including titles of series and chapters) the following: “history,” 29,176; “history war,” 1,420; “history politics,” 1,231; “history gender,” 526; “history race,” 358; “history labor,” 229; “history business,” 222; “history sex,” 163; “history ethnicity,” 125; “history pornography,” 12; and “history industrial work,” 9. The keywords are not exclusive. Because some titles share them, because the words themselves have different meanings in different contexts, because library acquisitions are not the same as holdings read, and for other reasons, this count cannot measure the real distribution of subjects of recent scholarly publication or reading. But it does indicate where the traffic is heavy, and where it is light.


Conference meetings would have gone just as well at any political or social or cultural history conference; “work” matters only because of the workplace, which matters only because of the culture in production or at work there. For its meeting in October 2004, on “Class, Work and Revolution,” NALHC “encourages sessions…from perspectives of gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality.”  

Even the new cultural history’s most sophisticated, rigorous, and acute rival (a historical sociologist of labor), who also wants a new history of work, urges studies to “demonstrate and specify….exactly how the cultural construction of economic concepts configured….practice in the [pre-1914] factory.” He himself has not proceeded there, but toward a theory of “culture in practice.”

Some North American labor historians have lately organized to promote “labor and working-class history.” Against a notion (eventually expressed at an Organization of American Historians meeting, where else?) that “the basic themes of labor history are inherently too obscure or unexciting to appeal to a larger public,” these labor historians practically redefine the field as a general history of injustice. In 2002 their man became editor of the field’s principal journal in the United States, conceded the field’s “intellectual stasis,” and proclaimed the journal’s concerns to be the racial, gendered, ethnic, sexual, and economic wrongs working men and women of all the Americas have suffered. He called particularly for “analysis of changing work processes and managerial structures as well as the felt experience of work,” much more on “the basic history of work and occupations,” including “hairdressers,…funeral parlors,…school counselors,” to strengthen the field’s “credentials in the intellectual marketplace.”


evidently cannot tell the difference between work and the experience of it, or the difference between
industrial and other work (experience). Nor does he show the faintest interest in the kind of work that
Montgomery 25 years ago might have told him was “strategic.” The graduate program he directs on “the
History of Work, Race, and Gender in the Urban World” (at the University of Illinois in Chicago) offers
one course partly on technology (bless that professor), but none on any kind of work; the program’s four
graduate colloquia are on “comparative feminism,” “immigration and ethnic history,” “race & working
class history,” and “sexuality, power, and politics.”60 This campaign “to broaden and reenergize the field”
now boasts a new journal. But the same editor is still hot as ever after that old-time “working-class
experience.” Neither he nor his associates, all in thrall to Thompson, Gutman, and a now thoroughly
Thompson/Gutmanized Montgomery, can distinguish between work and feelings. As I read them, they
could not imagine a technical story of industrial production that would not bore them senseless, and be a
complete downer in “the intellectual marketplace.”61

It may be worth wondering why the history of work (of any kind or time) seems now so “dreary.”
If 30 years ago, when Terkel first published his interviews, “labor” and “work” were all the rage among
intellectuals and academics of various specializations, what happened to that excitement? For good
practical reasons (productivity, profits, benefits, wages, premiums, elections, wars, law suits), economic,
sociological, political, psychological, medical, legal, and other kinds of studies of work remain in full flow.
Why does the history of “work,” however, especially “industrial work,” now evoke physical expressions of
boredom, even aversion? Considering the economic, social, and cultural changes of the last 30 years, it is
easy to explain historians’ positive fascination with the new cultural history (including the history of the
culture of the workplace). But the negative reasons why historians no longer want to learn about work, not
the culture, but the very action of work, are harder to find.

Surely the reason is not that there is nothing more to learn about it. Scholars now know vastly
more about race, gender, or sex than they do about work, but they as yet give no sign that they could ever
have enough scholarship about bodies in representation or erotic stimulation--while they have evidently had

60 Leon Fink, “Editor’s Introduction,” Labor History, XLIII, 3 (August 2002), 245-246; idem, “Notes and
Documents: What is to be Done--In Labor History?” ibid., XLIII, 4 (November 2002), 419-424; and on the
UIC graduate program, www.uic.edu/depts/hist/work.
“strategic” question arises in a long, otherwise interesting interview with the master: James R. Barrett,
“Class Act: An Interview with David Montgomery,” ibid., 23-54.
quite enough, little as it is, on the history of bodies and minds in industrial production. Unlike race, gender, or sex, work is inherently, endlessly curious, not sign or practice or instinct, but action to bring useful things forth, conscious, learned, serious, intentional, earnest, conscientious, engrossing, i.e., like culture, but also particular, wearisome, distracting, arduous, frustrating, maybe exhausting, and of general, fundamental, and pressing importance; and industrial work is divided, divisive, and nevertheless collective. We are far from having comprehended the reality that work has rendered our kind human, ever more human. It makes no obvious sense that studying the history of the activity necessary for any other human history to happen should hold no interest. It is historically as well as naturally interesting that the species would die out much faster without any work than it would without any copulation.

Besides, culturally, of all the great ancient myths of creation, how the world happened, why it has continued to happen, the one that developed into the symbolism, discourse, and ideologies most gripping in the modern world is a story of work, in the Book of Genesis’s first three chapters. This is a narrative of tremendous force and profound, vibrant, suggestive, reverberating subtleties: “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth,” made of it the firmament, two great lights, the stars also; created great whales, and man in his own image; on the seventh day ended his work, and rested; then he “planted a garden,” and there put “the man whom he had formed,” Adam, “to dress and keep it”; from the man he made a woman, Eve, “and brought her to the man”; and when these two violated one of his commands, so that “they knew that they were naked” and in vain tried to hide from him, he said to Eve, “I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children….,” and to Adam, “….cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life. Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee,” and expelled them from the garden “to till the ground” eastward.62 The story is (of course) strongest chanted in the original Hebrew, for the letters not only sound but have character, and the words’ ritual repetitions, three-consonant roots, and continual inflections resound in ringing allusions and distinctions. The divine work God did in creating and by hand making the world, for example, is radically, purely divine, work God alone could do. But the work he then did on creation is radically like our filling, freeing, fattening, satisfying, making sound, or an angel, a messenger, a message, or being on a mission, on business, occupied, on a promise, a covenant; God’s rest from his work is also a blessing, a sanctification

62 The Bible (King James Version), Gen. 1-3.
of it. The work Adam did in the garden is radically the work of having charge of something, keeping watch over it, preserving, protecting it. The work he did after is radically different, work at once service, obedience, subjection, bondage, servitude, slavery, and worship. The “sorrow” that after leaving the garden Eve will feel in childbirth and Adam at work is toil’s pain, at its roots like hurt, hard, grieving, torment, suffering, vexing, injury, travail, heartache, wounded, hurt in spirit. Belief in a divinely wrought world that took humanly alienated hard labor (one’s own or others’) to support the obediently faithful was orthodoxy among Jews, Christians, and Muslims for centuries. It went so deep in these cultures that only heretics could imagine the world as not work, divine or human. Since the industrial revolution, when first European capitalism, then European socialism, each in its own atheism, commenced really reconstructing Europe and everywhere else as human work, for profits, or for humanity, the idea that “this world,” “the real world,” is work (yours, or mine, or others’, or every able body’s) has permeated all cultures. As Marx discovered already in the 1840s (maybe in part because he was German), it was impossible even to think or


talk about “reality” without it “working.” Now anywhere only the other-worldly could imagine it otherwise.

The boredom among U.S. historians now with industrial work is in part simply reasonable avoidance of a subject become hugely boring to the U.S. public. “Public historians,” those historians most exposed to the public, understand this prudence best. Given the shrinkage of old-fashioned industry, the old-fashioned working class, and that old-time labor movement, given that unions have disappointed (if not disgusted) many workers and anger or scare many others of the public, given the continual, popular drive to the right for the last 25 years in U.S. politics, given popular dedication to “leisure,” “shopping,” and “entertainment,” etc., very few such historians could expect to pay their bills doing histories of labor or work, much less industrial work. Given the same conditions, some academic labor historians who have written on aspects of industrial work may now prudently (for enrollments or publishing contracts, or both) write away from it, toward more attractive themes, politics or culture.

But the aversion among primarily academic, avowedly cultural historians, who dominate the field now in North America, Latin America, and Europe, is not so reasonable. It goes deeper, farther back, and raises more complicated issues of evasion. These historians concentrate on injustice, the making (or loss) of labor’s community and solidarity, exclusively “social relations” (or the experience of them?), evidently because they believe it disrespectful to workers, a denial of their human dignity, a boring “reductionism,” to think of them in technical organization. They will not have it in their house, a vocabulary or grammar for discourse on the human technical divisions in industrial production. But this is implicitly to claim industrial workers have had power for their struggles only through their numbers or their moral merits, to deny they


ever had (also or only) technically determined power to force gains. The reasons for this denial go back maybe 25 years.

Giants of several kinds ruled the field then. Above all Thompson, but other worthies too, historians, sociologists, political scientists, old and young, Brody, Hobsbawn, Werner Conze, Paolo Spriano, Georges Haupt, Barrington Moore, Gutman, Trampé, Perrot, Kocka, Joan Scott, George Rudé, Mommsen, John Foster, Charles and Louise Tilly, Lawrence Goodwyn, Ralph Miliband, Leo Panitch, Royden Harrison, Yves Lequin, Montgomery, and more, spread various theoretical influences, Weber, Marx, Annales (Durkheim), and others, among the young entering the field. Whatever influence they accepted, the young all took their subject in Thompson’s spirit to be workers’ subjectivity, “agency.” Politically, a qualification essential to them, they were typically on the non-communist left, virtually living the struggles they studied, aching (as if to apologize for ’68) to make labor history useful for live workers. Instead they had to suffer live workers continually exercising their agency in favor of Thatcher, Reagan, and Kohl, the political fact that most deeply marked their intellectual generation (left and right).

In their labor histories they tended to tell either a story of power, of conflicts, challenges, wins, losses, never more than temporary compromises, a story ending in victory or defeat, or a story of wrongs, of discrimination, abuses, protests, resistance, leading to integration or alienation, synthesis or frustration. This second story, the history of (corrigible) injustice, the culturally inclined made their specialty, and within a decade made the main story in the field.

Especially in the United States, tailing Gutman and Scott, they wrote of workers enduringly divided against themselves, and not over politics or economics, but over race, religion, language, and in all
races, religions, and languages--between men and women. They went into divisions of labor, not industrial or technical, but racial, gendered, ethnic, or sexual. If some of them looked to a “point of production,” they did not see it connected to others, technical nodes, links, a material (including human material) nexus, a network of production actually producing things (inter alia moving them); they saw only a workplace culture. If they focused on workers at work, they saw them only in social relations, in communal action, normative (consensual or contested) interaction, or just individually on the job, experiencing work. At their most technical regarding this experience they would give a report on the primary material in its course from input to output, or a list of selected occupations, or brief job descriptions, maybe too a worker’s memory of the experience, as if the work were only personal. The best of them were absolutely clear about their concerns, to study workers’ “voices,” “subjectivity,” “experience,” “meanings,” “identity,” and “language--not just words but all forms of symbolic representation.” Some (like Scott) adopted from sociologists that remarkable word, “strategies,” sic, usually in the plural, not only (as of old) for “union strategies,” but now distinctively for “personal” or “survival strategies,” “class and gender strategies,” “fertility strategies,” even “identity-securing strategies.”

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71 The classic references then were Herbert G. Gutman, “Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919,” American Historical Review, LXXVIII, 3 (June 1973), 531-588; and Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” ibid., XLI, 5 (December 1986), 1053-1075.


74 E.g., Hall et al., op. cit., 100, 105, 146, 154, 184, 199, 225; Baron, op. cit., 22, 31-32, 38, 44-45; idem, “An ‘Other’ Side of Gender Antagonism at Work: Men, Boys, and the Remasculinization of Printer’s Work, 1830-1920,” ibid., 57, 69; Mary H. Blewett, “Manhood and the Market: The Politics of Gender and
Tiananmen, the ruin of reform in the Soviet Union, Solidarity’s passion for capitalism in Poland, and (the last straw) Sandinismo’s defeat in Nicaragua ended all innocent (and many jaded) hopes that workers would ever go for any socialism, that socialism could ever be more than a utopia. The heat on the left since 1917 having gone off, the cultural labor historians could go back to an easier, older, familiar utopia, “to end inequality.” And in relief they piled right into history’s public “culture wars.” There they advocated a kind of historical justice by “inclusion,” writing “working people” in all their multicultural glory into an open, convivial national narrative, e.g., “the pursuit of...democratic culture.” They wanted “work” in the narrative, but only “in the context of community and culture.” They urged inclusion of industrial workers (off work) “in the household, the neighborhood, and the community,” and in the workplace too, but still only in their social relations there, which they still (mis)took for the relations of work. They would not see that community and modern industry (not only manufacturing, but mining, construction, transportation, communication, and systematic services) have been as different as affect and technically coordinated production. Stuck on identities and injustice, insistent on workers’ “agency” in the “larger social and political culture,” but ignorant of industry’s engineering, they avoided any question of technical power, technical strategies, or lack of such power, and the consequent need for other strategies. They emphasized “how permeable were the boundaries between community and work,” only to clarify (they claimed) a common culture in both places, not to examine rival uses of the culture in protecting or isolating strategic positions at work. As they brought a second or third Thompsonite generation into


modern labor history, instead of teaching the new young about industrial work, they have taught them about “constructions,” “representations,” and “semitic challenges,” not only in literal texts (no longer a redundancy), but as well in “popular culture,” “subaltern culture,” “material culture,” “public culture,” “counterculture,” etc. And now the new generation has published an encyclopedia (on U.S. labor), including entries on Ralph Fasanella and “Music and Labor,” but none on “Division of Labor,” “Industrial Relations,” “Industrialization,” or “Technology.” The culture of labor, its traditions and their revivals, has become many labor historians’ happy, hopeful refuge, because they are safe there from the objective meaning of incorrigible, inevitable technical inequalities among workers at work.

Labor historians anxious or glad at this turn have explained it by the world’s changes. But it is not the world’s fault or to its credit that it changed. Nor is intellectual influence the answer. Because Gutman discovered his synthetic solution in “culture,” Scott her new “analytic category” in “gender,” it was not inevitable that so many of their scholarly heirs should discover (or lose) themselves in “cultural studies,” or that they should have brought their students there, or abandoned them there. Let the disciples accept their own agency. Especially in the United States and Great Britain their studies have turned increasingly into a kind of mutual entertainment, distraction, forgetting, to deny old questions that it is very hard for bookish, democratic people to open now, not only “work,” but “future,” or “technical reasons,” or “force,” or “socialism”; they cannot bear fantasies about them.


Robert E. Weir and James P. Hanlan, eds., Historical Encyclopedia of American Labor, 2 vols. (Westport: Greenwood, 2004). There are passing references to Joan Baez and Michael Dukakis, but none to braceros, Theodore Dreiser, Edward Sadlowski, Jr., or Baldemar Velásquez.


Good social and cultural questions about industrial work will keep coming to the labor historian’s mind. Physical, industrial objectivity, not reification, or why or how objects change, but an already imposed, actually existing system of technical things (including ordered natural forces)--what has this done to the subjectivity of the people ordinarily using it for production, sometimes breaking ordered discipline to stop use of it? How differently have pre-industrial and industrial workers construed the meaning of their work, and learned from it? Has technically determined cooperation at work fostered animosity among industrial workers as well as “sociability”? Has their work been a claim (on whom?) or a performance (for whom?), or both? To organize workers at work or in communities, between communities, and beyond, which has been better, integration of differences, or coalitions of them? Why have industrial workers’ movements rarely followed democratic rules? In movements beyond a workplace, beyond a community, among workers unknown to each other, what has brought out the emotion of solidarity? How differently have locality and solidarity constituted industrial workers? These questions keep revolving around (of course constructed) rights and wrongs, turning into moral stories, signs read and misread, practices performed and faked, true (trustworthy) and false (deceptive) senses of the world, historical arguments properly without end.

But meanwhile good industrial and technical questions about industrial work have gone unasked. Why have industrial systems always been discontinuous, systems of technical divisions and connections, articulated, linked, jointed? At industrial work, differently divided in different industries, but in all cases technically impossible for some workers to do unless others known or unknown to them are at it too, which workers’ work has had most other workers depending on it? In specific industries, when firms have changed their technology, how (where) has the inevitable technical inequality at work changed? Are its consequences, although not social, even so dynamic, cumulative, dialectical? To such industrial, technical question can there be an end, not an exhaustion, but a practical purpose?

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The historical study of industrial work would probably now be less difficult to pursue in Europe or Canada than in the United States. There, a historical scholar might respectably concentrate on “social practices…not governed by the laws of the formation of discourses,” or on “objective constraints that both
limit the production of discourse and make it possible.” Here, where the old social history still allows labor and work to dematerialize into “stylization,” image or ritual, a history of industrial work would have to convey that although the relations in which its subjects acted were not symbolic, they were nonetheless meaningful. Or, for the new cultural historians, who may or may not have read Rousseau or Kant or Nietzsche or Saussure or Lévi-Strauss or Derrida or Foucault, but who take the real world past if not present too as a matter only of language, indeed only of “utterances,” as a purely “discursive construction,” and this only of (continually altered) “identities,” it would have to make sense as nonsense, but charming nonsense. Over the last 15 years more than one of them has professed “social realities” to be only “different language games”; more than one wants every temporary, fragmentary identity to have its own history, in all the world’s rave-dancing diversity “a history of everyone, for everyone,” including as if so privileged the “barefoot” historian’s own history, or memories or reminiscences or self-analysis or confessions or fantasies or musings or naive fictions or personal ocurrencias, maybe all together, nicely scrambled; more than one, ignorant or forgetful that U.S. historians began debunking Newtonian (and Humeian) historiography 80-plus years ago, will beat on “objectivity” at the drop of a hat, but look into themselves (individually) for “human nature.” If the world is all cultural, matter but a text, work is not action, but an act, and industrial work is free theater, an improv play.

The histories I want to finish on industrial work will be most at odds with “subaltern studies.” Whereas I want to explain material complexes, dead and living, the subalternists have sought to study social practices, principals, agents, subjects, and objects on anti-materialist premises of truly Emersonian

dimensions. Founded in the 1970s to do Thompsonite “history from below” in India, the “subaltern studies team” (later “collective”) plunged into linguistic theory, structuralism, and post-modernism, concentrated on historiography, published ever less on “subalterns,” did little on labor, ignored work (pre-industrial or industrial), and cogitated a blithely contradictory historical sociology. For its highest authority it claimed yet another “Antonio Gramsci,” citing his “notion of the subaltern.” Unlike the original, this Gramsci was not much of a Marxist, not a Leninist at all, forgettably a Communist, and not a political prisoner writing coded notes for a terrible political struggle actually happening, but a virtual professor of social or media theory enjoying “transactional reading.” He slighted political economy and exploitation (“economistic reductions”), to discourse on “domination” and “hegemony,” and as they happened not in society, but in books. From his problématique (a brief of Pareto’s, Michels’s, and Mosca’s, which last the original Gramsci called “an enormous hotch-potch”), his subalternist disciples defined “domination” as by the “elite,” which (honest to God) signifies “dominant groups” and “social strata inferior to those of the dominant…groups,” but acting “in the interests of the latter and not in conformity to interests

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84 Gayatri Spivak, “Editor’s Note,” Selected Subaltern Studies, xii; and Guha, “Preface,” ibid., 35. “Subaltern” was a term the original Gramsci never used (at least in print) before he went to prison in 1926: Antonio Gramsci, Scritti, 1915-1921 (Moizzi Editore: Milano, 1976). Between 1930 and 1934, in prison, he used the term in 24 paragraphs scattered through 11 notebooks (of the 29 he kept between 1929 and 1935). His most sustained use was in Notebook 25 (1934), where in seven consecutive paragraphs he collected notes for an essay, “Ai margini della storia (Storia dei gruppi sociali subalterni): Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, 4 vols. (Giulio Einaudi Editore: Torino, 1975), III, 2277-2293. References are in the Quaderni’s index, IV, 3177, although not every reference is actually to “subaltern.” Like others then, Communists or not, Gramsci used the word without much discrimination, here in the strict, military sense, there to mean general subordination, here the peasantry, there the proletariat, here intellectuals, there “popular classes,” evidently not for any particular theoretical point, but mainly to avoid the censor. On his inconsistency and the consequent difficulties in translation, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. (and trans.), Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (International Publishers: New York, 1971), xiii-xiv, 5 (their footnote 1), 13 (AG’s footnote *), 26 (their footnote 2), 52-55 (their footnotes 4 and 5), 97 (AG’s footnote **).

corresponding truly to their own social being.” By this definition “the people” and “subaltern classes” are “synonymous…. The social groups and elements included in [represented by?] this category [the people, the collective subaltern?] represent [are?] the demographic difference between the total…population and all those whom we have described [defined?] as the ‘elite.’ Some of these classes and groups such as the lesser rural gentry, impoverished landlords, rich peasants and upper-middle peasants [what about upper-middle merchants or artisans?] who ‘naturally’ ranked among the ‘people’ and the ‘subaltern,’ could under certain circumstances act for the ‘elite,’ …and therefore be classified as such….“86 (Here industrial workers, of whom India for 150 years has had a substantial number, have become a new, Invisible Other.) It is enough to buffalo any historian who has got past King John, the Sheriff of Nottingham, and Robin Hood.

My project will therefore probably run into most resistance among the “progressive” U.S. historians of Latin America who through the last 10 years have adopted not only cultural studies but particularly “subaltern studies” for a model.85 The “progressives” have committed themselves to “subaltern studies” evidently not because of any deep or abiding interest (or training or talent) in linguistics, or linguistic philosophy, or epistemology. The most forthright has lamented her model’s conceptual “dilemma” (“structure” vs. “agency”) and other difficulties, e.g., its “language” and its being “ahistorical.”88 The commitment seems to have formed for other, appropriately fragmented postmodernist reasons, viz., personal political feelings.

First, if then young U.S. historians of U.S. labor suffered terminal disappointment with industrial working classes by 1989, the proto-“progressives” working on first or second books on Latin America suffered terminal disappointment with the traditional and various new lefts (all Marxist) there by 1990. Having come of age politically during Eurocommunism’s appeal, having read something of (the original) Gramsci, at least in English, they had no stake in “existing socialism,” but they had invested heavily in their own field’s popular nationalism, past and present. Mexico, however, had not revolted for Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, but was rapitly following Carlos Salinas. Cuba was going to the dogs. Chile had not overthrown

86 For the original Gramsci on Mosca, see Hoare and Smith, op. cit., 6 (AG’s footnote *). For these definitions, Ranajit Guha, “On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India,” in Selected Subaltern Studies, 44. The emphases are in the text cited.
88 Florencia E. Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru (Berkeley: University of California, 1995), xvi.
General Pinochet; its Christian Democrats had negotiated his retirement, with honors. Argentina was flocking to Menem’s scam. Peru looked ready to explode as its bloody army fought a bloody new “ultraorthodox Maoism.” Then (o grievous last straw) the Sandinistas lost their elections.

Second, it happened that Selected Subaltern Studies, blessed by Edward Said, was just then circulating handily in Oxford paperback. The “progressives” found there not only other Gramsci-readers, feminists, and Third-World post-colonials uncovering “hidden or suppressed accounts of…women, minorities, disadvantaged or dispossessed groups, refugees, exiles, etc.” but also post-colonial cultural studies, where, Said assured them, Gabriel García Márquez and Sergio Ramírez consorted with “a whole host of other figures,” including Frantz Fanon (d. 1961) and Eqbal Ahmad, making the “cultural and critical effort” for “the South of the new North-South configuration.” This was reassuring. As the most forthright “progressive” explained, “progressives” felt their “Marxist or Marxian horses” would no longer ride, and “subaltern studies” was “the perfect compromise…. politically radical yet conversant with the latest in textual analysis and postmodern methods”; the “latest” counted because they could then learn (from the Third World itself!) the theoretical vocabulary Euro-oriented Latin American intellectuals had been using for the last few years.89

Third, finally, the new cultural and “subaltern” studies’ theoretical contradictions, flexibility, pluralism, eclecticism, heterogeneity, pragmatism, subjective individualism, all against “totalizing discourse” or “meta-narratives,” freed “progressives” from the duties of coherence and consistency, and warranted whatever analysis, or “deconstruction,” or “representation,” their personal political feelings indicated. It has made no difference to them, for example, that the original Gramsci emphasized the “hegemony” of private direction or leadership to which a class or “bloc” moved other classes to “consent”

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in “civil society.” There is no reason why it has to make a difference; if the “progressives” so please, they can think as they please. But since (against the original) their “Gramscian” thinks “the state” exercises “hegemony,” they take it on his authority that they may utterly ignore concrete capitalist operations. For these “Gramscians,” capitalism is no longer a mode of production, but a cultural mode, the state is a relation of production,” hegemony is both a “process” and a “pact,” corporations have melted into thin air, and scholarship is (again, I swear) “dialogue among contradictory methodological and epistemological traditions.” The more “progressive” they present themselves personally, the more certain they seem to feel that their “theorizing” of history is doing right morally, intellectually, and politically.

Most of the “progressives” have tended to Mexico, and studied primarily peasants. They would in a flash subsume any study of industrial work of the kind I am trying to do into a dispute (ok, “dialogue”) over the muddles they call “culture,” “structure,” and “agency.” It could not end anywhere new. Round and round, in their diligently subalternist rites, they would continually turn (thinking it their cultural turn) to their old, unconsciously inherited, still unrecognized (so still unexamined), often contradictory assumptions from Parsonian functionalism, Popperite methodological individualism, Cooleyian symbolic interactionism,


and Goffmanite ethnomethodology, to save their “culture” and avoid seeing how work actually works in the organization of industrial workers.

From the same camp two labor historians have edited a collection on Latin American “women factory workers.” Proclaiming a “key conceptual breakthrough…found through engagement with the theoretical category of gender,” they hope “research on work and the production process itself,” as well as studies of discourse and subjectivity, will soon lead to “a truly gendered….history of Latin American workers.”\(^{92}\) But they evidently have no idea of what industrial work is, technical, collective, complex. One of the essayists in the collection knows the productive process cold in the industry where her workers were (meatpacking in Argentina), and her advantage shows in her vivid, cogent argument.\(^{93}\) Another knows enough about the process in the industry where her workers were (textiles in Colombia) to suggest its significance.\(^{94}\) But neither indicates (much less explains) the technical dependence of their particular workers regardless of skill or gender; both miss its inductance of cultural imperatives, alterations of identity, and pressure to mobilize. Another essayist gives keen insight into the virtually absolute duty of women (in textile mills in Brazil) to be in a family and bear every unpaid cost of holding it together.

Another sensitively, scrupulously portrays new women created in struggles for justice and their union (at a spinning mill in Guatemala), workers so brave, against terror worse than war, they risked their lives, their children, their sacred honor, and the love of others for them, old or new, and not for any formal “feminism,” but in courage like grace for workers’ and specifically working women’s rights. Yet another shows in compelling clarity that in newly impoverished rural families wives who went to work in a new agro-industry (fruit-packing plants in Chile) gained new economic and sexual independence, suffered much more physical abuse from their husbands, protested more against it, and took new, public part in organizing


their community. These admirable essays all involve the “social relations of work,” but nothing of the relations among workers in work, just doing their work. It remains a mystery therefore how industrial work in Latin America has taken gender’s conjugation, or changed its declension. The editors, heralding “a truly gendered labor history,” are in for a sad disappointment if they keep thinking “the factory” works like “the plaza.” They can “explore the articulation [sic, for inflection] of gender and class” all they please, but they will not explain industrial workers’ gender or class (or discourse or subjectivity), so long as they look for it only in “experience.”

Devoted as they are to synthesis, integration, resolution, they suspect analytical abstractions are deterministic moves against humanity, at least reductionist tricks on humanists. They will listen to how sausage was made, but they resist knowing how the factory ran (or that some workers held better positions than others to keep the place running, or to shut it down). My abstract histories of industrial work, featuring workers only as labor power, which I write hopefully to tell the difference between working relations and others, to understand strategic positions at work, then to write a full labor history, they would (consistent with their principles) have to denounce as a gross betrayal of the effort for “an androgynous vision of the future…based, above all else, on what it means to be human tout court,” a vision they think necessary for labor to deal with “all forms of inequality and hierarchy.”

Up front, like the details at any place of industrial work, the details in my studies may seem overwhelming. But there is a method to them that will, I hope, make them intelligible. It derives first from my own research in company correspondence and payrolls, public archives on industry and labor, trade and

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97 French and James, “Squaring the Circle,” 4-8, 24 nn29-31.

98 A “test to destruction” does not count: Levenson-Estrada, op. cit., 214.

professional journals, and engineering manuals and handbooks, but probably no less from my untutored, sporadic reading outside labor history over the last 35 years--in industrial sociology, business history, labor economics, scientific management, the sociology, philosophy, theology, and anthropology of work, interaction theory, industrial archeology, economic geography, organization theory, the history of technology, the theory of the firm, institutional economics (“old” and “new”), the “new institutionalism,” industrial relations, and fiction, poetry, memoirs, and reporting (if “reporting” is what Henry Mayhew, B. Traven, and James Agee wrote) about work, in none of which fields can I claim the slightest expertise. From all this accumulated welter the method began to come clear once I started teaching Mexican industrial and labor history, and reread John Dunlop on industrial relations. I soon concluded Dunlop had got the key concept right the first time he wrote his “theory,” now 60 years ago, as labor history, and he got it right ever after.
Chapter II. Strategic Position at Work: The Concept, Its Origin and Evolution

It was not “the web of rules,” however much good sense that made. Dunlop’s key to understanding industrial work historically was the concept of “strategic position,” even as the key to industrial relations, to organizing industrial workers (or not), used to be and remains such positions. This was not Soffer’s theory, which Dunlop’s theory had inspired, but which Soffer made against Dunlop, mangling his argument, cribbing his language, and establishing the figure of “autonomous workmen,” who because of their “strategic skills” in production held “strategic positions” there (the theory Montgomery eventually adopted and after him schools of others on at least six continents). Dunlop’s argument was neither prescriptive nor exclusive: Maybe because of certain skills, explicitly maybe not, but always in a “technological framework,” i.e., “in the productive process,” his “strategic positions” were any from which some workers could stop many others from producing, inside a firm, or across an economy, e.g., tool and die makers, or longshoremen, 1941-45, which an industrial economist or engineer could explain, but not a sociologist. There Dunlop gave me the concept I had long wanted, which for years had often sat on my desk, but I never recognized, an idea beyond “social relations in production,” or “social relations of work,” simply the idea of material relations, which I could now grasp as industrial or technical relations of production. I was not pondering base and superstructure. I was ignoring social relations, for a temporary, abstract, partial, but also therefore special view into another range of connections, thinking (in the abstract) only of forces of production timed in space. It bears the heaviest of emphases that this method of analysis comes not from game theory, but from military history, is not about moves within a matrix, or ordering, but about waging war. Corollary: Without knowledge of strategic positions, you cannot begin to think about a strategy.

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It also bears making absolutely clear (not that this will calm the culturalists), this is not an argument against cultural or moral or social or commercial or political or legal or religious or ideological labor history. Nor is it an argument against the idea (indeed the frequent fact) of culturally, morally, socially, commercially, politically, legally, and otherwise strategic positions, or any so informed strategy. It is only to argue for industrial and technical labor histories as well, in order to see in any study what kind(s) of strategic positions (if any) workers held, including (if any) industrially and technically strategic positions, in order then to tell if the workers in question understood their chances, or not, and if they did all they could with them, or not, and finally to explain why they did as much as they did, no more, no less.

Real history, real life: in long collective struggles at best you use whatever you grasp that you think will do any good; ordinarily you often lose sight of good chances, or screw them up, or gain from them without knowing it (much less knowing how or why); better learn to recognize them all, and use them for all they are worth.

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To try further to avoid confusion or misinterpretation, I offer here an example live in Dunlop’s day of the industrial and technical analysis he meant. It comes from the great UAW strike against GM in Flint, Michigan, December 30, 1936-February 11, 1937.103 This was an operation comprehensible only in terms of a massive, national (actually international), hurried, consciously historic campaign, involving many sorts of relations, class, markets, social circles, politics, cultures, ideologies, religions, personalities, all in critical commotion, and industrial and technical divisions of labor, in tremendous complications. Every major party to the conflict had its strategy, graduated, sequential, cumulative, or parallel and simultaneous, and because the stakes were very high, every strategy was “multiphbian”; the fight at Flint happened in multiple elements.104 Yet the differences between the various strategic “contexts” (in Dunlop’s sense) are

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remarkably clear. In 1935, in the new political “context” of the National Labor Relations Act, the group that eventually led the strike on GM made a grand strategic decision, to force industrial unions on the great corporations in U.S. automobile and steel industries, as soon as possible. The group’s main reasons for going after these mass-production industries first (rather than the cigaret industry, say, or textiles, brewing, soap, or oil) certainly included the number of workers in them, as many as 500,000 in the auto industry, another 500,000 in steel. But there was also the industrially strategic reason, that making cars took ever more steel, which took coal, so that the new industrial unions would interlock with the old industrial union in coal-mining, the UMW (500,000 members among 650,000 coal-miners), to make a direct, tight industrial alliance in their conflicts with capital. Aside from its other powers the alliance would hold the industrially most strategic position in the country, because no coal, no railroad trains.

The UAW, organized in April 1936 to start the campaign in the auto industry, soon decided to go straight for the industry’s biggest corporation. General Motors, Du Pont/Morgan-owned, colossal, fast-growing, fast-hiring, handsomely profitable, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.-managed, was then making cars and much else in 69 U.S. plants in 35 cities and 14 states, paying 172,000 workers, selling 37% of all car and trucks worldwide. Why not go for a smaller company, Chrysler? Strategically the problem would be the markets (costs and prices, not an industrial or technical problem). UAW success at Chrysler could not last, for the unionized smaller company could not last against the practically un-unionized giants, GM and Ford, whereas success at GM or Ford would probably force all other companies into collective bargaining. Why not strike the other giant, Ford, stop its gargantuan metallurgical heart at River Rouge, try to win the 70,000 auto workers concentrated there, the most industrial workers in one place in the world? Among the main strategic reasons not to try that, e.g., almost no UAW members or agents in the place, them politically divided, the industry’s bitterest “race question” (which Ford fomented between 60,000 white and 10,000 black workers), in other words social, political, cultural disadvantages, there was the disadvantage that Rouge was technically the most integrated industrial complex in the world. By contrast, although GM was altogether bigger, its material decentralization made it technically easier to crack.

As the strike-determined group in the UAW (primarily Communists) knew from previous strikes, GM’s entire production of cars depended technically on ten plants. Two in Detroit were for Cadillacs. The

others were Fisher Body 21 and Fisher Body 23, also in Detroit, No. 21 for checking fixtures (to gage a
die’s stamp), No. 23 for most GM body dies, GM Toledo, Saginaw, and Muncie for Chevrolet
transmissions, Cleveland Fisher Body for Chevy body parts, Chevrolet No. 4, in Flint, for Chevy engines,
and Fisher Body No. 1, in Flint, for Buick, Pontiac, and Olds body parts. The union would do the company
most damage fastest by shutting down Cleveland Fisher and Fisher One. Compared to GM’s biggest plant,
Flint Buick, 16,000 workers, these plants were not large, 7,200 and 7,500 workers, respectively. But (as the
Communists in Detroit knew first) they had the company’s only sets of dies for stamping the bodies of all
its most widely selling cars. Were GM to keep plenty body parts in stock, it could take a longer strike than
the union could give. But for financial and technical reasons (the expense of storing the bulky things) no
company stockpiled the parts. In GM’s technical “context” then, if any workers at Cleveland Fisher and
Fisher One stopped their pressrooms, they would not only force the other workers there to stop working,
but also in short order force probably 120,000 GM workers elsewhere to stop too, and so stop production of
maybe three-quarters of GM’s scheduled cars, while Ford remained in business. Technically the most
strategic positions at GM were in material command of those dies. The union therefore built its strength
particularly around them. Note: It was not the geographic location, the gps coordinates, but the position in
the technical division of labor that mattered.

In November other kinds of “contexts” emerged. GM would pay a bonus just before Christmas,
and a pro-labor Democrat would become Michigan’s governor on New Year’s Day, assuming command of
the National Guard in the state where seven of GM’s 10 key plants were. By mid-December 1936 the UAW
had enough members, maybe 750 at Cleveland Fisher, 1,500 at Fisher One, in enough concentration, to
shut both plants down. Most members and many other workers trusted their local leaders (particularly the
Communists). In neither plant did the “race question” arise, because the white workers could hardly find
any blacks to hound. On Monday December 28, at the first post-bonus grievance, workers in a panel
department at Cleveland Fisher “yanked the power off” and sat down, some in other departments did the
same, striking the plant, and by nightfall 260 workers held it from the inside. Late on Wednesday
December 30, in coordination with Cleveland, on a claim GM was about to move Fisher One’s dies for use
elsewhere, some 500 workers in Fisher One’s soldering and welding department (“body-in-white”)
captured the plant (including the dies), some in other departments joined them, and together they struck all
work from inside, took command of the kitchen, power plant, and heating system, and prepared defenses. By January 3 its local leaders had publicly adopted the vocabulary of “strategy.”

Through all the “contexts” then, e.g., the new Michigan governor’s tolerance of the strike, the union held Fisher One for the next 43 days and nights. Sometimes fewer than 100 workers were at “the sitdown,” rarely as many as 1,000, but they had much support organized outside, in Flint and beyond.

While the strike spread to other GM plants, the UAW settled strikes elsewhere that might slow Ford’s or Chrysler’s production. Eventually 17 GM plants were on strike (nine of them on sitdown strikes), which forced 34 others to close for lack of parts. By February 2 more than 135,000 GM workers had stopped producing, and for the month just ended GM’s output had been only a quarter of its scheduled production.

On February 11, 1937, GM recognized the UAW as the collective bargaining agent for its members in the 17 struck plants. The die-levered strike ended in the union’s celebration of “victory.” Within a month the UAW had a paid-up membership of 166,000. On March 2, 1937, preempting a strategically focused strike like that in the auto industry, U.S. Steel recognized the Steel Workers Organizing Committee as bargaining agent for SWOC members in its plants. Only after the new labor movement’s two strategic industrial victories, on April 12, 1937, did the U.S. Supreme Court decide (5-4) that the NLRA was constitutional. By May Day the UAW and SWOC each had some 300,000 members, the UMW 600,000. At its first national conference in October 1937 the Committee for Industrial Organization represented probably 3,500,000 workers.

It would wrong to leave this example from 1937 without observing that tool-making and dies are still highly strategic in metal manufacturing industries, not least in Flint. A UAW strike at GM’s Flint Metal Center in 1998, planned over other issues, started when GM removed the center’s dies. From the initial 3,400 strikers at Flint Metal Fab, it spread to 5,800 at Flint East, a parts plant, eventually forced the company to close 27 of its 29 North American assembly plants, stopped 180,000 other GM workers from producing, and in its course of 54 days cut the company’s profits by $2.2 billion. It ended only after GM returned the dies, and agreed to substantial investment in Flint’s presses, some of which it actually made.

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The notion of using a strategic position in a conflict over work may date from right after The Fall, when still in the garden Adam bargained with God. “When Adam heard the words, ‘Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth,’ concerning the ground, a sweat broke out on his face, and he said, ‘What! Shall I and my cattle eat from the same manger?’ The Lord had mercy upon him, and spoke, ‘In view of the sweat of thy face, thou shalt eat bread.’” However this may be, the notion was strongly in the air once much labor power and capital found each other through negotiating wages in a labor market, where there were “corps of reserve, to be cheaply purchased by the masters.” It came very close to expression in the continual agitation in Great Britain over “the aristocracy of labor.” And already then some noticed it went deeper than the labor market, down into production. Of a cotton-spinners’ strike in Glasgow in 1837 the sheriff of Lanarkshire complained, “…every spinner that struck [these being mule spinners, skilled workers, operating the most complicated machines in the mill]….threw out of employment from six to ten other persons [in the mill]….piecers, and reelers, and others…. Not long after aristocrats of labor gained their notorious name, a British royal commission studying how to police them discovered their nerve came “not necessarily” from being “the most skilled,” but from their “position” in production, where they could “stop a great number of other labourers, though many of these may be more skilled.”

Besides Adam’s moral argument, by which he obliged God to rise to the occasion, here already are hints of commercially, culturally, politically, and industrially or technically strategic positions. Whoever holds any of them holds an advantage in bargaining, but the adverbial differences among them are clear and important. From a commercially strategic position a few buyers or sellers (in a labor market employers or

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workers) may alter many exchanges. From a culturally strategic position a few of the esteemed may validate many social relations, discredit others. From a politically strategic position a few politicians may make many others pass laws favoring partisans, or betraying them for support elsewhere. From an industrially (between firms) or technically (within a firm) strategic position, a few workers may cause a concatenation of stoppages in production, or prevent them.

In early socialist discourse the contention between capital and workers drew the general notion out almost by name. Engels explained how in “the prevailing war of all against all” in England capital deployed its “reserve of unemployed workers.” Most bellicose in language, the “pacifist” Considerant railed against France’s new “industrial and financial Feudality” lording it over “the masses deprived…of ‘industrial arms.’” He limned a “great battlefield” where “some are educated, inured to war, equipped, armed to the teeth,…possess a great supply train, material, munitions, and machines of war, [and]…occupy all the positions,” while others had to beg them for work. Likewise in 1848 Marx and Engels, always thinking strategically, described “two great hostile camps” across Europe, “whole industrial armies,” “the more or less hidden civil war inside society now.” Marx would later declare, “…even under the most favorable political conditions all serious success of the proletariat depends upon an organization that unites and concentrates its forces,” and often wrote of “guerilla [sic] fights between capital and labor”—without distinguishing between “fights” in the market and “fights” in production.

So the notion circulated in Great Britain among the new “social scientists” and “political economists.” One of the former, on British unions in the 1850s: “Strikes hold in the intercourse between employer and employed the same place that war holds with regard to the intercourse of nations… The constant fear of a strike is as great an interruption to business and as great a check to enterprise in a trade, as the constant fear of war is to the business and enterprise of the world.”

Another, an authority on French labor: “…as matters now stand [in France], the masters and the men are two armies drawn up in battle array…” Through Britain’s “industrial war” of the 1860s the notion first (so far as I can tell) appeared in the word itself, if only in passing. Of striking workers then the political economist who destroyed “the wages fund” observed, they “have…evinced a judicious appreciation of Napoleonic strategy. Their favourite practice consists of manoeuvres to which they have given the appropriate name of ‘sectional struggles.’” A decade later the Marshalls reasoned likewise, if to a different point, and that not of “strategy,” but of “policy”: “The function of an army is not to make war, but to preserve a satisfactory peace…. And though there is always a war party in a union, its cooler and abler members know that to declare a strike is to confess failure.”

Edgeworth took “economic competition” generally as both “peace” and “war,” and explained contracts involving “combinations,” e.g., “Trade Unionism,” as “indeterminate,” settled by “higgling dodges…designing obstinacy,” and force. Jevons, who also understood a market’s “dead-lock,” then delved into the depths of “industrial dead-lock,” i.e., in production, where he saw the threat of “industrial treason.” Worse, he warned, “a great strike…might assume the character of social Revolution.” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University, 1986), 262-280.


treason. ...a really complete strike of colliers would place the country in a state of siege as completely as Paris was so placed by the German armies.”

Nearly a decade later, in terms of exchange, probably in answer to Fabian arguments about “class war” and “facts,” Alfred Marshall first (so far as I can tell) mentioned “the strategical position of the workmen.” Had he used his explanation of “joint and composite demand” and analogous supply (Menger’s “complementary goods” and “substitutes”) to conceptualize this “strategical” position in production as well as he conceptualized it in a business cycle, he would have made the matter of industrial “war” clear, maybe for good. But he kept to exchange, and shortly framed the “strategical” concept just for the labor market: “The relative strategic strength of employer and employed may determine for the time the shares in which the aggregate net income of the trade is divided…. [In bargaining, unions will insist on] retaining their strategic advantages…. For a Fabian account of wage determination, the Webbs before long made the same point as “strategic position….strategic strength….strategic advantage.” Another Fabian put it precisely: “The success of either workmen or employers depended on the strategic position of the two parties in the labor market.” A provincial Marshallian, “Canada’s first labour economist,” argued that labor’s “share of the product” depended on its “power to carry out the threat….to withdraw….co-operation” from capital, “to enforce its threat to ‘strike,’” missing only “strategic” to bring his case in line. Edgeworth a few years later, considering “industrial combat,” nailed capital’s “strategic reasons” for

123 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, “Primitive Democracy in British Trade-Unionism, I,” Political Science Quarterly, XI, 3 (September 1896), 424; idem, Industrial Democracy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1897), 29, 181, 217, 219, 654-655, 661-662, 668-669, 676, 692, 694, 719, 802, 810, 814, 816, 822, 842, 902, 920, 926. Cf. a British labor leader’s military metaphors (not “strategic”) about avoiding a lockout in the shipbuilding industry in 1897: “We have so far out-generaled Colonel Dyer as to have averted the threat upon an unpopular issue…. But the army of labour must come into line, so that the fight shall be won…” George N. Barnes, “The Engineering Dispute,” The People’s Journal for Dundee, August 7, 1897, 5, for the transcription of which in London I thank David Smith.
delaying a deal with labor (being “better supplied for a siege…in case of a strike”).126 In the fifth edition of his *Principles* (1907) Marshall made his points definitive on workers’ “strategical position” and consequent “strategy.”127 Pigou, his best pupil on labor, concluded like him that collective bargaining in some cases could bring “a clear strategic gain to the workpeople,” but in others do them “strategic injury.”128

On the Continent political economists lagged in adopting military words for industrial class conflict. Léon Walras, who granted the French state’s “strategic point of view” on railroads (for “national defense”), treated conflict involving “coalitions” of “entrepreneurs” or workers as only civilian *intimidation*, *menaces*, or *violences*, e.g., “à la façon des Molly Maguires.” He noted both capital’s and labor’s *puissance*, but neither’s “strategy.”129 Pareto came no closer to military parlance for industrial contention than *la spoliation*; no plan for industrial actions that he called “obliging” or “menacing” was “strategic.”130 Germans, haunted less by Marxism than by Lassalle on *Machtverhältnisse*, “power relations,” admitted *Macht* (might, strength, power) in industrial disputes.131 While Schmoller worried over *Terrorismus* by businessmen and workers, “a terrible struggle” between them, “a state of war,” Adolph Wagner pondered *Machtfaktoren* (power factors) in the labor market.132 So did these professors’ fellows

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and students, not only *Machtverhältnisse*, but *Machelage* (power situation), *Machtstellung* (power position), and *Machtposition* (ditto) too, all strategic in *Lohnkämpfe* (fights for higher wages), but never explicitly, conceptually “strategic.”¹³³ The word describing industrial positions first appeared in German shortly after the Webbs so used it in English, in a German translation of their book.¹³⁴ Having read the Webbs, but still attending less to power than to forceful action, e.g., *Gewalt* (“coercion”), or *Zwang* (“enforcement”). Schmoller in his magnum opus on economic theory mentioned nothing “strategic.”¹³⁵ Not until the year of Marshall’s fifth edition did a professor at the Frankfurt Academy for Social and Commercial Sciences, invoking Clausewitz, write expressly of “strategy” in current *Arbeitskämpfe*, “labor struggles.”¹³⁶ Five years later a disciple of Schmoller’s and Wagner’s published his dissertation on cartels and unions with much mention of their “power positions” and “market strategy.”¹³⁷ But the usage did not stick. Writing on “income distribution,” in German, for Germans, in the *Macht*-mode, the major Russian political economist at the time praised the Webbs’ “empirical material,” decried their “weak and insignificant” theory, and missed any notion of “strategic” or “strategy.”¹³⁸ Schmoller, revising his magnum opus, caught the

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Frankfort professor’s word, *Strategie*, and finally applied it to modern industrial relations, once.\(^{139}\) The Austrians decades before might have imagined “complementary goods” as “strategic goods.”\(^{140}\) But as beset as the Germans by Lassalle’s ghost, they ruled *Machtverhältnisse* out of “pure” analyses of capital and labor.\(^{141}\) In impure analyses Wieser addressed the ghost and power by name, and in explaining real economies recognized endogenous *Macht*, “begotten” in economic development.\(^{142}\) Ultimately Böhm-Bawerk himself granted that unions had “power” in “the fight for higher wages”: in “the extreme test of strength…the struggle by strike,” they could drive their members’ wages (temporarily) higher than their “marginal productivity.”\(^{143}\) But only about Moltke did an Austrian write *strategische*.\(^{144}\)

As in England, martial metaphors for industrial disputes circulated widely in the United States. The U.S. Army brigadier general (ret.) who would be the first president of the American Economics Association argued, “ Strikes are…of the nature of insurrection. Trades-unions are associations for facilitating insurrection, like secret political clubs….\(^{145}\) Combative Henry George epistled the Holy Father, unions’ “methods are like those of an army,…the strike…being a form of passive war. …when armies shall throw away lead and iron, to try conclusions by the pelting of rose leaves,” then unions

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resorting only to moral appeals might make gains. “But not till then. …labor associations [now] can do nothing to raise wages but by force.”146 The young, supremely civil Taussig, to explain “bargaining” for “particular wages,” referred to “the manoeuvres…of laborers.”147 In the 1890s Marx’s and Engels’s old comrade Sorge reported on the American labor movement’s “generalship,” “concentration of force and direction on one point of attack,” and “tactics,” although not its strategy.148 From the other side F. W. Taylor lamented workers’ “soldiering” and “war between the management and the men.”149 At the turn of the century, before the U. S. Industrial Commission, strategically minded AFL and Knights of Labor leaders testified in like terms; Gompers took pride in “the army of labor,” and specified, “…a defense fund is the arms and ammunition.”150

One of the commission’s economists, John R. Commons, was (I believe) the first anywhere who saw “unskilled labor,” viz., Chicago’s teamsters, “holding a highly strategic position in industry.”151 And John Bates Clark first (I believe) put it in a U.S. economics textbook that unions pursued “strategy” in bargaining for wages.152 But for all the military tropes about industrial conflict neither Commons’s nor Clark’s notion would circulate. The mature Taussig considered “large-scale” industrial organization to be “semi-military,” wage rates to be “always a debatable ground,” unions to have “bargaining position” there and “a chance for manoeuvring,” and the closed shop to be “a powerful weapon,” especially in “an industry

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151 J. R. Commons, “Types of American Labor Organization.--The Teamsters of Chicago,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, XIX, 3 (May 1905), 400; idem, “The Teamsters of Chicago,” in John R. Commons, ed., Trade Unionism and Labor Problems (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1905), 36, where oddly he called driving a team a “craft”; 37; idem, “Is Class Conflict in America Growing and Is It Inevitable?” American Journal of Sociology, XIII, 6 (May 1908), 757, 759. For his earlier testimony before the Industrial Commission (which was not about strategy), see its Report, XIV, 32-48.

of pressing importance to the public,” where even without “the tactical move of violence” a strike or “tie-up” would “amount to seizing society by the throat, and calling on it to stand and deliver,” a premonition of “the great struggle,” without, however, any “strategic” reference or “strategy.”Praising legal restraint of strikes in Canada’s strategic industries, Victor Clark declared in November 1916, “ Strikes are like wars,” hard on “the rank and file,” agonies to avoid, not study for strategic lessons. The very next month a general of U.S. business unionism declared, “Industrial war is precisely of the same character as actual war… If it comes,” he threatened, “it will come in a way that will make it overshadow all former industrial upheavals, precisely as the present war blots out of existence virtually all of the wars that preceded it.” Although he knew well the technically most strategic positions in the most strategic U.S. industry then, he uttered no such word (much less took any strategic action, save retreat). Debs and Haywood, the generals of U.S. industrial unionism, for decades thought, acted, wrote, and spoke to bring its forces to bear on capital’s industrial weak points, but also without writing or speaking (so far as I know) of any union’s “strategic” situation or “strategy.” Reflecting on his Rockefeller-funded study of “industrial relations” (post-Ludlow Massacre), a Harvard-educated Canadian ex-minister of labor concluded in 1918, “With industrial strife it is just as with international conflict… Here is the explanation of how men in large numbers…are drawn into conflict with each other, and come to hate each other…. A few men gain the positions of control. They have, for the time being, immediate power over other men… They take the decisive action which brings conflict in its wake… Countries cannot continue to watch antagonistic groups in Industry assume the proportions and attitudes of vast opposing armies, without some day witnessing conflict commensurable with the strength of these rival aggregations… In many particulars, the horrors of international war pale before the possibilities of civil conflicts begotten of class hatreds. This, the world is

155 This was Austin B. Garretson, president (1906-1919) of the Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen, speaking to the Economic Club of New York: “Garretson Warns of Revolution if Military Law to Prevent Rail Strikes is Passed by Congress,” *The New York Evening Mail*, December 12, 1916, 9, 18.
witnessing, even now!” But neither did he call positions of industrial control “strategic,” or write of industrial “strategy.” 157

The first worker I have found who expressed the notion in all its depth in the word was a formidable syndicalist organizing around Chicago in 1919. Whether or not the Great War evoked the military term from him, William Z. Foster described his strategy for a campaign to strike the U.S. steel industry and unite its workers in one industrial union, as “strategy.” 158

“Welfare capitalism” harmonized official U.S. discourse on industrial relations in the 1920s. “Bargaining power” sounded best for the differences between National Civic Federation and American Federation of Labor chums at poker. Rarely would a union’s “strategy” get into the tightest, stuffiest U.S. newspaper. 159 Popular discourse on actual industrial conflicts (railroads 1922, coal 1922 and 1925, Passaic 1926, Gastonia 1929) remained militaristic, “wars,” “armies,” “battlegrounds,” and such like. But I know of only seven notables then who wrote explicitly in “strategic” terms on workers’ strategic power at work. One was the generalissimo of U.S. trade unionism. In the last year of his life Gompers recalled “as much hard thinking as any military strategist ever gave a campaign,” a “strategic factor,” and “a strategic move” for a cigar strike (in 1877), “our strategy” for another cigar strike (in 1886), and capitalists’ usual “strategic economic advantage.” 160 More concrete was a Johns Hopkins-trained economist teaching the first academic course anywhere on “labor economics,” at Berkeley. In his textbook, the first ever titled “labor economics,” Solomon Blum observed, “A highly skilled group in a strategic position, like the locomotive engineers…, [has] a very definite point of vantage.” 161 From a different angle ex-syndicalist Foster, now chief of the Workers (Communist) Party’s Trade Union Educational League, spelled out the U.S. left’s current “strike strategy”: The “most vital concern” of its “strategists” should be, “organize the unorganized,” which would “transfer the center of gravity of the movement from the skilled trades and light industries to the unskilled and semi-skilled in the key and basic industries,” and “secure advantageous strategic positions for the

157 W.L. Mackenzie King, Industry and Humanity: A Study in the Principles Underlying Industrial Reconstruction (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918), 12, 15-16, 19-20, 378, 433-448. The only “strategy” he noted here, the “unprincipled” kind, was “a crafty opportunism” that an irresponsible politician might use to prevent “the introduction of Law and Order into Industry”: ibid., 517-518.
bigger…battles…ahead.”162 A year later a Columbia-trained, Sage Industrial Studies sociologist, Benjamin Seleman, reported Canadian unions’ “strategy,” meaning their goals, not much new, recognition and improvement of their members’ wages, hours, and working conditions.163 A year after that a Chicago-trained sociologist (Robert Park’s first to study labor) traced the natural history of “the strike cycle.” Amid his profuse “strategic” comments Ernest Hiller made none on workers “compelled to be idle or to join the strike in consequence of a stoppage” by “key workmen whose walkout causes dependent operations to shut down,” but his “strategists” did decide on timing strikes, on “[t]he strategic moment for a trade dispute.”164 That same year Selig Perlman pictured an especially U.S. American “economic front” on which (rather than on “the political front”) “the labor army” had found it would be “the correct strategy” to fight.165 And turning the decade in the pit of the Great Depression Stanley Mathewson reported foremen ordering slow production to save work: “Sometimes the [straw] boss himself is in a strategic position to enforce his orders for restriction directly….”166

Between the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933, legalizing “the right to organize and bargain collectively,” and the Supreme Court’s legitimation of the National Labor Relations Act in 1937, “strategic” discourse became common in the U.S. labor movement. The San Francisco Central Labor Council representing 120 unions appointed a “strike strategy committee” to direct a general strike all around Frisco Bay in July 1934, two and a half years before the UAW reps at Flint named their “board of strategy” for the strike against GM.167 The sitdowns of 1937 made the “strategic” discourse familiar even to ordinary workers. A new introduction to the IWW's old manual assumed its readers would now understand its reference to “the key places, the strategic places, in the present-day set up.”168

It took academics longer to think of labor in such terms. But as U.S. unions were going, students in the new field of labor economics followed. By then the field was strongest at Harvard. There “bargaining

162 William Z. Foster, Organize the Unorganized (Chicago: Trade Union Educational League, 1926), 21, 24-29; idem, Strike Strategy (Chicago: Trade Union Educational League, 1926), 6-7, 31-34.
166 Stanley B. Mathewson, Restriction of Output among Unorganized Workers (New York: Viking, 1931), 30, 42.
power” remained the customary term for the typically pragmatic consideration of troubles between big business and labor. In new English wage theories professors and students could learn a new neoclassical concept derived from Marshall’s “joint demand,” labor’s “elasticity of substitution,” and through this concept, at zero “substitutability,” the canny and critical could infer strategic forces. But Harvard’s real authority on industrial conflict was Sumner Slichter, first at its business school, then also in its economics department (1935-59). A student of Commons’s at Madison, Slichter had done his doctorate at Chicago with the premier U.S. expert on immigration and labor markets (Harry Millis), and become “probably the most widely read economist by the general public of his day.” Professionally and for the U.S. government, which he often advised, he studied unions’ “bargaining power” for the real macro-results on U.S. price levels. By 1939 he had a negative definition for it, “the cost to A of imposing a loss upon B.” And shortly two of his disciples at Harvard developed the first positive theoretical explanation. One of them, also steeped in Commons’s economics, familiar with Blum’s textbook from his undergraduate years at Berkeley, was Dunlop. Yet nothing overtly “strategic” crossed those pages.

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If young Dr. Dunlop had continued purely academic pursuits, he would surely have enjoyed a successful academic career. From Marshall, Pigou, Commons, and Blum, he would surely have soon proposed (as he did) that the structure of product and factor markets could give some workers “strong bargaining power...at the expense of other factors (including different types of labor)...,” an outright “strategic power” in the labor market. From Perlman on “the economic front” of “job-territories,” from Harvard’s Abbot Usher on “technology” and “strategic inventions,” from Schumpeter on “production function” and “innovation,” he would almost surely have soon held (as he did) that industrial technology comprised not only machinery, not only “engineering and geographic and biological conditions,” but also “industrial organization,” the “size and resources of enterprises,” and their continual development of “new methods of production.” And amid the “frictions” of real markets he may well have analyzed how much firms and unions counted on an existing (or available) cluster of technologies in their “strategic” negotiations over the price for clusters of labor.172 But better luck befell him, to go to Washington in 1943, not yet 30 years old, and serve for the duration of World War II as director of research at the U.S. National War Labor Board. There he learned from deeply urgent, extremely practical experience, in continual crises, which industries were materially most strategic to U.S. war-time production, which departments in them were technically most strategic to their operation, and which positions in these departments (if any) were more strategic than others to their work, all to report as precisely as possible where disputes at work would most threaten U.S. economic and military strength, to inform mediation of intolerable conflicts. He could have had no better education on the great modern industrially and technically strategic questions. Moreover, he quickly learned from the unions to think of production in explicitly “strategic” terms. And before the war’s end he brought to print the first explicit concept of labor’s industrially and technically “strategic positions.”173


Dunlop phrased it simply, for students of U.S. labor history. “The American labor movement,” he began, “has developed in the context of changing patterns of technology, business organization, social relations, and political power.” In particular, he came to the point, “unionization….is to be explained in terms of the position of workers both in a market system and in relation to a technological process. The combined strategic power of groups has varied widely. Some workers have been able to close an entire plant, or to inflict great loss, by possession of a scarce skill, by reason of their location in the flow of operations, or because of their control over perishable materials or product. Thus loom fixers in weaving, teamsters who deliver materials or finished goods, cutters in clothing, and those who soak hides in the leather trade all occupy extremely advantageous positions simply by virtue of technology. Other workers have strong bargaining power as a consequence of location in a market structure…at the expense of other factors….or…in the product markets… The bargaining power of wage earners depends upon their strategic position in dealing with the firm, and the strategic position of the firm depends in turn upon its dealings with the rest of the market mechanism.”

This explanation Dunlop shortly disguised in the first neoclassically argued study of unions’ economic functions and effects. Reconcentrated on markets, he emphasized their “technical organization,” i.e., as he put it, the “character of competition” in them, especially in the market where prices appear as wages. “…labor markets,” he wrote, “do not resemble bourses, auctions, nor [sic] closed-bid arrangements. A great many wage earners sell their services to a relatively much smaller number of enterprises. In the nonunionized market, enterprises typically set [=quote] a wage rate…. Trade unions seek to alter the labor market so as to transfer the pricing of services from an employer take-it-or-leave-it situation to a negotiated price market or a quoted-price market of their own.” Here, in a market, he considered only the “bargaining power” derived from markets. His concept of “strategic position” in production, he vaporized into an idea of “‘pure’ bargaining power: ability to get favorable bargains apart from market conditions,” which he

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might have condensed into a power over production, but instead diffused into problems of information and preference. And the earlier loaded adjective “strategic,” he here emptied of consistent meaning, to use it in one phrase “in the sense of amenable to particular controls [over markets],” in another to stress the “advantage of the initiative,” in yet another to indicate industries vital to the U.S. military, finally to suggest a reactionary steel baron’s ulterior motives. He had a perfectly professional reason for arguing only for “bargaining power” in the market. From the very nature of the modern labor market, nothing else, he could show that the modern wage structure was “a bargained rate structure.” If he had adduced industrial or technical power, in production, he would have made his case more realistic, but weakened it in professional “Economics.” And having argued by his discipline’s rules he could proceed freely (as he did) to attack orthodox wage theory, to blast the presumption of “free and ‘automatic’ markets” anywhere in modern economies, to refute “ideas of reliance upon automatic market forces….the interdependence of the total price mechanism,” and to slam notions of “the automatic pricing mechanism” in modern labor markets. “To explain…difficulties with the [automatic] price apparatus as ‘frictions’ is formally permissible but beautifully irrelevant and even vicious,” he charged. “…the automatic mechanism in any institutional form in the labor market must be relegated to history,” he ruled. “The automatic pricing mechanism as model or institution in the labor market is dead,” he concluded.

Even so, behind these markets, for them, modern production happened. It was implicit in the author’s every reference to technology outside the market’s organization, “technical innovations,”

“technical change,” “technical installations,” “technical conditions,” “technical input-output relations.” Its strategic organization lay here too, hidden in his neoclassicism on “complementary factors of production” and “substitution,” though nearly evident in “the technical possibilities of substitution.” Dunlop’s strategic urge came closest to expression in his proposal of “cluster analysis,” a Marshallian focus on prices in “a cluster of related [or “contiguous”] markets,” in effect a cover for strategic analysis of industrially and technically connected production (“multi-process industries”).

This was the first cannonade in neoclassical economics’s worst “marginalist controversy,” the one among marginalists, between Keynesian marginalists and Hayekian marginalists on “labor economics.” Dunlop himself was no Keynesista; he had much of Frank Knight’s view of The General Theory. But his obituary on “the automatic pricing mechanism” served the Keynesians splendidly, and angered his targets, obviously the Hayekians, who were gearing up against the first raise in the federal minimum wage. The Hayekians fired back at easier foes, won big battles in the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, claimed only their economics was “conventional,” impugned all other economics (however neo-classical) as “institutionalist,” or “untheoretical,” or “eclectic,” or soft on monopoly, or just politics, anyway unscientific, and eventually won the professional and political controversy, so that their economics became all “economics,” pure and simple. But Dunlop had done such damage to their assumptions and principles for argument on labor that they never could repair them. As he had neoclassically analyzed both the

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177 Cf. Dunlop, Wage Determination, 125-126, 151, 211; and F.H. Knight, “Unemployment: And Mr. Keynes’s Revolution in Economic Theory,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, III, 1, (February 1937), 100-123. At Berkeley in 1936 Dunlop had audited Knight’s (visiting) lectures on The General Theory, probably in “Economics 203A: Business Cycles”: Kaufman, op. cit., 77; Ross Emmett to John Womack, Jr., August 10, 2005; hes@eh.net.

determination of wages and the full economic results of changing them, he had shown marginalism could explain the level and structure of negotiated wage rates as well as the various effects of their movement marketwise—in other words, in modern labor markets, power was endogenous, with general economic consequences. Since the champions of the automatic market could not admit negotiated prices as economic phenomena, or unions as economic (“competitive” in function), they could not explain modern wages except through political (or criminal) distortion of the market. Ambitious in other fields, they quit that of wage determination; their best labor economist could only try by the automatic theory to measure unions’ “impact,” viz., always, that bargained wages caused generally inefficient allocation of resources.  

In 1947, in London, a Fabian Poale Zionist wished for a “labour Clausewitz, able to…analyse…the strategic and tactical conditions of successful striking.” Little did he know there already was one, even if no more than the original Clausewitz did this very different one necessarily advocate the action he studied, or defend it every time it happened.

In 1948, thanking Perlman, Usher, and Schumpeter, Professor Dunlop put his concept of “strategic position” as formally as he ever would. Again he began with “the context,” the labor movement’s “total environment,” the first two “factors” of which were still “l. Technology… 2. Market structures and character of competition…” But now he proposed a “generalized theoretical framework…” And it was both more comprehensive and more systematic. While “in the structure of markets there are firms, and consequently there are employees, who are in strategic positions to affect the whole stream of production and distribution,” at the same time in “any technological process for producing and distributing goods and services, there are some workers who have greater strategic position than others; that is, these workers are able to shut down, to interrupt, or to divert operations more easily than others… The term strategic…is not identical with skill. It means sheer bargaining power by virtue of location and position in the productive


Dunlop did not argue any priority between markets and production (including distribution), but logically workers would have a strategic position in the markets only if they already held a strategic position in a strategic firm’s productive operations. Moreover these positions were by nature historical; that is, they changed. And they changed not gradually, in constant, continuous evolution, but from time to time, continually, but episodically, in punctuated periods. From Schumpeter’s approval of Kondratieff cycles, and from his insight into the significance of the production function’s constant, that change in a constant has to happen abruptly, from one constant to another, Dunlop argued that workers’ technical positions had to change in the punctuation of periodic “major innovations.”

In other words “strategic position,” by which Dunlop meant industrially or technically strategic position (or both), is key because by using such given positions industrial workers organize themselves in direct contention with capital. Here is the argument abstractly: Through the study of various industries in a country’s economy we can understand which in any particular period are highly, nationally (even internationally) strategic, which are no more than provincially strategic, and which are only locally so, or not at all. Through the study of various firms in an industry we can understand which firms then offer most strategic opportunities, e.g., those that can best pass increased costs for labor to the purchasers of their products. Through the study of an industrial firm’s work, its technical relations of production, we can understand which departments then have the strongest strategic positions, and which workers, skilled or not, can most confidently then interrupt operations to try to change the social relations of production, only for themselves, or also for their fellows in the firm, or also for workers in other firms, or even for all workers. Here is the (abstract) argument vice versa: As soon as an industrial firm’s operations begin, the given technological structures of dependence among workers take hold, structures vertical as well as horizontal, structures in which some workers are less dependent than others. “...work communities [not towns or neighborhoods, but groups of people at work, in particular places or on the move], prior to formal organization, are not simply random aggregates of individual workmen. …informal coagulations exist. ...informal organization.”

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181 Dunlop, “The Development of Labor Organization,” 163, 174-175, 179-180, his emphases. He had been appointed associate professor, with tenure, in 1945, and would be promoted to full professor in 1950.
182 Ibid., 189-192.
183 Ibid., 180-183, 185.
184 Ibid., 178-179.
great number” of others that make the organization. It is the workers strong in this organization, holding strategic advantages, who decide whether, when, and how they and their fellow workers make the organization a racket or a union, and how they use it to deal or contend with the firm. It is the unions in the firms dominant in the industry that decide whether, when, and how they and other unions in the industry federate, amalgamate, or unite in an industrial union, and contend with the industry’s association of firms. And it is the federations, amalgamations, or unions in the most strategic industries that decide whether, when, and how they and other federations, amalgamations, and unions confederate or ally, and contend with the country’s capitalists. In short, unless we understand industrial work, we misunderstand modern class struggles, for the structure of this work frames the industrial working class’s organization, orients its movement, and gives the material vectors of its strategy—until the next “major innovations.”

This argument did not come alone. It arrived in a volume of 13 essays all aimed at the same target, the idea of labor’s automatic price and below it the politics of anti-unionism. If Dunlop had fired a cannonade in 1944, here was a barrage. Of the 16 authors besides Dunlop, 13 were then professional, neoclassical economists specializing in labor and unions. Six of them had received their Ph.D.’s from Harvard under Slichter’s direction or influence (three on Dunlop’s co-signature); a seventh would receive his doctorate from Harvard the following year (also co-signed by Dunlop). The three who were not economists were two professional Chicago sociologists of labor and unions and a City College B.S.S., the director of research for the United Rubber Workers. Of the 16 altogether, seven like Dunlop had served during the war on the National War Labor Board; another had been on the War Department’s Labor Branch, another on the War Production Board, another at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and another, Canadian (a McGill economist), since 1942 had been director of research for the Canadian Congress of Labor. Nine of the economists (besides Dunlop) and both sociologists held appointments at their universities’ centers or institutes for the study of industrial relations. The essays were expressly the work of experts, but for an educated public (only one table and three curves, all in the senior economist’s essay) and eminently practical, even urgent, “to enlighten the public on labor questions.” The introduction rang a national alarm. “It is no exaggeration,” its anonymous author (the new chairman of Princeton’s economics

185 These seven were Lloyd G. Reynolds (who took his degree in 1936), David R. Roberts (1941), Herbert R. Northrup (1942), Joseph Shister (1943), Nathan Belfer (1946), Gordon F. Bloom (1946), and Lloyd H. Fisher (in Political Economy and Government, 1949): Insights into Labor Issues, 357-361. Their dissertations with the approvals co-signed are all in the Harvard University archives.
department?) wrote, “to say that labor relations represent our most critical domestic problem [in 1948] and that perhaps the very survival of democratic capitalism rests on our ability to develop practical solutions to various labor problems.” For himself and the other authors he hoped the book would “indicate the value of economic analysis for a correct understanding of labor issues, help to stimulate further research in the field of labor, and contribute to the development of more intelligent policies in industrial relations.”

He should have been more careful what he hoped for. Increasingly “economic analysis” did focus on “labor issues,” but it was mostly Hayekian analysis, or Milton Friedman’s, anyway not friendly to unions. It was then not one of the War Labor Board vets, but Friedman, a self-described “rank amateur in the field of labor economics,” who recalled Menger’s “complementary goods” to indicate a strike’s real force, who explicitly stated Marshall’s “joint demand” to explain some labor’s industrially “strategic position” (in the market). And it was the Chicagoans, whether they were at Chicago or not, who increasingly defined “correct understanding” of all economic issues, including labor, including unions, which Friedman thought only in part “economic.”

Much new research on labor did happen, but much of it emphasized unions’ monopolistic or crooked operations, which directly or not justified 14 new “right-to-work” laws by 1958 and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act in 1959. Economists positive about unions cut impressive figures in business schools, the National Academy of Arbitrators, public service, and especially the old and the many new industrial-relations centers. But precisely because of their increasingly institutional careers, their economics looked ever less like “real economics,” more like a degraded economics, irreparably institutionalist, impervious to theory, a pseudo-science of only one

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subject, “labor economics,” a waste of time in the mainstream’s backwaters, almost sociology. Or worse
(from the new professional perspective), it stuck on its subject, and turned simply into Industrial Relations,
IR.  

Dunlop then let go of his materially “strategic” argument for several years. Operating
simultaneously as “general economist,” “labor economist,” IR organizer, labor mediator, arbitrator, all
during the Cold War, McCarthyism, the Korean War, the merger of the AFL and the CIO, and rising public
rancor against unions, he looked beyond the means of division, for means of integration, intellectual and
political. Probably Slichter, the Nestor of post-war IR, was most influential in turning him and holding him
to a concern for adaptation, not harmony, but at least mutual “adjustment,” in theory and practice. No
institutionalist in economics, Dunlop certainly was an institutionalist about institutions, public and private,
and after the blast of 1948 he thought hardest about how to keep them together. Following Slichter’s advice
to the new Industrial Relations Research Association in December 1948, to do research to guide “the
[national] community” in establishing “fair,” “workable,” and reliable “social control of industrial
relations,” in “the public interest,” Dunlop took crucial part in the IRRA’s effort to define the best
“analytical framework” for such research. He insisted that IR had to treat not only management, union, and
their “interaction,” essentially collective bargaining, but also “the environment,” “the total context,” “the
total external context,” in which they interacted. This was not some flight of holism. Harking back to his
earlier strategic arguments, Dunlop described the same “environment” as before: “(1) the technological and
physical conditions of the work community; (2) the conditions in the labor market in which the labor
services are purchased…and the conditions in the product market in which the output or service is sold….”
But he did not (of course) consider the technological conditions for technically strategic advantages that a
union might use against management, or the public. He allowed that collective bargaining’s
“accommodation” might actually be “continuous conflict, an armed truce, containment, domination of one

189 Lester himself was a principal collaborator of Archibald Cox’s in advising Sen. John F. Kennedy on the
U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the Select Committee to Investigate Improper
Activities in the Labor-Management Field, aka (for its chairman, Sen. John L. McClellan) “the McClellan
Committee,” or the “Labor Rackets Committee,” where Robert F. Kennedy served as chief counsel, 1957-
Development of the Neoclassical Tradition in Modern Labor Economics,” Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, LIV, 2 (January 2001), 204-213; and Bruce E. Kaufman, “On the Neoclassical Tradition in Labor
Economics,” Research Seminar, IZA/Institute for the Study of Labor (May 2002),
side by the other, or co-operation.” But he did not describe the industrial or technical positions behind the accommodation. In his textbook on collective bargaining, modeled on the Harvard Business School’s (and Slichter’s) “case method,” he opened with the U.S. economy’s “basic technological and market changes,” 1850-1950. He spelled out “[t]he influence of the environment” on collective contracts, “a) The technological and physical characteristics of the industry…. b) The market and competitive features of the firm and industry…. .” In clear, concrete narrative he explained standards and difficulties in modern wage determination. And he remarked how “economic analysis” particularly helped settle wage disputes. But only barely, in passing, without explanation, did he mention “strategic workers,” or “critical industries, coal for instance”; he discussed some “technical change,” but did not remark on “technical analysis,” and his three “technical” cases all read like (one manifestly is) testimony at arbitration, not about industrially or technically strategic power over production, but about pay rates. Dunlop had not forgotten “strategic position.” He had archived the concept. He aimed now “to make one world of the formal principles of economics and the facts of actual wage-fixing,” to integrate IR into neoclassical economics and neoclassical economics into IR.190

He gave his own strongest intellectual directions in September 1954 from a Swiss hotel above Lake Lucerne. Whoever decided that the International Economic Association would hold its annual “round-table conference” at Seelisberg, where the Mont Pelerin Society had already met twice (1949, 1953), and whoever decided that the conference’s subject for 1954 would be “wage theory,” it was Dunlop who managed the message. As the program committee’s chairman, he put the topics of the sessions in his terms, and led the selection of the participants. The message was clearly anti-Hayekian, anti-Friedman, but far

from simple. “By bringing together specialists in labour economics and general theorists,” Dunlop wrote, “the...conference aspired towards a more general theory of wages, towards a framework of analysis of wage experience applicable to a wider range of economies.” The Seelisberg papers and discussion assumed neoclassical theory, explored its failings and confusion about modern labor markets only to make it more comprehensive, more on target, more sophisticated, and like “the classical wage scheme” explanatory of “the total system,” therefore more useful. But they did not go into the (joint) demand-derived productive complexes where industrially or technically strategic positions were. In his inaugural statement of “the task” Dunlop developed his earlier (Marshallian) idea of clustered markets into the idea of “internal and external wage structure[s],” from which he drew the concepts of “job clusters,” “key rates,” and “wage contours.” But he did not get from the market into production, from commercial to engineered relations, or write “strategic” but twice--and that about demand and supply.

Two years later in Cleveland, at the ninth annual IRRA meeting, he tried to define its intellectual “task.” By then this was harder than wage theory to fit into any market-framed analytical order. IR’s original fault, the idea (typical U.S. social science) of neoclassical economics serving “the public interest,” was already growing into several institutionalized professions serving a typical U.S. compound of tremendous private power and public authority, to wit, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, federal and state departments of labor, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the American Arbitration Association, etc., to administer class conflict in the United States and abroad in the interest of what the U.S. president would call a few years on “the military-industrial complex.” At best IR had meant the multi-disciplinary study of modern relations of employment, a kind of social relations. Its economists had never explored material relations of production, i.e., strictly industrial relations, technical relations. And Dunlop in Cleveland practically consigned IR economics to IR history. Again he proposed IR researchers undertake “[s]ystematic analysis” of the “the evolving features of the total environment,” organization of management

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and unions, and “interaction” between “environment” and organization, to understand now not just “our collective bargaining system,” but “the American industrial relations system.” But by his description the present environment (worth studying) did not feature markets. From a review of recent U.S. labor history, culminating in the AFL-CIO, he explained unionism’s new “structure and government” and outlined the new “industrial relations system.” Five of its six features were sociological, political, or administrative. The other, “occupational wage differentials,” was fading. Long ago, Dunlop noted, citing his argument of 1948, without explanation, “strategically placed groups of workers” started unions. But now he mentioned “strategy” only once, and only in cases of unions raiding each other. If a raid might be to capture a technically strategic position, as the one he cited may have been (to gain control over jobs in maintenance), he gave no such hint. The issue here was to serve the system.¹⁹²

That very year McGraw-Hill had launched an ambiguously styled “Labor Management Series,” which the ex-chairman of the New York State Board of Mediation served as consulting editor. The second title of the series appeared the following year, co-edited by one of the United States’s two or three most distinguished professional arbitrators, a collection of 11 essays on “wage determination.” Dunlop figured among the essayists, leading the part on “structural characteristics and changes.” His essay was the exact same paper he had given at Seeligsberg in 1954, except for “labour” become “labor.” At least it brought “internal and external wage structure[s],” “job clusters,” “key rates,” and “wage contours” to McGraw-Hill’s labor-management readers. The distinguished co-editor, professor of Industrial Relations at Wharton, vice-chairman of the NWLB, 1942-1945, chairman of the advisory board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 1946-47, chairman of the National Wage Stabilization Board, 1950-52, arbitrator of the CIO’s internal disputes in 1952, successful co-mediator of the United Electrical Workers’ 156-day strike against Westinghouse in 1955-56, indicated in a few lines his own sharp knowledge of industrially and technically strategic disputes, but smoothly, almost perfectly, covered it. Two other essayists, both economists, the director of economic research at the AFL-CIO and a labor advisor to the State Department’s International Cooperation Administration, who had also contributed to the 1948 barrage, 

together alluded several times to unions’ “bargaining strategies,” but vaguely, and regardless of material
positions. The consulting editor himself could have added a lively thing or two about this kind of power
and its various uses, but refrained.¹⁹³

No wonder The Chicago School steered largely clear of Dunlop, on wage determination and on
production’s “strategic positions.” The more institutional he became politically, the more institutionalist
(negligible) Chicagoans could assume his economic were becoming. Only one Chicago master, actually
then at Stanford, addressed his economic argument, but in terms of questions in another field, welfare
economics. He denied Dunlop’s claim that unions acted economically, maintained they acted politically,
and explored the logic of bargaining wage rates against unemployment. He consequently missed the
business of joint demand and Dunlop’s points about the structure of markets and “cluster analysis.” And he
mistook Dunlop’s evidence on the matter of joint demand, the leverage or multiplier in disruptions of
production, for evidence about a problem of labor supply. In his economics coercion was interesting not for
where it happened, whether in the market or at work, but for its effects in the market, above all on
employment and inflation. His “strategic considerations” arose not as if from war, but as in “a poker
game.”¹⁹⁴ For the few other Chicaigos confronting Dunlop the contest was less subtle. At the school’s

¹⁹³ The first title in the series was Arthur J. Goldberg, AFL-CIO: Labor United (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1956). By the sequence of references: John T. Dunlop, “The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory,” in
George W. Taylor and Frank C. Pierson, eds., New Concepts of Wage Determination (New York: McGraw-
ibid., 84, 89 n7, 92, 105-106, 110; Nathaniel Goldfinger and Everett M. Kassalow, “Trade Union Behavior
in Wage Bargaining,” ibid., 70, 72-77. On all 12 contributors, ibid., v. Further on Taylor, eventually “the
Labor Review, CXVIII, 12 (December 1995), 29-34. Pierson, professor of economics at Swarthmore, had
also served on the NWLB and the Wage Stabilization Board. Kassalow, directing research for the United
Rubber Workers in 1948, had later gone to the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration (in France), which
became the U.S. International Cooperation Administration in 1955, which became the U.S. Agency for
International Development in 1961. The consulting editor, Merlyn S. Pitzele, also McGraw-Hill’s Business
Week labor editor since 1941, lately promoted to senior editor, unhappily soon fell foul of Sen. McClellan’s
Committee on Improper Activities, and testified that while chairman of New York’s Labor Mediation
Board he had received $15,000 in “retainer fees” from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, to
advise its president how to “clean up” the IBT: E.W. Kenworthy, “Pitzele Reveals $15,000 Beck Fees
While State Aide,” New York Times, November 2, 1957, 1. The fees came via checks from Labor Relations
Associates, Inc., a Chicago business of Nathan W. Shefferman, on whom see Nathan W. Shefferman with
Dale Kramer, The Man in the Middle (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961), ???; Sanford M. Jacoby, Modern
Manors: Welfare Capitalism since the New Deal (Princeton: Princeton University, 1997), 130-138, 233-
234.

¹⁹⁴ Reder, “Theory of Union Wage Policy,” 34, 36-37, 40-45; Melvin W. Reder, Labor in a Growing
Simons (1941) on organization, op. cit., 7-9, 14-17; and Friedman (1950) on “joint demand,” op. cit., 207-
212.
outpost in Charlottesville an elder warned that some unions were abusing their “strategic position” in the market, and advocated legislation to restrain the AFL’s and the CIO’s “monopoly power.”195 And three from the next generation, one (gone “liberal”) at Yale, one at College Station, and one at Durham, each tried his thesis, that unions being monopolies, causing unemployment and inflation, were “incompatible” with capitalism, that Dunlop’s analysis was neither new nor sound, and/or that it was neither adequate nor necessary.196

Besides, meanwhile, Chicago had plenty intellectual enemies keeping the question of labor’s power a question of the market, of “monopoly.” Harvard’s sage on “monopolistic competition,” who smelled Marxism in “labor union power,” argued that “industry-wide unions” were monopolies stronger than corporate monopolies, and were hogging “monopoly profit.” Eventually he suggested “the structure of labor organization…be dictated by the public interest,” for instance, by compelling “unions which are powerful because they are small and strategically situated [i.e., certain craft unions],” to merge with big unions where (he reasoned) they would lose their “market power.”197 Once the Korean War began, other economists who scorned Chicago’s devotion to “free enterprise” worried about labor in the same terms Chicagoans did, in the market. Dunlop’s colleagues at Harvard worried most prominently. Their earlier debate on the probabilities that “full employment” would cause inflation, they intensified around the Wage Stabilization Board, whether it should be tough or lax.198 Galbraith thought “countervailing power” between business and labor would fail in inflation, which would oblige the government to control wages


and prices. Alvin Hansen, chief U.S. Keynesian, thought the economy could take full employment without prices rising much. Given their institutional responsibilities, which they wanted, it would have been mad of them to wander into research on the industrial or technical positions from which workers could force major halts in production; that would be the FBI’s responsibility, or the National Guard’s. And so far I can find no responsible U.S. economist then taking such a perverse turn. The mighty mainstream rolled on.

Three of Dunlop’s fellows in the 1948 barrage deserve particular notice, because they might well have taken to the idea of material relations. Two of them had studied a major U.S. center of industrially and technically strategic action, San Francisco, and in passing had observed “strategic” positions, some of them material. But they confused them with monopolistic and political power, which they did not distinguish either. Under Dunlop’s tutelage, though without “strategic” or “strategy,” one of them later delved into technically strategic power in agricultural production; but he died at 41, in 1953. The other had an acute sense of the articulations of power, all kinds, everywhere, and did seminal papers on the labor market, implying cases of joint demand, that he could have developed into a strategic theory of production. But going instead ever deeper into California’s academic politics, he pursued different intellectual interests.


Otherwise the economist most likely to turn Dunlop’s arguments into industrially or technically strategic studies was yet another of Slichter’s (and Dunlop’s) Harvard Ph.D.’s, also a War Labor Board veteran, who as well as anyone then knew U.S. wage structures and Dunlop’s ideas about them. But from brilliant articles on wage-rate analysis, explicit about “intraplant wage adjustments,” “critical jobs,” “internal” differentials, wage “premiums,” all questions outside the market, he never turned his mind to matters of production. With Slichter he did a definitive review of Eisenhower-era collective bargaining, with sharp insights into U.S. management’s industrial and technical vulnerabilities. For the U.S. Labor department he directed a masterly study of collective bargaining in basic steel, to interpret the great steel strike of 1959 and evaluate the use of official intervention in “critical work stoppages.” For Chicago’s new, improved organ of influence he analyzed “power in collective bargaining…the relative willingness and ability to strike or take a strike…,” and noted companies’ general and particular vulnerabilities, including loss of production, interruption of essential services, “secondary unemployment,” and threats to national defense. But he expressed ever more an arbitrator’s concerns, with the bargaining structure, the negotiating process, to reduce the resort to power, to foster “policy accommodation” between companies and unions.204

In 1958 Dunlop published his most ambitious book, “a general theory of industrial relations.” A decade before, he had aimed only to integrate IR and neoclassical economics. Now he proposed “to make

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one world of direct experience in industrial relations and the realm of ideas.” More precisely, as Talcott Parsons and a Harvard Junior Fellow had just theorized the subsumption of “the economic system” into the bigger “social system,” Dunlop wanted to theorize “the industrial-relations system” too into the general social order, to demonstrate its theoretical equivalence, to establish that the economic and the industrial-relations “subsystems,” although not “coterminous,” were “on the same logical plane,” overlapping, but with “different scopes” and concentrated on different, but equally important problems (“the national product”/“the web of rules” for modern production). The result was (is still) a surprising, strange thing. It is not a theory, except in an economist’s sense (and in that sense no good), but a work nevertheless substantial, complex, deep, learned, incisive, a kind of general manual for analyzing industrial relations, of terrific significance for modern labor studies and movements everywhere. And here Dunlop reintroduced his original “strategic” argument.

Again it came because of the “environment,” “the contexts.” These were now more formal; they were “givens,” or “parameters,” or “constraints.” But the first, again, was “the technological characteristics of the work place.” And the second, again, was “the market,” except that now, alternatively or in addition to the market, the “given” might be “budgetary constraints.” The concept of “strategic position” was no more formal than before, but Dunlop now refined it, limited it, specified it, definitively defined it. One of the “givens” in both the economic and the industrial-relations subsystems, in an area on the “logical plane” where they overlapped, viz., production, was “technical (engineering) conditions of production,” and here, only here, in industrial relations’ “technical context,” would be “strategic position.” A few new examples, e.g., “the only engine-block plant in an automobile company,” did not change the concept. The formal, general explanation of industrially and technically “strategic power” remained the same: the power skilled or not at “some points” in “the production and distribution process of modern industrial society” to force

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205 Dunlop, Collective Bargaining, vii; idem, Industrial Relations Systems, vii.
“shutdown or stoppage.” But this was the new “strategic” limit of “power.” Elsewhere, within the market’s “parameters” or under “budgetary constraints,” because of “control” in pricing some products, a corresponding “discretion” would enter into the pricing of some labor. “Stringency” indicated certain kinds of labor were scarce, more expensive, but if they had been “strategic” before, they no longer were. Here only a product market’s “timing” might be “strategic.” Even then workers had no “power,” but were only in “short supply.”

Most remarkably a shift in “contexts” gave the argument, for the first time, a logic of danger, of radical, ineradicable tension, the danger of industrial war, or dangers much greater. Dunlop, a man totally devoted to institutional rules, could not have meant to develop a theory of dual power. But there he went by induction and deduction. Before, apart from “technology” and “market structures,” the other “contexts” had been two, a pair of socio-politico-cultural facts, “factors,” he often called them. In 1948 they were (a) “community institutions,” by which he meant a country’s media, schools, political organizations, and government, and (b) “ideas and beliefs,” the country’s “values, the ethos…of the community.” Whatever power workers then might hold over production or in the market, given (a) and (b), all legit, all in consensus, industrial relations by implication would always in the end resolve into negotiations, a bargain, a contract, a deal morally sealed. In 1958, however, “community institutions” and “ideas and beliefs” bonded into just one context, “the locus and distribution of power in the larger society,” the social, cultural, and political power brought from outside industrial relations to bear on them. The former destiny (if not duty) of materially powerful workers to join the national consensus was gone. Instead, workers who held “strategic power” now confronted another, entirely different “power,” all the strengths (and faults and contradictions) of “the larger society,” public power, civil society, its authorities, public opinion, and prevailing values. Either power could obey the other, or negotiate with it, contract with it, or challenge it, to try to command it, in continually changing balances of bargaining power. But neither power could destroy the other, and neither could ever be more than provisionally in agreement with the other, the one in

207 Ibid., 9-10, 33-61, 382-383; “strategic positions” (with explanatory citation of Insights into Labor Issues), ibid., 50-52.
208 Ibid., 10-11, 62-93; citations of Wage Determination and Theory of Wage Determination, ibid., 66 n5 ff. On “control” and “discretion” in product markets, but no “power,” not even “bargaining power,” ibid., 64-68; “timing” and “other strategic factors,” ibid., 69-70; “particularly short supply,” ibid., 83.
production inevitable, transformable, but always back again somewhere, the other inevitable too, transformable too, but inherent in any social order. The new logic of Dunlop’s argument was all (only) discursive, so that its points of radical antagonism remained deeply implicit. But it told. Almost at the end of the book he noted, oddly, as if in a sort of retreat, or disclaimer, “The concept of an industrial relations system is used most fruitfully as a tool of analysis when a specific system is examined in its historical context, and changes in the system are studied through time.” But he knew history does not quit happening. In the last substantive paragraph he observed, “…the main structure and relations of a system congeal early, unless transformed by revolution or the dislocations of war in the larger community.”

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Among economists, of course, this book was a total flop. It received not a single academic economist’s review. The only two reviews in professional economic journals were by a U.S. Labor department economist and by a political scientist. And no economist referred to Dunlop’s strategic argument in a book or economics journal afterwards, much less discussed it. In economics his concept of industrially or technically strategic position was dead on arrival. One of the rare young economists who read Dunlop became a deep student of unions’ collective action. But he focused on “coercion” in them, not Dunlop’s argument, and figured (on John Stuart Mill’s principles) “the instrument or organization to make membership compulsory” generally had its origins in “violence,” aggressive physical force, which for unions Dunlop would have denied. From 1958 to date I have found few references by economists (in English) to workers or unions having “strategic position” in production. Only two appeared in the 1960s, these in IR’s principal outlet. Another surfaced in the mainstream in the early ’70s, tied not to Dunlop’s

210 Ibid., 388-389.
concept, but to Friedman’s “small union in a strategic position.”

Dunlop’s main influence in academic economics came from his idea of “clustered markets,” as he had tightened it into the concepts of “job clusters,” “internal and external wage structures,” and “wage contours,” and in 1966 conjoined these concepts and others from allies of his in the idea of “internal labor market.” The term was odd, for it represented not a place/space where offers of compensation met agreements to work, but the administered (or bargained) allocation of jobs within a firm or plant. But two of Dunlop’s students then made the idea into an economic “theory,” useful for U.S. “manpower” policy and in academic analyses of “imperfectly competitive” labor markets. That this was economics, where very few cared where ideas came from, made it easy to ignore who (a supposedly institutionalist supposed conservative) first thought of “internal labor markets,” and for the supposedly novel idea to flourish. The new “theory” soon gained currency


among some of the profession’s hottest young stars and beyond them among the new “radicals,” the “political economists.” 217 Odder still, within a decade, as a “theory” of “segmented” or “structured” labor markets, it had passed back to include consideration of “bargaining position,” “bargaining power,” and a union’s “bargaining strategy.” The young economist who made this discovery/recovery had evidently not read Dunlop, but got closer than the others to connecting labor’s technically determined power and its organization in unions. 218 A year later a senior colleague of hers and another of Dunlop’s students applied Dunlop’s argument (without citing it) to explain the different development of “industrial relations” in the U.S. and British steel industries. Because they let their history determine their analysis, they confused skill and technically strategic position, but they did convey an idea of strategic power in production, twice in explicitly “strategic” terms. And in further studies of labor’s allocation and wage structures this student of Dunlop’s, although he kept thinking skill alone ever gave technical power, did make the “strategic” point in print in three other articles. 219 From the idea by then puffed into “segmentation theory” another economist rediscovered the “potential power” workers have in certain “job situations” in “a developed division of labor,” where they can use “bottlenecks” for “disruption or slowdown of the production process….” Of Dunlop he evidently knew only the argument on wage determination, but he too had roughly reconceived


Dunlop’s argument on materially strategic positions (though without the “strategic” word).\(^{220}\) Third-hand from Dunlop, again confusing skill and position, two more economists five years later derived the idea of “strategic industrial skills,” “strategic occupations,” and “strategic jobs,” but back again in an IR journal.\(^{221}\) After them I found no lead in economics on strategic power at work.

Even the student of Dunlop’s who succeeded him at Harvard saw unions’ power only in the labor market, electoral politics, and lobbying (and rackets).\(^{222}\) In the last 20 years economics has allowed a few instances of interest in labor’s “strategic behavior,” but always for explanations from “game theory,” not from production (i.e., the power to stop production).\(^{223}\) During Thatcher’s “Revolution” and Reagan’s “Morning in America,” in barely veiled wonder why the reserve army of the unemployed did not drag down all wages, this science ever more both ambitious and picayune grew yet another “theory,” to wit, “efficiency wage theory.” The problem here being the premium an employer paid workers over the wage at which she could hire such workers in the (perfect) market, the “theory” might well have touched on the industrial or technical charge in some workers’ (strategic) positions. One young economist had the nerve to explore the effect of the mere possibility of workers threatening “to shut a business down,” if it led their employer to pay them “efficiency wages.”\(^{224}\) But as a basis for the threat he mentioned only “laws, social customs and diseconomies of scale in training and hiring,” not any junction in the employer’s material division of labor. Whether they noticed his argument or not, none of his professional peers pondering wage premiums could evidently imagine workers holding an industrial or technical threat.\(^{225}\) Since “Morning in


America, so far as I can tell, U.S.-Anglo economics on labor (which sets the tone on the matter) resonates with Dunlop only in the literature on heterogeneous bargaining, and there but faintly, where heterogeneity appears in skills, seniority, or existing wage differentials. It has been a science absolutely clear of any static about differentials in workers’ power to stop production.

If Dunlop’s concept is useless for success now in economics, what good does it do a labor historian? Dunlop himself insisted on the need for students of real labor movements to take into account two other “interrelated factors: …community institutions of control [including political parties and the state], and ideas and beliefs.” He particularly qualified his argument about industrial or technical strategy by emphasizing the protection that labor law eventually offers workers, so that “strategic position” matters “much less” than votes, for a union, or a contract, or a strike. That is, abstractly, absent the social relations of production, absent the spaces and times off work (“the room of human development”), absent other social relations (e.g., of security, reproduction), absent culture, politics, law, corruption, ideologies, and illegal coercion, structure would issue in strategy. But really, because these concerns, experiences, conventions, customs, influences, conditions, hopes, consolations, and fears, never lasting for the same time or changing at the same rate, also move workers and their families, industrial work alone does not organize the industrial working class, and the industrial labor movement is not definite or predictable.

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228 Dunlop, “The Development of Labor Organization,” 174-175, 184-185, 186-189; idem, Collective Bargaining, 25-26; idem, Industrial Relations, 12-13, 94-128.
230 “…the room of human development” is from Marx, “Wages, Price and Profit,” 439. That families are the essential media for the formation and reproduction of class is implicit in Dunlop, “The Development of
Nevertheless, whatever Dunlop’s justified qualifications, because work in capitalist relations of production is fundamentally and urgently significant, to capitalists and to workers, it matters more than social relations (which can wait), matters more even than the state (let it investigate), in the incessant reconstitution of the working class and its agents. Industrially and technically strategic positions at work matter all the more where social relations provide workers little if any protection, and where labor law’s enforcement is irregular, often biased against workers, corrupt, and perverse. Materially strategic position is then the only real protection against private or official violence.

Dunlop made contemporaneous international comparisons to show similar industrial installations’ similar effects on different countries’ industrial relations systems. Likewise, by his logic, a comparison of countries strong versus weak in national political organization and cultural consensus makes clear how workers’ industrial, technical power matters (respectively) less or more. For example (one Dunlop does not give), compare the United States and Mexico, say between 1900 and 1950. The U.S. government and widespread American civic piety even at their weakest weighed more heavily on industrial disputes here than the very strongest Mexican government and a profoundly (religiously) divided Mexican civil society could ever have weighed on industrial disputes there. In Mexico the abstract account of industrial work’s importance would not grossly magnify its real importance. The most strategic industries there were mining, hydroelectric power, railroads, maritime ports, and oil. (Note: not manufacturing.) While the country’s national politics and culture--most violently dissentious during “the Mexican Revolution” (at the national level seven revolutions from 1910 to 1920, some concurrent, none ideological, never mind socialist)--allowed only patchy, brief concentrations of national power until World War II, industrially and technically strategic workers made formidable labor movements. By their struggles between 1906 and 1916, not in revolutionary armies, but through politically independent, broadly immobilizing strikes, on the railroads and most stunningly in 1916 at the main electrical company, Mexican Light and Power, Mexican workers gained a vast array of rights in the country’s new constitution in 1917. A confederation of Mexico’s industrially most strategic unions, in “transport and communications,” i.e., railroads, forced the institution Labor Organization,” 184. Cf. Jerry Lembcke, “Why 50 Years? Working Class Formation and Long Economic Cycles,” Science and Society, LV, 4 (Winter 1992), 417-445. On variations among the industrial arrangements that labor movements in part constitute, Dunlop, Industrial Relations, 307-379.

231 Ibid., 95-97, 130-150, 176-182, 201-228, 383-384. His comparisons are mostly of the United States and various European countries. Among the “underdeveloped countries” he considers the only one in Latin America is Brazil.
of the country’s first federal labor board in 1927. Forcing then Mexico’s first national labor law (1931),
using it forthwith better than other unions did, this confederation unified into one national industrial union
of railroad workers in 1933, which promptly supported the organization of two other industrially very
strategic national industrial unions, mine, mill, and smelter workers in 1934, oil workers in 1935. These
with the industrially very strategic union at Mexican Light and Power put together the country’s mightiest
ever labor organization, the Confederación de Trabajadores de México, in 1936, the basis of Mexico’s pro-
labor, leftist government between 1936 and 1940. Because of the national industrial unions’ strategic
power, by 1940 more than 60% of the country’s non-agricultural labor force was in unions. But only from
their strategic positions, by strategic action, could unionized workers keep enforcement of the labor law
favorable. It was a Cold-War, pro-U.S., pro-business political faction’s internally organized capture of the
railroad workers’ union, in 1948, that settled capital’s dominance in the country’s post-war development.232
In short, in general, wherever governments are weak and the culture is split, ingrown, or shameless,
strategic industrial action has most effect; wherever governments are strong and the culture hostile to
workers, strategic industrial action may be labor’s only recourse.

The concept of strategic positions in production does not solve or even simplify a study of
Veracruz’s industrial labor history. It actually complicates my analysis, but will also, I think, make my
explanation of the history truer, more convincing, and more useful. In a brief, schematic, superficial,
flagrantly general outline, but all that is reasonable now, my argument goes as follows: The first workers
unionized in Veracruz, politically Mexico’s most important state, were in national trade unions fighting the
railroads, the country’s most strategic industry, including its biggest corporation. The first to organize
locally were fighting companies in the textile and cigar industries, neither of them strategic (although some
companies were big). For their numbers and concentration in certain towns, these workers won local
political power during “the Revolution,” and by 1920 local textile unions and the port of Veracruz’s dock
workers union were major collective forces in state politics, together dominating the new state labor board.
Mostly therefore in accord with them local unions organized in other industries, brewing, garment-making,

232 Marjorie R. Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1934); Kevin
J. Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico (Johns
Hopkins University: Baltimore, 1995), 135-147; Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato, “Measuring the Impact of
Institutional Change in Capital-Labor Relations in the Mexican Textile Industry, 1900-1930,” in Jeffrey L.
Bortz and Stephen Haber, eds., The Mexican Economy, 1870-1930: Essays on the Economic History of
Institutions, Revolution, and Growth (Stanford: Stanford University, 2002), 289-323.
flour milling, construction, sugar, coffee, the other ports, electrical power, and oil, the last three being strategic, but all three locally unionized. Key to all these unions were workers who held technically strategic positions at work, electricians wherever the plant ran on electricity, loom-fixers at the textile mills, refrigerating engineers, pipefitters, and machinists at the brewery, cutters and mechanics at the garment factories, stevedores and winchmen on the docks, and so on, maybe not on their union’s executive committee, but at the core of its grupo acción, which decided whom the members would elect to the committee. For 15 years in Veracruz two powerful industrial labor movements fought business and contended with each other, one movement nationally and industrially organized, after 1933 in the new national industrial railroad union, enormously powerful by direct industrial action alone, the other locally organized in many enterprise unions, powerful by numbers locally, but only by federation and political unity statewide (and no farther). The alliance in 1935 of the industrially strategic railroad, oil, and dock unions, joined by numerous, politically strategic sugar workers’ unions, all in the CTM in 1936, dominated the state (with great national consequences) until 1945, enrolling most local unions there in the CTM too. Even so, on political grounds, the other movement survived in the main textile towns. In the national post-war crisis, when largely due to its old internal divisions the railroad union turned (lamely) pro-business, Veracruz’s local CTM unions on their political grounds took control of the CTM there, in effect making it the state’s main vehicle of local political unionism. Thereafter national politics and internal conflicts crippled all the national industrial unions, across the entire country, while the local unions in the CTM (in Veracruz as elsewhere) simply disputed with the local unions in other federations the political franchise for managing local labor contracts. Even so, as Dunlop argued, working powers over production figured in the contracts; workers in technically and industrially strategic positions (e.g., stevedores in the port of Veracruz) got better deals than workers otherwise just like them, but not in such positions. Strategically, the best unions retrenched, fortified their towns, and took opportunities for tactical offensives; the worst became rackets.

Finally, neither Dunlop nor any of his fellows or followers ever specified which kind(s) of strategy industrial workers will practice. They could not, because the actual use of materially strategic positions is not an industrial or technical question, but an economic, political, or cultural issue, or all three. It is ultimately a question of purpose, a question of actual workers’ ultimate purpose. For revolutionary workers
the strategy would mean the Clausewitzian offensive, where battle is essential, battle as Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon sought it, decisive battle, to annihilate the enemy and conquer his territory, in a revolutionary workers’ war at least “the commanding heights” of the economy.\textsuperscript{233} It was the strategy Engels knew best, studying which he learned, “…war is most like trade. Action in war is what cash payment is in trade…”\textsuperscript{234} And it was most certainly Lenin’s, and that which after 1905 he thought industrial workers could master.\textsuperscript{235} But revolutionary workers are rare. Militant workers have typically followed the strategy implicit in the conflicts Marx called “guerilla fights,” tactical offensives. Explicit, unfolded, conscious, this is the Clausewitzian defense, not an inferior “form of war,” but “intrinsically stronger than the [strategic] offensive,” which it in time enables, to which it may lead.\textsuperscript{236} And the best school in which to study it is Hans Delbrück’s, where it is the strategy of Pericles, Gustavus Adolphus, and Frederick the Great, the strategy of limited war, of exhaustion, Ermattungsstrategie, not so much defensive as conservative, a strategy of continual maneuvers to avoid battle, to deny decision, a strategy of blockades, ambushes, frontier occupations, raids to devastate territory, operations of attrition, until the enemy can no longer bear the costs of war, and collapses or retreats.\textsuperscript{237} It appealed to Marx’s first biographer, the German Socialist Franz Mehring. In a monstrous, rigid distortion it became the French, British, German, and Russian strategy in the Great War. And it informed the historiography behind the (original) Gramsci’s thoughts on


\textsuperscript{236} The problem in taking workers’ operations as guerrilla warfare is that through the 19\textsuperscript{th} century such action supposedly had no strategy, only tactics, and in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the strategy is revolutionary. Cf. Clausewitz, \textit{op. cit.}, 373, 479-483; C. E. Callwell, \textit{Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (London: HMSO, 1906), 51-52, 84-96, 125-149; and Vo Nguyen Giap, \textit{People’s War, People’s Army}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1974). Clausewitz on defense is the longest “book” in his treatise, \textit{op. cit.}, 357-519.

the war of position for hegemony. So developed, this strategy has served militant workers in many countries, Mexico among them, fighting to defeat capitalism by harassing and outlasting it. But undeveloped, as it has remained in most labor movements, it has served industrial guerrillas fighting for no more than to improve the terms of labor’s continual surrender, usually only served industrial avengers, or industrial bandits, aiming only to make capitalism do better by its workers (or at least labor’s racketeers). In that phase it bears close resemblance to Slichter’s negative definition of bargaining power and Dunlop’s “diversion of operations” and “exact[jon of] a price.”

Since strategy is for a purpose, its premise is choice, inevitable, constrained, irreversible, maybe fatal, but still a choice. If the hotly cultural and particularly the “progressive” Latin Americanist labor historiography were not so naive, it would not be necessary here, as it is, to repeat the obvious, that neither Dunlop’s “structure” nor my extrapolation that industrial and technical structures have framed, oriented, and given force to strategy means workers have not had “agency.” To use a strategic position to any purpose is to act: Structure (inevitable but always liable to change) is positions (at least in the short run, but never permanent), from some of which subjects who are principals act in regard to each other; they may act

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without strategy, but wherever there is strategy, there is agency. The cultural question is, for whom in the prevailing culture can the agents act, for whom do they act, why, and how can they change their purpose?

Chapter III. Power and Production: Different Dimensions in (Most) Bourgeois Social Science, 1839-2001

I cannot find a basis for Dunlop’s strategic argument in the classics of bourgeois sociology. Comte, the Aquinas of modern social science, taking “the true social point of view,” held the division of labor to be “the most essential condition of our social life,” the reason for “social solidarity,…and the elementary cause of the extension and growing complication of the social organism,” i.e., human evolution, progress. He granted that journelement, every day, “this regular and continuous convergence” (the division of labor) suffered “shocks and incongruities,” so that one “function” might be “more or less indispensable”
than another, which allows the question of strategic advantage.\textsuperscript{240} And he admitted that “even today [1839]…exceptional individuals…of the old human type,” men of “military spirit,” could resist “industrial discipline.” But he did not imagine “more indispensable functions” controlled by such men, or therefore the force they might thereby raise against “modern slavery….the slavery organized in the very bosom of industry, of the worker to the capitalist,…equally degrading for both.” If conflict of this kind happened, it would be only \textit{temporel}, in the Roman Catholic sense, he noted, temporal, secular, transitory. Not being \textit{spirituel}, it had no formal, foundational place.\textsuperscript{241} “Th[e] invariable conciliation of the separation of labor with the cooperation of effort,” Comte taught, “…constitutes, indeed, the fundamental character of human operations….”\textsuperscript{242}

Spencer affirmed, “A society is an organism,” and “progressive differentiation of structures is accompanied by progressive differentiation of functions…” Moreover, the consequent “division of labour…in the society, as in the animal, makes it a living whole.”\textsuperscript{243} And this “transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous…everywhere characterizes evolution,” industrial progress, social progress.\textsuperscript{244} Stricter than Comte, Spencer insisted that if an organization’s “parts can carry on mutually-dependent actions, then in proportion as organization is high there must go a dependence of each part on the rest so great that separation is fatal…”\textsuperscript{245} In a society’s “sustaining system” (production) he observed the iron industry’s dependence on mining, and in distribution he emphasized the critical dependence of the “sustaining” and the “regulating” systems on transport and communications.\textsuperscript{246} But all these functions being organic, e.g., distribution “entirely alike…the vascular system,” it would be formally (precisely) insane to think of them strategically. The blood threaten the stomach? Contention, “conflicts,”

\textsuperscript{241} \textit{Ibid.}, IV, 504, 506-509.
\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Ibid.}, IV, 418. Cf. \textit{ibid.}, VI, 265-272, 361-365, 511-512, 553-569. Comte’s concern that “the separation of social functions…, which alone has permitted the development and extension of general society, threatens, from another aspect, to decompose it into a multitude of \textit{corporations incohérentes}, disconnected bodies,” e.g., corporations, “interest groups,” unions, was different, and quite formal. He allayed it with \textit{gouvernement}, “the social purpose” of which was “to prevent this fatal disposition to dispersion,” which service revealed “the first positive and rational base of the elementary and abstract theory of government.” \textit{Ibid.}, IV, 428-430.
\textsuperscript{244} \textit{Ibid.}, I, 465, III, 327, 331, 404-411.
\textsuperscript{245} \textit{Ibid.}, I, 473. On “high organization,” which “subserves individual welfare,” \textit{ibid.}, I, 587-588.
\textsuperscript{246} \textit{Ibid.}, I, 440-441, 476-477, 484-485, 497-498, 524-526, 533-536, 581-583.
“antagonisms,” “competitions,” “wars,” “the struggle for existence” could occur only between organisms, not within them. Nevertheless Spencer too granted temporal disjunctions. Both in an old, “militant” society, organized largely for external offense and defense, its internal cooperation compulsory, coercive, and in a modern (1876-96), “industrial” society, organized largely for its members’ individual private pursuits, its internal cooperation voluntary, contractual, there would “arise…diversities of interests.”

Some “diversities” would issue in “constant quarrels,” characteristically in modern society between “limited-liability companies” and “trade unions.” Because “[s]o long as the worker remains a wage-earner…..[h]e is temporarily in the position of a slave,” his cooperation coerced, unions were “militant,” coercive. Indeed (although without a hint of strategy) unions used violence to enforce “their regulations.” Each union’s transitory gains taxed others’ members; all were a burden on “employers and the public.”

Even so, functionally, in a modern, still “semi-militant, semi-industrial state,” they brought their members benefits making them fitter for survival and “higher forms of social organization.” And formally “[t]hey seem natural to the passing phase of social evolution…."

In the future, in freely contracted cooperatives, absent war or socialism, “ultimate man” would “fulfil his own nature by all others doing the like.”

Durkheim concentrated on the division of labor “in order to make science of morality,” to his mind “the daily bread without which societies cannot live.” Following Comte, more functionalist than Spencer, taking labor’s divisions for “a phenomenon of general biology,” he held their “economic services” in modern (1893), “superior societies” to be “of little matter” compared to their “moral effect,” viz., solidarity. This, he posited (contradictorily), was “perhaps the very source of morality.” As he argued, “the growth and condensation of [modern] societies” had made “the struggle for existence…more intense,” but also “necessitated…the progressive division of labor,” which was the struggle’s “sweetened, softened denouement…, occupations…separated and specialized to infinity,” ever more individualism, ever more

247 Ibid., I, 508, II, 615.
250 Ibid., III, 523-525, 533-536, 539-551, 572-573, 587.
251 Ibid., III, 551-552.
252 Ibid., III, 553-607, 611.
254 Ibid., 3-4, 10, 49-50, 52, 57, 62-64.
solidarity, not (as per Spencer) contractual, but organic, indeed altruistic. It was impossible, he granted, “for social life to be without conflicts,” which solidarity could not “suppress,” but only “moderate.” And modern societies especially suffered “the [anti-functional] pathology” of “abnormal,…anomic divisions,” the most “striking” of them “[t]he antagonism of labor and capital.” Ever “more lively,” it had reached a “state of permanent hostility…in the industrial world,” where “in big industry…this rending discord is at an acute stage.” The conflict, “class wars” (his words), came from “external inequalities, …rich and poor at birth,” which caused “constraints” (“indirect violence,” practically extortion, a “usurious” or “leonine contract”), which caused a “forced division of labor,” which, not corresponding to “the distribution of natural talents,” prevented “harmony between individual natures and social functions…[and] falsifies the moral conditions of exchange.” But Durkheim had no idea of functions industrial workers could use, or stop using, to constrain capital to their purposes. The only “internal inequalities” he imagined among workers were “natural,” in their “capacities” and “aptitudes,” i.e., “their unequal merit,” which “will always make…unequal situations in society….” His moral science indicated the goal of modern morality: “The task of the most advanced societies is…a work of justice.” This work would be “in attenuating…external inequalities,” leaving only the “natural inequalities,” so that “the harmony between each individual’s constitution and condition is realized of its own accord.”

Simmel, anti-Comtean, neo-Kantian, epistemologically limited society to “the Wechselwirkung [continuous correlation, incessant exchange, correspondence, interaction, or interplay, alternating reciprocation, mutually reflective and resonant interworking]…of its parts…not only human persons,…but also entire groups,…in reciprocal, dynamic relations.” But its precondition, the “differentiation”

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256 Ibid., 44, 397-399, 409, 415-418.
257 Ibid., 419-423, 430-432.
258 Ibid., 422-423, 434, 459-460.
allowing such relations, he held to result from the division of labor increasing its “conservation of force
[=energy],” giving it an “evolutionary advantage,” powering its survival. As a society so survives,
through the expansion of some groups, the dissolution of others, and “the crossing of social circles”
(participation in several circles at once), individuals more freely develop themselves.\textsuperscript{260} In modern times
(the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries) society is increasingly \textit{Vergesellschaftung}, individually activated association,
which “continually knots and loosens and knots together anew, an everlasting flow and pulsation, linking
individuals even where it does not come to actual organization.” \textit{Vergesellschaftung}, Simmel argued, is at
once “the form…in which individuals on the ground of [their diverse] interests…grow together into unity
and within which these interests are realized,” and the form against which individuals struggle to preserve
their own subjectivity.\textsuperscript{261} Associations now (ca. 1900) happen continually, but never simply; they are
always complex and tense, not merely involving but requiring hierarchy and antagonism, many of them,
abstractly, a pure form of domination or strife. They cannot start without “gradation of superiority and
subordination, if only on technical grounds.” They cannot last unless they preserve themselves. And they
cannot attain “actual organization” voluntarily; given “human nature,” they need “force, compulsion,
coercion.”\textsuperscript{262} In “modern giant businesses” in particular Simmel adduced “the difference in strategic

\begin{flushleft}
the Interaction of Natural Forces,” tr. John Tyndall, in Edward L. Youmans, ed., \textit{The Correlation and
Conservation of Forces: A Series of Expositions} (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1865), 211-247; and
Chapter VI, “Die Differenzierung und das Prinzip der Kraftersparnis,” 258-295; “Zur Philosophie der
Kreuzung der sozialer Kreise,” 456-511; “Grundfragen,” 128-131, 139-140, 144-149. On “conservation of
force” then, Michael Faraday, “The Conservation of Force [1857],” in Youmans, \textit{op. cit.}, 359-383; Ernst
Mach, \textit{Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit} (Prague: J. G. Calve, 1872);
and Merz, \textit{op. cit.}, III, 397-402, 564-583. On “Die Kreuzung,” in an almost inert translation, see Georg
\textsuperscript{261} Idem, “Differenzierung,” 130; “Die Grossstädte und das Geistesleben [1903],” \textit{Gesamtausgabe}, VII,
dialectical) “relation of the individual to the group” in “special associations,” idem, “Philosophie des
On the translation of \textit{Vergesellschaftung} approved by Durkheim, G. Simmel, “Comment les formes
sociales se maintiennent,” \textit{L’année sociologique}, I (1896-97), 71-109. See also Donald N. Levine, “The
Structure of Simmel’s Social Thought,” in Kurt H. Wolff, ed., \textit{Georg Simmel, 1858-1918: A Collection of
Essays, with Translations and a Bibliography} (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1959), 17; idem, “Some
Key Problems in Simmel’s Work,” in Lewis A. Coser, ed., \textit{Georg Simmel} (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
\textsuperscript{262} Idem, “Differenzierung,” 283-284; “Die Selbsterhaltung der socialen Gruppe: Sociologische Studien
position” between workers and their employers. He found “especially interesting…the solidarity of wage laborers.” And he considered cases where “the superior is technically dependent on the subordinate.” But in his sociology coercion carried the force only of personal will or law, the strategic difference between workers and employers obtained only in the labor market (“the former unconditionally at the mercy of the latter”), labor’s solidarity was only psychological, and technical dependence happened only in bureaucracies—where it “damages the organization’s solidity.”

Pareto, “the bourgeois Karl Marx,” thought society comprehensible only “in its ensemble,” as a system of movements and conditions in equilibrium, so allowing study of “all the equations of equilibrium together.” In a social system, as in the solar system, or “a mechanical system,” or “a political economy,” or “a living organism,” equilibrium means that its parts are in “mutual dependence,” or “a necessary correspondence,” or “interdependence.” Although “social evolution” happens, slowly, through “a dynamic equilibrium,” it is still (again ca. 1900) conceivable only as “a series of static equilibria.” Pareto did not make much of the division of labor, but following Spencer he did agree that it brought more “mutual dependence.” Engineer, scholar of force, railroad executive, logician of agency, rationalization, heterogeneity, and inequality, erudite on violence, cunning, and elites in conflict, student of unions, strikes, and syndicalism (a friend of Sorel’s), he came closest to the concept of strategically positioned labor.
explanations of interest, coercion, and protection ("cycles of interdependence") gave the necessary logic and attitude. Even so, often hovering right over the strategic point, Pareto never got to it. He imagined mutual dependence resulting only from "automatic internal forces" (markets) or "coercive external forces" (government), recategorized class from production to power, charged monopolies and unions to luck, law, and politics ("non-logical action"), saw "very great importance" in workers in "big industry" leaving old skills and positions to become general technicians, and concluded that social conflict, quintessentially "class struggle," was all instinctive, and "almost all arguments" about it only derivazioni, wishful thinking.

Weber also had the necessary logic. Reasoning from Gemeinschaftshandeln (later soziales Handeln), "social action," or "social business," that individuals depended on each other for meaning and purpose, he defined society as persons acting in subjective, expectant regard to others, thus together forming Sinnzusammenhänge, significant, intelligible complexes. An ideal society is an Ordnung, he specified, when its actors orient their social business according to "assignable ‘maxims,’" and the order is "valid" when the actors see their orientation as obligatory. In fact, he argued, an order is most stable when it has "the prestige…of legitimacy," by virtue of tradition, faith, and legality. Although ideally its "economic activity" covers its demands for "useful production" peacefully in free markets, profitably on capital accounts calculated in money, real social orders have featured "domination" in their markets, e.g., "the big capitalist firm," "capitalist monopolies," "‘imperialist’ capitalism." Indeed "our modern economy
under our modern conditions [ca. 1914] surely needs…the state’s legal coercion,” so that “the most important and most modern economies show a structure of domination.”\textsuperscript{272} Workers too, Weber recognized, have held impressive economic positions. In German industry in 1918-19, as he witnessed, they appropriated jobs and means of production, in this “struggle” forcefully limiting the division of labor, raising wages (“today the central point” of the “class struggle”), turning profits into household wherewithal, defying the law, the state itself, for a new “material rationality.”\textsuperscript{273} But he could not explain the strength of their struggle. He understood the difference between power and domination. He knew technical, social, and dispositive divisions of labor, and an argument that the modern proletariat’s power came from its “necessity in the production process.” He himself had designed research on German industrial workers, and written an empirical study of them.\textsuperscript{274} But because he did not see power sociologically, or see domination except in the market or in authority, because he did not distinguish means of production from generic “means of provision” (Beschaffungsmittel), or relations of production from marketable personal assets (Lebenschancen), he could not imagine workers technically able to coerce each other, or management, or the government. Modern bureaucracy’s “position of enormous power” he explained from its “economic indispensability,” precisely (after Simmel) its “technical” expertise, “essential,” he noted, for modern transport and communications. But the most Weber granted workers was that the labor market might favor those organized in “especially ‘vital’ job” (and “the purely physically


\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Ibid.}, 24, 32, 44-48, 52-53, 58-62, 72, 78-79, 367, 634.

strongest”); he absolutely rejected proletarian “indispensability.” His industrial sociology would explore not workers’ struggles, but their psychologies, not their strategies, but their souls and spirits. Considering the great revolutionary proletarian movements then, Weber focused on personality, charisma and conspiracy. Only once he allowed a “very difficult even if…not quite impossible” case, in Russia, of “general fraternization and association,” which “anyway do not hold significance beyond that which workers through (normal) strikes can and want to attain,” which he did not explain.

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Nor did the founding sociologists’ intellectual offspring see industrial workers holding material power at work. The first to theorize on “trade unionism,” the Webbs, in the 1890s, thought unions happened not because workers decided to use their “strategic position” in the labor market, but because they had a “faculty” that came from their race and class. Unionism in their view sprang from “an instinct” in “the Anglo-Saxon workman” for self-preservation, and its first, indeed universal expedient (in England), “the Device of the Common Rule,” succeeded by “psychological effect” and “overpowering impulse.” This Common Rule “promotes the action of both forces of evolutionary progress…, the Selection of the Fittest… and Functional Adaptation,” ultimately to attain “the maximum aggregate development of individual intellect and individual character in the community as a whole…” Despite the National Union of Railwaymen, the Triple Alliance, the Shop Stewards’ Movement, the Webbs in the 1920 reedition of their theory changed not a word about labor’s “strategic position,” all economic, nothing industrial or technical.

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For them Anglo-Saxon workers used their “strategic strength” in the labor market because of their emotion.277

After World War I the likeliest country for a bourgeois sociology of power in production to appear would have been Germany, because of its industrial proletariat, its intellectual history, its revolutionary and counter-revolutionary moments, and its rampant reactionary modernism. But for all the German fascination with “man and technology” then, liberals, conservatives, and fascists who studied industrial workers (e.g., respectively, Emil Lederer, Hans Freyer, Fritz Giese) still concentrated on psychological and cultural questions.278

American, French, and British sociologists of industrial problems also looked then to the issues of morality, sensitivity, feeling, meaning. Considering Fordism’s power and Taylor’s influence, which virtually begged attention to technically situated conflicts, it would not have been surprising if any of them had taken an interest in an industry’s strategic troubles. But none of them did. Whatever their political differences over the labor movement in their countries (nowhere so bitter as in Germany or Italy), they all divined labor’s principal quality as spirituality. They disagreed on whether workers were properly objects or subjects of study, whether the object (or the subject) was properly an individual or a group, etc. But they all sought most to understand the worker’s mind, workers’ values.279

Note


war industrial unionism, a student of its power in wartime munitions plants, repeated post-war that British
unions ran on both “a vast mass of conservative tradition…a source at once of strength and of weakness”
and “a growing mass of idealism and of theory.” The American theorist Hoxie had declared before the
war that “the real unionism” came from “group psychology,” including “blind and spasmodic revolt.”
Unionized workers “do not usually independently understand the theory of their own demands or of their
constructive program. They feel.” After the war, despite the Seattle General Strike, the Winnipeg General
Strike, the Boston Police Strike, and the Great Steel Strike, Hoxie’s posthumous representative held his
“psychological analysis” still “true.” She suggested only “a new functional type” of union, “characterized
by practical idealism.” An American sociologist soft on Anarchism then thought, “…the machine is the
major cause” of the labor movement, but only because it made workers “insecure”: they organized unions
“to harness the machine” and reestablish “security and stability.” Perlman, the most authoritative, firmly for
the American Federation of Labor, concluded that “consciousness” started and drove “modern” trade
unions, “the consciousness of job scarcity” that “basically determined…their economic attitudes,” or
“‘mentality,’” and so their active “solidarity.” For “certainty” in the “theory of the labor movement,” he
advised, “the safest method is to go to the organizations of labor’s own making, shaped and managed by
leaders arisen from labor’s own ranks, and to attempt to discover ‘what’s really on labor’s mind’ by using
as material the ‘working rules,’ customs and practices of these organizations.” At Harvard, Mayo
worried worst over industrial workers’ “morale.” At Hawthorne his associates looking for “human factors”
ever imagined that these might include contests over technically strategic positions at work, did their

**Footnotes:**


research on small, “significantly homogeneous” groups, where they could not have found such positions, and concluded that “the technical organization of the plant” had to do with “the human organization” only through technical changes affecting workers’ “sentiments.”

Of all bourgeois sociologists between the Wars, only Parsons used the notion of “strategic position.” Having studied philosophy and biology at Amherst, history with Tawney and anthropology with Malinowski at LSE in 1924-25, and economics with Salin at Heidelberg in 1925-26 (whence his D.Phil. in 1927, for “Der Kapitalismus bei Sombart und Max Weber”), having taught for four years in Harvard’s Economics Department, and then endured L. J. Henderson’s “seminar” on Pareto, he was drawing his grand plan for a social science of action. His first Pareto-informed sketch emphasized “coercive power,” its main “instruments” being “force, fraud, and strategic position.” But this last was still in the market, where the Webbs had found it, and Marshall had left it, “e.g. monopoly,” without technical (“‘physical’ or ‘material’”) location. Parsons’s next sketch, which he justified by appeal to the most authoritatively

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maintained of classical economics’s theories, that of international trade, i.e., of tariffs, or protection, distinguished three “non-economic factors in social life”: 1) force and fraud, 2) the state, and 3) “inequalities in…the competitive struggle,” either between firms, because of, say, monopoly, so that “a strategic position in the bargaining process may be taken advantage of,” or between firms and workers, because of “the inherent bargaining disadvantage of the laborer so long as he is isolated,” a position, however “non-economic,” still in a market. Coached by Parsons, a colleague tried another sketch.

“…three of the…most important non-economic elements of social life…are (1) technology; (2) the power element, i.e., the pursuit and use…of coercive power…; and (3)…prevailing ethical attitudes.” Technology on one side (“in immediate interplay with purely objective situations”), the ethical element on the other (“motives”), both “affected by all other elements,” each nevertheless “determines…the interrelationships” of the power and economic elements. But technology was concretely only for engineering efficiency. Nothing in production appeared in this sketch’s principal forms of coercion: intimidation, deception, “non-economic monopoly,” and politics. Parsons’s finished study of the “theory of social action” went no further. It distinguished yet again three “elements” of action, technological (for efficiency), economic (for wealth), and political (for coercive power), plus a “system” of “common values.” One form of the political element, “bargaining power,” which, following Pareto (not Marx), Parsons saw “at the center of [Marx’s] attention,” might actually yield no more than one of “the milder forms of coercion….the ‘legal’exercize of a superior strategic position in the bargaining process.” Yet again, definitively, the exercise was political, and the position not in production, but in the market.

This argument, pressed from sociology into economics, confirmed Dunlop’s premise that strategy in economics need not imply social war (struggle to control the means of social production), but ordinarily apply only to economic battles (disputes over labor’s price). And it prompted his eventual formulation of “four interrelated factors: technology, market structures…, community institutions of control, and ideas and

Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), 178-300; Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton, 1938); and so on.


beliefs.”

More significantly, carrying Usher’s definitions of technology and strategy and Perlman’s insistence on “the job,” despite its expression in Parsonian terms, Dunlop’s argument for “strategic position” in production as well as in the market did not spring back into sociology. One reason, as Dunlop himself suggested, was the fortification then of “community institutions of control.” The Wagner Act, the National Defense Mediation Board, the Smith-Connelly Act, the National War Labor Board, Truman’s postwar seizure of railroads and mines, and the Taft-Hartley Act all made his concept of “strategic workers” seem less practical (at least in the United States). They were also evidence for his case, that industrial production was inherently dangerous to contracted order. But “community” loomed so strong then that sociologists took it for fundamental, the common ground even of their contentions.

During World War II the Harvard Human Relations crew had actually studied strategic shops in strategic industries. Yet at war’s end Mayo ignored its research, and preached industrial work as simply “teamwork…sustained cooperation,” always in “groups” where “technical skill” mattered much less than “social skill…[i.e.,] effective communication.” And some mighty institutions then endorsed just such a view of the matter, giving studies from the happier angle a wondrous lift in the market for research. In the years right after the war the Penn, Princeton, Harvard, Chicago, Yale, Columbia, and MIT corporations revamped their old programs on “industrial relations,” and state legislatures established new schools, institutes, or centers of “industrial relations” at Cornell, Illinois, Minnesota, UC-Berkeley and UCLA, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Rutgers. The experts (including Dunlop) organized a new profession, the Industrial Relations Research Association, which commenced publishing the Industrial and Labor


Relations Review. The main professionals (among them Dunlop) chartered the National Academy of Arbitrators. 290 Old friends of theirs at the new ILO and ICFTU wanted an industrial sociology of cooperation and communication too, to strengthen “free trade unions” in the Cold War against Communism. 291

In this consensualism “Industrial Sociology” became a bourgeois intellectual rage. The American Sociological Society opened a new Section so named, for studies, by one expert’s definition, of “experience in human association in the industrial community.” The Chicago School blessed “The Sociology of Work” industrial or not, every group’s work, entrepreneurial work too—why not? In London, Urwick recommended formal instruction in industrial psychology, social psychology, “the human factor in industrial relations,” Hawthorne, “[t]he abnormal worker….group morale,” and Jaques promoted research on industrial “group tensions and working-through.” In Paris, Friedmann urged a sociological “humanism of labor,” where “psychotechnicians” would assure workers of “maximum psycho-physiological ease….un magnifique possible.” In Hamburg, Schelsky advocated “industrial and business sociology” for its unique view into industrial businesses’ “fundamental” significance for modern society at large. 292


Berkeley/Rand sociologist, believing he had cracked the CPUSA’s “operational code” for “modern industrial society,” offered “an advanced-training manual for anti-communist forces” especially in the labor movement.

A slew of Mayoist studies appeared, of a telephone company, occupations, mobility, the labor market, automobile workers, Hawthorne again, again, strikes, professions, careers, unions, shoe factories, and so on, ever certain that in societati veritas.

Almost as fast a slew of neo-Mayoist studies concentrated on one or another “industrial organization”‘s external disturbances and internal heterogeneity, frictions, incongruency, changes, even unions, assuming nevertheless that the “organization” ought to cohere, in the new “systems theory” tend to “the steady state.” Only one caught Dunlop’s point on “strategic technological position,” literally, in his language, but lost it under layers of psychologizing about “participation.” Anti-Mayo studies accepted continual industrial conflict as inevitable, indeed natural to

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democracy, praiseworthy if institutionalized in collective bargaining, anyway necessary to improve “social welfare.”

And a textbook, the first book ever titled *Industrial Sociology*, introduced college students to “work relations.” There work was “the totality of technical and social behavior associated with a job,” socio-psychologically important for the “impact” of its “routines” on the “social atmosphere of the…plant,” on “extra-work adjustment,” and on “attitude” toward work “as it affects…outlook on life.” The first of a job’s “major aspects” was “technical operations.” But this was “the chief interest of the engineer and the apprentice, not of the social scientist,” because “purely technical” behavior had no “motives.” A garment-shop cutter’s “sociotechnical behavior,” for example, would involve only “interpersonal…contacts,” or “interaction,” no power, except maybe “to teach his job to a new worker.” Two nods of recognition went to “strategic industry” and “strategic power” in the market. But regardless of technical power in “functional organization” and in “work flow and segmentation,” missing every opportunity for technical analysis in an


entire chapter on “the social organization of power” in “the local work plant,” especially in a passage on “strategy and tactics of grievance bargaining” (including “intimidation”), and wasting references to “job in a social sense” as “work position,…the basic structural unit of a…plant,” the authors never indicated that any job could have strategic significance. The power they admitted in the plant’s formal and informal organizations, “an unpalatable flavor to those reared in democratic ideology,” hung safely in balance between “Management and Labor,” in “a rough equality,” no “significant difference…between them,” so that “true collective bargaining” occurred. The source of a union’s strength was a democratic mystery, the degree of its strength measurable only post hoc, by wages, hours, and working conditions.297

The best chance for Dunlop’s argument to lock into industrial sociology happened in 1958. He presented his case as he thought best, Parsons-wise, in Industrial Relations Systems. The sociologist who had earlier caught his point published a brilliant study of some 300 “work groups” in 30 industrial plants in Michigan, arguing that “the technology of the plant…molds the types of work groups that evolve within the plant,” and defining one type as “strategic.” He specified that these groups were strategic not for their position, or any other attribute, only for their behavior. But one factor in explaining their behavior he called “[e]ssentialness of their function,” or “degree of indispensability….ease of replacement….criticalness of skill….essentialness of location”; and he cited a student of Dunlop’s on “technically strategic position.” That same year a British scholar issued a first report on her brilliant study of 100 factories in South Essex, arguing not only technological effects on formal and informal organizations of work, but also “situational” rationality among workers as well as managers. Most corroborative was another brilliant study of 13 “so-called automated plants” in the U.S. East and Midwest, demonstrating automation’s “integration of the physical plant,” inflexibility, eventual reduction of required skills, “fundamentally dangerous” vulnerability to failures of supply, and maintenance as “a vital matter.”298


But the connection failed, maybe because sociology in general was flying apart then. Heirs of Durkheim, Simmel, Pareto, and Weber still at industrial questions ignored the concept of workers strategizing over technical power. In the new “organization theory” the derivative “strategic groups” received notice, and from this derivative came another, “strategic analysis.” There too a few arguments reminiscent of Dunlop’s emerged for any and all instrumental organization. And from the derivatives and reinventions, inklings of “strategic analysis” long survived (in “contingency theory,” then in “critical studies” or “radical theory,” lately in “de-centered subjectivity”). But the idea of a system with


independent circuit breakers—so not a system—could not thrive on the premises of coherence and consistency. Former industrial sociologists going into “personnel management” kept track of “strategic groups” for a while, but eventually let them go. Others meanwhile developed an “economic sociology” where rarely even a ghost of such a group appeared. Others studying industrial workers’ attitudes, status, and control.
mobility, movements, mental health, culture, and so on, often spying “strategies” in temperament, tendencies, or tactics, seldom showed a notion of strategic industries, and then only the faintest sense of technically strategic positions in them. Yet others took to “urban” or “ethnic” studies, now and then describing industrial workers in strategic jobs, but without conceptualizing the observation. A rare one


who saw that workers in certain jobs had technical power over others at work around them, confused this power with that of “understandings” in a “situation.” By the mid-1960s some “organization theorists” were specializing in “social movement organizations,” particularly their “strategies.” But few saw industrial workers’ organizations in “movement” then, or later, and the strategies they imagined for them were moral or legal. The massive public protests of the 1960s in the United States and Europe gave material for “a new social movement theory,” abundant on “strategy.” But these theorists typically had only historical use for industrial workers, and anyway thought of strategic strength simply as numbers, and maybe emotion; a mirrormakers’ strike mattered as much as a telegraphers’ strike.

Focused on the Italian...
*autunno caldo* of 1969, some old and young industrial sociologists discovered technically strategic workers in “new collective action” in a new industrial organization. A few were often right on target to remake Dunlop’s argument, but did not.311 Having studied 123 strikes in France in 1971, an old and a young sociologist of labor together found various *stratégies de négociation*, a Dunlopian principle of technical power, and the technical “tactic” of most power, the *grève-thrombose*, or *grève-bouchon*, with its “corollary,” *le chômage technique*, but all to argue a different issue (*revendication*).312 Through the old discipline of political sociology a few young sociologists in the 1970s studied workers’ “strategic options” and “strategies,” modern technology, work’s social significance, and the difference between capital’s collective action and labor’s in “Western liberal democracies.” They assumed the options and the strategies were only in the labor market, ignored technology except in change (always “labour-saving”), argued work was no longer “the key sociological category,” and distinguished between business associations and unions by their members’ “willingness” and “interests,” not by their parts in production.313 Another very strategically concerned sociologist of industrial strikes claimed he could predict when workers would gain (“residuals” at least) from striking. Arguing from the history of one highly strategic industry in France, he


never saw the strategic positions there, rediscovered the logic of them in other industries, but made nothing of it.\textsuperscript{314}

The last good chance for a clear Dunlopian connection into bourgeois sociology passed in 1979 without anyone knowing it. The miss happened in a British sociologist’s explicitly Weberian critique of Marxist “class theory,” in an argument on “social closure as usurpation.” To show how social “usurpation” could happen, Frank Parkin turned right to “the struggle between capital and labour,” and emphatically quoted two British authorities on industrial conflict. The first was a rather Paretovian political sociologist who did not know of Dunlop, but did know his argument in its main British version (the Donovan Report), and knew better than any other academic then how lobbies drove British political contention. The quotation from him featured “small specialized groups” in “organized labor” having “the potential” to “withhold certain services…critical to the survival of society,” having, in other words, “that socio-economic leverage which can paralyse society.” The second authority was the then most distinguished British professor of industrial relations, who had often praised Dunlop’s \textit{Industrial Relations Systems} (“the most important study in the field since the Second World War”), generally misunderstood its argument, but subliminally caught its point in his public dread of strategic strikes. Industrial relations, he declared, were about “the distribution of affluence and the [normal] disruption that occurs in the process…. But “uninhibited collective bargaining” could cause modern society too much disruption. “Under conditions of advanced technology involving high capital-labour ratios, low levels of intermediate stocks, and ever more closely integrated production and distribution processes,” in his quoted words, strikes damaged not only “industry” but “the community” at large. Unions “prepared to exploit this critical strategic situation” could cause “social disaster.” Therefrom Parkin drew the very Dunlopian concept of workers’ “disruptive potential,” highest among “key groups at the very heart of the productive system,” a power that workers could deliberately use for legally forbidden gains of indefinite extension. “It is as though once capital is shown to be vulnerable at certain tender points, labour as a whole becomes more confident of its usurpationary

\textsuperscript{314} Samuel Cohn, \textit{When Strikes Make Sense--And Why: Lessons from Third Republic French Coal Miners} (New York: Plenum, 1993), 12-15, 28-40, 114-118, 122-123, 217, 224. His conception of strategy is not Dunlop’s, but from game theory.
potential.” But there he dropped the matter, and from where he left it, no other bourgeois sociologist picked it up.

The connection then happened, but at five removes, under another name, and heading elsewhere. From an argument of Dunlop’s about a different matter, “the internal wage structure,” two of his most influential students in labor economics had developed a theory of “the internal labor market” (later “segmented labor markets”). [Here do I need to go into: Northrup 1944, Eiteman 1945, Williamson 1975, Stiglitz 1975, Rubery 1978, Carter 1982, Brown and Nuwer 1987? If so, I could do it so, in order to lead to these guys: ] [[From this theory, without reading its source, much less reading him on “the technical context of the work place,” some second-generation economic sociologists in “stratification research” adduced “structural inequality,” or “the structure of positional inequality,” and theorized it into a “new structuralism.” Still ignorant of Dunlop on “the technical context,” some “new structuralists” in 1980-81 inferred from his students’ argument on “job specificity” an argument very close to his on “job content,” and urged a focus on “the firm’s internal job structure.”]

316 By chance another of them then received a Parkin-oriented (but Marxist) paper on “disruptive potential,” which in due time two others and he, none of them knowing Dunlop on strategic position or Parkin on disruptive potential, represented as a new theory on “the positional sources of labor’s power.” But they put disruption of markets (“upstream”) on the same account as disruption of production (“downstream”), held it to matter maybe more, and changed the significance of disruptive potential (explicitly against the Marxist author’s intent) from strategic to psychological, so that “positional power” meant “militancy.” Along their line, in a deeply grounded,


technically detailed, otherwise acute analysis of industrial conflict in reengineered American automobile plants in the 1960s and ’70s, a young American Weberian argued the issue was “wildcat militancy.” He even got workers’ industrially and technically strategic powers right, but assumed them to pose the same questions as solidarity, questions not of calculation, negotiation, alliance, coalition, secession, but of “motivation” and “mobilization.”

The most sophisticated recent consideration of modern “worlds of work” is by the Tillys père et fils. Against “the neoclassical approach,” they claim “institutionalist, Marxist, and organizational” warrants for their “large….long view” into this cosmic question, and they report much interesting research and analysis, including Dunlop’s on internal wage structures. But they never get a grip on the title subject, “work.” Not Marxists actually, but Simmelists, they see work among “social interactions,” and continually pursue it in the general category of deals, as a “transaction” between “producer and recipient of use value,” not as collective action in production. Specifically in capitalist “production networks,” organized in “hierarchies, markets, industries, and coalitions,” they define “work transactions” as “work contracts” between workers and employers, the workers under contract to perform particular “roles…known as jobs,” the employers hierarchically authorized “to optimize…quality, efficiency, and power.” The Tillys therefore work hardest on labor markets, where they assume that demand receives a socially (or culturally) presorted supply, so that the only significant division of labor is gendered, racial, ethnic; they are very faint on technology. When they do run into their subject in a modern capitalist industrial firm, they see it happening in “labor markets.” Coercion they take only for “threats to inflict harm,” and these only by employers to make workers work. Strikes they represent as voluntary, culturally framed “strategic

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interaction.” Toward the end they actually repeat Dunlop’s point on strategic position, but only in passing, then lose it, evidently not recognizing what it means.

Only in the “interdisciplinary” field of “industrial relations” did Dunlop’s formulation of “interrelated factors” (including “technology”) have major influence. Even there, however, his argument on industrially and technically based strategies went largely for naught. In teaching, writing, and actual labor negotiations and arbitration, Dunlop continued to press this argument whenever it seemed to him to fit the case. But not many of the nearly 50 “Wertheim Publications in Industrial Relations” that he himself steered into print refer to his sorts of strategic considerations, and these references are almost all to labor markets; only one, decades old, not mentioning “strategy” or “strategic,” is to technically strategic power in agricultural production. Among Dunlop’s successors in “public policy” at Harvard (the

322 Tilly and Tilly, op. cit., 243, 246-248.
324 E.g., an influential book, various references to “strategy,” but devoid of strategic industrial or technical analysis, James O. Morris, Conflict within the AFL: A Study of Craft versus Industrial Unionism, 1901-1938 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1958), 55-56, 74, 78, 81-82.
program for studying IR there), but a few insist that workers may apply (unspecified) “technological pressures.”

Industrial Relations graduates in the labor movement, who must have studied Dunlop, did hardly better. Even after the PATCO (1981) and the Phelps-Dodge (1983) strikes I could find only one AFL-CIO document suggesting use of materially strategic (“key”) positions to “pressure the employer,” and then only to help the union’s “regular negotiating team” by “negotiations away from the table,” after consulting legal counsel, and for a better contract.  

What’s surprising is that with all the deregulation and privatization underway by Thatcher and late Carter, and the PATCO move to privatize CSRA and FLRA, there was no particular interest in union’s extra-political action. See Northrup and others. So far as I can tell neither the PATCO (1981) nor the Phelps-Dodge (1983) strike yielded any strategic analysis of the industrial or technical reasons for their failures. I.e., what would have been sufficient, industrially and technically, for them to win. Northrup’s article on PATCO’s direct action is masterly (note he’d been deputy director of the NWLB’s Detroit tool and die commission), but it doesn’t go into the industrial and technical plans, which he’s seen, by which PATCO lost support and the strike. And I can’t find anything as good on Phelps-Dodge. There was plenty for IR to consider on direct action in the 1980s. E.g., UAW Local 282’s inside strategy to “run the plant backwards,” at Moog Automotive in St. Louis in 1981, which eventually succeeded. And the word on it circulated. E.g., Boilermakers Local Division of Cement Workers at General Portland in Ft. Worth, in 1984, tried what they thought was the same game, protected concerted activity.

The AFL-CIO’s turn in 1995 to the “New Voice,” i.e., hopefully, much more organizing, brought out many U.S. IR professionals offering unions advice on “organizing strategies.” But like sociologists still at “social movement unionism,” they still ignored any question of workers’ technical power at work; the power they studied was “community” and “solidarity,” essentially the (obsolescent) moral power to

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Industrial Union Department (AFL-CIO), The Inside Game: Winning with Workplace Strategies (Washington: Industrial Union Department (AFL-CIO), 1986), 6-8, 17, 19, 31, 36, 40, 77-83; underline in original.
shame. "The Battle of Seattle" inspired U.S. labor’s main intellectuals to argue for “strategies” either from “political economy” (markets) or from “culture,” almost never, regardless of Dunlop, from industrial or technical positions. Stuck on the AFL-CIO’s nice, new, culture-friendly leadership, some hoped to unionize in the now strategic “information industry” by an “e-union strategy,” using its technology only for communication, making an “employee community,” and communicating its concerns to the public, not (also or instead) for direct interruption of a company’s operations to bring it to water. Many workers knew that for the last several years hackers and “net activists” worldwide had been seriously e-discussing, sometimes causing, major e-disruptions. Hacktivism was (so far) politically utopian (Hakim Bey, Marcos, Thoreau, I’d say Fourier) and strategically of two minds (liberation/resistance), but tactically and technically most interesting for actions that labor could well take. Yet in the AFL-CIO’s special forum for “ideas, analysis, and debate” it drew only one brief, brave notice, this declaring that despite unions’ fear of the consequences “coordinated cyber disruptions will still be possible....” There was no intellectual excuse for the main line’s simple disregard of labor’s technical power. By contrast, also regardless of Dunlop, but as he advised, journalists often connected cultural, political, mercantile, and technical “factors”

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to explain industrial conflict. So did the U.S. government’s favorite agents for “peaceful resolution of international conflicts” (in other countries).

The 9/11/01 doom had its day, and capital’s material vulnerability seemed at once obvious—and entirely a question of destruction, foreign terrorism, Homeland Security. Yet some IR professionals, mainly in California, already on the subject for the International Longshore and Warehouse Union preparatory to negotiations (critical for the union) with the Pacific Maritime Association, stayed at it in labor’s terms. As the ILWU-PMA talks began in May 2002, a former director of ILWU’s organizing department, well aware of the “patriotic zeal” prevailing then, bravely argued in the AFL-CIO’s special forum for “strategic strikes” with a “strategic focus” on “the most strategic sectors of the economy.” Peter Olney did not know Dunlop’s argument, but unwittingly he made there the most substantial contribution to it in almost 25 years (since Parkin’s in 1979). Although he confused technically strategic positions and skill, he drove the industrially strategic concept into AFL-CIO discussion of strategy.

The PMA’s shutdown of West Coast ports, the resulting threat to the whole U.S. economy, and a Taft-Hartley injunction against the lockout, in October 2002, proved Olney’s strategic point. Even so, even though he kept pressing in AFL-CIO forums for industrially strategic organizing, his argument has remained a minor theme in the U.S. labor movement’s continuing effort to debate “organizing strategies.” Since a new opposition emerged in the AFL-CIO in 2003, to use the federation’s elections in 2005 to rouse a much stronger commitment to organizing campaigns, the major theme has been “unity,” as both means

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and end, both for and against the opposition. It resounds incessantly among the Industrial Relations intellectuals on both sides. Unity by fiat or deal, top-down coalition, concentration of treasuries, and redivision of memberships according to economic sector, unity by free rank-and-file votes for unions in the same sector to cooperate, maybe offer social services to the public, unity of shop stewards pulling harder in their unions and beyond, unity in a clearer statement of the labor movement’s “enduring principles [of 120 or only 70 years ago?],” unity to elect Democrats to pass new, pro-labor laws, or some other unity, or some combination of all these unities, will somehow unionize the unionized, strengthen union density and democracy, beat Wal-Mart, and recycle the movement back into its promised land, “the counterforce it once was.”

It is today July 4, 2005. Less than three weeks before the federation’s convention and elections the supposedly strategic debates of the last ten years have clarified neither the movement’s positions of strength nor its goal. Olney’s strategic argument on “logistics” and “chokepoints” is even more to the point now. But it remains hard for the IR intellectuals to grasp, because steeped in sociology they no longer understand the literally, physically industrial division of labor. To them, “services” are an industry. Experts on community and solidarity, they can no longer tell an industry from a sector--or the past from the future.

Chapter IV. German Socialists Debate the “Mass Strike” and Its “Strategy,” 1895-1918

I have found a basis for the industrial and technical arguments among the first (post-Marx) generation of Marxists. It is not broad. Almost all Marxists then were as blind as bourgeois economists and

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sociologists to industrial workers’ in strategic positions at work. This is to be expected of the electorally and therefore numerically preoccupied, e.g., Wilhelm Liebknecht, Bebel, Lafargue, Guesde, the Adlers, Sombart, Zetkin, Bauer, Labriola, Plekhanov. It is surprising of others, famously interested in revolutionary tactics, e.g., Mehring, or “the general strike,” e.g., Pannekoek, Sorel, who were actually useless on details.  

However, the Marxists who did conceive of the technical argument explained it clearly, and saw its significance.

The first context of their reasoning was Britain’s “New Unionism” and the Second International’s discussion of strikes as extra-parliamentary “means of political struggle” in the early 1890s. Most important was the discussion in the German Social-Democratic Party. From England Engels’s trusted Eduard Bernstein publicly specified the conditions under which he would endorse “the political strike,” which could “perhaps” do more than “the struggle on the barricades once did” to force a government to save or enact laws favoring the working class. Among his conditions he noted “good labor organization, strong enough to exercise determining influence on the unorganized workers”; he did not yet indicate the source of such strength or how to build such organization. To introduce a new edition of Marx’s Class Struggles in France, “General” Engels himself wrote an essay on Socialist strategy. Although he emphasized that “1848’s way of fighting [i.e., on the barricades] is today in every respect obsolete,” he denied that “civilian fighters” had lost all strategic value. “A future [workers’] struggle in the street can win…if [civilian] disadvantage in position [versus the military] is outweighed by other momenta. It will therefore happen more seldom at the beginning of a big revolution than in its further course, and must be undertaken with greater forces. But these will then probably prefer, as in…1870 in Paris, the open attack to the passive tactic of the barricades.” He did not yet indicate how workers could build “greater forces.” Even so, the very idea that they could, enough to disorganize the military, seemed so realistic to his comrades in Berlin that they feared it would provoke an anti-sedition law and insisted he cut that passage from his text; he did.
In 1896, still in the debate over “political struggle,” a Marxist first called public attention to some industrial labor’s special positions of strength in national production. He was a 28-year-old Russian in the SPD, Israel Lazarevitch Gelfand, aka Alexander Helphand, “Parvus.” From his doctoral dissertation, “The Technical Organization of Work: Cooperation and the Division of Labor” (Basel, 1891), Parvus knew the logic of national industrial structure. A professed “social-revolutionary” Socialist, he brilliantly met all Bernstein’s conditions (in theory), used Engels’s omission to give his own strategic analysis, and proposed that against repression in a future crisis the German working class induce national “passive resistance” by a massive political strike. His proposal appeared in a long series of articles in the SPD’s theoretical journal, *Die Neue Zeit*, under a title hard to ignore: “Coup d’État and Mass Political Strike.” The key was his idea of striking (politically or not), not a discrete or a general event, but an organized, disciplined, guided accumulation of events, a deliberately loaded ramification of losses inflicted on the enemy, as if in a sketch of ever more ciphers in a succession of input-output tables. Simply and concretely he explained that strikes in certain branches of production had extraordinarily extensive consequences. “It is different matter if miners strike, or, for example, tailors, for the miners implicate the entire iron and machine industry, and thereby as well all big industry.” Most effective would be a railroad strike: “If the great means of transportation are put out of operation, then not only the whole mechanism of social production stops, but the political mechanism too.”


word) of the German bourgeoisie and the Reich’s security. After giant strikes in England in 1897, France in 1898, Belgium in 1902, Holland in 1903, Russia in 1902, 1903, 1904, Italy in 1904, and the Russian Revolution of 1905, through his own studies of world markets, colonial policies, and commercial crises, and through his strategic analysis of the Russian Revolution, Parvus eventually took the argument to a general conclusion. The modern concentration of capital, which meant industrial integration in internationally competitive conditions, which meant “wars, revolutions, and insurrections,” was also, he explained, a “technical development” that entailed “the organization of the proletariat…, forcibly propels the worker into union alliances and the centralization of unions.” In any modern country a “mass strike” would be almost revolutionary, not so much because of the masses as because of the shutdown of transportation: “Without railroad service there is no centralized state.” And so “sensitive” had the concentration of capital made world markets that a strike interrupting “the railroad and news service…in a great industrial country can…paralyze world production.”

The Belgian and Dutch strikes of 1902-03, for democratic (male) suffrage, particularly sharpened debate on “the mass political strike.” The arguments came continually to a head in Die Neue Zeit, where Belgian, Dutch, Austrian, and Polish as well as German Socialists (not all Marxists) disputed the significance of such strikes for workers, the proletariat, and socialism. Within a couple of years a raft of articles had appeared on the question. As theory or description some conveyed notions of an idea like Parvus’s, of workers’ industrial power. Most concrete was a description of the Dutch strike, which started in Amsterdam among warehousemen, longshoremen, dockmen, railroad yard crews, switchmen, and shop machinists. But no argument had any explicit industrial analysis like Parvus’s.

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Revolution: The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus), 1867-1924 (London: Oxford University, 1965); and Pietro Zveteremich, Il grande Parvus (Milan: Garzanti, 1988). His mentor at Basel had been Karl Bücher, the first historian of “the labor process and the division of labor,” on whose Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft: Sechs Vorträge (Tübingen: H. Laupp, 1893), Weber, Commons, and Lenin all variously relied.

Parvus, Der Klassenkampf des Proletariats [1908-10] (Berlin: Vorwärts, 1911), 11-24, 36-38, 44, 57-61, 135-149.

The controversy drew Die Neue Zeit’s editor, Karl Kautsky, by then “the Pope of Marxism,” into the debate to try (as usual) to center it. Since 1891 Kautsky had recognized capitalist vulnerability in the modern division of labor and expansive systems of circulation.345 Through Socialism’s economic, cultural, political, and ideological struggles to date he had been scrupulously refining his ideas of proletarian power. (Heavy on his mind were the Socialist International’s rejection of “the general strike” and the German General Commission of Trade Unions’ refusal even to discuss the question “yet.”) Lately he had reemphasized “that weapon…from which the proletariat above all draws its strength, organization,” and called attention to “the means of pressure and struggle exclusively the proletariat’s…the organized denial of work, the strike.” The more capitalism developed, “the more gigantic dimensions strikes take,” which could “bring about a national calamity, a political event.” But he had not yet explained how strikes grew.346 Now in 1904, citing Parvus for having given the explanation “first and in a no doubt more brilliant way,” he took Parvus’s argument to build his own case on the mass political strike. He spelled out the market essential for an “economic strike” to succeed, and noted “technical bases” for success too, e.g., leaving sugar beets to rot in sugar mills. But for his purposes he emphasized the mass strike’s mounting strain on the proletariat: “All the economic factors that favor the worker’s success [in an “economic” strike] will stand for less in a mass strike, all the less the more general it is….” When workers run out of food, if they start fighting for it, “the revolution of folded arms will leave the grounds of the economic strike and enter those of insurrection.” He went back (as best he could) to Parvus’s industrial structure: “The more commodity production develops, the more everyone produces not what he uses, but what he does not use, to sell it, so greater grows the quantity of objects of consumption that must go through transportation before they come into the hands of consumers. The division of labor among factories works in the same direction.


345 Karl Kautsky, “Der Entwurf des neuen Parteiprogramme. II,” ibid., IX/2 (August 31, 1891), 752, 757; idem, Das Erfurter Programm in seinem grundsätzlichen Theil (Stuttgart: J. B. W. Dietz, 1892), 63-65, 98-99, 210-211. Here (at 210-211) he notes some branches of production, “for the most part” in metallurgical industries, that “cannot do without” workers with “special strength or skill or knowledge” beyond “the competition of unskilled workers or…women and children.” Nowhere do the words “strategic advantage” appear, as in Karl Kautsky, The Class Struggle (Erfurt Program), tr. William E. Bohn (Chicago: Clark H. Kerr, 1910), 181. This translation “compressed” the original by one third. Bohn was then a member of the U.S. Socialist Labor Party; a brother, former national secretary of the SLP, was associate editor of the International Socialist Review in Chicago. William E. Bohn, I Remember America (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 143-148, 209-239; William D. Haywood and Frank Bohn, Industrial Socialism (Chicago: Clark H. Kerr, 1911).

The number grows of factories through which a product must pass from the form of raw material until it exists finished for use. So trade and transportation are the occupations that grow the most.” There he rediscovered the railroads, industrially and politically most strategic. “…whether the railroad business is private or state-owned, its undisturbed progress is ever more a life question for the modern state, railroad workers are therefore placed under an ever stricter discipline, while at the same time ever more military forces are trained to provide railroad service.” The trick, as per Parvus, was to use proletarian organization to disorganize the enemy. Although struggle on the barricades had ended long ago, for sound “military-technical reasons,” a political strike could now disorganize not only the economy, but national bourgeois security. It would depend first on “the railroaders, who are more interested than most other strata of workers in the achievement of a proletarian regime. But precisely they risk the most in a work stoppage that does not end in victory…. In most countries the railroaders will have to ponder well whether they should join a political strike, if it does not offer the prospect for winning a government dominated by the proletariat.” But he kept losing the industrial analysis in order to reach a balanced decision (viz., the time for the mass strike’s “successful application” had “not yet come”).

His judgment could not quell the controversy. The Socialist International in Amsterdam later that year, yet again opposing the general strike, made its first concession to advocates of the mass strike: “it is well possible that a strike that extends over a particular branch of industry or over a great number of factories can be in the extreme a means to accomplish an important social change or to resist reactionary assaults on workers’ rights…. But the German General Commission recommended that its affiliated unions “confront energetically” any propaganda for such strikes. On Kautsky’s recommendation the Amsterdam resolution’s author, Henriette Roland-Holst, wrote a book to promote “study and discussion of the mass political strike.” In its foreword in 1905 Kautsky likened the German unions to “a war office that not until war is declared is willing to begin to test its weapons, to exercise its troops, to drum strategy and

347 Karl Kautsky, “Allerhand Revolutionäres: III. Der politische Massenstreik,” ibid., XXII/1, 22 (February 24, 1904), 685-695; ibid., XXII/1, 23 (March 2, 1904), 732-740; quotations, 687-689, 693, 734, 737; Parvus, 694 n1. This citation is remarkable. Die Neue Zeit’s textual footnotes were rare; to Kautsky’s (frequent) articles, very rare. For all Kautsky’s military metaphors here, neither “strategic” nor any related word appears.

tactics into its officers’ head.” The book was a superb introduction to the field then. Clear, calm, fair, a full review, theoretical and practical, vivid in examples, sure-worded in explication, the work of a poet, it examined four kinds of big strikes, “the generalized sympathy strike,” “the economic-social general strike,” “the economic strike of political importance,” and “the mass political strike,” included an appendix on strikes and Socialist parties—and had an index! It went especially into how strikes spread, by “feeling of class solidarity,” or each shop or plant on its own and for itself, or for safety in numbers, or for public pressure on the offending employer, or most broadly (again as per Parvus, here via Kautsky) because of capitalism’s very development, its ever more complex industrial organization and integration, so that “economic struggles” in iron and coal, at ports, most of all on railroads, had “unintended political effects,” economic, social, and military repercussions so vast that they disorganized the state. From there it was “only one step…to the mass political strike.” The history, economics, and sociology of this kind of strike, across Europe and lately in Russia, Roland-Holst explained here at such length, in such detail, praising Parvus’s “excellent articles,” quoting a long passage from him, that she turned his argument almost into a manual for organizing industrially strategic strikes, whether unintentionally political or revolutionary. She never wrote “strategic” (or anything close) to describe them; she contrasted the state’s Zwang, coercion, to the striking proletariat’s “voluntary discipline.” But the General Commission of unions still would not allow the discussion among its affiliates. At its next convention (Jena, September 1905) the SPD accepted that to resist attacks on voting rights and freedom of association, it might call a “mass work stoppage.” The General Commission would not consider it. Roland-Holst’s book achieved a second edition, but used mainly in discussions of Socialist party programs, not by industrial organizers.

Bernstein in England had meanwhile observed English workers’ strikes, read the Webbs, and come to think workers generally through their “economic might” could win more from continual “reform” than from “revolution.” He had noticed the English engineering union acting “strategically,” but only in

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351 Ibid., 114-118.
recasting its demands. Back in Germany in 1905, fighting “anarcho-socialism,” he dismissed Roland-Holst’s “casuistry” on mass strikes. They were reasonable, he argued (on the party line), only for quite particular, strictly limited political goals, in defense in extremis, never for revolution. But in much of his argument about strikes as such he tacitly agreed with her. Strikes were not (pace Parvus) “passive resistance”: to refrain from work was “a very definite act, a very energetic action. ...the true meaning of the political strike is obstruction.” Even ordinary strikes needed strategic planning: “today the strike has become as much a science as the conduct of war....” Since a political strike was against an elected government, it would not only take “hundreds of thousands” of striking workers marching in “nonviolent demonstration” in the streets of the capital and big industrial centers, but also have to “concern the broad public,” which “nowadays only a strike of those workers who are engaged in the... great traffic, supply, preparation, and delivery of daily food supplies can”--railroaders, teamsters, “butchers, bakers.” The point here was “not to overthrow the enemy, but by fatigue and so on move him to give in.” In 1906 he produced a “socio-psychological” survey of the field, The Strike: Its Nature and Work. On strikes in “contemporary economic life,” ignoring Parvus’s, Kautsky’s, and Roland-Holst’s industrial arguments, he precisely explained technically strategic jobs. If all the workers at a dozen little locksmith shops, cabinet shops, or bookbinderies struck, they would not total a hundred, but a few score men striking a strategic department of a big industrial firm, for example, the molders at the Maffei locomotive factory in Munich, or the foundrymen at Krupp’s Grusonwerke in Magdeburg-Buckau, would directly force many hundreds, indirectly thousands, of other workers there to quit work too. On “the strategy and tactics of the strike,” he remarked (again) that “the strike is war, and has like every war its rules of preparation and conduct.” But between references (again) to the English engineering union and the Webbs he dwelt only on positions and

352 Eduard Bernstein, “Der Riesen-Ausstand im englischen Kohlengewerbe: Sein Wesen, sein Streitobjekt und seine Begleiterscheinungen,” Die Neue Zeit, XII/1, 7 (November 8, 1893), 204-211; ibid., XII/1, 8 (November 15, 1893), 229-235; ibid., XII/1, 9 (November 22, 1893), 267-276; idem, “Der Strike als politisches Kampfmittel,” ibid., XII/1, 22 (February 21, 1894); idem, “Eine neue Geschichte der Trade Union-Bewegung in England,” ibid., XII/2, 35 (May 23, 1894), 268-275; idem, “Der Kampf im englischen Maschinenbaugewerbe,” ibid., XV/1, 15 (December 28, 1897), 454-460; ibid., XVI/1, 21 (February 9, 1898), 644-653 (“haben...strategisch geschlagen,” 646 n2, his free translation of Barnes, op. cit.); and idem, Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie (Stuttgart: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1899), 102.

353 Idem, Der politische Massenstreik und die politische Lage der Sozialdemokratie in Deutschland (Breslau: Volkswacht [O. Schütz], 1905), 6, 17, 20, 22, 29-30, 39-40.
maneuvers in the labor market. At the end, on “the political strike,” he recited his previous argument, but missed both the industrial and the political “strategy” there.354

Rosa Luxemburg like Parvus had studied internationally industrial articulations and the extraordinary power of strikes at industrially strategic positions. From her dissertation, on Poland’s industrialization (Zürich, 1898), she gained a fine sense of disjunctions in capitalist development. And like Parvus a revolutionary Socialist, she could tell perfectly well why a railroad strike in Switzerland in 1897 had been “splendidly successful,” while a general strike in support of railroad workers in France in 1898 had “pitifully miscarried.” The former threatened (among other “traffic disturbances”) to stop shipment of coal from Germany to Italy, whereas the latter was a nationally broadcast call for collective political action in all industries around a particular event.355 Seeing in strikes the mark of workers’ class consciousness and their will to take political power, Luxemburg like Parvus and Bernstein found strikes’ expansion most significant. In 1906 this was the gripping quality of her instantly and widely disturbing tract Mass Strike, Party, and Unions. Her account there of Russia’s great series of strikes in 1902-03 goes from the strike at the Vladikavkaz branch railroad shops in Rostov-on-the-Don, the key to Russian communication with the Caucasus, all down the line southeast to Baku, back to Tiflis and Batum, westward to Ekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, and Odessa, north to Kiev. Likewise she describes the Revolution of 1905 starting with the strike at the Putilov plant in St. Petersburg. Both accounts clearly imply industrial if not technical explanation as well. But (against Parvus) she refused to recognize it, emphasized “spontaneous uprising of the masses,” denounced “the technical side, the mechanism of the mass strike,” by which she meant any organization of it, and insisted that only a labor movement of “‘disorganized’ revolutionary action” could be “natural.”356 As she collapsed the industrial into the political, she mistook strategic industrial action possibly of political importance as impulsive, inevitable, exclusively political action.

356 Against Bernstein’s argument, e.g., Rosa Luxemburg, “Die englische Brille [1899],” Gesammelte Werke, I/I, 471-482, where she quotes the Webbs on “strategic position,” 479; idem, “Eine taktische Frage
When the SPD’s conflict between its revolutionaries and the General Commission grew nastier in 1907, Kautsky kept trying ideologically to hold the factions together. In 1908-09, insisting that the proletariat should not shrink “even from extra-parliamentary means” to win all it could from parliament, he argued that struggles between the unions and big business were growing so “gigantic” that they “may convulse the whole society, the whole state, influence governments and parliaments….ESpecially “in branches of industry that business associations dominate and that are of importance in all economic life,” strikes have “an ever more a political character.” Besides, “ever more often…in purely political struggles,…the weapon of the mass strike yields rich results.” That unions had “ever more political tasks….is the valid core of the Latin countries’ syndicalism.” But he did not even hint at a strategic analysis, for industrial or political conflicts.

In 1910 Marxists had their best chance yet to conceive workers’ industrial power in explicitly strategic terms. Confronting Luxemburg in a then highly tense dispute over using “the mass strike” to win democratic suffrage in Prussia, Kautsky introduced “from military science” Delbrück’s distinction between “the strategy of overthrow” and “the strategy of exhaustion”; indeed, without citing his source, he copied Delbrück’s definitions verbatim for his readers. Ermattung, “exhausting” the enemy, wearing it out, he proclaimed, was the strategy Engels in his “political testament” (the “Introduction” to *Class Struggles in France*) had 15 years ago advised German Socialists to follow against “the ruling system.” If “overthrow” had once (back in the 1860s!) been the SPD’s “strategy,” “exhaustion” had long served better, and thereby the party was approaching “victory.” Luxemburg’s spontaneous “mass strikes,” he argued, were a dangerous reversion, for involving as they did improvised street demonstrations, maybe even a

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[1899],” ibid., I/1, 483-486; idem, “Die ‘wirtschaftliche Macht’ [1899].” ibid., I/1, 493-496. Her only other “strategic” observation at that time was geo-political: Luxemburg to Jogiches, January 9, 1899, in Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Briefe*, 6 vols. (Berlin: Dietz, 1982-93), I, 249. On Russia, Rosa Luxemburg, *Massenstreik, Partei und Gewerkschaften* (Hamburg: Erdmann Dubber, 1906), 12-18, 22, 35, 38-44, 46. “Strategic” was still a rare word in her vocabulary then, which she used only in a political or military connection: idem, “Eine Probe aufs Exempel [1905],” *Gesammelte Werke*, I/2, 532; idem, “In revolutionärer Stunde: Was weiter? [1906],” ibid., II, 28.

357 Karl Kautsky, “Maurenbrecher und das Budget,” *Die Neue Zeit*, XXVII/1, 2 (October 9, 1908), 45; idem, *Der Weg zur Macht: Politische Betrachtungen über das Hineinwachsen in die Revolution*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Vorwärts, 1910), 87. The SPD executive committee forbade distribution of more than the first copies of the first edition of this pamphlet in December 1908, because of its “revolutionary” language, which the committee feared might cause judicial action against Kautsky and the party’s publishing company. After Kautsky made “minimal changes” in the text and added that the views therein were his alone, the pamphlet reappeared in March 1909. Against “the fathers,” i.e., the executive committee, Luxemburg privately cheered his “victory,” without comment on the pamphlet’s substance: Luxemburg to Clara Zetkin, “after March 21.” 1909, in *Gesammelte Briefe*, III, 12-13. 
Zwangstreik, forcing businesses to shut down, threatening the Junkers, they would lead to “decisive” battles that the SPD might well lose. Between anarchist provocations and revisionist submission, he argued, “exhaustion” should remain the SPD’s strategy until obviously just the right time for the decisive blow, “to save our powder” for the last “big battle,” by which time mass action would be so obviously overwhelming that it might no longer be necessary. But like Luxemburg he had collapsed the industrial entirely into the political. Throughout his thoroughly “strategic” argument Kautsky pointed to power only in the government, parties, and the masses. In response Luxemburg charged ahead, blasting the “strategy of exhaustion,” recalling successes, e.g., lately in Russia, in “the incessant alternation…of economic and political action,” urging against formally staged performances “battle after battle right now…, struggle all along the line.” She wrote not just polemically, but as if at home in specifically “strategic” terms, and at the end invoked against Kautsky’s “military science” the mighty Mommsen on “Kriegsführung,” against “procrastination,” for the offensive. And (as before) she often specified industrial districts and workers. But still most keen on “the mass movement” in all its “feelings of strength” and “joy in struggle,” she made no connection between “strategy” and using industrial (much less technical) positions to advance the political movement.

Kautsky gave her back a strategically more interesting argument. “Mass strikes” had led to revolution in Russia in 1905 because the Russian government had already become “the world’s weakest government,” incapable of ruling its vast territory because of “deficient means of communication,” and stuck in a losing war (with Japan). Strikes in different places split the government’s forces, keeping the Czardom in constant turmoil for a year, until “the huge movement swelled up into a storm that hit the entire

358 Karl Kautsky, “Was nun?” Die Neue Zeit, XXVII/2, 28 (April 8, 1910), 33-40; and XXVII/2, 29 (April 15, 1910), 68-80; the quotations, 37-39, 69, 77, 80. He may have thought of resorting to Delbrück just then because of Luxemburg’s off-hand reference to “the means and strategy of the wider struggle” in her article in the Arbeiter-Zeitung, Dortmund, March 14-15, 1910: Rosa Luxemburg, “Was weiter? [1910],” in Gesammelte Werke, II, 292. Her letters at the time hold no hint of why after four years of not writing the word she now wrote “strategy.” E.g., Luxemburg to Clara Zetkin, March 7, 1910, in Gesammelte Briefe, III, 119-121. On the origins of the debate, see also Luxemburg to Haenisch, “before March 14,” 1910; idem to Luise Kautsky, March 17, 1910; idem to Jogiches, “after March 17,” 1910; idem to Jogiches, “after March 22,” 1910; idem to Jogiches, “after March 25,” 1910; idem to Clara Zetkin, “probably April 9,” 1910, ibid., III, 123-136. Kautsky may have started reading Delbrück’s Geschichte as early as 1900, when the first volume appeared, with the Niederwerfung-/Ermattung distinction. He must have had it in recent memory from Franz Mehring, “Eine Geschichte der Kriegskunst,” Ergänzungsheta zur Neuen Zeit, No. 4 (October 16, 1908), 11-13, 23, 31, 46.

359 Rosa Luxemburg, “Ermattung oder Kampf?” ibid., XXVII/2, 35 (May 27, 1910), 257-266; and XXVII/2, 36 (June 3, 1910), 291-305; the quotations, 262-264, 292-297, 302-305.
empire at the same time.” In contrast he described Prussia, with “the strongest government of the time,”
boasting a large, peerlessly disciplined army and bureaucracy, backed by a class of exploiters, the Junkers,
“of a force and brutality the likes of which are rare,” and supported by “great masses of peasants and petty
bourgeois.” The Russian strikes could be (as he thought they were) “amorphous, primitive,” and successful,
but strikes in Germany and Western Europe at large had better be “rational.” The question was not if the
German workers could strike as Luxemburg urged, but whether in their right mind they should. It would be
“much more difficult” in Germany than it had been in Russia “to bring about a…strike…that changed the
whole urban landscape and thus made the deepest impression on the collective bourgeois world as well as
on the most indifferent levels of the proletariat… In view of the iron discipline in the big national,
municipal, and private monopolies and…the strict connection of the government and capital [all across
Western Europe], it is unthinkable that among us in a strike to demonstrate against the government the
metropolitan railways, the tramways, the gasworks would come to a standstill.” Because the tremendous
centralization of capital and development of communications in Germany had also tremendously
strengthened proletarian organization there, struggles between German business and labor were gaining
momentum, but happening ever less often. “One does not conduct outpost skirmishes with heavy artillery.”
He imagined for his readers how “the last, highest…decisive test of strength” between the proletariat and
the state would go: “The [political] mass strike works by forcing the national executive authority into an
extraordinary deployment of power and at the same time disabling as much as possible its means of power.
This it does through its very massiveness.” Only after the (Socialist-declared) strike spreads from big cities
to “out-of-the-way factories” and farm workers “on the big estates,” do gas and electric plants shut down
and metropolitan railways stop running. And only then are “the post office and railroads seized by strike
fever; next shop workers strike, then younger shop clerks,” and so on. It was an operation both hard to win
and unnecessary. Kautsky advised Luxemburg to read Delbrück: his own “strategy of exhaustion,” he
claimed, was “the totality of the Social-Democratic proletariat’s praxis from the late [18-]sixties to date.”
This was to use “everything that disorganizes our enemy and undermines its authority as well as its feelings
of strength, equally everything that organizes the proletariat, lifts its views and its feelings of strength,
improves the confidence of the popular masses in their organizations.” It included “not merely
parliamentary politics,” but also “wage movements and street demonstrations.” It did not include the mass
strike, “an elementary event, whose occurrence one does not bring about as one pleases, it being an event one may expect, but cannot determine.” Whatever chance he had initially given himself to bring (Parvus’s) industrially strategic points to bear in Delbrück’s “strategic” terms, he had blown.

Luxemburg tore into his argument, mainly into the contradiction between his “strategy of exhaustion” and his “theory” of mass action. Precisely because of “the high development” of capitalism in Russia, particularly in “modern means of communication,” the mass strikes there “achieved their deeply shaking, decisive effect.” Against Kautsky’s claim that mass strikes in the West were in decline, she listed 24 in the last 10 years, 14 of them in mining, machining, railroads, postal systems. She mocked his illusion that strikers could not shut down a West European city: a general strike in Genoa in 1904 had left the city “three full days…without light, bread, or meat.” She explained her “‘strategy’” (sic, ironically, in quotes): “Not the childish Don Quixotery” Kautsky expected of her, “but making the most politically of the enemy’s defeats as well as our own victories, which anyway is not so much the discovery of some ‘new strategy’ as rather the ABC of any revolutionary, even any serious, fighting tactic…. ” She agreed with him that mass strikes could not happen on the party’s command, by plan. But neither were they “elementary,” natural, like a change in the weather, for the party merely to expect, or await. They came “from the masses and their progressive action.” Whatever chance Kautsky had given her to think “strategically” of strategic industrial strikes, she had blown.

Kautsky countered with rhetorical evasions, drifting to different questions, but finally returned to the industrial-military metaphor/junction. He came close to agreeing with Luxemburg, then passed her:

“The political mass strike is a result of the proletariat’s lack of political rights. But on the other hand the political mass strike presupposes, like every mass strike, a certain high degree of economic development, transportation, capitalist concentration. The more capitalism develops, so the more massive individual strikes are, the more multitudinous mass strikes are, but also the fewer the number of strikes overall are.

And the greater the dimensions of a strike, the more important economically the body of striking workers is

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360 Karl Kautsky, “Eine neue Strategie,” ibid., XXVIII/2, 37 (June 10, 1910), 332-341; XXVIII/2, 38 (June 17, 1910), 364-374; and XXVIII/2, 39 (June 24, 1910), 412-421; the quotations, 366-370, 374, 412-413, 418-419, 421. Luxemburg had not yet read Delbrück’s “Kriegsgeschichte,” which she asked Clara Zetkin’s son then to send her: Luxemburg to Konstantin Zetkin, June 21, 1910, in Gesammelte Briefe, III, 179.

for society as a whole, so the more the purely economic strike touches the state, insofar as it takes on a political character and exercises pressure on the state in a socio-political sense.” Here he could have integrated Parvus and Delbrück (maybe even Bernstein’s technical insight) into a Marxist theory of strategic industrial action, or framed a Marxist strategy for industrial operations. But he did not. He concluded, “When the right moment for the mass strike has come, when it is a matter no longer of putting on the brakes, but rather of putting oneself at the head of the assault, that [moment] theory cannot define a priori, anymore than military science can tell the field commander a priori when in the battle the moment has come for decisive attack.” In the end he could not tell strategy from tactics in any field, much less conceptualize operations.362

She pursued his rhetorical maneuvers, correcting his corrections of her interpretations of Engels on the question of a republic in Germany, without a strategic concern or a word of “strategy.” And he closed the debate likewise, more quotations from Engels, nothing from Delbrück. He tried one last distinction to clarify his disagreement with her: “…I hold the combination of union action and political action under certain conditions to be useful, yes, inevitable, and I assume that these conditions occur more easily the stronger the proletariat and its organizations are. …the combination of the struggle for political rights with the struggle for better working conditions in a joint action, I hold on the contrary to be wrong, and all the more so, the more developed political and union organization is. Comrade Luxemburg on the other hand thinks both [combinations]…are equally necessary and useful”; worse, she “simply identifies” them. In brief he would handle only one campaign at a time, stick to tactics, and forgo strategy, whereas she would (as she herself had urged) rush into any class conflict anywhere anytime anyway possible. To his formulation of their difference she did not object.363

A sweet opportunity for Kautsky to give some sharp lessons in industrial strategy opened two years later. Dutch Socialism’s most fervent advocate of the mass strike launched a polemic against Kautsky’s “passive radicalism,” theorizing a “spirit of organization” in the proletariat, a “moving soul,” that would free it from parties and unions and move it ultimately to “annihilate” the bourgeoisie and “all its

362 Karl Kautsky, “Zwischen Baden und Luxemburg,” ibid., XXVIII/2, 45 (August 5, 1910), 652-667; the quotation, 666.
power.”364 Fittingly, Pannekoek left not a hint even between the lines to suggest the realm in which the ghost would work its will, or the material means it would use for enforcement. Kautsky read in this gospel “the exact train of thought of the syndicalists,” although without the “syndicates” (unions). He could have given Pannekoek a most theoretical and compelling materialist explanation of just how syndicalists (sometimes) used industrial positions to remarkable advantage, to explain then how parteilos they could not stick together as the spirit moved them. Instead, ignoring the proletarian stake in industrial strategy, he left the issue in political ideology.365

Reviewing at book-length in February 1914 the SPD’s long debate on the mass political strike, Kautsky recalled Parvus’s original argument as “still worth reading.” He quoted considerably from it, as he did from numerous others that had built the controversy. Mostly he quoted himself. He repeated his old, ominous indication of railroads’ strategic importance, not just for a national economy but for national security, why railroad workers were “under an ever stricter discipline,” and the thesis that strikes mattered insofar as they caused “disorganization.” He reiterated his polemics against unions and Socialists aversive to strikes because of their political repercussions. Most remarkably, he quoted his plagiarism of Delbrück on “overthrow” and “exhaustion,” the latter the strategy he still thought Engels had bequeathed to Socialism. (He did not quote his advice to Luxemburg to read Delbrück.) At last he reflected on the SPD’s latest discussion of the mass political strike. At the 1913 party conference the executive committee and various dissidents proposed resolutions on the question. The differences were all on the conditions in which such a strike would made sense, the executive committee stipulating that conditions be “perfect,” Luxemburg that they be “as perfect as possible,” others that they be at least favorable. No one spoke of how to make the strike; Luxemburg and other dissidents premised only that the struggle’s “center of gravity [Schwerpunkt]” be “in the action of the masses.” Kautsky leaned in Luxemburg’s direction, but felt convinced they would first need “huge, powerful events that far beyond our party’s reach out there stir up

364 Anton Pannekoek, “Massenaktion und Revolution,” ibid., XXX/2, 41 (July 12, 1912), 541-550; idem, “Marxistische Theorie und revolutionäre Taktik,” ibid., XXXI/1, 8 (November 22, 1912), 272-281; XXXI/1, 10 (December 6, 1912), 365-373.
365 Karl Kautsky, “Der jüngste Radikalismus,” ibid., XXXI/1, 12 (December 20, 1912), 436-446; quotations, 441, 444.
the entire population and leave it in the wildest movement.”

In 1918 Kautsky condemned the “anarcho-syndicalist demand” for workers’ control in Russian industry as destructive: “The factory cannot be in operation a single day without supplies from other operations…. Absent the raw-material producers, the mines, or the transportation system, then the factory too fails.” But he did not develop an industrial analysis of Russian (or other) developments, then or later.

The first of the new European Communists I have found who wrote of Communist “strategy” was not Luxemburg, or Karl Liebknecht, or any other unforgettable figure. He was a German Socialist schoolteacher who despised German unions and the SPD. Once an SPD deputy, once a Spartakist, a founding member of the KPD, expelled therefrom like many other “true socialists” for “anarcho-syndicalism,” and with other truehearts (inspired by Pannekoek) founding the “federative,…councilist” KAPD, Otto Rühle believed that the proletariat truly acted for spontaneous, conscious, absolutely free reasons. For the “Frankfurt local group” of such communists in late 1919 he wrote a pamphlet giving the new party’s line, including “its strategy and tactics.” But neither in the KAPD nor in its new IWW-like General Workers’ Union did Rühle or any of his comrades in violation of their principles act strategically or write strategic criticism or plans, for political or industrial conflicts.

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366 Idem, Der politische Massenstreik: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Massenstreikdiskussionen innerhalb der deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Berlin: Vorwärts Paul Singer, 1914), 32-37, 67-103, 127-128, 211-213, 224-245, 255-281, 288-302; quotations, 32, 92-94, 228-232, 234, 292-294, 299. Besides his veiled references to Delbrück, Kautsky here writes “strategy” but one other time, and at that Ermattungsstrategie, and (I think) only to show his authority: ibid., 301. Meanwhile Luxemburg still but rarely used the word, then off-hand, only politically or militarily, not for analysis, only for analogy: Rosa Luxemburg, “Unsere Aktion gegen die Militärvorlage [1913],” in Gesammelte Werke, III, 231; “Taktische Fragen [1913],” ibid., III, 257; “Die Bilanz von Zabern [1914],” ibid., III, 367. Other young SPDers then not only misread Parvus, but learned nothing from the Kautsky-Luxemburg debate, e.g., the Pole Karl Berngardovich Sobelsohn, aka Karl Radek, Der deutsche Imperialismus und die Arbeiterklasse (Bremen: Bürger-Zeitung, 1912), 70-76.


Before the Red October of 1917 almost no major Russian-oriented Russian Marxist (in exile or in Russia) publicly discussed industrial workers’ power at work. Plekhanov, although he had studied mining, I have not found ever writing concretely of anything industrial or technical. Having also attended military schools, he wrote often of working-class or proletarian or Socialist “tactics,” but nearly always as a matter
of timing, and always in partisan political conflicts. To my knowledge he put the word “strategy,” into print only once, and then consciously confused it with tactics. From his pen the words “strategists” (actually “arch-strategists”) and “strategic” also came into print, but each, I believe, again only once, and again about politics. For his theory of “industrial crises” Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskii foreshadowed a concept of strategic industries, and in his study of Russian industrialization he clearly implied which they were, railroads, mining, and metallurgy, but did not explore capitalist vulnerability to organized labor there. By the time he turned to the question of Macht between capitalists and workers, he thought less of Marx than he did of the Webbs, and did not address the question in production. Like Plekhanov, Martov wrote often of “tactics,” never in an industrial battle, always in partisan political terms; only once (to my knowledge) did he write “strategy,” in German in 1910, lifting Ermattungsstrategie from Kautsky (Delbrück) to deny it had entered anyone’s head in Russia in 1905. Close to Parvus, Trotsky after 1905 wrote much about Russia’s industrially strategic places, positions, and

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371 Idem, “O taktike voobshche, o taktike nikolaevskogo generala Reada v chastnosti i o taktike B. Krichevskogo v osobennosti [1901],” ibid., XII, 126.

372 Idem, “Pis’ma o taktike [1906],” ibid., XV, 127, 130, where the “arch-strategists” are the Bolsheviks; and idem, “Dve linii revoliutsii.” Prizyv, October 17, 1915, 4, “a huge strategic mistake” in partisan politics.


374 Idem, Soziale Theorie der Verteilung (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1913), 21, 27-34, 41-47, 82.

workers, but too sweepingly, urgently, erratically, and indiscriminately even to imply an industrial or technical argument.\textsuperscript{376} In 1910 he (before Martov) jumped into the wake of the Kautsky-Luxemburg exchange, regardless of strategy and immune to the word.\textsuperscript{377} Zinoviev wrote some articles about “tactics,” many about labor movements, but rarely about both in the same piece, and never (that I can find) of labor’s positions of strength or its strategy in production (or of any “strategy” in any field).\textsuperscript{378} Kamenev, son of a railroad engineer, himself having organized railroad strikes in 1903-05, wrote many articles about “tactics,” some about labor movements, but only once about “tactics” in labor movements, never of strategy there (or “strategy” elsewhere either).\textsuperscript{379} And neither about theory nor about practice did the scholarly Bukharin then think strategically or tactically, or have the words “strategy” or “strategic” or “tactics” or “tactical” printed.\textsuperscript{380} Lenin, who best understood what he wanted, always thought strategically. But he rarely used “strategic” terms, then only about politics, or armed conflict. Not until his fourth publication, quoting a Narodnik enemy, did he write of a “main strategic point” in Russian peasant politics.\textsuperscript{381} From his own study of modern Russian economic history, maybe too from reading Parvus (as he did), he early gained a good idea which industries in his country mattered most, but he did not express a strategic conception of them, much less call them “strategic.”\textsuperscript{382} He and his closest comrade translated \textit{Industrial Democracy} in 1898-99.


\textsuperscript{378} On labor’s “tactics” all I could find are Grigorii Y. Zinov’ev, “‘Ekonomika’ i ‘politika’ [1912],” \textit{Sochineniiia}, 16 vols. in 17 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1923-26), III, 280, 282; idem, “Novye takticheskie debaty v germanskoj sotsial-demokratii [1913],” \textit{ibid.}, IV, 261-264; idem, “Itoji i perspektivy [1914],” \textit{ibid.}, IV, 511; idem, “Poslednii lokaut i teoriia ‘stachechnogo azarta [1914],’” \textit{ibid.}, IV, 540-541.

\textsuperscript{379} L. B. Kamenev, “Chastichnye trebovania i revoliutsionnaia bor’ba [1913],” in idem, \textit{Mezhdu dvumia revoliutsiiami: sbornik statei} (Moscow: Novaia Moskva, 1923), 511.


\textsuperscript{381} V.I. Lenin, “Ekonomicheskoe soderzhanie narodnichestva i kritika ego v knige g. Struve (otrazhenie marksizma v burzhuaznoi literature [The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve’s Book (1895)],” \textit{Polnoe sobranie sochinenii}, 5\textsuperscript{th} ed., 55 vols.+3 index (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Političeskoii Literatury, 1958-70), I, 379.

\textsuperscript{382} Idem, “Chto takoe ‘Druz’ia Naroda’ i kak oni vozvut protiv sotsial-demokratov? [What the ‘Friends of the People’ Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats (1894)],” \textit{ibid.}, I, 178; idem, “Razvitie
but did not adopt the Webbs’ (Marshallian) language on "strategic position" or "strategic strength" in the labor market. He could well have analyzed Russia’s industrially strategic linkages in the great strikes of 1902-05. But if he did, he never wrote anything (yet published) about them, probably because of his concentration on the strikes’ political significance. Like Luxemburg, when he wrote of these strikes, e.g., at Rostov, he described them spreading simply by “solidarity,” as if through the masses’ ether, or by a proletarian telepathy.  

In 1905 he made his first use of the military terms, the first Russian Marxist to use them in earnest. But he used them literally, still in the classical, Clausewitzian sense, i.e., “strategic railways” and “naval and military strategy” in the Russo-Japanese War, the army’s “strategic task” against the crowds in St. Petersburg, or with just a slight shift for his party’s “strategic move” or “strategy” regarding national elections. In this revolutionary moment he also first got the industrial point quite right, if only by reporting it. “They all,” he wrote of the government in 1906, “point to the extreme importance of railroads in a general strike. The railroads stop, the strike has every chance to become general. You do not get a full stop of the railroads, and the strike almost certainly will not be general. But for railroaders it is especially hard to strike: punitive trains stand in full readiness; armed detachments of troops are deployed along the whole line, at the stations, sometimes even on separate trains. A strike under such conditions can mean--moreover in a majority of cases will inevitably mean--a direct and immediate clash with an armed force. The engineer, the telegrapher, the switchman, they will be put before a dilemma: be shot on the spot…or stay at work and break the strike. …out of a [railroad] strike inevitably, and not slowly either, will grow an armed uprising. A railroad strike is an uprising….without a railroad strike, the railroad telegraph does not stop, carrying letters by railroad is not interrupted, and impossible, consequently, is a postal and…


383 Idem, “Novye sobytia i starye voprosy [New Events and Old Questions (1902)],” ibid., VII, 61-62; idem, “Revoluiutionnye dni [Revolutionary Days (1905)],” ibid., IX, 220; idem, “Politicheskaia stachka i ulichnaia bor’ba v Moskve [The Political Strike and the Street Fighting in Moscow (1905)],” ibid., XI, 346-348; idem, “Vserossiiskaia politicheskaia stachka [The All-Russia Political Strike (1905)],” ibid., XII, 1-4.

telegraph strike of serious dimensions.”

But he did not develop his discovery into an industrially
powered revolutionary strategy.

The Kautsky-Luxemburg dispute in 1910 over proletarian “strategy” drew the word again from
him (in exile in Paris). He did not think through its politics to analyze proletarian industrial strengths.

From his own review of Russian revolutionary prospects he had already started this analysis, a strategic
study (without mentioning “strategy”) of Russian strike statistics to determine which workers were Russia’s
proletarian “vanguard,” and why. Counting incidence of strikes by industry and “branch,” he figured
metalworkers were most prone to strike, ergo the vanguard, among whom “the most important” strikers
were engineering, shipbuilding, and foundry workers. And given his sources, he gave a good explanation:
“The general rule throughout these years [1895-1908] is that as the size of the establishments [the number
of workers at a plant] increases, there is an increase in the percentage of establishments in which strikes
occurred.” Metallurgical plants, like Putilov, were biggest, i.e., had most workers, and therefore suffered
the most “repeated strikes,” because, he argued, such big congregations of workers made it easier to bring
“new recruits into the movement.” And again like Luxemburg he argued that these strikes spread because
of the vanguard’s “energy in… ‘stirring up’ the entire mass.”

His explanation was, however, too willful. Recruitment and agitation were surely effective, but they were not all that happened, maybe not as
important as strategic calculation between vanguard and mass. The material reason for so many strikes at
big metallurgical plants anywhere in the world then was not their size, but (as Bernstein had shown in
1906) their technical division of labor; bigness indicated the technologically disjointed complex typical
among them then, a coordination of labor easy to disrupt. And the material reason strikes at such places led
to strikes at others (as Parvus had shown in 1896) was that without their products plants in other modern
industries had to stop production. In exile Lenin occasionally returned to his (largely correct) judgment on

385 Idem, “Rospusk dumy i zadachi proletariata [The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the
Proletariat (1906)],” ibid., XIII, 316-317.

386 Lenin entered the dispute only to refute Martov (and Trotsky), and only in quoting Kautsky,
Luxemburg, and Martov (quoting Kautsky [Delbrück]) did he write the word. Idem, “Istoricheskai smysl’
vnutripartinoi bor by v Rossi [The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia (1910)],”
ibid., XIX, 367. Cf. F. Karski, “Ein Missverständnis,” Die Neue Zeit, XXIX/1, 4 (October 28, 1910), 101-
102; Lenin to Tyszka [Jogiches], March 28, 1910, in Lenin, Polnoe sobranie, XLVII, 242-243; Lenin to
Marchlewski [Karski], October 7, 1910, ibid., XLVII, 272-273; idem to Radek, October 9, 1910, ibid.,
XLVII, 266-267; idem, “Dva mira [Two Worlds (1910)],” ibid., XX, 18; idem to Kautsky, January 31,
1911, ibid., LIV, 354-356.

metalworkers as the vanguard. But he did not develop his argument technically or industrially. When he wrote (as he often did) “strategy,” “strategist,” “strategic,” “strategically,” his usage remained Clausewitzian, political or military.

So far as I can tell, only Stalin among the Russians in those years addressed the technical and industrial questions of workers’ power at work, and spelled out an answer. Having learned from Tiflis Central Railway shopworkers how to organize, himself having organized strikes at Batum refineries and in the Baku oil fields, and directed “military-technical” operations in Baku in 1905, he explained strategic positions in 1906-07, slipping into functionalism, not writing “strategic,” but making the point. In “big capitalist production,…..each and every worker of every shop is closely connected by work with the comrades in his own shop, but just as much so with the other shops. It is enough to stop in any shop, and the workers of the entire factory are left without anything to do… And so it happens not only in individual factories, but also in entire branches of production and among them: it is enough for railroad workers to

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strike, and production finds itself in a difficult position; enough for the production of oil or coal to stop, and
after a little while entire factories and plants close down."  

Once the October insurrection began Lenin quickly dealt with workers’ power over production. In private he asked technically and industrially strategic questions of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee, managed preparations for the seizure of Russia’s then most strategic place, Moscow junction, and once in command kept as tight a rein as he could on the railroad union. During “War Communism” (1918-21) conflicts between the proletariat’s dictatorship and its unions were terrific, above all in transportation, largely because the People’s Commissariat of Labor practically belonged to the industrially most strategic unions. In various public declarations Lenin made no bones about the vital importance of the railroad workers to the Russian economy and the Soviet government. “If the trains stop,” he told Moscow railroaders in February 1920, “that’s the ruin of the proletarian centers,” i.e., the end of the revolutionary vanguard, now supposed to lead production. He told a mine workers’ congress a couple of months later, their work was “exceptionally important for the Soviet Republic. …without the coal industry there would not be any modern industry…. Coal--this really is industry’s bread; without this bread industry stands idle; without this bread railroad transportation is condemned to the most pitiful situation, and there is no way it can be restored; without this bread big industry in all countries falls apart.” In March 1921 he told a transport workers’ congress, “…on the work of this part of the proletariat more immediately than on its

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393 Idem, “Rech’ na I Vserossiiskom uchreditel’nom s’ezde gornorabochikh [Speech at the First Founding All-Russian Congress of Mineworkers (April 1, 1920)],” ibid., XL, 292.
other parts depends the fate of the revolution. We have to restore circulation between agriculture and industry, and to restore it a material support is necessary. What is the material support for the connection between industry and agriculture? It is transport by rail and water ways."

But he did not yet represent the industrial struggle in “strategic” terms. When he wrote “strategy” and its relatives, he still meant them as Clausewitz had meant them.

In 1920, for example, preparing the Second Comintern Congress, he missed a sweet opportunity to teach industrial “strategy” to the KAPD’s alleged “anarcho-syndicalists.” To their (or Rühle’s) pamphlet on the KAPD’s “strategy and tactics” for Germany’s revolution, which included leading workers out of their unions into “councils” and a “general union,” Lenin responded with The Childhood Disease of Leftism..., originally subtitled “Attempt at a Popular Conversation on Marxist Strategy and Tactics.”

From Russian Communist experience by then he could have given the KAPD compelling materialist lessons on how to

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394 Idem, “Rech’ na Vserossiiskom s’ezde transportnykh rabochikh 17 marta 1921 g. [Speech at the All-Russia Congress of Transport Workers (March 27, 1921)],” ibid., XLIII, 143.
395 Idem, “Zakliuchitel’ noe slovo po politicheskomy otechetu tsentral’nogo komiteta 8 marta [Reply to the Debate on the Political Report of the Central Committee (March 8, 1918)],” ibid., XXXVI, 29, 34; idem, “Vystupleniia protiv popravok Trotskogo k resolutsii o voine i mire 8 marta [Speeches Against Trotsky’s Amendments to the Resolution on War and Peace (March 8, 1918)],” ibid., XXXVI, 37; idem, “Rech’ o godovshchine revoliutsii 6 noiabre [Speech on the Anniversary of the Revolution (November 6, 1918)],” ibid., XXXVII, 138; idem, “Doklad ob otoshenii proletariata k melkoburzhuarznoi demokrati [Report on the Attitude of the Proletariat to Petty-Bourgeois Democrats (November 27, 1918)],” ibid., XXXVII, 218; Lenin to Trotsky, January 3, 1919, ibid., L, 235; Lenin to Trotsky, January 24, 1919, ibid., L, 248; idem, “Zakliuchitel’ noe slovo po dokladu Vserossiiskogo tsentralnogo ispolnitel’nogo komiteta o voens Pushchur [Speech at a Meeting of the Members of the German, Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Italian Delegations (July 11, 1921)],” ibid., XLIV, 59-60. Cf. “lavirovanie, tacking, veering,” in idem, “Pis’mo k amerikanskim rabochim,” ibid., XXXVII, 56, and “stratagem,” in idem, “Letter to American Workers (August 20, 1918)],” Collected Works, XXVIII, 67.
396 Idem, “Detskaia bolez’ levizny’ v kommunizme [The Childhood Disease of ‘Leftism’ in Communism],” Polnoe sobranie, XLI, 1-90, 480-482 (quotations, 7, 23). Cf. idem, “‘Left-Wing’ Communism--An Infantile Disorder,” Collected Works, XXX, 25, 40, 539; and there “ulovki, trick,” is “stratagem,” ibid., XXX, 46. Cf. Lenin’s earlier, “strategy”-less explanation to an English comrade, idem to Pankhurst, August 28, 1919, Polnoe sobranie, XXXIX, 160-166; his criticism of Bukharin’s “Left Communist” opposition the year before, idem, “O ‘levom’ rebiachestve i o melkoburzhuaznostvi [Left-Wing’ Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality [1918]],” ibid., XXXVI, 283-314; and Kautsky’s criticism of “rank worker-socialists,” who wanted “the immediate, complete overthrow of the existing order” and saw any other “form of class struggle” as “a betrayal of the cause of mankind,” their “train of thought” being “a childhood disease [eine Kinderkrankheit],” which threatens every young proletarian-socialist movement that has not yet reached beyond utopianism”: Kautsky, Das Erfurter Programm, 237-238.
reorganize workers in the use of “strategic” industrial positions for revolution, to explain then how only a principled and disciplined party could make the revolution stick. Instead, typically, he cut the subtitle, ignored industrial power, and kept entirely to “political strategy and tactics.”

Through the Soviet turn from production for war to production in peace, Lenin came to conceptualize two strategic integrations in production, one technical and political, the other of the economy and revolutionary security. Had he contemplated their connection, he might have thought up a general Marxist theory of the transition to socialism. But it was his Communist practice that evoked the concepts, and directed their evolution. A crisis in the party opening at a national conference of unions in November 1920 demanded that he focus on the question of “unions’ tasks in production.” Trotsky, having recently imposed official control over the railroad union and others in transportation, had told the conference the government should put all unions under administrative orders for production, and urged the party’s central committee to support administrative appointment of unions’ executive officers. At a special party caucus in December Lenin against Trotsky gave his view of the post-war proletarian dictatorship and the “extraordinarily original” part unions had in it. A union now was “not a state organization, it is an educational, training, formative [vospitatel’naia] organization....” To explain, he described for the first time the “mechanism” at the dictatorship’s “very base,” “a complex system of several gearwheels” that ran on “several ’drives’ from the avant-garde [the party] to the mass of the advanced class [the proletariat], and from it to the mass of working people [the peasantry].” Capitalism in Russia had left “an extraordinary complexity of drives” in class relations, and the party now had to “connect” with the unions to “win over” the working masses, “to adjust the complex drives...for realization of the proletariat’s dictatorship.”

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397 Idem, “O professional’nykh soiuzakh, o tekushchem momente i ob oshibkah t. Trotskogo. Rech’ na soedinennom zasedanii delegatov VIII s’ezda Sovietov, chlenov VTsSPS i MGSPS—chlenov RKP (b), 30 dekabria 1920 g. [The Trade Unions, the Present Situation, and Trotsky’s Mistakes..., December 30, 1920],” Polnoe sobranie, XLII, 202-226 (quotations, 203-207). Cf. idem, “Eshchë raz o profsoiuzakh, o tekushchem momente i ob oshibkah t. Trotskogo i Bukharina [Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current Situation, and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin (January 25, 1921)],” ibid., XXLII, 296. For Lenin’s initial “’privodov’” (“drives,” or “drive wheels,” or “drive gears”) and later “privodnyi remni” (“drive belts”) the standard English translation of Lenin has “transmission belts” and “transmission system.” Actually “privodnyi remni” are “drive belts” or “transmission belts,” i.e., the same things. A drive belt transmits power from a drive wheel to a driven wheel. I write “drive” to try to express better what people who knew ordinary machines in 1920 meant, and to avoid the confusion of “transmission.” In mechanical ignorance many now believe a transmission belt is (what it is not) a conveyor belt, which confusion has distorted some interpretations of Lenin’s meaning here, and in fact would make a mess anywhere. For the difference between transmission and conveyance, cf. a fan belt and a supermarket.
the party’s next congress, in March 1921, he as much as admitted “a mistake” with the transport unions, and insisted the party (through unions) “restore mutual understanding and mutual trust” with the proletariat. He did not explain the mutuality, just declared it imperative. “We have to convince people whatever it may cost at the beginning,” he said, and only if that failed, “force them.”

In October, coming out of the turn, explaining the New Economic Policy, he discussed the economy for the first time “strategically.” The great struggle now was between two powers, capitalism and the proletarian state, he said, and Communists had to think about it in military terms; his clearest “comparison” was the Japanese operation against Port Arthur in 1905. In economic reports and speeches then he referred to “strategic retreat,” “strategy” and “prepared positions,” “siege and sapping,” “revolutionary strategy” and the enemy’s “strategically correct” provocation, and to “a position we could grab--river, hill, marsh, this or that railroad station.”

January next he finally made the connection: “As the very best factory, with an excellent motor and first-class machines, will stand idle if there is damage to the drive mechanism from the motor to the machines, so a catastrophe in our socialist construction is inevitable if something is out of line or working wrong in the drive mechanism from the Communist party to the masses--the unions.”

Here he faced the general question (missing only “strategic”), how to design a socialist transmission, where technically to connect the political drive, how to maximize the tension to maximize the industrial energy transmitted, for collective labor power to work most productively and resolutely. But he lost the connection. He quit thinking of


Vladimir I. Lenin, “Reč’ o professional’nykh soyuzakh, 14 marta [Speech on the Trade Unions, March 14, 1921],” Polnoe sobranie, XLIII, 52-56 (quotation, 54).


Idem, “Proekt tezisov o roli i zadachakh profsoiuzov v usloviakh novoi ekonomicheskoi politiki [Draft Theses on the Role and Tasks of Unions under the New Economic Policy (December 30, 1921-January 4, 1922)],” ibid., XLIV, 341-353 (quotation, 349); Cf. idem, “Plany tezisov ‘o roli i zadachakh profsoiuzov v usloviakh novoi ekonomicheskoi politiki [Plans of the Theses ‘On the Role and Tasks of Unions under the Conditions of the New Economic Policy,’ December 28-30, 1921],’” ibid., XLIV, 494-500; and “Rol’ i zadachi profsoiuzov v usloviakh novoi ekonomicheskoi politiki (Odinnadtsatyi s’ezd RKP(b), 27 mart-a-2 aprileia 1922) [The Role and Tasks of Unions under the New Economic Policy],” in Institut Marksa-Engel’sa-Lenina-Stalina pri TsK KPSS, Kommunisticheskaiia partiiia Sovietskogo Soiuza v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniakh s’ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, 1898-1953, 7th ed. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1953), 603-612.
mechanisms, and rarely wrote of “strategy” anymore. Not for another year did he speak again about the NEP in strategic language, “retreat,” “go over to the offensive,” “all the commanding heights,” although without saying “strategic.” Even so, he had a drive in his macro-economic “dream” the last time he wrote the general’s word, in March 1923, “how I connect in my thoughts the general plan of our work, our policy, our tactics, our strategy, with the tasks of the reorganized Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate.”

Most of his Russian party comrades in power after 1917 came not nearly so close to the idea of industrially (or technically) strategic positions. Commissar of War Trotsky had of course continually to deal with unions, especially the railroad union. By January 1920 he was urging every effort to keep the railroads running. In March at the annual party congress, where he advocated outright labor’s “militarization,” he pressed hardest for the Communications commissariat’s special authority over transport workers, “the key to our entire position.” Appointed Communications commissar too, he received the requested authority. At a national congress of unions in April, demanding “compulsory labor” even in peacetime to make the transition to socialism, he remarked on “the need in the first place to get busy restoring transportation,” without which “our country will tear to shreds, and the working class dissolve into a peasantry.” As the second need he ranked “construction of transportation machinery.” In “that area…for us most important of all,” he declared most alarmingly, “the basic capital, the rolling-stock, the locomotives, is wearing out,” repairs could not make it last much longer, and imports were impossible. But he concluded most generally, calling for “the highest effort” of the whole working class. His seizure of

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401 Lenin to Bukharin and Zinoviev, February 1, 1922, *Polnoe sobranie*, XLIV, 377. This was political, in preparing negotiations with the resurrected Second International and the new Vienna International.


404 Leon Trotsky, “Osnovnye zadachi i trudnosti khoziaistvennogo stroitel’stva (doklad na zasedanii moskovskogo komiteta RKP[b], 6 ianvaria 1920 g.),” *Sochinenia*, 21 vols. (12 published) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1920-27), XV, 86-87; idem, “Khoziaistvennoe polozenie respubliki i osnovnye zadachi vosstanovleniia promishlennosti (Doklad na zasedanii fraktsii Vserossiiskogo Tsentral’nogo Soveta profsoiuzev, 12 ianvaria 1920 g.),” *ibid.*, XV, 32-33, 45, 50; idem, “Organizatsiia truda (Doklad na IX s’ezde RKP(b)) [March 30, 1920],” *ibid.*, XV, 129-163 (quotations, 129-134 passim, 162).

transport unions in September, as he proclaimed in November, again in December, suggested his program for labor at large, evidently a state administrative authority for each major industrial branch, each authority including state agents running the industry’s union. But even on his own terms he slipped between action ad hoc and theory on principle; he gave no sign of thinking political coercion into a strategy of industrial organization or development. Thereafter his strategic concerns swelled to grand, global geo-political dimensions. If (rarely) he approached an industrial struggle, he sailed past it toward “world revolution.”

Comintern Chairman Zinoviev continued to write much about labor, much more than before about labor’s tactics. And since the Comintern line (starting from Lenin’s attack on “leftism” in 1920) soon turned into the United Front, he had plenty reason to examine the proletariat’s industrial bases. But if he did so, he left no record of it. Closing the Comintern’s Third Congress in 1921, his executive committee foresaw Communism happening because of “the spontaneous upsurge of the vast majority of the [world’s] proletariat” (under Communist party leadership). It mentions in anticipation only one industrial action, a strike on (of course) railroads, which will stop the bourgeoisie from sending troops to crush the spontaneous upsurge. The committee warned that while the bourgeoisie had a “well thought-out strategy,” the proletariat “is only beginning to develop a strategy.” This, “a plan of action,” workers must have, because “a careful and intelligent proletarian strategy must be counterposed to the enemy’s strategy.” But the committee left no less than the great chain of Communist being then, “increasingly intense and extensive revolutionary agitation,” “clear and accessible slogans,” “experience in struggle,” as bases for the determination of a strategy. At the Comintern’s Fifth Congress in 1924, regarding labor, Zinoviev again urged “strategy.” Defending the United Front, denying popular mistrust of “a policy of maneuver that does

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not give immediate tangible results,” he declared, “Workers are not children. They know the class struggle is a war where you need strategy.” But he never (at least in public) explained its industrial or technical dimension.  

Radek, an SPD (pro-Luxemburg) veteran, having jumped to the Bolsheviks in 1917, took it for his Comintern mission to propagate a general strategy for socialist revolution and proletarian dictatorship. But even when the strategy (nominally) involved unions and strikes, it was all political. For example, introducing the Comintern’s first general report “On Tactics” at its Third Congress, he mentioned “anarcho-syndicalists,” “direct action,” and (of course) miners and railroaders, and explained the party’s duty “to raise the whole working class to the defense of the workers of any one branch of industry, and exactly the same, for workers fighting on a local scale, it must strive to get the proletariat of other industrial centers on their feet and marching. The experience of the revolution shows that the broader the battlefield, the bigger the hopes for victory.” But he omitted explanation of how to raise the support, or broaden the field.

Kamenev meanwhile, who knew the Russian railroad union at its most syndicalist and most aggressive, contributed nothing that I can find in print on its strategic positions or maneuvers.

Bukharin was the Bolshevik formally most qualified to develop the concept of proletarian industrial strategy. In 1919, in a theoretical defense of “proletarian dictatorship,” he wrote of the bourgeois state’s “considerations of strategy against oppressed classes (so called concessions under pressure from below)….“ Like Parvus, whose old argument Lenin (and he himself) had turned into substantial books during the war, he emphasized modern capitalism’s fractured, disparate, spasmodic conflicts, whence he

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could have taken the dialectic to proletarian strategy. But he did not. A year later, in a brilliant theoretical study of socialist “transformation,” backing Trotsky’s War Communism, he opened questions of “technical relations” of production, the “technical division of labor,” economic equilibrium, “expanded negative reproduction,” and coercion, all rich in suggestions of proletarian industrial power. He recalled Marx on “cooperation” and quoted him on the working class as “schooled, united, and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist productive process,” precisely to highlight a “decisive….fundamental” relationship, “that system of collaboration which is embodied in the relations of production between workers…..” He explained “the technical intelligentsia” and its strategic function in production. He tried to understand proletarian coercion as “self-organization and compulsory self-discipline.” And now and then he thought “strategic.” He wrote again of a state’s “strategic concessions to a class enemy, observed in “the process of social [socialist] transformation….the proletariat’s seizure of the economy’s strategic junctions,” and cited The Childhood Disease of ‘Leftism’ plus its subtitle “…Marxist strategy and tactics.” But he did not show industrial and technical imbalances in cooperation, the difference between function and position in production, or that “breaking [or maybe only slacking] the connections” in production could force a (tacit) bargain even on a proletarian dictatorship. What could have been a major step in the formulation of a Soviet doctrine of proletarian strategy, featuring industrial operations, did not happen.\(^{411}\)

Bukharin’s intervention in the uproar over the transport unions, a suddenly cogitated “workers’ democracy,” even “industrial democracy,” heralded loftier concerns.\(^{412}\) In 1921 he published his most ambitious opus, the Theory of Historical Materialism, “a general introductory manual of Marxist sociology.” Here he inflated historical materialism into a kind of materialist Durkheimian functionalism, in which “man’s connection in work,” or “social labor” in general, was “the fundamental condition for the possibility of the inner equilibrium of that system which is human society.” Disconnections at work did not appear. As an example

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\(^{412}\) N. Bukharin et al., “O zadachakh i strukture profsoyuzov [January 16, 1921],” in N.N. Popov, ed., Protokoly c’ezdov y konferentsi Vsecoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b): Desiatyi c’ezd RKP (b), mart 1921 g. (Moscow: Partinoe Izdatel’stvo, 1933), 801-804.
of dialectical differences between a class’s “enduring” and “momentary interests,” he gave “the proletariat’s most enduring and general interest in capitalist society…the destruction of the capitalist regime,” and “its partial interests…the conquest of strategic positions and…the undermining of bourgeois society.” But the “strategic” dimension of these positions and trenches (political, industrial, or other) was not simply indefinite, but indeterminable.

On Lenin’s death Bukharin praised him as a “strategist,” and wrote of his “strategy” as “applied Marxism,” but mostly in a political context, never in industrial conflicts. He also left a doubt about how Lenin had strategized, whether he did it after changes “in the objective sphere,” in response to them, in “adaptation to what is new,” or ahead of things and enemies, providing “leadership” to make objective conditions new.

Appointed Commissar of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate in 1919, Stalin soon knew more about the Soviet economy’s “strategic junctions” than anyone else in the world. He wrote little about them for the public record. His sense of them by January 1921 (the heat of War Communism cooling) comes only by implication, in his account of Trotsky’s and his disagreements on “the question of unions,” i.e., “strengthening labor discipline.” On balance, not simply in timing, but in general, he was by then against “forcing” workers, or, as he put it in parentheses, “(the military method);” he stood for “convincing” them “(the union method).” He criticized “compulsory” appeals to them, and urged instead raising their “initiative” to fight the new “economic danger (shortgage of locomotives and machinery for agriculture, textile mills, and metallurgical plants, shortage of equipment for electric power stations…).” And against Trotsky’s transport authority he defended the transport unions. In sum, he understood the country’s industrial fields, and would not battle but negotiate to command them.

Six months later he drafted a pamphlet on “Russian Communists’ political strategy and tactics,” drawn it seems from his lectures at Sverdlov University for party organizers. His examples were all from

414 Idem, Revoliutsionnyi teoretik (Leningrad: Gosudarstvenoe Izdaleza’stvo, 1924), 3; idem, Lenin as a Marxist (London: Communist Party of Gt. [sic] Britain, 1925), 50, 60-61, 63.
415 Joseph Stalin, “Nashi raznoglasnia [Our Disagreements, January 5, 1921], Sochineniia, V, 4-14 (quotations, 5, 8-11).
politics and war, not one from industry (not even railroads). But his conceptions of strategy and tactics were so abstract, first philosophical, then often in the discourse of a mechanical engineer’s manual, that they made sense for any field. To start, he explained where (he thought) strategy and tactics had no “application,” on “the objective side,” on “those processes of development that happen outside and around the proletariat independently of its will or its party’s” (e.g., until then, technological development?). The “area” for applying strategy and tactics was on “the subjective side,” on “those processes that happen inside the proletariat as the objective processes’ reflection in its consciousness.” In the highest consciousness, “Marxist theory,” the objective processes came clear in “their development and dying away” in each objective “period,” from one historic “breakthrough” to the next. If in a modern period the proletariat and its party correctly understood which class was rising, which falling, if they correctly deduced from theory the rising class’s (“in this case” the proletariat’s) “movement” and “target,” and if they correctly calculated all the objective and subjective forces in conflict, they would have a correct strategy (for that period) for defining “the general direction” of history’s (revolutionary) movement. Consequently, although they could not determine objective development, they could by their strategic “disposition of forces” and direction of them speed it up. (To many of his students such a lecture may well have sounded like a problem in vector analysis, in the composition and resolution of forces, finding a polygon of motion’s resultant.) Within a period, from battle to battle, their tactics might correctly change several times, even to seek losses, if these hastened strategic success (increased the proletariat’s velocity or shortened the distance to the breakthrough onto a new plane or into a new system of only its consciously controlled force?). The draft remained a draft; the author did not take it to press.

Shortly he did adapt passages from it for an article on the Russian party’s “three periods” from 1900 to the present. The tropes were still from mechanics. But the exposition was more concrete, thoroughly political in its examples to 1917, mainly political on the last, post-’17 period, the “strategy” for

which, at once international and national, was, he wrote (most indefinitely), “to maneuver.” Accordingly among the party’s tasks figured (the only industrial references) “mastery of the basic branches of industry and improvement of provisions for the workers employed there, … electrification of transport and heavy industry.”

In January 1923, managing negotiations to organize the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Stalin lectured again at Sverdlov on the Russian party’s “strategy and tactics.” Two months later he published his definitive views on the matter, making him (to my knowledge) the first Marxist anywhere to conceptualize in print a specifically Communist “strategy and tactics.” This version was sharper, but not new. Its concern was in fact not a complete “strategy and tactics,” but as before “political strategy and tactics.” The processes that happened “outside and around the proletariat” were now “objective, or elemental,” i.e., primal, basic, uncontrolled, natural, spontaneous, while the processes involving their reflection “inside the proletariat” were now “subjective, or conscious,” cognitive. As before, the objective processes were beyond strategy, but he now clarified what they (mainly) were, “the economic development of the country, the development of capitalism, the breakdown of the old power, the proletariat’s elemental movement…” Likewise, the subjective processes were clearer for being not only “conscious,” but also “open to planning and measurement,” which of course made them “entirely subject” to strategy and tactics. But the periodic definition of strategy (its task “to predetermine the character of operations for the entire period of the war, to predetermine maybe nine-tenths of the fate of the entire war”), the episodic definition of tactics, the reminder that deliberate tactical losses could guarantee future strategic advantages, all this was the same. Of industrial matters the only hints were simple, unweighted references to “particular strikes,” “mass political strikes,” “unions,” “factory committees,” and “strike committees.”

Barely a month later, reporting on “organization” to the party’s annual congress, he repeated his old criticism of the military model. “…in the military area…the party gives orders, and the army, i.e., the working class, carries out these orders… In the political area things are much more complicated. …in politics the class does not depend on the party, but the other way around.” To describe the relationship he tried a new analogy, a fictional technology, the party surrounding itself with a network of “mass apparatuses that would be like antennae in its hands, by means of which it would transmit its will to the working class, and the working class from a scattered mass would turn into the party’s army.” Back on earth, to examine the “apparatuses” actually in practice, he reverted (for his first time in print) to Lenin’s image of “drive belts uniting the party with the class.” Here he made himself absolutely clear: “The first, basic drive belt, the first, basic driving apparatus by means of which the party connects with the working class--this is the unions.” He analyzed them only by levels of membership, down to “the primary cells…the fabzavkomy, the factory-plant committees; he made absolutely no other distinction among them.419

Deep in the struggle over the party and the state in 1924, Stalin gave a series of nine lectures at Sverdlov on “the basics of Leninism.” He had a broad and a narrow definition of the subject: “Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution in general, theory and tactics of the proletariat’s dictatorship in particular.” From neither perspective did he mention material bases, say at railroads, ports, coal mines, pipe lines, oil refineries, iron smelters, steel mills, or power plants. In Lecture VII, “Strategy and Tactics,” he cited Lenin’s “Detskaia bolezn’ [sic, The Childhood Disease]” among “the most valuable contributions to Marxism’s…revolutionary arsenal,” quoted it more than anything else, and declared, “Leninism’s strategy and tactics are the science of leadership of the proletariat’s revolutionary struggle.” Mostly he repeated his own stuff, e.g., periodization of strategy, examples from the Bolsheviks’ political history. A few statements were new (for him), but military clichés. (“Strategy is the determination of the direction of the proletariat’s main blow on the basis of a given stage of the revolution….” The first condition for “the correct use of reserves” is, “Concentration of the revolution’s main forces at the decisive moment at the enemy’s most vulnerable point….”) His most suggestive new image here (new for him) occurred in his discussion of tactics, an oddly spoiled metaphor: “…that special link in the chain of

processes seizing which it will be possible to hold the whole chain and prepare the conditions for achieving strategic success.” In the lecture on the party (“the proletariat’s combat staff”), he did mention among its constituents both unions and “factory-plant organizations.” These and other “extra-party organizations of the working class,” he repeated, the party “by its experience and authority” could “turn into…drive belts uniting it with the class.” Nowhere in the series did he even discursively connect strategy, force, power (vulnerability), or drive with industrial organization.

Two years hence, approaching a showdown with Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, Stalin published a pamphlet on “questions of Leninism.” As he had before allowed, he now confirmed, “The basic question in Leninism…is the question of the proletariat’s dictatorship.” No surprise, he found in Lenin’s work no explicit industrial argument about this or any less than basic question. But he recalled Lenin (again) on the dictatorship’s “‘mechanism’” and “‘drive belts,’” adding (as if Lenin had originally included them) “‘levers’” and “‘guiding force.’” Catechistically he explained the belts and the levers as “those very mass organizations of the proletariat without the help of which it is impossible to bring about the dictatorship”; the guiding force, he need not have explained, but did, was the party. Again, of all the mass organizations, the first were “the workers’ unions.” And here they carried at least the trace of an industrial identity and argument, “the mass organization…connecting the party with the class above all along the line of production.” Stalin quoted Lenin as well on the need for “mutual trust between the working class’s

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420 Idem, “Ob osnovakh leninisma: Lektsii chitannye v Sverd’lovskom universitete [The Foundations of Leninism: Lectures Delivered at the Sverdlov University, April-May 1924],” Sochineniia, VI, 69-188 (quotations, 71, 151-152, 157, 163, 170, 172, 177-179). Stalin’s references to “concentration of Russian industry” and “every serious strike” (ibid., 127-128) I have not counted as serious industrial references. For help translating boevoi shtab as “combat staff” I thank William C. Fuller; this is the staff on the battlefield, not the “General Staff,” i.e., the staff at headquarters, as in the standard English translation: Works, VI, 187. The lectures appeared in Pravda, and became a pamphlet under the same title. Cf. Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, rev. and exp. (New York: Columbia University, 1989), 821-822. The often noted catechism of Stalin’s prose may come not only from his adolescent years in the seminary, but also from old familiarity with manuals for “practical engineers,” many taking courses at Sverdlov. Cf. e.g., Matthias N. Forney, Catechism of the Locomotive, 2nd ed., rev. and enl. (New York: Railroad Gazette, 1891); Georg Kosak, Katechismus der Einrichtung und des Betriebes der Locomotive: Eizugs-, Personen- und Güterzugslcomotiven, Berglocomotive, Strassenlocomotive, Tramway-Locomotive, für Locomotivführer, Bahnbeamte, studierende technischer Fachschulen, sowie zur populären Belehrung für gebildete jedes Standes, 6th ed. (Vienna: Spielhagen & Schurich, 1892); Ivan Time, Prakticheskii kurs parovykh mashin, 2 vol. (St. Petersburg: A. Transhelia, 1886-1887); N. A. Kviatkovskii, Prakticheskoe rukovodstvo k obrabotke nefti i ee produktov, 2nd ed. (Nizhnii-Novgorod: N.I. Volkov, 1902). The last three I have not yet seen; Kosak is in the Stanford Library, Time in the Library of Congress, Kviatkovskii in the UC-Berkeley Library.

vanguard and the workers’ mass.” He again instructed the party “not to command, but first of all to convince,” as “guide, leader, teacher of its class.” He recalled the very particular fight five years before between Trotsky’s transport authority and the transport unions, and quoted Lenin at the time urging the party “to convince people whatever it may cost at the beginning,” and only if that failed, “force them.”

Not only was he attacking Trotsky. In the factionally agitated contests then over Soviet wage policy he was again (implicitly) bargaining for strategic unions’ political support, against the Leningrad Opposition and for “socialism in one country.”

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Lenin had several times urged Taylorite studies of industrial work in Soviet Russia. He thought of them for practical purposes, to raise Soviet productivity, and Soviet economists might have made them into a theory of value and a policy in practice accounting for production’s strategic positions. For a decade no major Russian Marxist showed any interest in any such matter. But two lesser figures came close to the strategic points. Stanislav Strumilin, who before 1917 had studied electrical engineering (Petersburg Electro-Technical Institute) and economics (Petersburg Polytechnic), became the main Soviet social scientist of labor in the 1920s. As the scholar who taught Wassily Leontiev input-output analysis, he might well have reconciled Marx on value with matrices and the evidence of industrially strategic power, but his more urgent duties at the Gosplan occupied him otherwise.

Aleksei Gastev, poet, machinist, in 1917-18

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422 Idem, “K voprosam leninizma [On the Questions of Leninism, 1926],” ibid., VIII, 13-90 (quotations, 15-16, 32-33, 35, 43-44, 53). Mechanically considered, the levers and the directing force are puzzling. The author may have had in mind the mechanism of linkage, where the oscillating link is the lever, or beam. (See B.K. Thoroughgood, “Mechanism,” in Marks, op. cit., 652.) But if so, the directing force is nonsense. In another, more probable imagery, transmission of power by friction gearing (engines or motors, flywheels, drive wheels, sheaves, drums, drive belts, drive shafts, guide pulleys, driven shafts, etc.), a lever would serve not to move dead weights, but (as a friction-gear shift) to shift a belt from a driver to an idler and back. When the worker shifted the lever to bring the transmission into effect (“in gear”), he was throwing the driving force into action. (Walter Rautenstrauch, “Machine Elements,” ibid., 734-748; and C. Kemble Baldwin, “Hoisting and Conveying,” ibid., 1107.)


secretary-general of the Russian metalworkers’ union, in 1920 organized for the new national federation of Russian unions a Central Institute of Labor, for research on “the scientific organization of work.” Its purpose was to socialize Taylorism, but in practice it yielded rather a blend of individualized workplace safety tips, ergonomics, and personnel management. Eventually it had to compete with a full-blown Soviet “psycho-technics,” a Soviet Mayoism.425

In this atmosphere the Marxist study theoretically richest for an explanation of the links between productivity and the structure of work came into print in Leningrad. It was a paper by Bukharin on “the technology and economy of contemporary capitalism,” for the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1932, maybe the most original and stimulating work he ever published. Coming from interests he had already pursued in his brilliant 1920 essay on socialist “transformation,” steeped for 12 more years in Marx on material production and the labor process, sharpened by the latest, most serious German, French, English, and American literature (and testimony) on modern Technik and technology, more learned for its author’s part the year before in the Second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology (in London), focused by his duties then as director of research for the Soviet Union’s Supreme Council of the National Economy, but aimed at bourgeois Europe and the United States, the paper explored one of Marxism’s greatest subjects in an absorbing analysis of socialism’s ultimate antagonist.426 From the

contradictions between productive forces and productive relations, which explained material development
and class conflict, therefore human history, Bukharin deftly drew the unity in contradiction between the
“technical” and the “economic.” In competitive and in monopoly capitalism he examined the various
inherent conflicts between production’s process and its organization. Most to the point he adduced
monopoly capitalism’s technically ever more powerful internalization of dead and live labor, “the
materially substantial, direct connection between economies.” He emphasized “electrification,
thermofication, gasification, oil pipe lines,” not for simple examples, but to change “the question” from
“movement of goods by transport” to “unification in the heart of production itself, in the sources of its
energy, in the centers of its motive force.” He considered all the new processes, “mechanization,”
“automatization,” “chemicalization,” and “along the same line…the telephone, radio, television
[televiziia],” moreover (for “the subjective factor…the working class”) “’biotechnics’ and
’psychotechnics,’” to show “the general technical tendency of monopoly capitalism…to universal
technical combination.” But the more systematic his Marxist argument, the stronger his functionalism,
which again got the better of him. Although he recognized imbalances, asymmetries, and contradictions
galore, he saw nothing strategic in them. He did not once treat static or dynamic connection as capitalist
weakness, a conjunction of differences, a joint for a disjunction, a transmission that could go into neutral, a
combination showing its seams, where it would most easily break or tear. And he took every connection’s
maintenance for granted (gratis to the adversary). By then he knew of Böhm-Bawerk’s admission of Macht
in the market, but like him thought of it politically, and agreed it did not abolish “economic law,” his own,
Marxist economics. He elaborated an almost Schumpeterian argument on monopoly and development
through his analysis of modern capitalism’s technical and organic composition. But he had no idea of some
(even unskilled) workers’ technically strategic power over constant or variable capital. Only, he thought,
because of monopoly capitalism’s inevitable organization in “corners, rings, pools, cartels and syndicates,

Tekhnika, 19 n1. Bukharin’s paper in London displayed much culture, but no scientific or technological
work: N.I. Bukharin, “Theory and Practice from the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism,” Science at the
Cross Roads: Papers Presented to the International Congress of the History of Science and Technology
trusts, mergers, concerns, banking consortia,” would the world not end in a “single, technically organized capitalism.”

The next year, on the fiftieth anniversary of Marx’s death, Bukharin contributed to a Soviet Academy of Science memorial. Here he repeated themes from earlier papers, including another treatment of capital’s composition, again regardless of technically strategic positions. Only in a discussion of Hans Kelsen’s errors on Marxist theory of proletarian revolution, “practically” the need to destroy the bourgeois state, did he mention the proletariat’s “strategy and tactics,” i.e., in politics or war.


Chapter VI. Red International Labor “Strike Strategy,” 1923-1930

If daily practice made ideas clear, the leaders of the Red International of Labor Unions (founded in 1920) could have taught industrially and technically strategic positions as a science, like topography in military science. None of them a major Marxist, they were nevertheless directing the hardest strategic organizing, recruiting revolutionary syndicalists into Communist parties (or keeping them there), helping them into strategic jobs in strategic industries, and holding them true to the Comintern’s United Front. If they did not know, they had to learn fast which positions were strategic, why, and how to use them, or fail. And being international, British, French, German, and Russian, they had national variables to test their technical and industrial experiences, to tell political (or cultural) from material factors. Immediately on the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923, maybe having heard Stalin’s Sverdlov lectures, a Russian (ex-Left SR) framed the idea of “workers’ strategy” in the RILU’s journal, internationally, financially, politically, militarily, and culturally (but not industrially or technically).\(^{429}\) That summer the RILU’s central council elected a special “commission for strike strategy,” to promote useful knowledge of the matter. “You yourselves well know,” the council’s executive bureau circularized RILU affiliates, “that the strike movement, which yearly involves millions of workers all over the world, has until now been little studied. …draw a comparison between the bourgeoisie’s output in the…study of the conduct of war and what on our side has been undertaken for putting the experiences of class struggle to use… In all countries there is a rich literature on war, schools and academies of war, where they painstakingly examine everything that would throw new light on the forms, methods, and accompanying circumstances of military engagements. What can we show in the…study of the strike movement? Almost nothing at all!… But does the strike of 1,200,000 English miners, which shut down the gigantic English empire…, have less importance than the Battle of Sedan? Is the strike struggle that in 1919-20 involved the whole world and awakened millions of common workingmen not worth being studied in all its details?” For practical purposes the new commission would be a red labor research project. If the commission had “exact material” on a long list of questions (no industrial or technical question) about strikes, if it “sifted and

studied” the material, “we would have an inexhaustible source for the internationalisation of our tactics and make the experiences [of some] accessible to all.” From red case studies could come “the elaboration of a [red] strike strategy.” In April 1924 the bureau announced the agenda for the RILU’s next congress, the sixth of 12 items being “strike strategy.” In May it asked all affiliates to provide “sifted” information of various kinds on strikes, including “exact data of trade or industry [on strike], the district and the number of participants,” and whether “the strike remained isolated from neighboring firms or overlapped onto other trades (territorial localization of the strike).” Better even than the 1910 Kautsky-Luxemberg debate, this was a chance for Marxists to conceptualize explicitly strategic terms for workers’ industrial power.

The congress opened in Moscow on July 8, 1924. Welcoming the delegates (311 of them, from 39 countries), RILU Secretary-General Lozovsky within about six minutes referred to “strategy.” In the next breath he addressed “organizational questions,” and in the next raised “a question of the highest importance, the strike.” At once he set the congress a big challenge: “To total up the results [of past strikes], to underpin a scientific foundation [for new strikes], to try to define how to lead our economic battles, how to gather all our forces into one,” that was the delegates’ first concrete “task.” And they had no better guide to meet it, despite his faults, than Lozovksy. Russian, a schoolteacher’s son, a Socialist since 1901, Bolshevik in 1905-06, refugee in Paris from 1909, a CGT hat-and-cap makers’ union secretary, split with the Bolshevik exiles in 1912, closest then to French syndicalists (mainly in the railroad unions), back in Russia in June 1917, a national officer in Russian unions since, Bolshevik again, expelled from the party, readmitted again, in charge of the RILU from its foundation in 1920, and editor of its journal, he knew more varieties of syndicalism than anyone else at the congress, had written much more about multiply strategic cases, e.g., Alsace-Lorraine, and had studied the “strike-strategy” commission’s data.

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432 III kongress Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoiuzov: Otchet (po stenogrammam) (Moscow: Profinterna, 1924), 5-7.

433 A. Lozovskii, Ugol’ i zhelez: k bor’be za El’zas-Lotaringiiu: ekonomicheskii etiud (St. Petersburg: Kniga, 1918); idem, Rabochii kontrol’: s prilozeniem instruktsii po rabochemu kontroliu Vserossiiskago Soveta rabochago kontrolia, professional’nykh soiuzov, fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov i rezoliutsii
If not a major Marxist, he had a sophisticated Marxist appreciation of “mutuality” between economics and politics. And he specifically wanted powerful (pro-Communist) labor movements in other countries as a non-party support for the Comintern.

Amid arguments about other business, mainly the Amsterdam International and anarcho-syndicalism, it took two days for “strike strategy” to surface. And it was Lozovsky who brought it up. Reporting on the RILU’s “future tasks,” he previewed the item on the agenda. “…our strategy does not correspond to the unfolding struggle. No one has been occupied until now with questions of strike strategy, not a single International. Earlier ones did not think about it, but we revolutionary unions are bound and obliged to think it…. In general and on the whole the broad masses of the members of revolutionary unions do not have a concept of the question of strike strategy. Even the top leadership still thinks little about this question.” We have to reflect (“speaking in Russian, in synod”) on our “experience of separate gigantic battles,” he said, and how to use it for the coming struggle. “I think in this area we can also learn something from military science. True, our army is not the same as a regular army. There they maneuver with other materials; there it is another system of organization. But inasmuch as it is about conflicts, battles, we can learn something.” Shortly he was talking about the need for “special economic counter-intelligence” on big businesses, and then, as if he had been reading Parvus, he gave a remarkably clear argument on industrial strategy.

“Our still home-made operation,” he said, “is expressed in the fact that the work Profintern activists carry out (and Communists among them) is done, speaking in Russian, camotiëkom, by gravity, drifting wherever our weight takes us. Where Communists were raised (leather workers, food workers), there they continue to work. This is very good; we have to take over all branches of work. But a more or

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less rational approach to the questions before us has to make us think out where, in which lines of production, to concentrate our attention so as to have in our hands the most necessary organs of the capitalist machine.” This work, he said, we have hardly started. “I remember when in the past I put forward this idea of the need to concentrate our attention on transport, on taking over mining, gas, electricity, the telegraph, radio, the chemical industry, and so on, comrades told me, ‘Sorry, but you cannot just throw Communists from other branches over into these lines, because in Europe they have customarily had among leather workers, leather workers working, among metal workers, metal workers, among miners, miners.’ But comrades, they have a lot of customs in Europe and America that we have to fight against. We have to concentrate, to put all our forces together in one fist, to be able to throw them into the branches of production most essential to us for a given country. In one country coal plays the central economic role, in another country another branch of production, and so on. But in each country we have to thoroughly study which areas of people’s work are most important, which one may be the most sensitive, if we should hit it, on which we should turn our maximum attention, for if we do not have these most important branches of work, we will not win any decisive battle or any decisive victory.” And he gave a classic example, railroads (and a freshly painful case). At a union conference the previous October in Saxony, when (and where) the Comintern leaders and the KPD thought they could finally commence the German Revolution, he had asked comrades there, “…and how about the railroaders, will they let the troops into Saxony or not?” They answered me, among the railroad workers we have almost no influence. Well, comrades, if we have no influence among the railroad workers, then, for your information, the revolution is going to go very bad, for a centralized state can then throw its units and its army back and forth to all sides, and will beat us according to all the rules of the art of war. This art of war our enemies know well, and we do not know it well enough. So the concentration of forces on socially essential [obshchestvenno-neobkhodimykh] lines of production presents itself as the most important question for the entire revolutionary union movement.” He did not stop. Having made the industrial argument, he shifted it immediately into international terms, urging “the creation for the most important lines of production of joint committees of representatives of different countries…let’s say a German-Polish railroad workers’ committee, a Franco-German railroad
workers’ committee, or a Russian-Polish railroad workers’ committee…. We have to prepare organizationally [i.e., industrially], and not only politically, the possibility of international action.”

After he proceeded through 10 other “future tasks,” the debate on them all ensued. Altogether 32 delegates (from 15 countries) spoke. No one disputed the industrial argument. Nor did anyone develop it. Most ignored it, talking about other problems. Only four showed some concept of it. Ireland’s lone delegate (for years an ITGWU organizer in the United States) pointed (as if Lozovsky had not) to “the huge revolutionary possibilities that transport workers offer us.” One of Poland’s 13 delegates, responding, he said, to Lozovsky’s call “to concentrate our attention on certain individual [sic, einzelne] industrial groups that play an important role in the working class’s struggle,” declared they should include chemical workers unions (which Lozovsky had included). He noted (originally) that they would be important in future wars. “The creation of solid revolutionary cells in chemical shops has to be given due attention, for only on this basis can anti-militarist work be done effectively and not only in words.” On another “task” Lozovsky had considered, that of going beyond industrial unions to organize “One Big Union” (like in Czechoslovakia), one of Czechoslovakia’s 18 delegates observed that guilds and trades there resisted joining industrial unions much more than they did the one general union. He explained, suggesting an argument on technical strategy, “Precisely these craft kind of groups as neighbors have often had the biggest fights with each other, and would rather be brought into a general union and there be sectioned into locals.” For example, he said, machinists, firemen, and smiths would not go into the metal workers’ industrial union, or varnishers and carpenters or bricklayers and stucco masons into the building-industry union, but they all went happily into the OBU, although there now disputes arose over whether locals were “autonomous [selbständig]” or “independent [selbständige].” One of Austria’s three (!) delegates raised an intensely practical question of industrial power, “the relations of the RILU with Edo Fimmen,” since 1919 secretary-general of the International Transport Workers Federation, leading “the Amsterdam Left”; he hoped the RLIU would cooperate with Fimmen.

In his summation therefore Lozovsky did not return to “strike strategy,” or speak of force in “socially essential lines of production.” He did complain about “millions and millions of workers who not only do not think about strikes happening over the border, but do not even get excited when strikes happen

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434 III Kongress, 43-44.
alongside them, but in another line of production. Only a strike happening in the plant where they work affects them. This separatism,” he said, “this corporative isolationism, this lack of principled, welded unity of the working class, has its tracks preserved even in our organizations. Maybe you say I am exaggerating. But…country after country I will show you a whole series of facts when some groups of revolutionary workers, let’s say, chemical workers, get very little excited because, let’s say, revolutionary metal workers have gone into a struggle before them.” He certainly knew the difference between ideals and solder, but he probably could not have explained off-hand why it took principled solidarity to spread some proletarian operations, while others spread as if action in one plant materially triggered action in another, almost automatically. His remarks closest to an industrial argument came in final passing references to the need for bi-national industrial-union committees for international action, “for example, railroaders, miners, chemical workers.”

On July 16-17 the report and debate on “strike strategy” took place. After “future tasks” it took most time. The first of four reporters (himself a French railroad union leader, syndicalist, and CGTU secretary-general) explained the strategy’s purpose, “to make useful all favorable circumstances for centralization and coordination of strike movements in every country and gradually so shape them that international strikes are practically feasible.” And he explained the biggest problem, workers’ “local craft tradition…, which prevents them from surveying the effective range of the battlefield of classes and from observing the power of capitalist concentration.” Hence “the abundance of elementary, partial strikes, which are the more difficult to lead the more deep-rooted the federalist prejudices that rule some union organizations,” and all the more difficult the bigger the economic differences among workers in different trades, regions, and countries. (Although this was beginning to sound like the pre-war problem of mass political strikes, how they spread, the reporter was heading in a new direction.) He offered a few lame proposals, e.g., new slogans (“No more elementary partial strikes!”), solidarity, labor councils for trades and regions. But considering the business he knew best, he turned sharper. “International industrial cartels

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of unions” could coordinate international industrial strikes, especially by transport, metal, and mine workers. He confessed he could not lay out any strike strategy “in all its details,” because “it is a much too complicated matter,” but he assured the delegates that “since the end purpose of our strike strategy’s application is the revolution,” they would “perfect” it in practice. And then he sketched a pretty good idea of “international strike strategy” in six “points.” Its third, most industrial, and most technical point was “organizing national strikes: (a) concentration of thrust in a determined region, (b) material support on a country-wide scale, (c) disorganization of the technical equipment [Einrichtung], (d) preventing supply of raw materials and manufactured parts to the affected region, (e) creation of special groups for disorganizing the technical equipment.”  

The second reporter recognized this was not enough. Indeed he said it only made him see how far they still were from “conceiving the situation…and accomplishing adequate action in it.” (German, by trade a mason, Spartakist, member of the Berlin Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in 1918, a KPD minister in the Comintern’s recent disaster in Saxony, he had quite fresh memories of battle-shy unions and workers.) “The military strategist” and “the union strategist” fight different kinds of war, he declared. In “class war” workers have enemies not only at the front, but also in the rear, and some of the working class “stay in the bourgeoisie’s camp,” while yet others are “hard to move into the struggle.” In the proletarian army “there are often the most different views of the nature and the goal of the struggle,” and “the proletarian field commander’s reserves are hard to calculate.” Applying Clausewitz’s “ground rules to union struggles or civil war” would end in “a complete beating.” They could not adopt old or extraneous models, he implied. “We ourselves have to create a strike strategy….” He then explained the complications, but also the necessity of it: “We cannot wait for spontaneous explosions within the working masses... The element of spontaneity naturally has to fall back, because our enemy is no longer so splintered as before.” After posing again the problem of differences among workers he gave the delegates his practical advice. “Above all” do not allow “struggles in isolation. …get in touch with workers of the same locality, with other trade categories, …confer about the locality with the region around, with groups in other industries….” Provide for the physical defense of strikes, soon against “hand grenades and revolvers,” as “in America.” Prepare

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436 This was Gaston Monmousseau: Protokoll, 201-208. Cf. idem, “Zur Streikstrategie in Frankreich,” Die Rote Gewerkschaft-Internationale, No. 6 (41), June 1924, 377-381.
for longer strikes. Do not use a slogan like “no partial strikes,” which “makes workers passive.” And help the French (and others) overcome their “localism and federalism.” But he showed no industrial or technical insight.

The third reporter spoke most briefly, about “strike strategy” only in the United States. (Born in Kansas City, Mo., son of a railroad man, himself an electrician, a leader of the Anaconda copper strike in 1917, Communist, and officer of the Montana Federation of Labor until the AFL expelled him in 1923, he knew U.S. American syndicalism better than anyone else at the congress.) He emphasized a basic socially strategic fact about the American labor movement: “There are only two branches of industry where the number of organized workers is bigger than the number of unorganized….transportation and coal mining.” There unions could make effective alliances. Elsewhere (although he did not say so) some force was necessary, whether physical, legal, political, cultural, technical, or industrial (or all at once). “Every strike strategist in America has to orient himself toward the unorganized workers,” he said. The American party “in every branch of industry must therefore have a certain number of young, energetic, and devoted comrades, who themselves grow up in the industry, who have to have not only political learning, but also every practical knowledge of the industry, …and we take pains to bring up such leaders.” He looked forward to when they could combine the struggle of French, German, and American workers. Until then, he explained, amazingly, as if from a textbook on industrially strategic positions, “we will be able to penetrate only in small groups, and it will be necessary that we concentrate our forces in the strategic points that in every branch of industry occupy a central position. There are, for example, in America two railroad junctions that concentrate the country’s whole railroad transportation. If we succeeded in establishing firm contacts with the workers of these junctions, if we understood with the help of our cells how to convince them of the need for action in solidarity with German comrades, it would be possible to organize the kind of demonstration that would strengthen German workers’ courage.” He warned this would take more than “a few months.” But he closed in the hope of such “rules of labor strategy,” to “serve revolutionary unions in all countries as a plumbline.” If the congress’s conclusions were “not only on paper, but turned into living elements working in our daily struggle, if they…turned into positive action, then even in reactionary

\[437\] This was Fritz Heckert: Protokoll, 208-218.
America workers would begin to feel that not only in Europe was a struggle for power going on, but also in ‘peaceful’ America hard days would come for capitalism.”

Finally Lozovsky reported on the subject. He wanted to see “if it is possible…to set up some rules binding for all countries and replace scattered, elemental, insufficiently studied, or badly organized strikes by a planned strike struggle based on the laws of military science and civil war.” And here (unlike in his report on “future tasks”) he proceeded mainly by quoting authorities. First he distinguished between politics, strategy, and tactics. Assume theory, party, program, goal, and tasks. “‘Politics,’ Lenin said, ‘is knowing how to maneuver with millions,’” to meet the tasks and realize the goal. “But the way you have to go, the basic lines of the movement for bringing to life the set tasks,” that is strategy. He quoted Stalin’s “very interesting” recent book: “‘Strategy is the determination of the direction of the proletariat’s main blow on the basis of a given stage of the revolution….”” Then he tried to show how military concepts of strategy would apply, or not, quoting an anonymous “German military authority” on “the direction of the operation and the choice of that point where you ought to fight,” and so on. Quoting the same source, plus Moltke and Stalin, he defined tactics, “determination of the lines of conduct and methods of struggle for a single battlefield…. .” This science did not apply across the board. “…the basic sign of an army, compulsion, is missing in the united union army,” he said. “Our union army is a volunteer army,” where “compulsion is replaced by class solidarity, class-welded unity.” (Here he ignored the first and the third reporters’ industrial and technical points.) Also, repeating the second reporter’s point, he distinguished between a military front, “a line of fire,” and a “social front,” which is “zigzag,…inside the country, cuts in a thousand directions across town and country.” He expanded on the cultural struggles especially worrisome to German, Austrian, and Italian Communists. Then he returned to the strike, “to which the working class resorted long, long ago,” but which remained “not studied,” until now. And here came some of the previous months’ information, sifted. “…the strike, like war, is the continuation of politics by other means.” There were 13 kinds, (in his order) wildcat, “organized [union-run],” offensive, defensive, the solidarity strike, the kind “coming at intervals,” the local, the regional, the industrial, general strikes, international, economic, and “purely political” strikes. Consequently, although “[e]ach strike is a test of strength between the entrepreneurs and the workers,” many “conditions” have to obtain for “this specific

\footnote{This was William F. Dunne: \textit{ibid.}, 219-222.}
proletarian method of struggle” to have “the results desired by us.” Necessary to start, first, was “a highly conscious working mass.” Second, “merciless struggle against…guildsmen and corporatism, and a great, exclusive trust in [union] leaders,” which raised “the very important question of the mutual relations between the army and its staff.” From a military staff, he said, citing “military men,” you want “a strategic feeling [chut’ë], a strategic sense [chuvstvo], and strategic learning [znanie].” You could say the same, he said, “of the leading nucleus [iadro] of the union movement.” And he then listed 26 different abilities a union leader should have. Besides timing and knowing the enemy’s “weakest place,” “weakest link,” and “center of gravity (Clausewitz),” the only one industrially significant was the thirteenth, “knowing at the decisive moment [of the strike] how to draw in new reserves, mainly workers in socially essential [again obshchestvenno-neobkhodimykh] enterprises.” Always learn more from the enemy about “how to make war,” he advised them, citing, e.g., Bernhardi on “the war of the future,” in order to use the enemy’s lessons against him, “not for a minute forgetting that the strike is one of the forms of civil war.” He quoted Hindenburg: “’One must never fight without a decisive point of attack.’” True, he said, which for union leaders meant knowing “the socio-economic topography of the theater of military operations and what our enemy represents in political, economic, and organizational [industrial?] relations.”

He was heading again toward the industrial point. “It is essential to organize economic counter-intelligence… It is essential to carry out as soon as possible the concentration of our forces in industrial unions and the centralization of the whole union movement, if we want to oppose the force of concentrated capital by the might of concentrated labor.” He lit into wildcat strikes, anarchists, and anarcho-syndicalists, just the moment for explaining the field of industrial force and the structure of technical power for strikes. He missed it. Instead he thought only of urging “the political element, i.e., the general class element.”

For all the information the bureau had collected, Lozovsky concluded most frustratingly on a maxim that he or any adult Marxist, liberal, conservative, or fascist had already learned in life, “You cannot think up or create a science of victory.” The best you can do, he advised, is take “a scientific approach,” which may reduce your defeats and increase your “chances of victory.” And be concrete, he added, and “learn, learn, and again learn from the most ingenious strategist of class struggle, Lenin,” on whose “strategic genius” he quoted Trotsky, in effect that Lenin took absolutely nothing for granted. He ended
with a bromide from Moltke, “In war as in art there is no general norm. In neither can talent be replaced by a rule.”

The discussion of the report carried no dominant theme. Seven speakers mostly criticized what they took for erroneous criticisms and important omissions, most of them thereby provoking subsequent critics to criticize them too. (Behind the mutual, mounting criticism here throbbed German suspicion of French syndicalism and French resolve to make the suspect syndicalism Communist.) But amid the criticism and counter-criticism two (only two) positive notions received expression at least three times. The first was a compound truism, repeated probably because of the report’s promise of “a [single] strike strategy”: any strategic rule had to fit all cases. (No one questioned the premise of rules.) The first speaker, the Irish delegate, put the notion negatively and totally, but clearly enough. “…I know the strike mechanism [which he did not here reveal] …and I will tell you, if you believe that you can run a strike from some information bureau or some strategic bureau, I have to say that the people saying so know nothing at all of the subject they are talking about.” A British delegate made the point indirectly, regarding particular British difficulties with wildcat strikes. Another declared his “joy that comrades are of an opinion that a strike strategy has to apply according to the situation in each separate country.” A Canadian seemed to indicate the same: “All the reports…rest on the assumption…that we can completely lead the proletarian army and maneuver…during the strike according to the rules of the strategy of war. But if we look at the facts, we see that our strikes in capitalist countries with the possible exception of Germany still have the character of elementary uprisings, which result from the immediate needs of the working class.” A French delegate put it more clearly, the slip in his language exposing the novelty still of a “strategy” for labor: “…we cannot here in any way firmly lay down one, uniform, once-and-for-all-time valid tactic for the whole International.…”

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439 Idem, “O stachechnoi strategii,” III kongress, 225-232. Cf. Protokoll, 223-230. His sixth kind of strike, “stachki peremezhainaushchiesia” (strikes intermittent, coming at intervals), probably misread as “stachki peremeshaunshchiesia” (strikes intermingled, mixed up), appears in German as “Streiks mit kombinierten Zielen,” which is not the kind of strike he meant: cf. III kongress, 227, and Protokoll, 225. Also, his reference to Clausewitz on “tsentr tiakhhesti” (center of gravity) in Russian suffered the translation to “das Zentrum des…Schwerewichts” (center of the heavyweight, peso completo, full strength) in German: cf. III kongress, 228, and Protokoll, 226. Furthermore, the thirteenth attribute of the ideal union leader in Russian is the fourteenth in German: cf. III kongress, 228, and Protokoll, 226.

440 Ibid., 231, 233-234, 237, 241. The Irish delegate was Jim Larkin; the British, George Hardy and one Thomas (whose first name I cannot find); the Canadian, Tim Buck; the French, Pierre Sémard.
The other positive notion with some support (not as much as the first) was of strategic industries. When the Canadian explained the importance of solidarity (or lack thereof), he spoke materially about the railroads, which in Winnipeg in 1919 and in Nova Scotia in 1923 had brought the strikebreakers and troops. A Polish delegate, winding down from a singularly arrogant lecture, let one last imperative fly: “Great working masses, entire industrial branches and industrial centers, must be led into the struggle. Decisive importance obviously belongs to the dominant economic and social lines: transport, mining, metal industry, public utilities.” And the French delegate who had lapsed from “strategy” to “tactic” (himself a leading French syndicalist) declared, “We have to fix on the industrial branches against which our strongest battle should be directed. We have to increase our propaganda among the workers of those industrial branches that supply electrical energy, gas, ore, coal, on which the work of other industrial branches depends. If we finally manage to put these industrial branches under our control, we will have at our disposal greater chances for our struggle’s success.”

The first reporter summed up assuming no consensus. He would combine all the reports into one, he said, as “a basis for careful study of the questions under discussion.” The congress’s resolutions on July 22 reflected his judgment. The second resolution, on “future tasks,” admitting that even “[t]he revolutionary worker” still had no thought of “strategy and tactics” in strikes, set no task in this regard; RILU activists were only to “turn special attention to the methods and means of the strike struggle,” which they were to “treat with the highest attention.” Yet it also instructed affiliates “to organize economic counter-espionage.” And (as Lozovsky had urged) it ordered an industrial strategy, although without the name. “An equal distribution of forces in all lines of production is not rational. It is necessary to concentrate RILU backers’ attention on the organization of workers in those branches of work that can play a decisive role in the working class’s struggle against the bourgeoisie (transport, mining, metallurgy, the chemical industry, electricity, gas, telegraph, radio, etc.).” It emphasized, “Without the conquest of these basic lines of production the struggle of the working class is doomed to failure.” It explained in straight Parvusian terms the logic of the strategy: “Concentration of efforts in this area results from the elementary calculation of the expedient application of revolutionary energy to the goals of the disorganization of the most vulnerable and important points of the capitalist system.” And (as Parvus had long ago suggested) it

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441 Ibid., 238, 241, 243. The Polish delegate was one Redens (Mieczyslaw Bernstein).
advised “creation of joint comittees (Franco-German, German-Polish, German-Czech, Franco-Italian, Franco-German-English, German-Russian, Russian-Polish, and so on) of workers in the most important branches of production for the organization of combined campaigns and action.”

The seventh resolution was on “strike strategy.” As if the second resolution had not already ordered an industrial strategy, here the congress directed the executive bureau to publicize the report on the question and publish monographs on big strikes, and directed affiliates to publish material on “the methods and means” of strikes in their countries. It called on “all revolutionary unions to treat the question of strike strategy with utmost seriousness, for without thorough study of every experience of strike struggle, without mutual and broad acquaintance of the revolutionary workers of one country with the experience of other countries, without concentration of all forces, without planned, systematic preparation of small and large conflicts with capital, the revolutionary proletariat will not be able to defeat concentrated, backed by the contemporary bourgeois state’s full might, monopolistic capital.” But it offered no guidance in connecting research to the practice of concentration or industrially strategic operations.

In their tenth resolution, on “organizational building,” the delegates acted on numerous complaints of unions acting (or not) in isolation. “Separate trade unions are to be joined together in industrial unions,” they ruled, “and separate industrial unions are to be unified as groups according to the most important branches of production. Industrial unions of a given country are to be unified on an international scale, at which level this unification is nevertheless to be carried out from below in the process of joint struggle.” In this same resolution they surprisingly elaborated Lozovsky’s push for “economic counter-intelligence” to order without so naming it the institution of workers’ agencies for advising on technical and industrial strategies. “Economic intelligence is to be organized at all union cells [iacheikakh, also slit trenches, foxholes]. The task of such an intelligence apparatus...consists in determining the real forces and intentions of the capitalists. For the construction of such an intelligence apparatus revolutionary unions and minority [i.e., Communist] movements in other unions are to start without delay in the person of the existing commissions of workers’ control. In addition, into this work through unions are to be drawn employees of banking and administrative enterprises and also of establishments and organizations regulating industry.”

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442 *III kongress*, 332-3, 343-344, 350.
Whoever drafted Resolution No. 21 (of 28 in all), on the Canadian Trade Union Educational League’s “program of action,” did the congress’s last industrial analysis. It began sharp and promising. “The railways constitute the arterial system of Canada and 79,000 organized railway workers are potentially the most powerful single body of organized workers in the Dominion.” (Canada’s labor force then numbered about 1,100,000, in transport and communications ca. 225,000.) But in three paragraphs it dwindled into a little string of flimsy, intelligence-free, destrategized, intra-industry exhortations.443

As RILU’s secretary-general Lozovsky continued to speak and write much about international labor strategies. These strategies, however, he like most Communist intellectuals already in 1924 increasingly reckoned in political or cultural terms (or bothwise). He did not forget the divisions of labor, but he urged his comrades ever more to capture hearts and minds.444 During the Comintern’s reorganization for “the third period,” expecting “sharp accentuation of capitalism’s general crisis,” he pressed RILU agents hard for more sensitivity to popular humors. At the RILU’s fourth congress, March-April 1928, he redefined “strike strategy” culturally. “The problem of our strike strategy is the problem of the conquest of the masses,” he said, as Gramsci and various others had been arguing. “…an incorrect approach to a strike, an insufficiently attentive relation to those processes that go on in the masses, thoughtlessness in capturing the mood of the masses, attempts to substitute the mass by apparatus, all this can lead only to defeat.” For example, he told them, look at China (the great Communist urban revolutionary movement and disaster there, 1925-27). “In each country you have to study the question [of strikes], and each line of production you have to approach with special attention, especially those…that are concentrated. You have to find ways

443 Third World Congress, 57.
444 E.g., A. Losovsky, Lenin, The Great Strategist of the Class War, tr. Alexander Bittelman (Chicago: Trade Union Educational League, 1924); idem, Lenin and the Trade Union Movement (Chicago: Trade Union Educational League, 1924); idem, The World’s Trade Union Movement, tr. M.A. Skromny (Chicago: Trade Union Educational League, 1924); idem, Die internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung vor und nach dem Kriege (Berlin: Führer, 1924); Edinstvo mirovogo profdvizheniia: doklady i rechi na VI S’ezde profsoiuzov SSSR (Moscow: Profintern, 1925), 73-77; A. Lozovskii, Parizh, Breslav’, Skarbono (Moscow: Profintern, 1925); idem, Na frantsuzskom s’ezde: rech’ na s’ezde Unitarnoi Konfederatsii Truda vo Frantsii 29-go avgusta 1925 g. (Moscow: Profintern, 1925), 8-12, 35; idem, Le mouvement syndical international: avant, pendant et après la guerre (Paris: Internationale Syndicale Rouge, 1926); IV sessiia Tsentral’nogo Soveta Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoiuzov, 9-15 marta 1926 g.: ochët (Moscow: Profintern, 1926), 27-30, 70-71; A. Lozovsky et al., Rabochaia Amerika: sbornik statei (Moscow: Profintern, 1926); idem, Wie kann die Einheit der Gewerkschaftsbewegung hergestellt werden? (Moscow: Roten Gewerkschafts-Internationale, 1926), 5-20; idem, Der Streik in England und die Arbeiterklasse der Sowjetunion (Moscow: Rote Gewerkschafts-Internationale, 1926); idem, Mirovoe profdvizhenie nakpanune desiatoi godovshchiny Oktiabria (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1927). Cf. the similar emphasis on morale, the negligence of transport and communications, in Emile Burns, The General Strike, May 1926: Trades Councils in Action (London: Labour Research Department, 1926), 21-68.
of organization so as to counteract concentrated capital; you have to do research on the methods of organization for opposing international trusts and cartels. All this [study and research and at least industrially specific organizing] you have to do, but”—no longer for industrial or technical intelligence, rather to win workers’ feelings—“you have to do it in such a way that each step, each act, each demand, each statement, each article and the program, action, speeches, all this is subordinated to one and the same goal, conquering the masses for the side of independent activities against capital.”

The old industrial and even the technical lessons stuck in some Communist minds. In the United States the executive director of the new Labor Research Association, for a series of “industrial studies….from an avowedly labor point of view,” wrote one study himself, on the automobile industry and its workers. Arguing for an industrial union of auto workers, he dwelt much on the unskilled majority, but cautioned against neglect of the skilled minority. “The assembly line workers, when questioned on organization and strike prospects, often ask: ‘Would the tool and die makers strike too?’ These workers are very important… They must be appealed to as the most strategically situated forces in any mass movement, and the danger, even after they are organized, of their splitting off from the industrial union into rival A.F.of L. craft unions must be carefully guarded against.”

After major industrial conflicts in Poland and Germany in the fall of 1928, an RILU-sponsored “International Conference on Strike Tactics” took place in Strassburg in January 1929. There Lozovsky renewed his industrially strategic discourse, in military language. He urged planning “strike strategy and tactics” for “the economic struggle.” The conferees considered the strike “a variety of war,” and sought “to outline for the battling proletarian army those offensive and defensive operations…making for…its maximal success in combat.” To oppose the defeatist “social-democratic strategists,” Lozovsky recalled the analogy of military science, military schools in every country using military history as “the basic material” for teaching “strategy and tactics.” Against the “reformist strategy” of a united front with the bourgeoisie to disorganize “the proletarian front and rear,” against the reformist claim that “economic struggle” was

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445 IV kongress Profinterna, 17 marta-3 aprelia 1928 g.: stenograficheskii otchet, resoliutsii i postanovlenia (Moscow: Profintern, 1928), 55-56, 295-297.
“anarcho-syndicalism,” he urged “study of gigantic economic battles” for “instructive material” precisely because of “the mutuality between economic and political struggle.”447

But of the conference’s ultimately 20 “decisions,” only one pertained to production. Decision IX addressed an old revolutionary Socialist concern, an old syndicalist specialty, now a Communist imperative there. Against capital’s concentration and recent “rationalization,” how to stop lockouts, how to spread strikes? The directions for both were on the simple side: extend operations, which you could do “along a vertical line or along a horizontal line, i.e., capturing…the workers of the given industry, or other [related] branches of industry, or workers of the entire region.” Which line, which kind of “reserves” should you call on? “…it depends on where the weakest place is for the entrepreneurs affected by the conflict.” And that you discover by studying “a trust’s connected and subordinated businesses, then…those businesses that supply raw materials or finish and distribute the products.” See if the businesses can transfer orders one to another, or meet their local shortages by shipments from other regions or from abroad. Against this maneuver “a very strongly effective weapon” was cutting off land and sea transport and public utilities (electricity, gas, etc.).448

The other decisions were all political and cultural. And the directions were for hyper-sensitivity to the masses’ moods. The very first decision warned, “The most dangerous thing in an economic struggle is improvisation in calling for a strike under the influence of feelings, and not on cold calculation.”449 But the calculation essential in 19 of the 20 decisions lay in interpreting angry workers’ emotions and displaying the broadest possible respect for them, to induce voluntary mass action that RILU activists could lead.

From January to March 1930 Lozovsky gave five lectures on “the strike” at the Comintern’s Lenin School for party organizers. Only once did he go into the industrial argument, in the second lecture, on “politics and economics,” or, as he rephrased its topic, “economic struggles and our tactics,” but without a word of “strategy.” The character of economic struggle depends on numerous conditions, he explained, “above all on where the given economic conflict takes place.” For example, he said (yet again, classically), if it is “on the railroad or in the electrical industry, or includes other public enterprises, like waterworks, ...

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448 Voprosy stachechnoi taktiki, 29-30.
449 Ibid., 17.
then this conflict with one blow acquires a more extensive and more general character than the original dimensions of the strike or conflict in question.” A conflict’s importance, he said, repeating (without knowing it) Parvus’s point yet again, is a matter of “the branch of industry in which it develops.” For example, take a strike “anywhere in private industry, let’s say among garment workers, and an economic conflict in an iron and steel trust’s enterprises, e.g., US Steel… Such conflicts have different importance, not only because the number of involved workers is different--here quantity changes into quality--but because they implicate different strata of businessmen, whose influence on the bourgeois state apparatus is not equal,” which was not exactly Parvus’s point. But he came back to it, or close to it. “Naturally a conflict in the iron and steel trust, in heavy industry, or let’s say in the coal industry, insofar as these main branches of industry are leading in the bourgeois state, gains at once the importance of a general class conflict, for it puts the workers in opposition not only to the businessmen of that branch of industry, but also to the state, which is controlled by them.” He explained also, if not so clearly, that economic conflicts differed according to the period when they happened, e.g., in wartime, or before or after a war, or when capitalist industry was developing, or in decline. Trying to generalize the argument for the organizers, he resorted to philosophy. Help yourself to Hegel’s rule, he advised them, reassuring them it had become “a permanent part of Marxist thought,… ‘the truth is concrete.’” He brought the generality back to an anti-generalizing rule of thumb: “We can’t talk about economic struggles in general. We have to evaluate this or that economic struggle, one or another economic conflict, in order to comprehend the whole situation, the totality of all conditions, the balance of forces, and so on…. But his dialectic came loose: “…and only then [after comprehending the whole situation] can the degree of political importance that’s due to a particular conflict be weighed, only then can the connection between [the conflict’s] economics and politics be self-evidently settled.”

The third lecture was on “the strike as battle in the class struggle (the application of military science to leadership of the strike movement),” the fourth on “strike strategy and tactics.” In these the military analogies repeated in the RILU since 1923, Lozovsky faithfully reiterated. He omitted Moltke, Bernhardi, and Hindenburg, but gave Clausewitz (whom he reassured his students Lenin had

450 A. Losowsky, Der Streik: Fünf Vorträge gehalten an der Lenin-Schule zu Moskau (Moscow: Rote Gewerkschafts-Internationale, 1930), 31-32. Throughout the lectures Lozovsky ignored the RILU’s third congress, in 1924, citing antecedents no farther back than the fourth, in 1926.
recommended) a magnificent representation. And he discussed some particular strikes in military terms. But he did not bring the previous lecture’s industrial argument into either lecture’s military discourse. For his students’ needs he tried to find or phrase some more rules, but to no operational or consistent or even vivid effect. Here “I emphasize,” he said, “the most important rule of strategy and tactics, that in defensive struggle alone you cannot possibly win.” True, actually a truism. Appended were 1929’s “decisions” so insistent on sensitivity.\footnote{Ibid., 46-47, 50-52, 54-55, 57, 60-61, 67, 71, 76-77, 91-111. Cf. Selznick, op. cit., 102-104.}

Lozovsky remained the RILU secretary-general until the organization closed during the Popular Front, in 1937-38. Although of course he continued to express authoritative analyses and judgments on unions, often in military language, he never again for any public (so far as I know) went into any industrially or technically strategic argument.\footnote{A. Lozovsky, Die Rote Gewerkschafts-Internationale im Angriff. Drei Reden... (Moscow: Rote Gewerkschafts-Internationale, 1930); idem, The World Economic Crisis: Strike Struggles and the Tasks of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (Moscow: State publishers, 1931); idem, Karl Marx und die Gewerkschaften (Moscow: Ausländischer Arbeiter in der UdSSR, 1934); idem, Za edinstvo mirovogo profdvizheniia 9 avgusta 1935 g. (Moscow: TsKVKP(b), 1935); idem, ed., Handbook on the Soviet Trade Unions, for Workers’ Delegations (Moscow: Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1937); idem, Polozhenie rabochego klassa kapitalisticheskikh stran i bor’ba za edinstvo profdvizheniia (Moscow: Profizdat, 1938).}
Chapter VII. Western Marxists: Industrial Warfare, Ideological Struggle, Strategic Power, and Social Movements, 1935-2003

Neither (so far as I can now tell) did Communist or other Marxists in Western Europe, Africa, or Asia, anyway until after World War II. Communist, Socialist, and Trotskyist union organizers continued to collect industrial and technical intelligence for their parties. But their parties did not publish it; the only “strategic” references I have found in their publications, which are rare, are political. However private this intelligence, it became practically secret after Dimitrov’s speech in mid-August 1935 on “Unity of the Working Class against Fascism,” to commit the Comintern’s sections to a “Popular Front against fascism.” For security and because of the rules of bourgeois democratic discourse Communists would not divulge their privileged information. And neither would the others, if only to keep Communists from using it. Industrial and technical operations identified as “strategic” disappeared then from Marxist print, I would bet, everywhere in the Eastern Hemisphere. Even in party schools (i.e., the Comintern’s, not places like SUNY-Albany), although such matters were occasional subjects of discussion, they faded into general lessons, or evanesced into high theory.

But they remained under discussion in the CPUSA. And in the world’s biggest capitalist country, where bourgeois democracy was safest, the industrial working-class had a strong syndicalist streak, and Communists would have to guide a tremendous new labor movement despite the dangers of dual unionism in order to build a Popular Front, the Comintern evidently encouraged the discussion. “J. Peters,” whom it sent to the United States in 1924, had landed here already wise to workers’ industrial and technical as well as political strongpoints. Born in 1894 in Cop, Hungary (now Chop, Ukraine), a railroad junction and border town, he had known material divisions of labor as a little boy, his paternal grandfather “a needletrade worker,” his father a railroad brakeman later a café-owner, his maternal grandfather a locomotive engineer, his mother the family café’s cook. His grandfather the engineer raised him in

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Debrecen (Hungary), a railroad division point. At home one brother became a “skilled machinist,” the other an “unskilled factory worker.” Four years an infantryman in World War I, “Peters” joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1918, helped organize the Cop and Debrecen railroad shops, served in the Hungarian Red Army in 1919, then over the border north in Czechoslovakia organized organizers for the party in Uzhorod, another railroad junction and the regional (Transcarpathian) capital. Many other industrial and technical strengths (and weaknesses) he did not yet understand in 1924, he learned working in small New York City factories, then as a Chicago District organizer, among Southern Illinois mineworkers, Gary steelworkers, and South Bend automobile workers. Five years he then spent back in New York apprentice to the party’s best organizers there. Elected New York District organizational secretary in 1930, he served as the central committee directed at the party’s national training school for organizers, teaching its course on “Organizational Principles.” At Paterson on the strike’s first day in 1931 he helped “bring down shops” at the silk mills. The next year he trained at the Comintern in “organizational issues.” Back in the United States in 1933 he may then (if Whittaker Chambers told it true) have started organizing the party’s new “konspirativnye” connections in Washington and in Hollywood.455

Two years later he certainly showed a strategic conception of industrial organization. In July 1935 he published in New York his “manual” on Communist organization, 117 pages of text, plus an index. He kept losing his focus between “big” and “strategic,” and used “strategic” inconsistently. But in the chapter on “structure and functions” he made the strategic argument on industries clear enough. “The most important points” for the party to organize were “1. The big factories, mines, mills, docks, ships, railroads, etc., where the great masses of the basic sections of the proletariat are employed… The basic organization of the Party is the Shop Unit (Nucleus)…three members or more in a…factory, shop, mine, mill, dock, ship, railway terminal, office, store, farm, etc.” The party’s other basic organization was the street or town unit, “members living within a given territory.” But a shop unit mattered more. “The strategic importance of a Shop Unit, or Concentration Section, or of a District is the governing factor in deciding the number of

delegates to the [party’s highest body, the National] Convention. …the Section Committee can decide whether a Shop Unit from a big factory sends proportionately more delegates to the Section Convention than a Street Unit with the same number of, or perhaps even more, members.” And he explained why. “The main strength of our movement is in the Units (Nuclei) in large factories because: 1. The large factories and railroads are the nerve centers of the economic and political life of the country…” But “large” did not matter as much as “basic,” as he further explained. “The Party should concentrate all its forces and energy to build Shop Units, first of all in the basic industries. Basic industries are those upon which the whole economic system depends. They include: 1. Those which produce material for production, like steel, mining, oil, chemicals. 2. Those which deliver material to the place of production or consumption, like railroad, trucking, marine, etc. 3. Those which produce power for running the wheels of industry, electric power plants, steam and hydro-electric plants.” Strong shop units “in these basic industries with a mass following” in the automobile, textile, and packinghouse industries “could really…deliver decisive blows to capitalism.” He even headed toward a technically strategic argument. Why inside an industrial operation, including transportation, was “the Shop Unit (Nucleus) the best form of basic Party organization?” Among nine reasons, the first was economic (easier formation of a bargaining unit), the second (at least implicitly) technical. “A properly working, well-trained, politically developed Shop Unit…cannot be found out and gotten rid of by the boss. In order to stop the work of such a Unit, the boss must close the factory. That means stopping production--shutting off the profits.” There lay the main difference between Socialist and Communist organization: “the Socialist Party organizations (branches) are built on the basis of bourgeois election wards and districts while the Communist Party is built on the place of employment. Party members who work in the same shop cannot belong to different Street Units.”456

In 1936 “Peters” went into the party’s conspiratorial “apparatus,” and in 1938 went deep underground. But meanwhile, running a united front from below in the AFL and pushing a popular front in the CIO, Party National Chairman William Z. Foster continued to insist as in the old RILU on the vital necessity of “strike strategy,” not only political but industrial too, and at least once, in the parable of the

cook, on a technically strategic position.\textsuperscript{457} Whittaker Chambers bears witness credibly here: In 1939 he agitated against “the Party ‘underground’ in what Communists call ‘strategic places’”--to mention only the least strategic, the Post Office….\textsuperscript{458} Coherent details of various Marxist organizers in industrially or technically strategic action came into public print then and later in lore, memoirs, and autobiographies, e.g., of V. R. Dunne, Karl Skoglund, Wyndham Mortimer, or Robert Travis, “the most brilliant strike strategist the UAW ever had.”\textsuperscript{459}

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After World War II, the tremendous strikes across the United States in 1945-47 challenged Marxists here to understand them and lead them accordingly. Like the great struggles of 1918-20 and 1930-33 they opened historic opportunities for a working-class party, and drove anti-socialist labor leaders to try to stop pro-socialists from organizing bases in labor for it. But unlike before, these post-war strikes happened in the world of the United Nations, a co-victorious Soviet Union, the WFTU, Euro-decolonization, and the atom bomb, all of which seemed to Marxists to make socialism both probable and urgent. And despite the federal laws for collective bargaining this great labor movement gave spectacular proof of certain workers’ industrial and technical power, e.g., classically, in the country’s first nationwide railroad strike. U.S. Communists, having strained during the war to prevent strikes, now fought to lead them in a kind of revival of the united front from below for “a mass people’s party.” Chairman Foster called again as if from the RILU for serious “strike strategy.”\textsuperscript{460} Two years later a federal jury convicted him and his party’s other national officers under the Alien Registration Act of “willfully and knowingly


\textsuperscript{458} Karl [Whittaker Chambers], “The Faking of Americans,” quoted in Klehr et al., \textit{op. cit.}, 95.


conspiring (1) to organize as the Communist Party of the United States of America a society, group and assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence, and (2) knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying” said government by force and violence.\footnote{U.S. Supreme Court, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).} Even under this heat a (still Communist) former CIO steel organizer, become in 1950 an AFL hotel workers’ treasurer, published a sharp, tough, rousing defense of strikes, including “a practical manual” on their conduct, viz., “strike strategy.” There, coming from the RILU’s third congress, 1924, through the lectures at the Lenin School in 1930, is Lozovksy’s explanation of military analysis in “industrial warfare,” uncited (of course), in good American English, but a faithful translation, right down to mentioning Clausewitz. Besides, in abundance, the author offered many industrial examples and some technical lessons from U.S. labor history, e.g., “the key plants and departments [must] receive special attention… Not all the plants are of equal importance. There is always a key plant or department, upon which production, or lack of production, depends… the key point of production,” and “spread the struggle.”\footnote{John Steuben, 	extit{Strike Strategy} (New York: Gaer Associates, 1950), 63-86, 91, 119, 138-139, 148.} But his was (to my knowledge) the last public Communist consideration of such keys.\footnote{Cf. William Z. Foster, 	extit{History of the Communist Party of the United States} (New York: International Publishers, 1952), 299, 347, 561: three passing references to “strike strategy.”}

Already during the war Trotskyists had publicized workers’ power, in wildcat strikes in the United States and in the soviets (they saw) in the works councils organizing across Europe in 1943-44.\footnote{Comité Executif Européen de la IVe Internationale, “Résolution sur la stratégie de sections européennes de la IVe Internationale dans les luttes ouvrières,” 	extit{Quatrième Internationale}, n.s., No. 4 (February 1944), 17-20.} After the war every Trotskyist “tendency” presented its own strategy for fortifying the proletarian cause. But few of these strategies were industrial; none was technical. Cannonism professed “concentration on trade union work,” and introduced “automation” into socialist discussion, but its strategy was always “ideological,” or “educational.”\footnote{James P. Cannon, 	extit{The Struggle for Socialism in the “American Century”: Writings and Speeches, 1945-1947} (New York: Pathfinder, 1977), 86-94, 290, 299-304; idem, 	extit{American Stalinism and Anti-Stalinism} (New York: Pioneer, 1947), 29-34; idem, 	extit{Speeches to the Party: The Revolutionary Perspective and the Revolutionary Party} [1952-1953] (New York: Pathfinder, 1973), 54-63, 124-135; Lynn Marcus, “Automation: The New Industrial Revolution,” 	extit{Fourth International}, Spring 1954, 53-58.} The Johnson-Forest Tendency looked “right at the point of production,” and found there an interesting individual worker (a machinist), but collectively only “the self-mobilization of the proletariat.” And thence its “strategic conclusions” soared into the wild, blue yonder: “abolish
organization….develop spontaneity--the free creative activity of the proletariat.” The Shachtmanites in their “third camp” kept backing “the reformist officialdom against the Stalinist officialdom,” their strategy ever more simply propagandistic, until the one still recognizable Marxist among them adopted a strategy of politics and culture. The Chaulieu-Montal Tendency foresaw workers overthrowing “the fixed and stable distinction between dirigeants and exécutants in production and in social life in general,” organizing their own macro- and micro-gestion, or all humanity suffering “degradation and brutalization.” The proletariat’s capacity to overcome “capitalist and bureaucratic barbarism,” Montal argued, came straight from its history, its “experience,” viz., its “progressive self-organization,” and (explicitly against American industrial sociology then) he framed a brilliant design for research on the “fundamental question, how men placed in conditions of industrial work adapt to this work, knot specific relations among themselves, perceive and practically construct their relation with the rest of society, in a singular way compose an experience in common that makes of them a historic force.” But he did not inquire into their relations of industrial or technical power at work, seeking instead their “attitudes” and “mentality.” Pabloism’s industrial strategist, explaining his plan for factory occupations, advised workers to take “a key enterprise threatened with a lock-out and preferably using [domestic] inputs,” organize national support, operate the plant themselves, and sell the product “according to the population’s needs….”. He and Pablo hailed contrôle ouvrier and autogestion, but never explained what control or management of a plant in production required industrially or technically. The Cochranites, veterans of struggle “at the point of production” in

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Detroit, Flint, and Toledo, sure that industrial work gave industrial workers “class instinct,” pressing therefore “to proletarianize the [Socialist Workers] party,” expressed only a political strategy. The quasi-Bordigan Italian Socialist Left brilliantly expounded the logic of industrial and technical strategy, in which workers’ “informed awareness…and therefore positive, intelligent initiative” would be “decisive” for socialist economic development, but never got to concrete analysis. The Naville ex-Tendency, no longer in a party, but highly influential in the French Ministry of National Education, directed public attention to new technologies’ effects on the divisions of labor, examined automation’s critical need for maintenance, introduced Dunlopian comportement stratégique into French sociologese, and drew suggestive parallels between modern war and industrial work. But it remained stuck on psychology (Watsonian behaviorism!): the sociologie du travail it helped to create, mainly a sociology of occupations, had only a vocational strategy.

Other French Marxists, in the new Parti Socialiste Unifié, insisted on automation’s revolutionary potential. Following (tacitly) the Naville ex-Tendency, an analyst of “the new working class” emphasized l’autogestion en Algérie,” Autogestion: Études, débats, documents, No. 3 (September 1967), 4-10, 70-78; Ernest Mandel, ed., Contrôle ouvrier, conseils ouvriers, autogestion: Anthologie (Paris: Maspéro, 1970), 7-45, 317-425.


its “social psychology,” particularly automation’s “integration” of workers into the firm, that in the most advanced industries “for the first time in history” workers, technicians, and production managers were together merging unionism and socialism. He especially noted “the means of pressure that the relations of [automated] production themselves” gave unions to gain “effective participation” in a company’s gestion. There was “la grève ‘presse bouton’” [the push-button strike], …a system of meticulous organization of the strike based on the system of organization of the firm itself. …the essential thing is to hit management at its most sensitive points,…interrupting production not where the “climate” for making demands is necessarily the strongest, but where stopping production is liable to paralyze important orders or block the start-up of certain production series. …it is a technical conception of striking based on the firm’s characteristics of production and on its inability to put into place a procedure for repression in regard to the technicians.” On such a strike the union’s leadership resembled “a real technical general staff, whose decisions must be followed with discipline by the entire membership.” A long strike at Thomson-Houston in Bagneux in 1959 was “a series of coups de butoir [fender bumpings] day after day at different essential points liable to disturb management.… Here a lab, there a shop, or a section of a shop, they would shut it down for an hour, an hour and a half. In fact 1/25th of the firm was shut at a time, but the repercussion of these different plugs was such that all the firm’s production was paralyzed. Altogether 10% of working hours on strike blocked all production for six weeks. …the slogan: ‘A minimum loss for personnel with a maximum loss for management.’” This particular strike had carried onto the French left’s “strategic and tactical map,” provoking some discord in the Communist Party and encouraging the foundation of the PSU.473 Another PSU intellectual then wrote copiously about French labor’s needs for new “strategy,” which he described eloquently, e.g., “a strategy of progressive conquest,” but rather as he thought Marcuse would, not concretely.474

Marxists eventually (occasionally) Maoist brought no question of workers’ industrial or technical strategy to public debate either. Of those concentrating on economic matters, the most prominent never put their explanations in strategic terms. Of those otherwise occupied, e.g., at “structural Marxism,” the most


Among the many more becoming academics, the most perceptive studying workers worried over the problem of “ideology,” what their subjects thought and why. One of the canniest, who had read a strong derivative of Dunlop’s concept of “strategic,” and who could have related it to union stewards and their “ideology” (ca. 1958), missed that question by a mile.\footnote{E.g., Sidney M. Peck, \textit{The Rank-and-File Leader} (New Haven: College and University Press, 1963), 32-33, 68, 94, 194, 323, 325, his derivative source being Sayles, \textit{Behavior}.} Another, writing on Revolutionary Cuban industrial workers’
“political attitudes,” recognized (as few academics then did) that skilled workers in the sugar mills had a strategic position, which he nearly called “strategic,” but he explained it as a function of the Cuban labor market and as contingent on their “Communist ‘political education.’” He recognized as well that workers (collectively) in certain other industries were “privileged,” viz., workers in “communications, electric power, oil refining, tourism, cigarette manufacturing, and beer and malt brewing,” but not because of their industrial position, rather because they thought they were “privileged.”

1968 sharpened the U.S. academic New Left on authority and alienation, but not on industrial work or workers. Most impressive on these matters in ’68’s immediate wake was a young colleague of Dunlop’s in the Harvard Economics department. Asking whether “work organization [was] determined by technology or by society,” he gave himself plenty room in between or in synthesis to consider industrial workers’ strategic use of technology, which might (often did) lead employers to thwart them by changing it. But he radically shunned Dunlop (then his faculty’s dean), did not differentiate pre-industrial and industrial work, confused the technical need for coordination and the social functions of hierarchy, mixed static with dynamic problems, worried over the wisp of “self-expression,” and never grasped the technical struggle. More acutely an even younger scholar (Harvard B.A., ’70), not yet an academic, but a legislative assistant at Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers, studying (not knowing it was Dunlop’s idea) “labor market stratification,” set to explaining the labor market formed in the U.S. steel industry from 1890 to 1920. Unaware of Industrial Relations Systems (except as she unknowingly read it in Brody’s labor history), she recreated much of Dunlop’s argument on “the technical context,” not in his terms (IR “systems,” or “job content,” etc.), but in some of her “major themes” close to his idea, e.g., a technical “realm of possibilities,” conflict over job reclassifications, and so on. Even so she too confused technical and social relations, mixed struggles in place with struggles over change, and missed the strategic uses


workers made of technology between changes.⁴⁸¹ Among other U.S. academic New Lefties then, typically engrossed in studies of working-class “consciousness,” none I can find wrote of modern workers conscious of their industrially or technically strategic power at work, or of them actually having any power, except as a class, culturally united. One who knew industrial work well saw workers’ power there only in skill, whiteness, masculinity, seniority, and (for those lacking these attributes) anger. He took technical divisions of labor simply for limits on workers, and took the labor movement, as if its members’ work were strategically irrelevant, for at best “a social movement.”⁴⁸²

Unlike the U.S. New Left, young European academic Marxists post-’68 consistently focused on capitalism’s class struggles, and conceptualized them strategically. One in Britain referred explicitly to technical strength, e.g., “strategic power to bring a whole works to a standstill,” citing Dunlop in his account of the difficulties and significance of organizing early 20th-century English craftsmen, semi-skilled workers, and unskilled laborers into a “general union.” Even in the emotion over “unofficial strikes” in Britain then he recalled, not from Dunlop but from a directly derived source, “strategic position in the flow of production which makes management highly vulnerable.” Others regardless of Dunlop also commented on technically strategic positions and shopfloor strategy in their own studies of (then) modern assembly lines and plants “as automated as possible.” All these, however, were passing observations, the primary question being to explain, “What do workers want?,” not whence did they have the power to act, but why they acted, the answer being “grievances and aspirations,” or “consciousness,” or “attitudes.”⁴⁸³ Of


the young theorists in “the current debate [1973] on revolutionary strategy” in France, the most important noted not only “the particular opportunities” that “technicians and subaltern engineers” had “of impeding production,” but also “the new possibilities of…bottle-neck strikes…precisely…open to semi-skilled workers,” but again only in passing. In Italy among the young professors of Potere Operaio, recognizing the working class “as subject of power,” the most ingenious was teaching that in autonomously organized struggles for their obvious needs, “the factory of strategy,” workers were gaining “a capacity for violence equal and contrary to that of the bosses,” and on their own would create “the strategy of revolution.” But he could not tell what “the revolutionary practice of the masses” would be, since “insurrection” was “an art.”

Among the New Left’s elders one Marxist, in Britain, popularized electronics for a broader, more peaceful movement. As he explained it, “the new technical revolution, namely, the computer revolution,” provided the necessary material condition for “a new socio-economic structure.” From operations research, network analysis, and input-output economics he argued that the computer allowed not only more centralized (monopoly) capitalism and more centralized socialism, but also local “basic community units” to develop “decentralised” socialism. He cited for an example (a sign of New Left confusion) the Czech reforms in 1967-68, according to which “the central economic authorities [were] to take only broad strategic decisions shaping the general direction of longer-term development.” He did not even hint, however, that workers at computers could also disorganize existing economic and political structures. It would not take a very subversive reader to infer an industrial strategy from his discussion of “the transportation problem,” “linkages,” “bottlenecks,” or “the technological dangers in excessive centralisation,” viz., “very serious disruption in the event of a breakdown.” But he did not draw it, not even in his “strategy” of a “Socialist-trade union alliance” and “workers’ control.”


Another in Britain, the most theoretically enthusiastic and critically keen of the younger generation there, returned to the original Gramsci for help on a revolutionary socialist strategy. It was a long, fascinating, often brilliant inquiry, but on one plane and along one (very sinuous) line. From a politico-cultural perspective the hopeful strategist went far into Gramsci’s politico-cultural ideas on “hegemony,” and carefully, grippingly explained their politico-cultural virtues and faults. He even discovered (for socialists who don’t read German) the great Kautsky-Luxemburg debate of 1910, the unacknowledged Delbrück, Niederwerfungs- and Ermattungsstrategie, and Gramsci’s unwitting, indirect adoption of this discourse. But for all that about strikes and revolution and socialism he did not notice Kautsky’s or Luxemburg’s industrial examples, or wonder about Gramsci’s (scattered, idiomatic, coded) notes on Ordine Nuovo, “the new intellectual,” “spontaneity,” “union” and “unionism,” and “the factory,” where (Gramsci wrote) “hegemony is born….”487 There a “new intellectual” might read some industrially and technically interesting strategic commentary. But a leading New Left intellectual did not.

Of all the Marxist intellectuals then actually involved in socialism as it actually was, but trying to “humanize” or “democratize” it, probably the most strategically minded was the Czech who had been the principal author of the Prague Spring’s “Program of Action.” But the positions of strength for his strategy, in 1968 in the CPC Central Committee, afterward in the international public discourse, images, and politics of human rights, made it best always to ignore the chances of workers seizing the Skoda steel furnaces. A young Hungarian in excellent position to publish a view on workers’ technical power in a big plant’s machine shop, innocently did not in his book about his work there (which may be what kept him out of jail). A member of the East German party, announcing his “general strategy” for a “Communist Alternative,” predicted a “comprehensive cultural revolution” to “overcome subalternity,” i.e., a radical educational reform that would abolish “the old division of labor.” But the main force for this revolution would be only “unhappy consciousness” among “an intelligentsia focused on the universal.” The leading intellectuals of the Polish Workers Defense Committee showed no particular interest in the Lenin

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Shipyard’s electrical department (but went to jail when they joined Solidarity, the chairman of which, an
electrical engineer, came from that department). 488

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So for decades Marxism contributed but faintly to public considerations of workers’ industrial
(never mind technical) power. Not until fifty years after the RILU’s deliberations on “strike strategy,”
almost 40 years after “Peters” explained “basic industries” and “Shop Units,” almost 25 years after the
CPUSA tried to refocus organizers on them, nothing of which anyone evidently remembered in 1974, do I
find again clear, publicly Marxist premises for the industrial and technical arguments—in an ex-
Cochranite’s remarkable book that year on “the degradation of work.” Unlike New Leftists American and
European then, Harry Braverman did not worry over proletarian attitudes; he wanted to understand “the
structure of the working class.” Rejecting the craze “to derive the ‘science before the science,’” he intended
to conceptualize the class first not “for itself,” but “as a class in itself.” This conception he sought in the
study of production, of the working class at work, in its occupations and their changes. He went deep into
the new Harvard Business School- and U.S. government-sponsored studies of automation, its effects on
productivity, and their consequences for “manpower.” 489 There he saw “the working class as it exists, as the
shape given to the working population by the capital accumulation process,” and consequently cast his
explanation of the class in the modern divisions of labor power and “the labor process,” i.e., “the work of
production,” specifically “the subdivision of labor in detail.” 490 On these premises he might well have made
a Marxist version of Dunlop’s argument. And he did describe skilled and semi-skilled workers in the
United States, particularly machinists and clerical workers, holding industrially and technically strategic


490 Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 70-84, 187-223.
positions of unprecedented power from the 1930s into the 1970s. But from faults in logic and substance, e.g., a slipping dialectic, irrepressible Trotskyist apocalypticism, a continual drift in focus from divisions of labor to particular trades, an underdeveloped notion of imperialism, neglect of recent American and European industrial battles, omission of the recent European Marxist analyses of technology and labor, assumption (shades of the aristocracy of labor) of the identity of skill and power, he could not conceive of such strength in the future. The “labor process” under monopoly capitalism (nearly the same in “the Soviet bloc”) led, he explained, to continual deskilling, therefore labor’s progressive incapacitation. It was simply the scientifically centralized, subordinate cooperation of scientifically divided, detailed, degraded labor, continually redivided, redetailed, and more degraded. Like bourgeois sociologists and the New Left then, he concluded that modern workers were losing all but emotional power.

Post-Braverman, mostly in his wake, many Marxist academics considering questions of strategy took only capitalists or managers for strategists. In their accounts workers acted only in “resistance,” on the strength of interests, indignation, or solidarity, maybe by “stratagem,” but never strategically. In one of the best such accounts, on the British automobile industry, the author distinguished “central workers…who,

by the strength of their resistance [because of their “power to disrupt production”], collectively force...managers to regard them as essential,” but never identified which were disruptive, much less “the potentially most disruptive,” or allowed that their disruptions could be strategic. In many other Marxist accounts industrial workers (even “the working class” at large) appeared capable of strategy, but only away from work, in labor markets or politics or culture. In still other accounts workers did hold positions of recognized industrial and technical power. Some of these positions were only conjunctural, opportunities of a transition from one division of labor to another. Most, which more or less veiled Braverman, were structural, inevitable, inherent in modern production whether in capitalist democracies, a capitalist dictatorship, a people’s republic, or in Islamic republic.

496 E.g., Michel Freyssenet, La division capitaliste du travail (Paris: Savelli, 1977), 107; Randy Hodson and Teresa A. Sullivan, The Social Organization of Work (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1990), 251; Enrique de la Garza Toledo, Reestructuración productiva y respuesta sindical en México (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1993), 163, 171-172, 176-177, 180, 182, 195.
in cooperation or conflict with capitalists, managers, or other workers, they wielded extraordinary force. But none of this literature included any industrial or technical explanation of the fact.

The failure is particularly frustrating in otherwise good studies of labor’s struggles in highly strategic industries. For example, to show “workers’ actual potential, . . . what workers can do . . . if they choose,” a young U.S. critic of Braverman’s wrote of “democratic” and “bureaucratic” factions in a Los Angeles Teamsters local. He argued rightly that the IBT had enormous “economic power,” enough “to transform the social and political climate of America,” not because of its numbers or treasury, but because of its “power . . . to disrupt production” on a national scale. But he never indicated how much disruption his local could cause. He attended constantly to “strategy” and “strategic” concerns. He gave a vivid sense of truck drivers’ “potential power,” even internationally. He described how drivers had done “direct action.” And he explained why his “democratic” subjects had to resist “their own localism,” not hold to “a parochial strategy,” but connect with other workers, spread their movement, if they would beat the bosses and their “bureaucratic” rivals; he insisted on “strategic outreach.” But he thought their strategy, i.e., “thought-out plans of long-term action,” depended only on social relations, e.g., personal circles in the company yard, hiring hall, or parking lot, or at a regular café or club, where militants could stir the offensive spirit and keep it strong. He noted that unlike most Teamsters locals elsewhere his local comprised only drivers, and these not on the road, but driving “the streets” making “pickups and deliveries,” viz., PUD drivers. But he missed the fact’s technical significance. His drivers’ “strategic position” he explained in purely sociological (Simmelian?) terms, adding that it gave them “cultural influence” among other workers, but ignoring their material relations even with other Teamster “crafts” in moving Metro LA’s freight, or stopping it. As if a formalized division of labor meant technical separation, he lamented his local’s “isolation” from the other “crafts,” e.g., dockhands and maintenance mechanics, but simply for the sociological loss, not for the technical loss of the power to close docks and deadline trucks. He recalled cooperation from the mechanics’ local in successful direct actions, but as an issue of solidarity, not as technical reinforcement. Evidently he could not see the extra-disruptive potential of technical alliances.


498 Samuel R. Friedman, “Changes in the Trucking Industry and the Teamsters Union: The Bonapartism of Jimmy Hoffa,” The Insurgent Sociologist [Special Issue on The Social Relations of Work & Labor], VIII, 2
Another example appears in the preeminent analysis of changes in technology and work at U.S. automobile plants between the 1890s and 1950. Following “a complex, dialectical [actually New Left] theory,” this young Braverman critic wanted to show that capitalism continually regenerated “subjective and cultural” contradictions. For proof he adduced the auto industry’s concentration in “a few huge factories,” which brought its workers “into close communication with one another and [stimulated]…the growth of class consciousness and collective action.” He gave an engineer’s precise insight into the functionalist “vulnerability” of the industry’s moving assembly lines, the threat of “disruption” in the technically symmetrical dependence there. And he had a clear concept of technical dissymmetries, e.g., in the 1930s, GM’s vital dependence on its two “mother plants,” manufacturing units in Flint and Cleveland where its workers stamped the bodies of maybe “three-fourths or more” of the company’s cars. But he also left the wrong impression that “interdependence of the labor process” happened only along the line, as if only in continuous sequence, so that strategic positions were only on the line. Considering the great strikes in 1936-37 he focused on pulling switches, and missed the workers’ physical capture of the strategic dies GM tried to remove from Fisher One, or the strategic importance of the powerhouse there (if only for heat, since this was Michigan, and the occupation began December 30). And he ignored the difference between technically and socially strategic operations (Fisher One and Chevrolet No. 4).

The most original and effective Marxist critique of Braverman’s thesis came in 1979 from Michael Burawoy. Like Braverman, Burawoy wanted to explain monopoly capital’s exploitation of labor in “the labor process,” particularly in machining. However, he defined this process as both “practical” and “relational.” Practically, it “is…[or “involves”] the translation of the capacity to work into actual work,” evidently (as for Braverman) a material or technical process. In its “relational aspect,” it is “the relations of the shop floor into which workers enter, both with one another and with management,” making “a shop-floor culture.” Against Braverman, Burawoy minimized the matter of divided and subdivided labor, took


499 David Gartman, Auto Slavery: The Labor Process in the American Automobile Industry, 1897-1950 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University, 1986), 15, 33, 155-160, 164-178, 262-263, 322. See also Larry George to h-labor@h-net.msu.edu, “Third message on Flint sit down,” July 8, 2003, where Travis’s daughter Carole Travis tells of the decision to take Chevrolet No. 4, referring to “[not] strategic enough” and (twice) to “strategy,” but not specifying or explaining “strategic” or “strategy,” emphasizing instead the importance of “drama.” Cf. Kraus, op. cit., 78-83, 86-91, 106, 125-126, 150-151, 179, 189-229, 251-254.
individuals as his subjects, magnified culture’s power, and shifted emphasis from capitalist coercion to capitalist inducement of workers’ (self-negating) consent. Even so, from derivatives of Dunlop’s argument in “organization theory,” he recognized certain workers as “strategic,” or “key,” or “core,” in “a strong bargaining position.” Even if some workers knowingly worked perforce part of their turn just for capital, while others felt they were playing as they did so, Burawoy could well have also considered those who were “crucial to the [strictly “practical”] production process or…important to the smooth [“practical”] running of the factory.” But he did not. Because of his primary interest not in the working class, but in the singular worker, because of his emphasis on consent, his free-spirited (not Marx’s, rather Simmel’s, or Erving Goffman’s) dialectic, his irrepressible functionalism, and his dramatization of “the labor process,” which he also termed, indiscriminately, “relations in production,” “relations at the point of production,” and “the organization of work” (comprising “technical relations in production” and “social relations in production”), in which form he stressed its “political and ideological effects,” he instead mostly dematerialized “the production process.” By his definition it was “the [technical and social] organization of work” plus “political apparatuses of production,” or, as he defined them, the workplace’s regulatory “institutions.” Hence “the production process” was a “production regime,” specifically a “factory regime,” whose “political apparatuses” were the “locus and object” of a “politics of production.” This notion, a workplace “regime” and its politics, was not Dunlop’s idea of a workplace’s “rules” and “disputes.” For Burawoy whatever happened at a shop where production happened, workers working, workers playing, was part of production (or a part in the production): what mattered most was immaterial work, serious stuff, all work, no play—“ideological struggle.”

Most remarkable, however, on proletarian industrial power the most important Marxist advance in theory since Parvus’s, were some “papers” posthumously published in the United States on industrial workers’ “potere vulnerante,” the damage strikes can do to an economy. The young Italian professor who

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had written them, Luca Perrone, had been no militant, and he never gave any sign of even having heard of Braverman or his thesis (or of Burawoy, much less Parvus). A graduate of the Università Cattolica in Milan in 1968, he had spent 1969-71 at Pirelli (in “information and industrial relations”) mastering the literature on information theory, systems theory, and organization theory. In his first professional performance, at an Olivetti Foundation conference in 1971 on “the social and political implications of scientific-technological innovations in the information sector,” he had concentrated on strategic information, systematic conflicts, and technically powerful shifts inside organizations. As a graduate student in Sociology at Berkeley from 1971 to 1974, he had shown special interest in “social classes,” particularly in measuring inequality. In 1979, for his first major project, on “strikes as collective action,” looking to found an “Italian school” on “labor conflicts,” he went into “graph theory,” toward “operations research,” “network analysis,” and “path analysis,” to learn how to find industrial “constraint.” Just then he discovered Parkin, workers’ with vastly “disruptive potential,” and “vulnerable” capital, whence his translation, *il potere vulnerante*, “wounding power.” And surveying neoclassical labor economics, as it happened in literature by Dunlop’s critics, he discovered the concept of “union power,” which (despite the economist he quoted) he took for “workers’ power.” So contrarily induced into Dunlop’s strategic argument, without knowing it, he ingeniously invented it himself, got its industrial and technical logic quite right, not in a market but in production, in “micro-macro interaction,” went beyond Dunlop to install the argument explicitly in input-output analysis, making “a strategic position in the flow of goods and services” (in principle) clear and measurable, added Ricardo on “positional rent” in matters of compensation, and started collecting evidence for a full theoretical development. But he died in 1980 (at 35); and since then no Marxist has promoted his argument, expanded it, or refined it.  

Meanwhile old and new Marxist academics were advocating a new Marxist science that might have yielded a concept of industrially powerful workers. In Cambridge (Mass.), Worcester (Mass.), Paris, Baltimore, and London (why in these places in particular an intellectual historian may one day explain), they revealed exciting prospects of their “new economic geography,” the study of capitalism’s continual, always uneven territorial development, redeployment, relocation of industrial operations. But they remained geographers nonetheless, and all oblivious of Parvus, Delbrück, and Dunlop; they had no engineer’s eye. Had they seen labor’s “strategic locations” not only in terrestrial but also in unevenly developed industrial “space,” or in localized technical division, seen them on a scale of disruptivability, they might well have drawn a Perronian argument in industrial maps and blueprints. But they worried too much about capitalist real-estate maneuvers, urban planning, and economic landscapes, to conceptualize a cartography or model of capitalist industrial (or technical) vulnerability.502 The biggest loss accrued from the best of them, Yves Lacoste, who had the clearest strategic sense. Had he and his comrades at Hérodote offered not only a geopolitical analysis for anti-imperialists, but also a geindustrial analysis of proletarian powers of disorganization, they could have taught workers “how to organize there, how to fight there.”503 But they did not.

Highly promising anyway, even without Perrone or the new geography, was a new British Marxist study of industrial relations in “new technologies,” i.e., computers. Bryn Jones opposed Braverman’s thesis


workers in “strategic” terms. In short he established the grounds for a sophisticated Marxist analysis of workers’ industrial and technical positions of power, and he had the vocabulary. But he had other fish to fry.

Still more promising was a British Marxist adoption of “sociotechnical theory.” From study of “industrial psychology,” John Kelly had turned to “job satisfaction,” then to modern industry’s “organization of work,” in his words its “division of labor,” and the “wage-effort bargain…the instrumental character of employment.” There he reported workers “strategically placed to disrupt production,” and recognized that a labor movement could have a general “strategic framework.” But despite his insights into labor’s structure he did not indicate specific industries or particular positions at industrial work from which workers could seriously disrupt production; much less did he develop an argument to explain industrially or technically strategic action. In later studies of strategic industrial strikes in Britain, although he once cited Kautsky (i.e., Kautsky’s crib from Delbrück) on “the strategy of attrition, as opposed to the strategy of overthrow,” Kelly did not suggest an industrial or technical position on which to base either strategy. Ultimately he recalled Dunlop’s Industrial Relations Systems, but ignored its strategic argument to criticize the book for having “conveyed a sense of stability in industrial relations.” As if strategy were mission, or simply a wish (“if wishes were horses…”), he returned to a kind of social psychology, “mobilization theory,” in search of the conditions and ideology to inspire workers’ collective action: labor’s strength of will would be the basis of labor’s strategy. The young U.S. Marxist probably best prepared then to conceptualize strategic industrial work was a second-generation “new economic geographer” at Berkeley. Coming from a Stanford (’69) B.A. in Economics and a Hopkins (’77) Ph.D. in Geography and Environmental Engineering (supervisor David Harvey), Richard Walker had written brilliantly on value and rent in Marxism, capital mobility, and

505 Jones, Forcing the Factory, 111-112, 248-249.
location theory, before turning in 1983 to study labor. Through the next decade he and fellow Marxist geographers wrote brilliantly on labor markets and mobility, services in production, mechanization and reorganization of “the labor process,” the geographics of industrial work, technology and place in developing divisions of labor, and so forth. They enlarged on every idea necessary for conceptualizing strategic position in production. And along the way they read some Dunlop (and the right Parkin). Most promising were their considerations of the “social” (¼ industrial) and “technical” as well as “spatial division of labor,” where they brought their geographic arguments nearly to the strategic point, almost replicating Dunlop’s analysis. Even so, they did not consider the use of labor’s divisions to disrupt production. In their accounts (as in Braverman’s) capital was the protagonist, especially for its powers of “coordination,” and never in danger. Walker and his co-authors insisted on capitalist mayhem, but emphasized firms’ “strategies” keeping continually new divisions of labor together in production and “circulation.” The only base they noted that labor used strategically was political, e.g., “the left-controlled Greater London Council,” which in 1985-86 pursued an “Industrial Strategy….embodied bold and imaginative socialist policies” (before Thatcher abolished it). They wanted to imagine a Left better at coordinating production and consumption than capitalism or Soviet socialism had been, a Left able to “overcome the social division of labor,” to “integrate” labor for the sake of all workers. They did not envision politically or industrially how this Left could gain a serious chance to do such integration.509

By the late 1980s a second generation of post-Braverman sociologists at Berkeley was doing Marxist studies of “the labor process.” One of Burawoy’s students who shifted well into Industrial Relations chose a comparative study of U.S. and British machinists suffering pre-1914 degradation of their labor and fighting back in “factory politics.” He conceptualized “strategic power” at work, and used the

concept to help explain U.S. machinists’ support for industrial unionism, British machinists’ support for syndicalism. But confining himself to machinists, disregarding not only Dunlop, but Parkin and Perrone too, conceptually in debt to Soffer, and relying often on the Sofferism in Montgomery’s labor history, he practically argued only craftsmen or skilled workers ever held “strategic positions” -- the old (anyway mainly cultural) argument about “labor aristocrats.”

Among young U.S. Marxist academics then the one who dealt most with labor’s direct leverage was another sociologist, Howard Kimeldorf. He wanted primarily to understand “radical” West Coast dockworkers. While emphasizing social origins and culture to explain the difference between West Coast “radicals” and East Coast “conservatives” in the 1930s and ’40s, he knew about “critical, basic or ‘key’ industries,” knew as well that “every work place has its characteristic paratechnical relations,” and that “content and timing of strategy” were “of critical importance.” Nevertheless, “bridging” only “‘culturalist’ and ‘syndicalist’ problematics,” he ignored the industrial and “paratechnical” positions of power at work that “radicals” and “conservatives” used to spread (or impose) their “organizing strategies.” In his later study of syndicalism among Philadelphia dockworkers and New York hotel and restaurant workers, in both cases “industrial syndicalism” (the IWW) in the 1910s, “business syndicalism” (the AFL) in the 1930s, he argued from the start workers’ power “to disrupt production.” And there he drew outright on Perrone’s strategic argument. But he used it only half right: distinguishing between “strategically located skilled workers” with “reserve power” and “the less skilled” without “positional advantages,” who had only “the power of large numbers…magnified by strategic timing,” or “situational power,” he ignored strategically positioned less-skilled workers. If Kimeldorf had understood better the modern industrial division of

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510 Jeffrey Haydu, Between Craft and Class: Skilled Workers and Factory Politics in the United States and Britain, 1890-1922 (Berkeley: University of California, 1988), passim, especially 2, 12-13, 27-30, 60, 66-67, 73-74, 77, 100, 103, 118, 125, 137, 175, 186, 228 n1, 266 n1.
labor, industrial work’s asymmetries in dependence, he would have understood better labor’s continual
conflict between homogeneity and heterogeneity, and could have strategically explained its varying
syndicalism. But “in the world of work,” following Burawoy, he looked rather for “consciousness,” for a
dispositional issue, a feeling, “solidarity,” and (most undialectically) for “syndicalism, pure and simple.”
Instead of projecting even half of Perrone’s argument into a highly strategic modern industry, e.g.,
communications, he found general significance in the “unusual militancy” of a Las Vegas restaurant
hostess, a brave worker, but no more than morally powerful.\textsuperscript{513}

Through the last 15 years, in concern over Information Technology and the latest round of
capitalist globalization, Marxists have much debated contemporary labor strategy—all regardless of Parvus,
Parkin, and Perrone. Testing Braverman’s and Burawoy’s arguments in “hi-tech communications,” one of
the sharpest new scholars of “work and technology” did an excellent analysis of “strategic” work at Bell’s
old Central Offices. He also gave an excellent explanation of AT&T’s “algorithmic” victory there by
installing its Mechanized Loop Testing system, which “destroyed the industry’s most strategic craft [the
Test Deskmen]….” He concluded that management’s new technology could (as it did at New York
Telephone in the 1970s) bring more skilled jobs to a plant, but destroy workers’ technical power there,
because it automated the work “at the directive nodes of the productive circuitry…. ” If he had taken a cue
from Jones (whom he may have read, but did not cite), he might have found new directive nodes and
workers there. If he had followed Perrone, he would have examined the connections between circuits.\textsuperscript{514} He
may have been too pessimistic about hi-tech labor’s future because he had not looked at the field broadly
enough.

However glum its conclusion, his book implied a reasonable hope for labor that other Marxists in
the debate rarely offered. For the most part their efforts in writing looked like many not-Marxist debates on
labor strategy, much moral advice and exhortation, heavy-lifting, straining, huffing, and puffing about what
labor should do, must do. Almost all the coherent arguments were largely political: what strategy labor
should follow in partisan affiliation, what strategy supposedly pro-labor parties should follow against pro-

\textsuperscript{513} Kimeldorf, \textit{Battling}, 1-20, 30, 58-59, 85, 153-158, 166-167, 175 n28, 182 n60, 208 n4.
\textsuperscript{514} Steven P. Vallas, \textit{Power in the Workplace: The Politics of Production at AT&T} (Albany: State
University of New York, 1993), 11, 13, 17-24, 83-140, 187-195. He knew Parkin, \textit{ibid.}, 218 n9, but not the
book best for his purposes.
business parties, what strategy putatively pro-labor parties in government should follow. The few that shifted away from national “social democracy,” to strategies for “new social movements,” or “mobilization,” or local “democratization,” or “structured movement,” or “new internationalism,” have all again been to change labor’s heart and mind. Seldom is there any recognition of the kind of power workers themselves might have at work, its locale no more specified or detailed than “the workplace,” “the shopfloor,” or “the assembly line.” In France, instead of explaining the tremendous strikes (successful) there in 1995, so that labor elsewhere could learn from them, French academic Marxists took the occasion to prove themselves smarter than “certain” other French intellectuals who had assured the world of la fin du travail. Some hegemonic contest!

Although barely noticed even in the U.S. debate on strategy, the contemporary Marxist who has clarified most about it is Jerry Lembcke. He too is blank on Parvus, Parkin, and Perrone. But he has articulated familiar theses into his own sharp, dialectically tight explanation of labor’s potential. Straight from Marx and Engels (regardless of the “new economic geography”) he emphasizes that capitalist development is uneven from the start within countries, so that nationally the capitalist class and the working class are both continually reforming in sectorally and geographically shifting divisions of the old-fashioned, the not so old but far from new, and the vanguard of growth. From “structural Marxism” he

518 E.g., Jacques Kergoat et al., Le monde du travail (Paris: La Découverte, 1998), especially on “the strike as enigma,” 389-390.
insists on the distinction between a class’s “intrinsic capacity” (the capitalist class’s being capital accumulation, the working class’s being “collectivity”) and either class’s “hegemonic capacity”…[or] ability to deploy…[its] intrinsic capacity against opposing classes.” From “radical critical theory” Lembcke stresses the strategic difference between the capitalist class’s “pecuniary logic” of collective action, and the working class’s “associational logic” of collective action, its less “proletarianized” fractions pushing business unions (“the mobilization of financial resources”), its more “proletarianized” fractions pushing industrial and general unions (“mobilizing human resources”). And from Communist unionizing in the 1930s he argues for “strategic importance” rather than size (number of members) as “the key consideration” in unionizing campaigns. “The key…was to mobilize the sectors of the working-class movement that were regionally, sectorally, and politically over-developed in such a way that…sectors underdeveloped at the time could advance, sling-shot fashion, beyond…more advanced sectors… In other words, the structural location of job positions in the most advanced sector constitutes the cutting edge of the historical process.” (In yet other, simpler words, “the most advanced sector” in the most developed region is most strategic because it matters more than any other to the entire structure of production.) If workers in this sector and region use their strategic power only for themselves, they do no more than drive capitalism into new forms, and sooner or later it will outflank them. If they use their power collectively, to organize the working class at large, they give it the “hegemonic capacity” for “socialist transformation.” And if the working class at large uses this capacity not only defensively, in economic strikes, but also offensively, in political strikes, it takes the lead toward socialism.

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Lembcke, “Labor History’s ‘Synthesis Debate,’” 159; idem, *Capitalist Development*, 29-31, 41-42, 150-153, 158-159, 163-168, 175. Cf. the third generation of “new economic geography,” or the new “political economy of place,” especially “geographically informed study of labor and work,” the best of which are Andrew Herod, ed., *Organizing the Landscape: Geographical Perspectives on Labor Unionism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1998), xiii-xvi; and idem, *Labor Geographies: Workers and the Landscapes of Capitalism* (New York: Guilford, 2001), both ignorant of Lembcke, but fully versed in “social construction.” Of at least 60 references to labor “strategy” in the former, none shows any sense of specifically industrial positions of strength, and only one is to a technically strategic stronghold: *Organizing*, 276-277. Of at least 30 such references in the later book, none has specifically industrial
But Lembcke does not go deeper, into the industrial, technical bases of strategic strikes, defensive or offensive. The “units” of Communist unionizing in the 1930s interest him as bases more of “representation” and community “mobilization,” than of industrial action. For all his clarity on “linkage between temporal and spatial unevenness,” he misses the party’s emphasis on “Shop Units…in the basic industries”; he does not look for linkages in production, the “micro-macro interaction” at work or striking work. His slingshot simile, potential energy released into kinetic energy, correctly puts labor’s most strategic positions inside capitalism’s most advanced sector, but “sector” (domestic, foreign, private, public, primary, secondary, tertiary?) is too vague for practical strategic analysis or planning. Besides, the logic of starting a struggle in the same area as the planned final front may be too narrow. Because of uneven development, a strike in a less advanced industry, e.g., transportation, may shut down various more advanced industries, including the most advanced, pull capital into crisis, and cascade labor’s collective action.

If Lembcke had connected historical, sectoral, geographic, industrial, and technical questions, he could have made Marxist theory even more useful than he did not only for labor history but for labor sociology and labor’s strategizing as well. For example, consider the now (still) most advanced U.S. industry, telecommunications, where it is most developed and most congested, along the East Coast. Struggling with capital there as strategically as they can, telecommunications workers have not lately suffered another algorithmic defeat. Since each algorithm is good only for its task, workers have sought as yet extra-algorithmic, still irregular tasks, found them in repairs, installation, and maintenance, and struck them to defend themselves. They have even tried to close MAN (metropolitan area network) offices. And they have had some defensive success. Struggling with capital there as strategically as they can, telecommunications workers have not lately suffered another algorithmic defeat. Since each algorithm is good only for its task, workers have sought as yet extra-algorithmic, still irregular tasks, found them in repairs, installation, and maintenance, and struck them to defend themselves. They have even tried to close MAN (metropolitan area network) offices. And they have had some defensive success. They would probably win new ground for themselves and other workers if they made industrially strategic alliances, fought across broader terrain, and raised the stakes. If the next telecommunications strike along the East Coast coincided with “concerted activities” on I-95 in New Jersey and in the North American Power Grid’s Eastern Interconnection, at least in the East Central

significance; a non-strategic reference to “skill” suggests “greater bargaining power”: Labor Geographies, 276 n3.

Area and the Mid-America Interconnected Network serving Louisville (UPS’s hub) and Memphis (FedEx’s hub), it would indicate substantial working-class “hegemonic capacity.” What would such a coincidence take technically? Most important, as far as I can tell, would be strategically located electrical maintenance technicians, radio mechanics, help-desk workers, teamsters, and shipping clerks. Consider the same industry in Mexico, where the Mexican working class already has an industrially strategic alliance with substantial “hegemonic capacity,” between the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas, the Sindicato de Telefonistas, and the Sindicato del Seguro Social. Its technically most strategic workers are all in electrical and electronic maintenance. If capitalism cannot avoid industrial or technical divisions of labor, if being historical, happening sequentially, in time, in consequences, it cannot avoid misfits, overlaps, or bridges, if in its hopefully algorithmic fortresses automation cannot be seamless, absolute, and continuous, endlessly evolving and profitable, if even cybernation cannot do without several algorithms (crisp or fuzzy) and their consequent intersections, connections, and interfaces, the exposure most vulnerable, if especially in colonies and neocolonies the connections between technologically old and technologically new processes of production are fragile, then the more technical complexity, but also the more the working class’s technical powers increase—especially where the matrix is international. If these powers are not more effective, as force, the reason may be less culture than calculation, which being reasonable could reasonably change to favor force.


Chapter VIII. Strategic Practice and Theory in Business, Indignation and Memorials in Labor

In commerce, because merchants have ever used advantage to block or beat each other, the implication of strategy is ancient.\(^{526}\) As the origins and etymologies of “commission,” “arsenal,” commande, Cadiz, “company,” Kamerad, “caravan,” tovarishch, pochteca, ah ppolom, mindala, tinkuy, gongsi, and Balija Naidu suggest, it was strong in trading societies North, South, East, and West. To cite only a few famous cases, the Vikings, the Karimi, the merchants of Venice, the Ayyavole, the merchants of

Zaitun, the Dutch East and West Indies Companies, and the Bobangi all did their business strategically. So did innumerable lesser partnerships along the way. The first point in modern commerce was always to corner the market. In the United States, whatever good they did national defense, capitalists investing in canals and turnpikes had strategic position against rival businesses in mind.527

At least since Americans went into the fur trade in the Rockies the notion of “strategy” in business has been explicit in print in English.528 Surveys by U.S. Army engineers of rival railroad routes westward antebellum and the success of the U.S. Military Railroads during the Civil War strengthened the notion postbellum.529 Whether Daniel Drew or Cornelius Vanderbilt spoke or wrote of their “strategy” against each other in “the Erie [railroad] wars,” I do not know, but the best journalist on these wars publicized the “strategy” of Drew, Gould, Fisk, and the Erie directors.530 The president of the Louisville & Nashville in 1880 boasted to its shareholders of “the commanding and strategic position enjoyed by your company.”531 Jay Gould’s nemesis, raising capital to hold the Northern Pacific, privately bragged of “the greatest feat of strategy I ever performed…”532 Amid Teddy Roosevelt’s trustbusting a journalist repopularizing American


528 The first use recorded in the OED is Washington Irving, The Rocky Mountains: or, Scenes, Incidents, and Adventures in the Far West; digested from the journal of Capt. B.L.E. Bonneville…, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, and Blanchard, 1837), I, 68: “The captain had here the first taste of the boasted strategy of the fur trade.” Cf. Johann Heinrich von Thünen, Der isolierte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirtschaft und Nationalökonomie [1826] (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1990), 15-280, first clear grounds for a theory of strategy in business, but no such conceptual development; and Antoine A. Cournot, Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie de richesses (Paris: L. Hachette, 1838), the first such theory, but with the idea of strategy only implicit, despite Cournot’s services to Marshal Gouvion de Saint-Cyr.


railroad history for a mass readership praised the Pennsylvania Railroad as “a triumph of financial strategy.”533 Ida Tarbell in her instantly famous articles on Standard Oil hyperbolized “[t]he strategic importance” of Standard’s early acquisition of refineries, titled a passage “Strategic Location of Refineries,” and observed of John D. Rockefeller, “He saw strategic points like a Napoleon, and he swooped on them with the suddenness of a Napoleon.”534 So far as I can tell the first professor to write “strategist” (once) for a businessman acting strategically against other businessmen (all in the abstract) was the German social philosopher Franz Oppenheimer.535 But the first economist I believe to have adopted the popular usage, to describe entrepreneurs, trusts, and monopolies, was the American John Bates Clark.536


534 Ida M. Tarbell, “The History of the Standard Oil Company,” McClure’s Magazine, March 1903, 496, July 1903, 316, 320. Her articles ran in three series, November 1902-July 1903, December 1903-May 1904, October 1904; McClure’s then had a circulation of some 500,000. Tarbell had already published a popular biography of Napoleon. Cf. idem, The History of the Standard Oil Company, 2 vols. (New York: McClure, Phillips, 1904), I, xiv (a subtitle, “Rockefeller outgenerals his opponents”), 146 (like N, putting pins in a map), 148 (the quote on “strategic importance”), IL, 12 (“Mr. Rockefeller…is like all great generals: he never fails to foresee where the battle is to be fought; he never fails to get the choice of positions.”), 63-64 (people in Oil Region thought of him as N), and 241 (“With Mr. Rockefeller’s genius for detail, there went a sense of the big and vital factors in the oil business, and a daring in laying hold of them which was very like military genius. He saw strategic points like a Napoleon, and he swooped on them with the suddenness of a Napoleon.”).


The first economist I know to have used the notion and the word “strategic” for theorizing about business rivalries was Veblen, in 1904. His sources were superb, the testimony the new Captains of American Industry had themselves lately given before the U. S. Industrial Commission; and his Social Darwinism was ruthless. “With a fuller development of the modern close-knit and comprehensive industrial system,” he wrote, “the point of chief attention for the business man has shifted…to a strategic control of the conjunctures of business through shrewd investments and coalitions with other business men.” It deserves notice that Veblen applied the idea not simply to “business enterprise,” but to a particular “concatenation of processes” and “the great business men who with force and insight swing the fortunes of civilized mankind.” Moreover Veblen’s is the sense in (I believe) the first economics-textbook reference to “strategic” business. Veblen did not develop the idea then, seldom even repeating it in his next major study. During World War I he wrote of “strategy” as much in a literal, military sense as in terms of “competitive enterprise.” Nor did other economists adopt the idea, much less explore it, or expand upon it. John Maurice Clark did not call “acceleration” in demand a “strategic factor,” as he well could have; he and almost every other economist then wrote of “strategy” only in terms of war. The only two who continued to write “strategic” microeconomically were still writing about railroads. But three years after the war Veblen recovered the idea, and integrated it into his analysis of modern capitalist production and

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Two years later the book where he had first “sketched” his theory received a second, more influential printing. Most significant was his new study of American “business enterprise,” or the “business strategy” of corporate “salesmanship and sabotage.” All through the 1920s more sociable economists and professors of business administration mentioned “strategy” and its branches as if they were common in the market. At least once that decade “strategic points” in marketing appeared in an officially approved national economic report.

Economists of various schools then, Marshall’s, Schmoller’s, Walras’s and Pareto’s intellectual heirs, might have framed theories of “business strategy.” Taking (as they did) statistical mechanics for their explanatory model, concentrating variably on “bilateral monopoly,” “duopoly,” Macht, polipolio, unvollständiges Monopol, quasi-monopole, monopolie incomplet, beschränkter Wettbewerb, Magtpaavirkning, mehrfaches Monopol, “monopolistic competition,” “oligopoly,” “imperfect competition,” they need only have formalized current business notions into a concept of business position, communications, objective, and timing—and called it “strategy.” For various reasons through the 1920s none did. Only two briefly came close. Revising his almost 15-year-old study of entrepreneurs and...
“economic development,” Schumpeter added a couple of military similes: entrepreneurial “carrying through of new combinations,” like a Feldherr’s “conception and carrying through of strategic decisions,” and entrepreneurial action “in economic life,” like that in “a given strategic position.” And a young French economist noted an entrepreneurial stratagème.

In 1933 the economist by then maybe the most able to theorize “business strategy,” Ragnar Frisch, seemed about to do it. For a theoretical “polypoly \( n > 3 \) firms en combat,” he formalized “strategic situation,” “economic communication,” and a “parametric regime” of profits. That year in another paper he formalized a “determinate macro-dynamic analysis” of business cycles, essential for strategic business


549 Schumpeter, Theorie, 104-115, 125. Cf. idem, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1912), 103-198. His description of the money market as “so to speak the headquarters of the capitalist economy” is in both editions: Theorie (1912), 276; Theorie (1926), 204-205.

550 Leduc, op. cit., 268; for a government “stratagem,” ibid., 308.
timing. If Frisch had connected these models, they might well have given (among other results) a theory of capitalist generalship. Instead he pursued his high ideal, a macroeconometrics of dynamic equilibrium.

The very next year, Commons, by then pope of American Institutionalism, tried to conceptualize “strategic transactions” in business. Drawing on the old Austrians, he had some sharp insights into the question. “Economics,” he argued, meaning capitalism mainly, was ultimately “transfers of ownership, functionally interdependent, bargaining, managerial, and rationing transactions.” Such deals comprised two radically different kinds of “factors,” each kind with its “objective side” and its “volitional side.” One kind of factor was objectively “complementary,” volitionally “contributory”; the other kind, objectively “limiting,” volitionally “strategic.” “Complementary” and “contributory factors” issued in “routine transactions”; “limiting” and “strategic factors,” in “strategic transactions,” the purest of which was either “bankruptcy or revolution.” Commons laid down the law. “The most important of all investigations in…economic affairs…, and the most difficult,” he emphasized, was that of the volitional factors, “contributory” and “strategic.” He waxed quite Archimedean: “By operating upon, or furnishing a supply, or withholding supply, of what—at the particular time, place, or quantity—is the limiting factor in obtaining what one wants in the future, the whole complex of the universe may be brought under command of a physically puny [but strategic] human being.” This was way too much, a Theory of Commercial Relativity, if not a Philosophy of Economic Functionalism.

Not nearly enough was J.M. Clark’s casual usage in his new book that year, where, from title to text, without definition or analysis, “strategic” meant no more than “really, really important.” Negligible except for the fact that their author had moved to Harvard’s Economics Department were Schumpeter’s


552 He did not, however, forget his “strategic” point: idem, “Annual Survey of General Economic Theory: The Problem of Index Numbers,” Econometrica, IV, 1 (January 1936), 14; and idem, Theory of Production, tr. R.I. Christophersen (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), ??.


earlier military references appearing that same year in English translation. The first “strategic competition” appeared in “location theory,” but the concept went undeveloped. No more than suggestive were the “strategic” allusions by various other economists through the 1930s. The great Keynes would not stoop so far; he stopped at the vulgarity, which he quoted to show it was not his usage, “bottlenecks.”

But the recognition that firms needed “strategies” against each other continued to spread among businessmen and business journalists. When New Jersey Bell’s President Chester Barnard, encouraged by the Harvard Business School’s dean, rewrote Commons on “strategic” in 1938, in a book as didactic as Commons’s was convoluted, businessmen found in print the words they already knew in practice, and seized upon them as their own, or to dignify their own. Barnard’s “theory of opportunism” was perfect. The only economist who reviewed the book then ignored “strategic,” and lamented the book’s “excessive conceptualism.” But Schumpeter caught the popular response. In the middle of World War II, in his first volume for the educated (though not necessarily economics-trained) American public, he flaunted “price strategy,” “business strategy,” “industrial strategy,” and “monopolistic strategy,” making his adoption of the notion and the word powerfully clear. Probably it was the war: Younger economists who wanted to

556 Tord Palander, Beiträge zur Standortstheorie (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1935), 249-250, 389, 394.
understand “spatial competition” made “strategic” language their own, to build a theory of capitalist
exchange and conflict.561

Through the golden age of post-war capitalism economic discourse on “strategic” and “strategy”
in business expanded, but remained largely indefinite.562 Economists by the score then wrote of businesses
in “strategic” positions, at “strategic” action, committed to a “strategy,” meaning (like J.M. Clark) only that
such firms were somehow important, deliberate, and consistent.563 Even so, within this fog, several familiar
lines of usage were clear. One was old-fashioned Institutiona.564 Another, almost as old, was Location
Theory.565 More recent was the Monopolistic Competition line.566 New Keynesians also picked up
“strategic” and “strategy” for their analyses of coercive structures or disturbances of the market.567
Likewise neo-Walrasians from Marschak onward used the ideas and words in developing their economics

LXIX, 3 (June 1941), 428, 431-432; Walter Isard, “Transport Development and Building Cycles,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LVII, 1 (November 1942), 93, 95-96, 98, 101, 109; idem and Caroline
Isard, “Economic Implications of Aircraft,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, LIX, 2 (February 1945), 146-
148, 165-166, 168.

562 From 1838 (foundation of the Journal of the Statistical Society of London) through 1945 JSTOR under
Business, Economics, Finance, and Statistics, henceforth JSTOR-BEFS, all told 87 journals, shows 94
articles, reviews, opinion pieces, and other items containing both “strategic” and “strategy,” 948 containing
only “strategic,” 518 containing only “strategy,” in military, labor, business, or other specific or indefinite
references. From 1946 through 1960 there were 274 articles, reviews, opinion pieces, and other items with
both “strategic” and “strategy,” 1,512 with only “strategic,” 1,349 with only “strategy,” E.g., in references
other than to labor or business, Lawrence R. Klein, “Theories of Effective Demand and Employment,”
Direct Control in Economic Mobilization,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XXXIII, 1 (February
1951), 12-13, 15-17; Edith Tilton Penrose, “Profit Sharing Between Producing Countries and Oil
Companies in the Middle East,” Economic Journal, LXIX (June 1959), 239.

563 E.g., T. Wilson, “Cyclical and Autonomous Inducements to Invest,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, V, 1
(March 1953), 66-67, 71, 88.

Institution, 1945), 80-81, 135, 147 n1, 189, 194-195, 200 n23, 248-249, 264, 328-329, 334; George W.

Economics, LXIII, 4 (November 1949), 504; Douglass C. North, “Location Theory and Regional Economic Growth,”
Journal of Political Economy, LXIII, 3 (June 1953), 250 n37.

XXXVI, 2 (May 1946), 745-746, 760; Robert F. Lanzilloti, “Multiple Products and Oligopoly Strategy: A
Development of Chamberlin’s Theory of Products,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXVIII, 3 (August

567 K. W. Rothschild, “Price Theory and Oligopoly,” *Economic Journal*, LVII, 227 (September 1947), 305-
307, 310-312, 314-316; Don Patinkin, “Involuntary Unemployment and the Keynesian Supply Function.”
of organization, uncertainty, and information.\textsuperscript{568} Maybe most attractive then was the new Game Theory, where in “general non-zero-sum games,” on questions of “the familiar economic type….bilateral monopoly, oligopoly, markets, etc.,” “strategic” applied only to action according to “strategy,” and “strategy” meant a firm’s “set of rules for…how to behave in every possible situation of the game,” or “a complete plan of action” for “all possible contingencies…in conformity with the pattern of information which the rules of the game provide [the firm] for that case”; probably because he wrote mainly of war, Schelling most effectively spread this idea among economists.\textsuperscript{569} More influential was the not yet so-called New Institutional Economics. Drawing more than he recognized from Commons’s “strategic transactions” and Barnard’s “theory of opportunism,” Herbert Simon offered his “theory of [executive] decisions in terms of alternative behavior possibilities and their consequences.” So he theorized, “The series of such decisions which determines behavior over some stretch of time may be called a \textit{strategy}.”\textsuperscript{570} Most important was the first public mark of another new, not yet named institutionalism, eventually


“organizations” making “strategic decisions” did.\textsuperscript{577} By 1982 (thanks to another engineer) the ideas of “business strategy” and “corporate strategy” had traveled to Japan, and back to the United States in translation.\textsuperscript{578}

Through the last 20 years two considerable schools of business strategy have formed. One, the more famous, is that of “competitive strategy.” The principal there is Michael Porter. Having produced a huge, cosmically successful trilogy on strategic advantage among firms and national economies (harking back to international trade), co-chaired the World Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Reports, and lately edited a volume on “the latest breakthroughs in strategic planning,” including his prize-winning article on the internet, Porter now directs the Harvard Business School’s Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness; he and his disciples look ever outward to calculate “strategic positioning.”\textsuperscript{579} The second school, originally an inversion of the first, now much more sophisticated, is that of “resource-based” strategizing. It has no principal, but a variety of professors on business faculties at several major universities in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Each professor is trying to reconcile business analysis, vision, imagination, learning, culture, context, and rhythm in a distinctive theory or compelling


message; among themselves they agree at least that strategy is the process of using a firm’s unique resources for unique powers to dominate its field.580

Meanwhile two projects by economists on the main issues in modern capitalism promise more interesting discussion. One project has resulted in a textbook on “endogenous growth theory,” in which its two now leading exponents, boosted by a game theory of industrial organization, have brought Schumpeter’s metaphor of “creative destruction” into “the mainstream of macroeconomic theory.”581 Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt pay little attention to Porter or other business professors on business strategy (the business professors paying none to them). They would rather explain “endogenous technological change and innovation within a dynamic general equilibrium setting.” In “mainstream” economese (unlike in some of Aghion’s earlier articles) they here make only a few idiomatc references to “strategy” or “strategic,” but they do treat “industrial policy,” “Bertrand competition,” “comparative advantage,” “bargaining power,” and “coalition.”582 This is theory extraordinarily useful for understanding corporate rivalries and international contests over productivity, whatever the problems of aggregating production functions. The other project is not so “mainstream,” but just as ambitious, probing, and incisive. It began in research on “sustainable prosperity: industrial innovation, international competition, and the

development of the American economy,” and now heads toward a theory of “corporate governance,” “innovative enterprise,” and socially transformable markets. Its two leading exponents pay much attention to business professors, but much attention as well to certain economists, above all Schumpeter (although they ignore the new “endogenous growth” theorists, who ignore them too). William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan want primarily to explain “how enterprises…can be organized to support skill formation and technological change,” making markets that provide greater welfare in more equality, and why, if it could happen, it does not. Unlike “mainstream” economists, they write seriously about “strategic management” with “investment strategies” yielding higher real wages and a broader distribution of income worldwide. This project too is a source extraordinarily useful for understanding corporate and international contention, whatever the problems of counting on reason alone to reform so much interested power.

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As businessmen have always known, a business strategy is no good without a labor strategy. Since the invention of “industrial relations,” business’s conflicts are publicly on both external and internal lines, “competition” and “personnel.” Corporations in strategic contests with each other are also strategically struggling each with its own means of production and “human resources,” using them as they are, increasing them, decreasing them, driving them harder, improving them, replacing them, even while the workers strategically quit, cope, resist. About corporate contests and about this productive struggle, general and continual, in other, old words the class struggle, business’s strategic thought is now much more

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comprehensive, acute, sophisticated, and dynamic, even dialectical, than labor’s is. And business history is ever better than labor history, more interesting, significant, analytical, critical, and explanatory. Why not? After all, business rules. But it rules in part by labor’s leave, because modern labor strategists (with lonely exceptions) dwell on markets or moral politics, forgo labor’s industrial and technical strength, think only of resistance, and have no industrial or technical strategy or program, defensive or offensive. Likewise, labor historians (with lonely exceptions) forget their working subject’s industrial and technical positions, and treat modern labor movements without regard to labor’s power at work, treat them simply as moral protests, so that labor history is now (usually) only “an assertion of the dignity of defiance.” If this were all labor history could do, it would never be more than a memorial. But this is not all it has done, or can do. Among its several uses it can explain past movements’ weaknesses and strengths, not only in the market, in culture, in politics, but also in production, especially in the complexes of modern production. Labor history would be much more interesting than assertions of dignity are now if it included labor’s powers of industrial and technical coercion in explaining why modern movements have gone as far as they have, but no farther. It would be most interesting if its lessons helped labor regain the capacity to tell how much farther (if at all) its movements now could go than they do, how much harder it could press the class struggle, even how to turn its powers into an offensive.