1. Introduction

The Danish welfare state is characterized by universality – all citizens in Denmark have the right to free medical help, free hospital, free education and a pension independent of saving and employment. The general social safety level is high. All this is financed by taxes and this means that progressive income taxes are high. This model can be seen as rather ideal considered in a Rawlian perspective; the strong shoulders are carrying the heavy burdens and the help and possibilities for weak persons are higher than in most other countries. Denmark (and the other Nordic countries) is among the most equal countries in the world.

This welfare state has been developed since the 1870s. The Danish society at that time was very homogeneous. After the war against Germany in 1864 we lost all the German speaking parts of the Danish monarchy, and after that, the country includes only Danish speaking people in a country which became one kingdom already before year 1000; there was a very homogenous culture with a long history in the country. All were Lutherans and only completely insignificant ethnic minorities existed in the area. Many indicators show that there was a high degree of social capital and coherence in the Danish society. The political conflicts never escalated to armed conflicts and a strong middle class, including farmers and workers, dominated the Parliament. Political extremists never got any power. This welfare state was further developed during the whole period from the 1870s to the 1970s.
The globalisation since the 1980s has threatened this organisation. The immigration of foreign workers and refugees since the 1960s has created considerable minorities of very different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. The immigrants include large groups of Turks, Pakistanis, Palestinians and Vietnamese. Islam became the second biggest religious community. The solidarity among the different groups in the society has weakened. The weakest people are now from the ethnic minorities and the strongest people have the possibilities of escaping the high taxes by taking jobs in low-tax countries or by choosing spare time instead of taxable monetary income. This has also changed the political system. Before 1973 the different political parties’ share of voters were very stable, but after 1973 new parties has an important place in the parliament and the fluctuation among all the parties is considerably higher.

The globalization and of the technical development has accelerated this development. Caused by the traditional solidarity, the minimal wages in Denmark are rather high, and this means that unskilled workers are much cheaper in many other countries, and consequently unskilled jobs were moved to Eastern Europe and Asia or substituted by computer controlled automatic processes. It became problematic for unskilled Danes and immigrants to find employment. Many in the ethnic groups were bad skilled and unemployed.

The solidarity in relation to the weakest persons seems considerable smaller when the weakest is part of another ethnic and religious group. A number of reductions in the level of social security for immigrants have been seen since 2001. Solidarity in relation to the weakest seems possible in a small homogenous nation, but a welfare state with high minimal wages and high social security rates and with high taxes for the well educated seems problematic in an open world. Instead of talking about how “the strongest shoulders shall carry the heaviest burden” it has become more common to talk about how you need to “pay something for something”. A high degree of solidarity in a society seems only possible in an ethnic and religiously homogenous society.

Perhaps becoming a multi-ethnical and multi-religious country is especially problematic for a former homogeneous society without any institutional mechanisms to handle these sorts of conflicts. The formal sharing of power between different segments of a society divided by ethnicity, language or religion, which is analysed by authors like Arend Lijphart and William Kymlicka, has not been necessary, and some of the actual immigration and integration problems in the Danish society are perhaps symptoms of how difficult it is to change a homogeneous welfare state to a multi-ethnical society with its necessary check and balances.

The paper is divided in 7 sessions. Session 2 gives a short overview of the different types of welfare states and characterizes the Danish model. Session 3 describes the history of the Danish welfare state, and session 4 analyses the history of ethnic and religious minorities in Denmark. In session 5 is the relation between session 3 and 4 discussed, and session 6 discusses the actual problems for the Danish society in the light of the historical experiments. Session 7 is a short conclusion.

2. Different types of welfare states and the Danish model
All western countries are some sort of welfare states, but they are of different types. There are a wide range of mixtures of arrangements for securing the weak citizens a minimal amount for their necessities. The weak inhabitants can be taken care of by the state, the local authorities, the family, labour market organizations, charity organizations, ecclesiastical institutions, private insurance etc.
The welfare states can be classified in different types according to the importance of the different organizations. In fig. 1 is the citizen shown in the network of institutions.

**Figure 1: The Welfare diamond**

![Diagram of the Welfare diamond]

The welfare states have been classified in different groups, depending of which part of the diamond are stressed. A modern society is always a complicated mixture of many elements, but the welfare state researchers have found different types of welfare states in different geographical areas and in different historical periods, see e.g. Esping-Andersen (1990). A normally found rough classification will be in an Anglo-Saxon type with stress on the south-eastern corner of the diamond in fig.1, a south European with the stress on the south-western corner and a Nordic model with stress on the public sector.

Even inside the different groups of welfare states are very big differences, but the aim of this paper is not to discuss types of welfare states. And no doubt the Danish welfare state is of the Scandinavian type with high public social benefits, free health care, free education - and all these things independent of the person’s individual history on the labour market and of his private insurance. The welfare services are for all citizens. Such a model is depending on a big public sector, and on a considerable number of public institutions like hospitals, schools, universities, kindergartens, old people’s home etc. This means also high taxes.

The high social benefits, the high progressive income taxes and the big number of free services for all inhabitants results in a very equal income distribution. All this is illustrated in table 1.
Table 1: Population, income distribution and taxes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Decil-ratio</th>
<th>Tax rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5.3 mill.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8.9 mill.</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>58.7 mill.</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>59.1 mill.</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82.1 mill.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>273.1 mill.</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Danish Economic Council (1998), p. 198

In table 1 is furthermore shown the number of inhabitants. It is striking that the income distribution generally is more equal in the smaller than in the bigger countries. This can be caused by the simple fact that the regional differences are bigger in the big countries, but it seems also caused by a higher degree of internal solidarity and coherence. The redistribution via the public sector is indicated by the taxes, and there is a clear negative correlation between the size of the country and the pressure of taxation. The inhabitants in the small countries have shown a political willingness to contribute with a bigger part of there income to a public sector which mainly supports the weakest part of the population.

3. A short history of the Danish welfare state

It is highly debatable when the Danish welfare state, as we know it today, is established, but it seems reasonably fair to say that it has been developed more or less continually during the century between the 1870s and the 1970s.

Many trends in the Danish society started in the 1870s, see Kærgård (2002). The first modern political party (Det Forenede Venstre, the United Left) was founded in 1872. The Danish Women’s Association (Dansk Kvindesamfund) dates from 1871 and the first female university students are from 1875. The professionalisation of the different professions take form; the Danish Economic Association (Nationaløkonomisk Forening) was founded in 1872 and the Danish economic journal (Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift) is from 1873. The Danish currency system was completely reformed in 1875, where the country changed from a silver based currency to a gold based, and from a old system (1 daler was equal to 6 marks which were each equal to 16 shillings) to a new one with “kroner” each equal to 100 ører, and at the same time Denmark together with Norway and Sweden formed a Scandinavian currency union, see Henriksen & Kærgård (1995) and Kærgård & Henriksen (2003).

During the 1880s the main sector in Denmark, the agricultural sector change from being cereal producing and exporting to being animal producing. The modern bacon and butter producing agriculture was established by founding a considerable number of cooperative dairies and slaughterhouses. The first cooperative dairy was built in 1882 and the first slaughterhouse in 1887; in 1914 there were 1208 cooperative dairies and 41 slaughterhouses, see Henriksen (1993).

This period of reforms included the social arrangement of the society. In 1873 a law for protecting children and young ones against industrial works was confirmed (work were forbidden for children less than 10 years, and children between 10 and 14 were only allowed to work 6 hours per day). In
1891 a general old age pension for poor elder people was introduced and at the same time support to people undeservedly loosing their income. A law about sick-benefit associations (“sygekasser”) was confirmed in 1892 and at the same time the public paid half of the cost at the hospitals for members of these associations. From 1907 the unemployment insurance associations got public support. A main social problem in the Danish society was the farm workers; a land reform, which gives small pieces of land to the farm workers, passed the parliament in 1899 and was further developed in 1904, 1907 and 1919.

In the interwar period the Danish welfare state was highly developed by smaller and bigger reforms in the 1920s and especially in 1933 (“Kanslergadeforliget”). This development was escalated after the Second World War with fast growing levels of the social benefits, with shorter working hours, longer holidays, with free education and with a number of reforms, e.g. a general old age pension reform in 1956 which established a public pension for all citizens independent of their income.

When the unemployment, caused by the first oil crisis, reached Denmark in 1974, the welfare system was fully developed. What happens after 1974 was mainly a number of arrangements for diminishing the unemployment. The almost monotonically growing unemployment between 1974 and 1993, see fig. 2 was met by a number of initiatives for reducing the labour supply; parents with small children, people on education, and elderly people under the age of normal pension were given public support if leaving the labour market.

Fig. 2: The Danish Unemployment Rate

Source: Kærgård (1991) and ADAM’s data base, Statistics Denmark.
Note: The two sources are linked together in 1968. The figures before 1968 is unemployed relative to the total number of wages earners, the figures after 1968 is unemployed relative to the total labour supply including owners.

\[\text{It has hardly any meaning to compare the unemployment rate in the 1930s and the 1980s. The difference will completely depend on the definition of the rate. The total number of unemployed were smaller in the 1930s, but the problem is whether this figure shall be related to the total labour supply (including a considerable number of farmers and shop-owners), to the total number of wage-earners or only to unemployment insured workers.}\]
The level of the social and unemployment benefit were not developed further - on the contrary. The value of the social and the unemployment benefits and the level of the services has grown drastically from there introduction in the beginning of the 20th century to around 1974; since has a number of the rates been reduced relatively to the general level of incomes. This is in fig. 3 illustrated by the unemployment benefit in relation to the wages. Since the beginning of the 1970s there has been a systematic declining; the unemployment benefit has since felled relatively to the wage with more than 20%. During the 1990s the possibilities for getting unemployment benefits (e.g. the possible period of getting the benefits) were reduced, and the government stressed the importance of economic incentives for the unemployed’s active job seeking, which means reduction of social benefits especially for the young ones. The same picture is seen if one considered the general income distribution; the inequality has been growing in the Danish society since the mid-1990s, see Baadsgaard (2005).

**Fig.3: Unemployment benefit relative to average wage**

![Graph showing the relationship between unemployment benefit and average wage from 1903 to 2003.](image)

Source: Kærgård (1991) and ADAM’s data base, Statistics Denmark

Introduction of a number of expensive new types of transfer income has, however, caused that the general level of taxes continued to rise after 1974. The labour force reducing arrangements (earlier pension of elderly people, a growing number of pensions to younger sick and weak persons) and for a long period a high unemployment has until very recently caused a unbroken growth in the tax rates, see fig. 4. But even this curve has stabilized since the early 1990s.

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2 The extreme tops in the years after the two world wars are caused by extraordinary circumstances, e.g. help to rents, heating and extraordinary high living cost.
The problems with the high taxes have been in the very top of the political agenda, and the liberal-conservative government, which came to power in 2001, has declared a stop for all raises in taxes. Especially on the immigration and integration area has the policy change rather dramatically. The possibility for coming into the country is much more difficult than earlier. In the full employment period in the 1960s Denmark invited foreign “guest workers” to come to the country where there was excess demand for labour. But in 1973, when the economic cycles looked less optimistic an immigration stop passed the parliament, and this was confirmed in 1983. There were, however, a number of exceptions for the immigration stop. Immigration of refugees, family unification and foreigners for specific jobs were still legal, and this means that the immigration reached a maximum in the 1990s with an average of about 51,815 immigrants per year for the period 1996-2000 compared with an average of 66,951 births and 59,305 deaths. Of the 51,815 immigrants were 22,522 re-immigrated Danes, 3611 are refugees, 7623 family reunification, 9655 from the common Scandinavian and EU labour market and 8404 for specific jobs, studying etc. (See Think Tank, 2002, p. 37).

In 2002, possibilities for coming into Denmark were reduced. Especially the claim to refugees and to spouses were strengthened; to get a spouse to Denmark both needed to be more than 24 years old and the couple shall in average have greater affiliation to Denmark than to any other countries. In 2002, the social benefits for immigrants were cut down. The social benefit (“Kontanthjælp”) for a single person more than 25 years old is 1098 Euro if the person has been in Denmark at least 7 of the last 8 years, and only 708 Euro if not (“Starthjælp”).

Source: Kærgård (1991) and ADAM’s data base, Statistics Denmark
It seems not unfair to conclude that the Danish welfare state is constructed gradually in the period from about 1870 to about 1970, and that the period since the early 1980s has seen a number of cutbacks especially for young ones, immigrants and unemployed.

4. The homogeneity of the Danish population

The debate about Danish citizenship started in the 18th century. Some authors and scientists began to write in Danish, and a public debate about language was going on. Ludvig Holberg (1684-1754) was born in Norway and wrote both in Latin and Danish, but worked systematically for the use of Danish for all purposes (about Holberg, see Estrup, 1976, and Sæther, …). In a poem to his praise from 1827 Chr. Wilster (1797 – 1840) writes about the time before Holberg:

> Before, every man who in wisdom became absorbed
> in writing used only Latin.
> With the ladies French,
> with his dog German
> and with his servant Danish, he spoke.

The professor in political philosophy Jens Schelderup Sneedorff (1724 – 1764) writes in 1759:

> All well-informed men in Europe have long time agreed that one of the biggest advantages of our time is that the sciences and letters, which before were hidden in the dead language, are now discussed in the living. That is why the truth and the useful are now open for all classes and sexes. It is no longer a dead treasure with which a few schooled haggled and practised usury (see Kærgård, 1995 pp 260-261)

The Danish Kingdom at that time was composed of a number of different areas, see table 2. Of these were Holstein, Oldenburg and parts of Schleswig German speaking. In the period 1770-72 the weak king’s physician, the German J. Fr. Struense (1737-72) was governing, and his reformist and sometimes arrogant regime irritated many Danes. Legitimated by his openly close relation to the young queen (he was almost officially father to her youngest dauthor), he was arrested and executed in 1772 and a more traditional and national government was formed.

After some internal conflicts, the new government reacted against the foreigners with Denmark’s first law about “national” citizenship in 1776, see Bech (1977) and Feldbæk (1991). A problem was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number of inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>785,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway 1)</td>
<td>Danish/Norwegian</td>
<td>723,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slesvig 2)</td>
<td>Danish/German</td>
<td>243,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holsten</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>278,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldenburg</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>79,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Icelandic</td>
<td>46,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faroe Islands</td>
<td>Faroese</td>
<td>4,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,161,027</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of course that the kingdom, as shown in table 2, includes Norwegian, German as well as other parts,
so the citizenship was far from pure “Danish”. Foreigners from outside the kingdom could only
immigrate to Denmark if they had a fortune and bought property in Denmark for no less than
10,000 rix-dollars. The arguments in this debate seem very close to the modern debate about
immigrants. The minister for foreign affairs, the German A. P. Bernstorff (1735-1797) and his
circles were against and upset “Ought the real competence not to be international, or at least be
counted equal to a sum of 10,000 rix-dollars”. He found that the law was narrow-minded and
unjust and Denmark “will be object for hate and critics in more than one nation”. On the opposite
side was the de facto Prime Minister Ove Høegh-Guldberg (1731-1808); he was conservative and
nationalistic, and argued for the law: “Justice is when the country’s own children shall enjoy the
bread of the country and that the advantage of the nation shall fall in the lot of its citizens”. How
parallel this conflict is to the modern debate about integration can be seen by the fact, that the main
ideologist of the most nationalistic wing in Danish policy, the priest Søren Krarup, MP, has written
a very admiring portrait of Høegh-Guldberg, see Krarup (1993).

Denmark was on the loosing side in the Napoleon was and lost Norway to Sweden in 1814, and the
conflicts between the Danish and the German part of the kingdom resulted in a war, partly a civil
war and partly a war between Denmark and Preussia, in 1848-1850, which Denmark won. But
Denmark lost a new war between Denmark on the one side and Prussia and Austria-Hungary on the
other side in 1864, and consequently all the German parts of the kingdom and the whole Schleswig
was included in Germany.

This means that Denmark except for the very small North Atlantic parts Iceland, Greenland and the
Faroe Islands, in 1864 was a nation with only one language, one religion and only landscapes which
have been part of the kingdom since the age of the Vikings, and there were neither any ethnical
minorities except for the very small group of inuits in Greenland, an this part of the Kingdom was
until 1953 considered as a colony. Denmark was after 1964 an extremely homogenous society. The
Danish part of Schleswig came back to Denmark in 1920 and this includes a German minority, but
this minority has always included only about 10,000 people3. There are no other linguistic
minorities except for the immigrants discussed below.

This is documented in table 3, where the number of immigrants in Denmark for the period 1870-
2005 is shown. There are three very different sources for the table. The figures from 1870-1940 are
found in the Danish census; these census is carried out with about 10 years intervals and based on a
questionnaire to all inhabitants in the country. One of the questions is about birthplace, and it is the
birthplace which is reported in the table. This specific question is rudimentary or not at all treated in
the census after 1940. The figure for 1960-75 is for foreigners with residence or working
permission; this figures did not include Scandinavian citizens, because permissions are unnecessary
for them, and probably less than half of the immigrants from Western countries is included, but all

3 The German minority has participated in the elections for the parliament 1920-1964, and has got between 6,406 and
15,016 votes.
Non-Western citizens need a permission. Finally has the ministry of integration established a register of immigrants in Statistics Denmark with figures since 1980.

It is of course problematic to consider so long a series. The definitions are not exactly the same and the borders have changed. A considerable part of the former Yugoslavia was earlier part of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Inhabitants</th>
<th>Born in Denmark</th>
<th>Western Countries</th>
<th>Non-Western Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>1,784,741</td>
<td>1,732,957</td>
<td>50,169</td>
<td>1615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>1,969,039</td>
<td>1,906,918</td>
<td>60,123</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>2,172,380</td>
<td>2,101,408</td>
<td>68,294</td>
<td>2606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2,449,540</td>
<td>2,369,122</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>2202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>2,757,076</td>
<td>2,671,750</td>
<td>79,984</td>
<td>5342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>3,267,831</td>
<td>3,160,264</td>
<td>100,173</td>
<td>7393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>3,550,656</td>
<td>3,461,820</td>
<td>83,022</td>
<td>5814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>3,844,312</td>
<td>3,760,431</td>
<td>78,482</td>
<td>5399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,585,256</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,492,966</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5,054,410</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5,122,065</td>
<td>4,987,360</td>
<td>90,727</td>
<td>43,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5,111,108</td>
<td>4,970,542</td>
<td>88,111</td>
<td>52,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5,135,409</td>
<td>4,954,300</td>
<td>90,182</td>
<td>90,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5,215,718</td>
<td>4,990,723</td>
<td>97,513</td>
<td>127,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5,330,020</td>
<td>5,033,096</td>
<td>109,188</td>
<td>187,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5,411,405</td>
<td>5,068,038</td>
<td>116,071</td>
<td>227,296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1870-1940 Danish Census, supplemented for 1880 with Falbe-Hansen & Scharling (1885)
1960-1975 Residence and working permissions to foreign inhabitants, Statistical Yearbook
1980-2005 Ministry of Integration’s register of immigrants in Statistic Denmark

Note: There can be discrepancies between the different sources’ three principally complete different types of data (The census’ self-reported birthplace for all inhabitants, permissions and finally register statistics). Non-Western countries includes for the years 1870-1890 all other countries than the Scandinavian countries and Germany, for the period 1901-1975 Africa, Asia, Russia and America except USA. Compared with the modern definition used 1980-2005 Balkan is excluded and Canada included from the non-western countries. Balkan and Canada is numerical unimportant before World War 2 and the classification is caused only of data reasons (for many of the years a considerable part of Balkan was included in the Austrian-Hungarian empire and America is in the statistics only divided in USA and the “Rest of America”). It is not possible to count immigrants from Western countries for 1960-75 on the basis of residence and working permissions because citizens from the – in this relation very important - other Scandinavian countries did not need any permission. The number of permissions in 1975 did not include children below the age of 16; this is adjusted by adding 5206 children to the number of permissions. The figure 5206 is calculated on the basis of the assumption that the relative part of children in the Western and the Non-Western group are equal.

Austrian-Hungarian empire and considered as a “normal” part of central Europe, today these countries are classified as “Non-Western” and has produced a considerable number of refugees. Russia or USSR has always been classified as Non-Western, but USSR includes the Baltic states which are now part of EU and classified as Western. Canada has only been a full sovereign state
since 1931 and is together with all other parts of North and South America except USA until 1975 included in Non-Western countries (it would have been possible to change the classification of Canada earliere, but now the series have the same classification from 1901 to 1975).

In spite of all these modifications the picture is very clear. There is a growing number of immigrants and there is a change in the distribution of immigrants between Western and Non-Western countries. The immigrants before World War II were from the neighboring countries – the Scandinavian countries and Germany – but today they are mainly from Non-Western countries. The number of immigrants with a real different culture was earliere very small. The 1998 persons in 1880 includes all immigrants from “Other foreign countries”; this figure is in Falbe-Hansen and Scharling (1885) specified to 459 born in UK and Ireland, 386 in Russia, 182 in the Austrian Empire, 138 in France, 127 in Switzerland and 512 outside Europe and of them 361 in America (Scharling supposed that a considerable number of them are the families of Danish emigrants to USA who returns).

The clear conclusion is that a considerable immigration of other ethnical groups is a phenomenon only observed for the period after 1970\(^4\). In the debate it is often said that we earlier have seen considerable groups of immigrants, but this is not true. The earlier waves of immigrants were considerable smaller. One of the groups mentioned is farm-workers from Poland in the first decades of the 20th century. Before World War I there was no Polish state and consequently non separate registration of people born in Poland, but in the census from 1921 there are registered 7568 people born in Poland and in 1930 a total of 5242. Another of the mentioned “big” groups are Jewish refugee from Russia in the first decade of the 20\(^{th}\) century and one can see that the number of Jews in Denmark grew from 3476 in 1901 to 5164 in 1911 and 5947 in 1921. The Jewish refugees are analyzed in detail by Cordt Trap (Trap, 1912), who registered 1277 Russian Jews immigrated to Denmark in the period 1901-1910.

The immigrants in the latest decades are quantitatively completely different. The biggest groups of immigrants in 2005 are classified according to country of origin in table 4. No doubt Denmark has in the last couple of decades got ethnical minorities of a considerable size.

This is also seen in the figures for religious belief in Denmark. Denmark has a officially, public Lutheran Church supported by the state. This has been the case since our first democratic constitution from 1849. Since we have had liberty of conscience, but there are special arrangements between the official church and the state. The church takes care of registration of born and deaths, of cemeteries and of some ecclesiastical historical monuments, and the state collects the member fee for the church via the tax system and pay some support to the churches. The budget of the church and the main rules are decided by the parliament and the minister of ecclesiastical affairs. It is questionable whether the church or the state has net benefit of these historical grounded arrangements.

\(^2\) The big migration in the earlier periods has the opposite direction. 232,976 Danes emigrated transatlantic in the period 1870-1908, see Warming (1913) p. 68

\(^4\) The big migration in the earlier periods has the opposite direction. 232,976 Danes emigrated transatlantic in the period 1870-1908, see Warming (1913) p. 68
Table 4: Number of immigrants in Denmark 2005 from Non-Western Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Descendants</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>30,923</td>
<td>23,936</td>
<td>54,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>20,771</td>
<td>5,580</td>
<td>26,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,077</td>
<td>10,155</td>
<td>22,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>17,850</td>
<td>3,025</td>
<td>20,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>10,644</td>
<td>8,657</td>
<td>19,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jugoslavia</td>
<td>11,946</td>
<td>5,582</td>
<td>17,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>11,224</td>
<td>5,728</td>
<td>16,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>11,687</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>14,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>8,657</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>12,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>9,380</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>10,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Western</td>
<td>80,137</td>
<td>22,509</td>
<td>104,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Non-Western</strong></td>
<td><strong>227,296</strong></td>
<td><strong>93,267</strong></td>
<td><strong>320,563</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The ministry of integration’s immigrant database

Note: A person is in this statistic defined as “Dane” if one of his parents is Danish citizen and born in Denmark, other persons are “immigrants” if they are born outside Denmark and “descendants” if they are born in Denmark.

Some public accepted religious societies are supported by tax cut for peoples’ payments to the societies; these societies includes the Jewish community, the Roman-Catholic church, the Baptists and many others.

These religious arrangements implicates that the public church includes most of the Danish population and that the church are very inclusive and broad in relation to religious belief. The main conflicts in Danish ecclesiastical life have taken place inside the public church (e.g. conflicts between different Lutheran wings, like internal mission, Grundtvigians and Bath’ians). Compared to other countries this means that Denmark’s population to an extreme high degree are organized in one church and that their relation to the dogmas of the church are very relaxed, see Andersen and Lüchau (2004).

The best figures for the Danes religious belief are again the census 1870-1921. In this census are people asked about their religious affiliation. This question was however used last time in 1921. For the period after 1984 (and partly for 1974) there is a statistic of the members of the public supported religious societies. The figures are shown in table 5. Unfortunately there are no good figures for the Muslims, which without any doubt have become a big and fast growing group.

Until the 1970s the public church has been completely dominating with more than 95% of the population as members. The group “Others” includes a considerable number of Christian societies like Baptists and Methodists. The biggest of these groups was before World War 1 the Baptist with 5664 supporters in 1911. In the last decades has atheists and Muslims been fast growing groups. These groups have before been very small. It is not possible to find the number of Muslims in the census, but there is a figure for “Other religious communities” (it is non-Christian communities) and the figure for that group is indicated in brackets in the column for Muslims. These figures are extremely small, and Falbe-Hansen and Scharling reported on the basis of the census for 1880 that there were 8 Muslims in Denmark at that time. The group of “non-believers” was 63 in 1870 and
Table 5: The religious belief in Denmark, number and per cent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Inhabitants</th>
<th>Public Lutheran Church</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Roman-Catholics</th>
<th>Others Including other Christian societies</th>
<th>Of which Muslims (Non-Christian religious societies)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>1,784,741 100%</td>
<td>1,769,724 99.2%</td>
<td>4290</td>
<td>1857 0.1%</td>
<td>8870 0.5%</td>
<td>(117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>1,969,039 100%</td>
<td>1,951,513 99.1%</td>
<td>3946</td>
<td>2985 0.2%</td>
<td>10,587 0.5%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>2,172,380 100%</td>
<td>2,138,513 98.4%</td>
<td>4080</td>
<td>3647 0.2%</td>
<td>26,124 1.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2,449,540 100%</td>
<td>2,416,511 98.7%</td>
<td>3476</td>
<td>5373 0.2%</td>
<td>24,180 1.0%</td>
<td>(873)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>2,757,076 100%</td>
<td>2,715,187 98.5%</td>
<td>5164</td>
<td>9821 0.4%</td>
<td>26,904 (892)</td>
<td>(0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>3,267,831 100%</td>
<td>3,200,372 97.9%</td>
<td>5947</td>
<td>22,137 1.2%</td>
<td>39,375 (3942)</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5,036,184 100%</td>
<td>4,748,000 94.3%</td>
<td>(4067)</td>
<td>24,980 0.5%</td>
<td>259,000 5.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>5,112,130 100%</td>
<td>4,684,060 91.6%</td>
<td>(3663)</td>
<td>27,387 0.5%</td>
<td>397,020 7.8%</td>
<td>38,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5,135,409 100%</td>
<td>4,584,000 89.3%</td>
<td>3486</td>
<td>29,783 0.6%</td>
<td>518,140 10.1%</td>
<td>75,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5,330,020 100%</td>
<td>4,536,422 85.1%</td>
<td>2982</td>
<td>33,177 0.6%</td>
<td>757,439 14.2%</td>
<td>168,122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The number of Muslims is not reported in the Census 1870-1921 - except for 1880 where Falbe-Hansen & Scharling (1885) reported 8 muslims - but there is a figure for Non-Christian religious societies (separated from non religious affiliation), and it is these figures reported in parents in the table. For Jews in 1974 and 1983 is only reported main persons in the household; the figures are because of this raised with 50%. The figure for members of the Public Church in 1974 is calculated on the basis of number of church-tax-payers which is reported 1976-1985; this series is lineary extrapolated to 1974 and the level adjusted on the basis of the years 1983-85, where both Church-tax-payers and the members of the public church is reported. The number of Muslims 1983-2000 is calculated on the basis of the number of immigrants from the 17 in this relation most important Muslim countries and Muslim-ratios for these countries reported in Kühle (2006). For an earlier attempt to use that sort of methods see Simonsen (1999).The number of Muslims from other countries, converted Danes and 3rd generation immigrants are assumed to have the same ratio to the number of Muslims from the 17 countries as in Kühle (2006); this means that the figure from the 17 countries are multiplied with 1.087.

8,118 in 1911. Denmark was a religious very homogeneous society. There have been conflicts about more or less fundamentalistic interpretations of the Holy Scripture, about moral problems and about female priests (which has been in function since 1946) etc. but they have taken place between different wing inside the public church.
The picture has changed considerably in the very last decades; the number of Non-religious and Muslims has been fast growing. The Non-religious has hardly given any problems; they are born in a Christian tradition and a considerable part of their ethical and moral attitudes are taken from Christianity. The Muslims are still not a very big minority, but a fast growing one – Kühle (2006) and others has by different methods calculated there number in 2006 to about 200,000 –and they are very visible with special clothing and eating rules and often with other attitudes to the relation between men and women and to the structure of the families. The attitude to this minority has been an important part of the political debate in Denmark, and one of the most controversial parts of the debate, which has been seen in relation to a heated debate about some newspapers cartoons of the prophet Mohammed in the last month of 2005 and the first of 2006.

5. The welfare state and ethnical and religious harmony: Some empirical observations

There are of course many reasons for the development of the Danish welfare state and for the specific construction of the institutions. And it seems reasonable that the forces behind the development can have changed during the hundred years from the first beginning in the 1870s to the welfare state was fully developed in the 1970s.

In the very beginning social engaged Christians and economists played a key-role, see Kærgård (2005 and 2006). The Social Democratic Party has a dominating influence on the development between 1924 and 1973 and a number of politicians could be mentioned. But also among the politicians from other parties there have been a number of social disposed people; a considerable part of the reforms have been carried through the parliament by broad coalitions of parties.

But it is typical that solidarity and interpersonal redistribution of income is easier in small and homogeneous groups than in big groups. Complete equality, where everybody contributes according to ability and enjoy according to needs, is only seen in small groups. An important small group is the family, and a considerable redistribution is done in the families. The same has been seen in smaller utopian societies, see Aage (1971). The opposite is seen in very big countries like USA and Russia. In table 6 is the size of a number of countries and the decil-ratio (the ratio between the 10% and the 90% fractal in the income distribution) are shown. The table indicates that it is easier to establish internal solidarity and an equal income distribution in smaller countries than in bigger countries.\textsuperscript{5}

Even though there are many possible explanations and many influencing persons in the history of the Danish welfare state, it seems obvious that a type of welfare state, where every inhabitant is secured a reasonable level of living independent of insurance and labour market affiliation, must be difficult to manage if the society is religious, linguistically and ethnically split up and if the solidarity between the members in the different groups are weak.

It is perhaps not accidental, that there has been a number of cuts in the welfare benefits and a number of tightening of the welfare rules in the last couple of decades, where the Danish society has

\textsuperscript{5} The given explanation related to mutual solidarity is of course not the only explanation. It is obvious that the regional differences normally are bigger in big than in small countries.
become more multiethnic and multireligious, and where the globalization has weakened the national connection between the inhabitants – now the inhabitants are often partly educated in

Table 6: Population and income equality in Selected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group of Countries</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population in mill. inhabitants</th>
<th>Unequality measured by decilratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Countries</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>7,1</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10,2</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>3,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium size countries</td>
<td>Polen</td>
<td>38,7</td>
<td>3,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>39,4</td>
<td>4,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>57,3</td>
<td>4,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>58,7</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>59,1</td>
<td>3,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82,1</td>
<td>3,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big countries</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>145,6</td>
<td>6,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>273,1</td>
<td>5,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The figures for population is from 1999 and taken from the Danish Statistical Yearbook 2002. The figures for the income distribution is from *Year Book Australia 2001* supplemented with figures from Danish Economic Council (1996) for Polen and Russia.

It is problematic to have a very open society with high progressive taxes, high social benefits and an equal wage distribution with high minimal wages. The high skilled part of the labour force, which are assumed to pay the high taxes, can emigrate to low tax countries, and unskilled immigrants can benefit of the high level of social security, and the high minimal wages will often result in a high unemployment, see Kærgård (2004).

It seems obvious that many unskilled Danes can have reasons to fill that a globalized world, where Denmark has become a multiethnic and multireligious society, and where multinational firms and institutions play key roles, is very threatening. And this has had implications for the political system. The four old political parties (the Liberals, the Conservatives, the Social Liberals and the Social Democratic Party) dominated Danish policy completely from before World War I to 1973,
and except for very short periods, neither a liberal-conservative coalition nor the labour party side have a majority without the social liberal center party. Danish policy has been dominated by the center parties and by a considerable consensus. Since 1973 a number of new parties, partly rather populist and partly rather hostile towards ethnic and religious minorities, has got a considerable number of votes and a considerable political power.

No doubt, some of the cuts in social benefits for immigrants, which has been implemented in the last decade, will be completely unacceptable for the political majority, if they strike “traditional Danish” citizens. The solidarity between the different ethinical groups is obvious not as big as the solidarity between the traditional economic classes in the former homogeneous national state. If fig. 3 and table 3 and 5 is compared, it seems remarkable that the establishing of the welfare state and the growing level of social benefits are seen in the period from 1864 to 1974, where Denmark was without any ethnical or religious minorities, and the period after 1974, where the minorities have became bigger, is characterised by a falling level of the social benefits. This is not the whole truth or nothing but truth, but it is a striking part of the history.

6. Theories about cohesion, pluralism and solidarity
No doubt, the Danish society has changed in the last couple of decades, and the problem is how much of the traditional institutions, that need to be changed too. A main problem is that Denmark has no tradition for treating minorities. The Danish society is constructed for a coherent, homogeneous society. As in may other countries cohesion has been an often used word in the last decade, but the meaning of the word seems often very imprecise.

The debate about the problem of “cohesion” is much older in countries like USA, Canada, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands, where considerable ethnical and religious minorities have a long history. In Canada Jane Jenson’s report (Jenson, 1998), Evigail Eisenberg’s survey article (Eisenberg, 2002) and a number of publications of William Kymlicka, Keith Banting, Richard Johnston and Stuart Soroka (Banting et al, Forthcoming, Banting & Kymlicka, 2004, Soloka et al, Forthcoming, Soroka et al, 2004, Banting, 2005, Kymlicka, 1989, 1995 and 1998) are interesting contributions.

Jenson discusses four different definitions of cohesion (Jenson, 1998, p. 17):

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6 The only old minorities are the German in the southern part of Jutland and the north Atlantic minorities on Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The Germans where part of a border conflict between Germany and Denmark dating back to the middle ages and the modern rules were decided in an agreement between the Danish and the German government and consequently not seen as an internal problem. Greenland and the Faroe Islands were included in the country in 1953 and they got two members in the parliament each. But Denmark has historically no understanding of the feelings in the north Atlantic municipalities, which has been shown a couple of times. The productivity in the developing economy Greenland was lower than in Denmark; in a market economy this will result in a lower wage for the Greenlanders than for the Danes and bigger gap between high educated and low educated in Greenland because of relatively fewer educated people in Greenland. But what about public jobs in Greenland? On the advice of rational economists the wages for the same public jobs differed from 1964 to 1989 depending of whether the employees were born in Greenland or Denmark. This was meant as a rational arrangement for securing a reasonable small gap in Greenland between private and public employed Greenlanders and between skilled and unskilled people, but it contradicted with basic feeling among the Greenlandic minority and was a clear case of discrimination. Similar conflicts about establishing teaching in Greenlandic as first language in Greenland in stead of Danish, which for a rationalist is seen as a bigger language usable outside Greenland, were seen in the 1960s. The Danish administration in the 1960s had no strong empathy for the feelings in minorities and saw only factual economic problems.
- The capacity to construct a collective identity, a sense of belonging.

- A society’s commitment and capacity to assure equality of opportunity by including all its citizens and reducing marginality.

- In relation to democratic practices, including patterns of participation and the legitimacy of representative institutions such as advocacy groups, political parties, unions and governments.

- Society’s capacity to mediate conflicts over access to power and resources, to accept controversy without trying to shut it down.

This is analyzed in five dimensions:

- belonging/isolation
- inclusion/exclusion
- participation/non-involvement
- recognition/rejection
- legitimacy/illegitimacy

She concludes that “one of the major issues for the cohesion of modern societies is the capacity to recognize and mediate politicized diversity” (Jenson, 1998, p. 35). And therefore,

the real challenge for conversations about social cohesion is to identify the mechanisms and institutions needed to create a balance between social justice and social cohesion. Such mechanisms and institutions are ones that continue to value and promote equality of opportunity and fairness across all dimensions of diversity, while fostering the capacity to act together. (Jenson, 1998, p. 36)

She strongly stressed the importance of institutions:

A cohesive society is one in which accommodation of conflict is well managed. Social cohesion will be at risk only if differences are mobilized; becoming ground for conflicting claims, and management of those claims is fumbled. Thus social cohesion is fostered by conflict management of mobilized differences (or cleavages) of all sorts – cultural, linguistic and economic. - - - Institutions are central both because they are the locale for managing diversity and because their actual design will affect their capacity to contribute to cohesion. (Jenson, 1998, p. 31)

Institutions have been a key topic for both economics and political science. A branch of economics related to these problems is the theories of “Social Capital”. These theories are developed to explain why some regions (a number of the former central planning economies, South Italy and others) have economic problems while others (e.g. Denmark) are doing well, independent of their labour forces and capital equipment. Trustable institutions and social relations among the agents of the economy seems important. The ideas are discussed in Bourdieu (1986), Putman (1993 and 1995), Paldam (2000) and Paldan & Tinggaard Svendsen (2000). Social capital is difficult to define and measure; a number of indicators are shown for Denmark and a number of Eastern European countries in Paldam & Tinggaard Svendsen (2003). Social capital as explanation of the success of the Danish agricultural sector is discussed in Svendsen & Svendsen (2000) and Chloupkova et al. (2003).
early and famous branch of this research area is Robert Dahl’s investigation of the USA’s democracy, see Dahl (1956 and 1966). For Robert Dahl it is important to stress that

...if there is anything to be said for the process that actually distinguish democracy (or polyarchy) from dictatorship, it is not discoverable in the clear-cut distinction between government by a majority and government by a minority. The distinction comes much closer to being one between government by a minority and government by minorities. (Dahl, 1956, p. 133)

Democratic systems, like the USA, are characterized by their treatment of minorities. 8

I defined the “normal American political process as one in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision. To be “heard” covers a wide range of activities, and I do not intend to define the word rigorously. (Dahl, 1956, pp. 145-146)

The minorities in Dahl’s contributions are seen as changing groups forming different and not stable coalitions. The borderlines between the groups are not permanent.

This line of arguments are continued by Arend Lijphart in a number of books and articles (see Lijphart, 1969, 19771, 1977 and 1999), e.g.

The majoritarian interpretation of the basic definition of democracy is that it means “government by the majority of the people.” It argues that majorities should govern and that minorities should oppose. This view is challenged by the consensus model of democracy. As the Nobel Prize-winning economist Sir Arthur Lewis (1965, 64-65) has forcefully pointed out, majority rule and the government-versus-opposition pattern of politics that it implies may be interpreted as undemocratic because they are principles of exclusion. Lewis states that the primary meaning of democracy is that “all who are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in making that decision either directly or through chosen representatives.” (Lijphart, 1999, p. 31)

Lijphart quotes Robert A. Dahl (1966, p. 358-59) for the point of view that conflicts involving subcultures can rarely be handled by normal democratic processes because

...“this sort of conflict is too explosive to be managed by ordinary parliamentary opposition, bargaining, campaigning, and winning elections.” Instead, the principal ways in which such conflicts are dealt with are (1) violence and repression, (2) secession or separation, (3) mutual veto, (4) autonomy, (5) proportional representation, and (6) assimilation.

According to Lijphart, most researchers working with integration predict the first two or the last of the possible outcomes; one of the first two, if integration fails, and the last for successful integration. But what interests Lijphart are, however, the possibilities in between. This is what he calls a “consociational” solution. And this is what he finds in traditional pluralistic societies .

Lijphart’s main idea is to analyse such “consociational” democracies. He finds that stable consociational societies are characterised by a number of check and balances, mainly arranged by

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8 The parallel to the debate in Denmark just after the War is striking, see especially Hal Koch (1945) and Alf Ross (1946), e.g. “The essence of democracy is not voting but dialog, negotiation, mutual respect and feeling for the interest of the whole society” (translated from Koch, 1945, p. 23).

9 Lijphart is interested in all forms of differences. Lijphart (1979) investigates the importance of religion, language and class for voting in Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland, and he finds religious attitudes the most important and class interests the less important.
agreements among the elites of the different subgroups. Consociational arrangements are not established by interrelations among the masses of the subgroups; typically there is little interrelation between the different groups.

The Canadian researchers, especially William Kymlicka, are working with the rights of minorities in a liberal democracy. He stresses that human rights for individual are not enough; they need to be supplemented by rights for minorities. Culturally “neutral” policies in a society tend not to be neutral at all, but instead favour the history, language, symbols and values of the majority. How fare it is fair and necessary to go in protection of minorities depends, according to Kymlicka, on whether the minority is a “polyethnic minority”, which consists of voluntary immigrants to the country, or a “national minority”, like the Flemish in Belgium, the Aboriginals in Australia, and many others.

William Kymlicka is aware of the argumentation that

- multiculturalism policies emphasize diversity;
- emphasizing diversity undermines the sense of common national identity;
- welfare state depends on feeling of national solidarity

But he stresses that a multiculturalism policy need not erode cohesion. On the contrary, multiculturalism can reduce prejudice and combat stereotypes and stigmatizations that often erode feelings of solidarity across ethnic, religious and racial lines. And this is exactly what has happened in Canada. The Canadian researchers like Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting stress that growing minorities of immigrants in Canada have not eroded the Canadian cohesion and solidarity. They find in Canada a distinctly multicultural form of nationalism where multiculturalism is seen as an important part of what it means to be a “good” Canadian. As part of the Canadian society, minorities can claim multicultural rights and privileges. These researchers only found little general evidence of a necessary conflict between ethnic diversity and solidarity:

One of the most compelling challenges facing western democracies is how to maintain and strengthen the bonds of community in increasingly diverse societies. There is no question that there is a potential conflict between ethnic diversity and solidarity. We do not need social scientists to tell us that. There is far too much evidence of ethnic and racial intolerance on our television screens. Moreover, there is undoubtedly potential fallout for the welfare state. But we need to keep our balance. Given the limited research base available to us, we need to be careful about rushing to premature judgment. --- The cross-national evidence points in several directions. Western democracies with large foreign-born populations have not had more difficulty in sustaining and developing their welfare states than other countries. But the pace of social change does seem to matter: countries in which immigrant communities grew rapidly experienced lower rates of growth in social spending in the last three decades of the twentieth century. Yet --- the adoption of robust multiculturalism policies does not systematically exacerbate tensions and further erode welfare state. Within these broad cross-national patterns lie many distinctive national stories, and the contrasting patterns in the United States and Canada point to a range of possible balances among diversity, recognition and redistribution. Given the limited nature of our hard information in this area, there is a danger that the experiences of one country will emerge as a sort of master narrative, a story that is seen as capturing the essence of the issues in play. For many Europeans, the United States has become the quintessential multicultural country, and the key test case of the relations between immigration, ethnic diversity and redistribution. (Banting, 2005, pp. 11-12)

Others have been more convinced that there is a conflict between diversity and solidarity. A number of articles in serious, non-scientific British magazines are worth mentioning, e.g. Goodhart (2004) and Pearce (2004). In relation to the topics of this problem, Goodhart’s remark on how to find the final truth in the solidarity/diversity debate is interesting:
Sweden and Denmark may provide a social laboratory for the solidarity/diversity trade-off in the coming years. Starting from similar positions as homogeneous countries with high levels of redistribution, they have taken rather different approaches to immigration over the past few years. Although both countries place great stress on integrating outsiders, Sweden has adopted a moderately multicultural outlook. It has also adapted its economy somewhat, reducing job protection for older native males in order to create more low-wage jobs for immigrants in the public sector. About 12 per cent of Swedes are now foreign-born and it is expected that by 2015 about 25 per cent of under-18s will be either foreign-born or the children of the foreign-born. This is a radical change and Sweden is adapting to it rather well (the first clips of mourning Swedes after Anna Lindh’s murder were of crying immigrants expressing their sorrow in perfect Swedish). But not all Swedes are happy about it. Denmark has a more restrictive and “nativist” approach to immigration. Only 6 per cent of the population is foreign-born and native Danes enjoy superior welfare benefits to incomers. If the solidarity/diversity trade-off is a real one and current trends continue, then one would expect, in, say, 20 years’ time that Sweden will have a less redistributive welfare state than Denmark; or rather that Denmark will have a more developed two-tier welfare state with higher benefits for insiders, while Sweden will have a universal but less generous system. (Goodhart, 2004, p. 4)

Goodhart himself is sceptical to the combination of a generous, pluralistic welfare state:

More controversially, there is also a case – as Meghnad Desai has argued – for introducing a two-tier welfare system. Purely economic migrants or certain kinds of refugees could be allowed temporary residence, the right to work (but not to vote) and be given access to only limited parts of the welfare state, while permanent migrants who make the effort to become citizens would get full access to welfare. A two-tier welfare state might reduce pressure on the asylum system and also help to deracialise citizenship – white middle-class bankers and Asian shopkeepers would have full British citizenship, while white Slovenian temporary works would not. Such a two-tier system is emerging in Denmark. (Godhart, 2004, p. 7)

See also Kærgård (2003) and for a more economic-technical argumentation for this point of view Kærgård (2004 and 2006).

7. The theories and the Danish case
The Danish observations in session 5 supported the potential conflicts between diversity and the redistributing welfare state. The establishing of the system was gradually done during the period 1864-1974, when Denmark was an extremely homogenous society. And there are indications that the redistributitional policy has been eroded over the last decades, where society has become more pluralistic. This is of course far from being the only explanation of the development and far from being a simple deterministic causal chain.

The development in the last decades can be interpreted in the light of the theories from session 6. The period until the late 1990s is characterized by mutual understanding among the established political parties and leading newspapers, according to which immigration and integration were outside the political agenda. This can be seen as an unconscious attempt to establish a form of Lijphart’s consociational policy where the relation between the majority and the new minorities were regulated by implied rules. The minorities should accept the fundamental values of the society, like equality among the sexes, and be rather invisible in the public space, and then they would gain the right to get the benefits of the welfare state and establish their own religious and ethnical associations and traditions – the aim was not assimilation but only practical integration.

As described by Lijphart that sort of consociational policy is based on agreements between the elites and not in an understanding among the masses, but in Denmark there is no tradition for such a policy. New parties were established, and Dansk Folkeparti (established in 1995) made a restrictive immigration policy its main political goal. A considerable part of the voters supported this policy,
and immigration and integration became an important part of the political agenda and a matter of conflicts between the traditional left and right wings of Danish policy. At the same time some minorities became more aggressive and visible in the public areas; some Muslim spokesmen strongly argued against the traditional Danish liberal attitude to e.g. sexual moral or blasphemy. The harsh debate, of course, escalated the conflicts.

With the shift to a right wing government, in 2001, based on support from Dansk Folkeparti, the policy changed radically. The immigration policy became restrictive and social benefits to newcomers were limited.

As discussed in session 6, it is still too early to make the final evaluation of whether that sort of policy was necessary, or whether the policy’s influence on the cohesion and dynamics of the society are positive or negative. And still many questions remain to be answered. Denmark has to find out which sort of integration of ethnic and religious minorities is necessary and possible. Where is the line between the need for integration, necessary for being part of a solidaric Welfare state, and the demand for an assimilation which is in contrast to the minorities’ religious and ethnical rights? Can a Muslim in a country of beer drinkers with pork production as the main industry, deny handling alcohol and pork, and still demand publicly paid unemployment benefit? Is the aim the traditional homogenous Danish national state or is it a consociational multicultural state? And if a consociational society is the aim, which check and balances between the different groups are then needed? And how will that affect the Scandinavian type of Welfare state? What is discrimination and what is selling out of valuable national traditions? Many difficult questions have to be answered.

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