

# History of Concepts Newsletter

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Edited by  
Henrik Stenius, Suvi Ervamaa and Jani Marjanen

## In this Issue:

*The Theory and Method of German  
"Begriffsgeschichte" and Its Impacts on the  
Construction of an European Political Lexicon*  
Lucian Hölscher

*The Interdisciplinarity of History of Concepts  
– a bridge between disciplines*  
Irmeline Veit-Brause

*The history of counterconcepts: "Latin  
America" as an example*  
João Feres Jr

*Adriaan Koerbagh and the comparative history  
of concepts - The past and the future*  
Pim den Boer



# The Theory and Method of German “Begriffsgeschichte” and Its Impacts on the Construction of an European Political Lexicon

LUCIAN HÖLSCHER

Confronted with the Idea of an European Political Lexicon we are in a time of rapid change: Twenty or even ten years ago the political integration of Europe was almost nothing but a political vision, today we are in fact on the way towards a rapid integration in almost all fields of political, economic, cultural and social development – in foreign policy, in constitutional law, in traffic, in standards of university training and so on.

But at the same time the prospect of a European Lexicon has become more realistic, too: whereas twenty years ago almost nobody in Europe would have thought it possible, that such a lexicon would be possible (perhaps with the exception of Melvin Richter, who, as an American, was already than much more used to integrate different cultural traditions – I remember a famous meeting of conceptional historians in New York in 1987, where Reinhart Koselleck and Quentin Skinner almost came to the point of beginning a kind of academic war between the German school of *Begriffsgeschichte* and the Anglo-Saxon Cambridge School) – today we are able to compare the advantageous of different methodological approaches with much more patience.

It is true, the so called “linguistic turn” of the 1980s had many aspects and versions, but today nobody would deny, that it also has linked them to a common movement and concern for language analysis all over the world. Today students of the history of language in Germany have learned to appreciate the methods of the English study of political “languages” and of French “discourses” in the concept of Michel Foucault and others, as much as scholars all over Europe, In Europe, Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands and Scandinavia, have started to study the German concept of *Begriffsgeschichte*. So today we are at the point to throw together what might be useful for a common project of an European lexicon. In doing so we have to compare the approaches in their theoretical and practical aspects.

## I.

But before going into that business I would like to ask: What is the scheme, the “ratio”, the general aim

of such a project as the Political Lexicon, which we have in mind? It seems to me, that most of us would agree on the idea that Europe is not and shall not be a centralised national state like the USA, with but one language, one political culture and one common history, but a continent with many cultural centres. What we call Europe today, is the outcome, the result of a historical tradition, which from the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards combined various, at least two very different tendencies: In economic terms we find a growing dominance of the big business centres of Western Europe at least from the 18<sup>th</sup> century onwards. The growth of population, traffic and industry was here much higher than in the rest of Europe. But at the same time we find a growing number of independent national states all over Europe, too, each of them with its own national history and cultural autonomy.

It is true, even in terms of cultural development these nations were not totally independent from one another: For instance in the religious structure of Europe, in constitutional law and many other branches of classical scholarship common roots of a European heritage can be defined in the Jewish, Greek and Roman culture of the Roman Empire. In the development of European arts it is not difficult to find Europe-wide connections between Dutch and Italian, French and English, Spanish and German painters. In some branches of highly developed arts craft some nations even won a dominance at certain times, such as the French industry in toilet articles or the English in furniture.

But this tendency towards unification always was balanced by the counter-tendency of national diversification and autonomy: In literature for instance each European nation has built up a canon of “classical” authors: What is Dante, Petrarca and Boccaccio for Italy; that is Chaucer, Shakespeare and Milton for England; Molière, Racine, Corneille for France; Cervantes for Spain; Goethe, Schiller, Lessing for Germany; Tolstoi, Turgenjew and Dostojewsky for Russia and soon. All European nations have cultivated their national language by national dictionaries, have collected their ancient songs and fairy-tales. All this is well known and has not to be repeated at

this place.

So coming back to the idea of an European Political Lexicon I guess that we all agree, that it is the main purpose of such a project, to represent and develop the variety and richness of many national cultures within Europe – not in order to perpetuate the former animosity of political and cultural warfare within Europe, but in order to form our common European future on the basis of very different national experiences. We have to know from one another, f.i. concerning political and cultural centralisation what makes French people hopeful, but Germans anxious; we have to know, why English people like to rely on individual autonomy and local self government, whereas many Eastern societies lived better with patriarchal systems, why ...

## II.

Now, what kind of a Lexicon should it be and on which methodological approaches should it be based? Today among historians of conceptional history two different branches of studies are well established and much propagated: They may be called "discourse analysis" and "concept analysis". In looking to structures and changes of language, the one focuses on texts, the other on words, the one concentrates on systems of arguments, which are represented by sentences, the other on ideas, which are represented by words. In fact, in many aspects the approaches are not as different as they may seem in my presentation, but for the sake of argument and in order to discuss their distinguishing features, I would like to hold to this description for a moment. Looking closer to both branches of conceptional history we again have to distinguish between various schools or "philosophies".

(a) In discourse analysis it was Michel Foucault, who by his "archéologie du savoir" already in the late 1960s did most for the acceptance and popularisation of discourse analysis in France and later in the United States. His concept of a 'discourse' was based on the idea, that we find coherent systems of knowledge in certain epochs of history, which are able to reign basic questions and arguments in all branches of human knowledge. It was the main concern of Foucault to reconstruct these basic scientific interests in a way, which in terms of epistemology made them historically independent. So he excluded as much the idea of historical origin and development as the idea of hermeneutic translation: For it was his conviction, that discourses can not be understood by translate them to our own time and language, but only by using them. But in spite of his great influence on discussions about discourse analysis all over the world, Foucault had very few followers in practical work. His concept of 'discourse' probably was too difficult to be used as an analytical tool. Thus to most historians it seemed extremely difficult to prove the empirical evidence of his description of

discourses. I am sure, that he would not be amused by comparing him with historians of "ideas", but in his intuitive method of formulating the basic concepts of past knowledge systems he in fact reminds me to them very much.

(b) Much more based on empirical evidence is the approach of the so called "Cambridge school", established by John Pocock and Quentin Skinner, that is of those scholars, who follow the analysis of "political languages". Originating from the old European concern for political philosophy this kind of discourse analysis is much more limited in its claim of explanation: It doesn't claim, as Foucault does, to represent the knowledge of a certain period of time on the whole, but only of one fraction, that is it allows to reconstruct the basic ideas and cultural practices of a certain political traditions without caring too much about texts in different spheres of political and social life. Its main concern is the idea of "republicanisms", which from the late middle ages down to our own time serves as a model for many aspects of political and social life such as constitutional law, social organisation, public morals and aesthetic ideals. Its method is the reconstruction of a system of basic concepts, arguments and ways to handle things which are bound together in the term "language". 'Discourse' in this sense doesn't mean neither Saussure's "langage" nor a single text or speech, but the common features of texts and speeches of those who are engaged in the same "philosophy" of life.

Now looking to the various types of "concept analysis" one again has to distinguish between two schools or "philosophies" of language:

(a) When Reinhart Koselleck in the 1960s elaborated his theory of concept history (Begriffsgeschichte) he amalgamated various theoretical traditions: From Hans-Georg Gadamer he adopted the hermeneutic concept of "translation", that is the conviction, that in order to understand historical sources we have to translate them into our own language. This is what I would call the "realistic" feature of his theory. From Carl Schmitt he adopted the concept of political anthropology, that is the idea, that certain concepts "reign" certain periods of time dominating most of its arguments and giving the ground for what seems to be evident to the contemporaries. In Koselleck's concentration on "basic concepts" (Grundbegriffe) his theory is familiar to Michel Foucault's: Both, Koselleck and Foucault, take concepts as centres of cultural knowledge in the discourses of past societies. They cling to the (rather metaphysical) idea, that in a given period of time even the opponents of political debates usually rely on the same "meaning" of a concept, taking it only from different sides. What makes the difference is 1. Koselleck's conviction, that concepts are highly mobile semantic units, which switch from one discourse to the other, attracting and widening their semantic

potential out of all of them; and 2. his organisation of empirical evidence: For Koselleck basic concepts have to be defined in their actual usage: They are not only indicators to the past reality but also factors and instruments of historical change.

(b) Whereas Koselleck's concept of "concept history" still holds to the idealistic distinction between the representing linguistic form and the represented historical reality, Rolf Reichardt and his co-editors of the "Lexikon der politisch-sozialen Sprache in Frankreich 1680-1820" relies on the theory of Berger and Luckmann, who in their book "The social construction of reality" (*Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit*) of 1972 argued that what we are used to call "reality" is nothing but a system of knowledge. This had the practical consequence that in their approach it doesn't make sense to reconstruct the past reality independent of their contemporary representation. For historians this is hardly acceptable, because for them the reconstruction of the past is more than collecting the contemporary knowledge: We know that we know more about the past than contemporary people could know. On the other hand it is not difficult to give Koselleck's approach a constructivist interpretation: For what the historian calls (past) "reality" may be interpreted as well as our knowledge of the past. Instead of contrasting reality and its linguistic representation we would have to deal with two different constructions of past reality – without any loss of empirical evidence.

To sum up this part of my paper I would like to stress two facts:

1. Thinking of the basic units of linguistic analysis the concentration on concepts seems to be superior to that on discourses or languages out of various reasons: First, in terms of semantic analysis the concept is a more "mobile" unit than the discourse. The historian is able to follow it into very different contexts taking notice of a lot of semantic qualities, which are transported between them. For example let us take the concept 'enlightenment', which by the 17<sup>th</sup> century was born in the context of weather descriptions, but later transported as a metaphor to philosophy and history. Second, in a given context the concept very often is nothing more than the label or catch-word for a discourses. So by analysing concepts we come to discourses anyway, but not the other way round. Third, because the concept is "bound" to a word, it is better to be isolated as a linguistic unit. This also helps to organise a lexicographical system by its alphabetical order.

2. It is true, the "realistic" approach of the German concept of *Begriffsgeschichte* relies on some metaphysical implication, which are opposed by constructivists today: For example, it takes the semantic analysis apart from what historians call the past "reality" (that is their own present reconstruction of it). And it relies on historical concepts like

'history', 'historical change' and others. It is true, this approach has to face some theoretical problems: one is the question how concepts may "change" over time; another the question how concepts may be defined without reference to the defining position of the present historian. But again the advantages of the realistic approach seem to prevail compared with the constructivist approach: First, because historians can hardly avoid to describe the past "realistically" from their own point of view in the present: It would be disastrous for their job, if they were unable to decide which out of various descriptions of any past event was right or wrong. Second, only in contrasting the world of "events" with that of "concepts" we are able to ask for the capacity of concepts either to represent reality or to interfere with it.

### III.

So, what I would like to do now, is to start with some general remarks on the history of political concepts in Europe, including some empirical examples for what I would call a comparative analysis of concepts in Europe:

1. For the vast majority of basic concepts (including as many political as social as cultural and economic concepts – it is a fundamental fact, that most of them are taken from the ancient languages of Greek and Latin. There is almost no vital political term in any Western European language which doesn't go back to a Greek or Latin origin, either in its semiotic form or in its semantic content: 'state' and 'republic', 'monarchy' and 'government', 'constitution' and 'law', 'citizen' and 'mankind', 'the public' and 'the private', 'liberalism' and 'conservatism', 'liberty' and 'order', 'policy' and 'propaganda', 'reform' and 'revolution' are familiar terms in the sphere of politics, 'family' and 'honour', 'class' and 'race', 'emancipation' and 'treaty' may be examples from the sphere of social organisation, 'religion' and 'church', 'transcendence' and 'salvation' from the religious sphere and so on. Looking through the various European languages we find a common fund of classical terms which by the medieval and early modern period were used in all parts of Europe as the linguistic material and starting point for political and social theory.

2. But when the European nations began to emancipate from the Greek and Latin as languages of scholarship and political organisation – a long-lasting process which from the 13<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> century covered more than 700 years – the national vocabularies also began to include regional semantic particularities into their political and social concepts. 'Res publica' now didn't mean the same in France and Germany, the term 'libertas' ('liberty', 'libertà' etc.) covered different rights and norms in Italy and England. But they still referred to the same basic ideas elaborated by 'classical' authors like Cicero, Aristotle and Polybius. To give but one example: When the term 'natio' was adopted to the modern political languages of West-

ern Europe, it first referred to the various linguistic communities in a town or country, such as the French and German student groups at the University of Bologna in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries. By the 17<sup>th</sup> century the term ‘nation’ already was well established in English and French for the civil society of these countries, being used in many contexts as a substitute for the constitutional term ‘people’ (‘people’ etc.). In France by the French revolution ‘nation’ was adopted as the legal term for the new sovereign: ‘la grande nation’, as Napoleon called it. But whereas in England and France the term ‘nation’ could already be used for an existing political body, in countries like Germany, Spain and Italy (not to speak of Greece, Poland and Bulgaria) ‘the nation’ still was a idealistic and programmatic, if not an utopian concept. Later we find national diversifications like in Germany (around 1900) ‘Kulturnation’ (= nation defined by a common culture) and ‘Staatsnation’ (=nation defined by a common political body). Even today the various shapes of national concepts testify different national histories and traditions. It is of vital interest for the European Communion to keep their historically developed meaning in mind.

3. But the development of national concepts was – speaking in terms of linguistic structures – more than a semantic diversification of Latin and Greek semiotic materials: In many European nations the classical languages amalgamated with the regional vernacular, giving birth to new semiotic models. But there is a remarkable difference to be found between Romanic and Germanic resp. Slavonian languages: The more remote from the centre of the Roman Empire the more linguistic material was taken from the vernacular in building political and social concepts which were able to interpret the regional and national structures of society. Let us take the example of the term ‘civis’: In Italian and Spanish we find the terms of ‘cittadino’ and ‘ciudadano’ (both derived from lat. ‘civitas’), in French and English the terms ‘citoyen’ and ‘citizen’. In German from the early modern times onwards we only find the term ‘Bürger’ (Danish ‘borger’), as an equivalent to ‘civis’ signifying both, the citizen of a town and of a state or nation. Similar expressions can be found in Italian (‘borghese’), French (‘bourgeois’), English (‘burger’), but they are limited to the social group of inhabitants of a town, vested with all rights and privileges of this group, or from the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards to the middle-class, the so-called ‘bourgeoisie’. A comparative investigation into the concepts in English, French and German has shown, how much more the German and English concepts of ‘Bürgertum’ and ‘burgher-life’ was influenced by the culture and memory of medieval town-life, compared with the strong impacts of Roman law in France.<sup>1</sup>

This shows on the one side, how in most Romanic countries the existence of a second idiom allowed to differentiate between various semantic layers, leav-

ing space for the representation and elaboration of new social and political patterns; it shows on the other side, how the vernacular was used for building new semantic architectures. The usage of the Germanic terms ‘freedom’ (beside ‘libertas’), of ‘open’ (beside ‘publicus’ and ‘communis’), of ‘Geschichte’ (beside ‘historia’), of ‘Gesetz’ (beside ‘ius’), of ‘Bund’ (beside ‘foedus’, ‘conventio’ etc.) would give other examples for this important dimension of variety and diversification. It bestowed the Romanic and Germanic languages with a richness of expression, which was vital for their culture not only in political, but as well in religious and social terms. (For the Slavonian languages, I hope that somebody else will be able to extend and limit my observations. The only hint which I am able to give in this respect, would be to the importance of Greek at least in the sphere of religious and ecclesiastical concepts.)

4. Finally we find a strong secondary influence of modern national languages like French and English on other European languages in certain fields of cultural life: The term ‘constitution’ goes back to the Latin ‘constitutio’, but the modern concept was adopted to most European languages from the French and English definition of a constitution in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. The same is to be observed from concepts like ‘industry’, ‘emancipation’, ‘parliament’, ‘policy’ and many others. But there are other ways of influence from Eastern to Western languages, too: As we all know, many monetary concepts (like ‘deposit’, ‘conto’ etc.) were developed in Italy already by the late medieval times. The German language developed a lot of religious terms like ‘Erweckung’ (awakening), ‘Konfession’ (confession in the sense of “denomination”) and so on. For the future of Europe it is of major importance to acknowledge and appreciate the cultural traditions which stand behind all these concepts. This doesn’t mean that we should stick to them for ever, but rather that we are aware of common traditions and differences within the spectrum of national heritages within Europe.

#### IV.

Let me finish this paper with some remarks on the organisation of the lexikographical project, which has to be planned within the next few years. I would suggest to think of to layers of organisation:

1. We need national groups of scholars which are specialised in the history of concepts and willing to cooperate and carry the project by their own semantic investigations. Each of these national groups should consist at least of 5 – 7 scholars, who are

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Reinhart Koselleck, Ulrike Spree, Willibald Steinmetz: Drei bürgerliche Welten? Zur vergleichenden Semantik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in Deutschland, Frankreich und England, in: H.-J. Puhle (Hg.), Bürger in der Gesellschaft der Neuzeit. Wirtschaft – Politik – Kultur. Göttingen 1991, S. 14-58.

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ready to take over the “national” part of an article. The articles have to be elaborated in collaboration with scholars of other cultural regions in Europe. The communicating language should be English, and English should be the language of the publication (but we should discuss the possibility of national translations of the Lexicon.) In each participating country there should be a national editorial board, run by one of the national administrators. For each article one of the national editorial boards should take over the organisation of the working group, including the organisation of meetings and the editorial work of the article.

2. Each national group should be lead by two scholars who form with the leaders of the other national groups a board of administration and planning. This international board should elaborate the scheme of the project (including the election of concepts and the methodological guidelines), apply for the financial funds (if possible in Brussel), and it should initiate the working groups on each concept article and care for the final publication.

These are only some central ideas, which have to be discussed, elaborated and modified. But in any case I think it is time to begin.

# The Interdisciplinarity of History of Concepts – a bridge between disciplines

IRMLINE VEIT-BRAUSE

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The theses I wish to defend can be briefly summarized:

History of concepts is more than just a sub-discipline of philosophy where it normally has its institutional location.

History of concepts if it aspires to being *histoire problème*<sup>2</sup> and not a pure history of words and terms has to work in an interdisciplinary way. History of concepts as an investigation of the genesis of (scientific) concepts and guiding themes<sup>3</sup> is a necessary pre-requisite of interdisciplinarity.

I am basing my reflections on my own experiences as a historian of concepts<sup>4</sup> as well as on my experiences of teaching interdisciplinary courses.<sup>5</sup> An essential part of these experiences is the insight into the embeddedness of styles of thought into the different national languages.<sup>6</sup>

## Internal and external motivations for research in history of concepts

As someone moving between worlds, that is between different scientific discourses and scientific cultures – though this sensitivity for national styles of thought and doing science is a rather novel phenomenon<sup>7</sup> – I am quite aware not only of the internal but also, and especially, of the science policy motivations for research in the history of concepts. ‘History of concepts’ is a neologism in English introduced by those who argue for similar projects in their respective national languages and cultures as the ones attempted in Germany. The older English term *History of Ideas* – or, as Bernard Williams simply said, *key words* – is loaded with a rather different philosophical tradition than the German distinction between *Begriffsgeschichte*, *Sachgeschichte* and *Problemgeschichte*. French terminology prefers to speak of *histoire sémantique* or *mots clefs*. These terminological variants themselves call for a consideration of intercultural aspects and the need to take scrutinize the distinct contexts of traditions.

In Germany, the prompt for such conceptual historical investigations arose in particular from the internal dynamic of philosophy and of history, partly

with a decidedly interdisciplinary orientation. In the 1950s, Hans Georg Gadamer, who just as Reinhart Koselleck, Karlfried Gründer and Reiner Wiehl<sup>8</sup> come from a hermeneutical tradition – chaired the “Senatskommission für begriffsgeschichtliche Forschung bei der deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft” and initiated an interdisciplinary history of concepts, which sought to clarify ‘the important core concepts of philosophy and the sciences in exchanges between the representatives of the specific disciplines and philosophy.’<sup>9</sup>

In the Anglo-Saxon language community, the impulse for delving into history of concepts arose interestingly enough from political motivations. Prompted by the horrific experiences of the Second World War, UNESCO established in 1946 an international research group on the topic of ‘Human Rights,’ the results of which were published in 1949 in English and French. As Richard McKeon (University of Chicago) reported in 1959,<sup>10</sup> there followed other UNESCO projects concerning the key terms of western democracy: *Enquête sur la liberté* (Paris 1953) and a study on democracy with the title *Democracy in a World of Tensions* (Chicago 1951). The fourth world congress of the *Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française* was devoted to the topic of “Freiheit” – “Liberty” – “La Liberté”.<sup>11</sup> The *Revue internationale de philosophie*, published in Bruxelles became the organ for the recently aroused interest in philosophical core concepts with the intent of furthering international understanding.<sup>12</sup> In 1950, five years after the end of the war, the plan was ripe for a new type of philosophical dictionary: ‘to study fundamental terms and to inquire into the relations of philosophical traditions in determining their meanings.’<sup>13</sup> In January 1950, Raymond Klibansky, the

1 This is a much shortened version of the keynote address presented at the History of Concepts conference, Amsterdam, June 2002.

2 Cf. Jean Starobinski, ‘The word civilization,’ in id., *Blessings in Disguise*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993.

3 Cf. Hans Blumenberg, *Nachbemerkungen zum Bericht*

philosopher born in France, educated in Frankfurt, professor at McGill University, and an exile like Isaiah Berlin, presented a memorandum outlining the purpose and orientation of such a project. He made one particularly important point among others.

‘In the Tower of Babel confusion arose when different terms were used by different people to express the same meaning and they did not understand one another’s speech. Today we are witnessing another kind of confusion, less obvious, but no less harmful. For often the same terms are now used in different tongues to express different meanings [...]’

Klibansky emphasized in 1950 that it was ‘imperative to recognize that differences are inevitable and to be able to be taken into account.’ Thus a then urgent political motif – and still important today – produced the plan for an International Dictionary of Basic Terms of Philosophy and Political Thought, and the intention was to publish this work in all the world languages. Sample articles in five languages – English, French, Spanish, Italian and German – did eventually appear in the *Revue internationale de philosophie* for the entries of ‘Responsibility,’ (1957), ‘Justice’ (1957) and ‘Society’ (1961). The work was to be, according to McKeon, a *Handbook for Statesmen*, ‘to show the connections among significances required for Statesmen designed to provide fixed meanings congenial to one cultural view and institutional framework and suited to confute other views as obvious deviations from what is true and right.’<sup>14</sup> This venture in the history of concepts was ultimately an attempt in normative definitions of concepts in each of the European main languages and of the conceptual/terminological equivalences. Such a project *de longue haleine* – as Klibansky said in his autobiographical interviews of 1998 – required resources of extraordinary extent. A much more modest publication, the *glossaire de mots-clefs de la philosophie*, was published before the larger venture was completed and appeared in 1996 with 500 philosophical key terms in five languages.<sup>15</sup> The purpose of this *Glossaire* claims that ‘ensuite, des études détaillées devont mettre en lumière les différences entre les équivalents les plus proches dans les différents langues en cause.’<sup>16</sup>

The great Dictionary of political and social language in Germany – *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* – was originally planned in two languages, that is French and German.

History of concepts thus is oriented towards comparative approaches, or, to use the fashionable word, intercultural perspectives. The Dictionary of the History of Ideas, edited by Philip P. Wiener (1973ff) places the emphasis ‘on inter-disciplinary, cross-cultural relations.’ Philip Wiener stressed in particular that ‘[d]epartmental and national boundaries have thus been crossed in the cooperative exchange of ideas and cultural perspectives among editors and contributors.’<sup>17</sup>

über das *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, in *Jb. Ak. Wiss. u. Lit.*, 1967, 79-81.

4 Irmeline Veit-Brause, Partikularismus, in: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 4* (1978) 735-768; Irmeline Veit-Brause, *A Note on Begriffsgeschichte*, in *History and Theory 20* (1981) 61-67.

5 Cf. Irmeline Veit-Brause, ‘Zur Theorie und Geschichte der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften: Bericht über einen interdisziplinären Fernstudienkurs der Deakin University, Victoria, Australien,’ in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 33* (1982) 734-747.

6 Cf. Hartmut Lehmann/Melvin Richter eds, *The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts. New Studies in Begriffsgeschichte*, Occasional Paper No. 15, Washington D.C., 1966. Melvin Richter, ‘Opening Dialogue and Recognizing an Achievement,’ in: *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 39* (1996) 19-26; id., *The History of Political and Social Concepts. A Critical Introduction*, New York-Oxford, 1995; James Tully, ed., *Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics*, Oxford, 1988.

7 Cf. James Bono, ‘Locating Narratives: Science, Metaphor, Communities and Epistemic Styles,’ in Peter Weingart, ed., *Grenzüberschreitungen in der Wissenschaft. Crossing Boundaries in Science*, Baden-Baden, 1995, 119-151, esp. 6: The contention [...] is against the background of the universality claim of modern sciences in itself a provocation, or it was such at least at the time when Pierre Duhem, in his studies of theory of physics, referred to the different mouldings of style in England and France (Duhem, 1914),’ see also 17, 20f. Further evidence concerning the changes between internationality of research and the nationalization of the sciences in the age of nation-states and the discovery of the utility of knowledge in P. Weingart’s Introduction to *Grenzüberschreitungen*, esp. 8, 14f.

8 Cf. R. Koselleck, ‘Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte (1972)’ in id., *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*, Frankfurt a. M. 1984 107-129; K. Gründer, ‘Hermeneutik und Wissenschaftstheorie,’ in id., *Reflexion der Kontinuitäten. Zum Geschichtsdenken der letzten Jahrzehnte* (Göttingen 1982) 74-87; R. Wiehl, ‘Begriffsbestimmung und Begriffsgeschichte. Zum Verhältnis von Phänomenologie, Dialektik und Hermeneutik,’ in: *Hermeneutik und Dialektik. Aufsätze I*, ed. by Rüdiger Bubner et al., Tübingen 1970, 167-213.

9 Cf. Helmut G. Meier, ‘Begriffsgeschichte,’ in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Basel 1971ff [=HWPh] 1 (1977) 788-808, esp. 805.

10 Richard McKeon, ‘Introduction: The Meanings of Justice and the Relations among Traditions of Thought,’ in: *Revue internationale philosophie 11* (1957) 253-267.

11 Neuchâtel, 1949.

12 R. McKeon, Introduction, [fn 10] 254.

13 R. Klibansky, Le philosophe [fn 2], cf. Franziska Augstein, ‘Drei Handschläge. Raymond Klibansky besichtigt sein Zeitalter,’ *FAZ* 9 April 1998, 37.

14 R. McKeon, ‘Introduction: The Meanings and the Relations among Traditions and Thought,’ in: *Revue internationale de philosophie 15* (1961) 5.

15 Klibansky, 261.

16 Ibid.

17 *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, 6 vols (1973-76).

Politically motivated projects are today still on the agenda. The sciences are embedded, as we all know, in a historical-political context, so too the history of concepts. Its most significant task should be to serve international, intercultural and interdisciplinary understanding.

It comes as no surprise that the metaphor of the tower of Babel for the confusion of languages has been used to refer not only to the different natural languages and the cultural traditions and styles of thought sedimented in them, but also for the different language games of the disciplines. To overcome semiological barriers between disciplines is also the purpose of interdisciplinarity.<sup>18</sup>

Referring to the different specialisms, orientations, schools and theory wars in sociology, Mattei Dogan, *Directeur de Recherche au Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris*, posed the rhetorical question: 'Is there still a discipline without using an adjective?' He observed: 'During the last decades, sociology has transgressed the frontiers of all other social sciences, infiltrating everywhere and expanding immeasurably. To such a degree that it has become a Tower of Babel.'<sup>19</sup> That is to say that the relationship between the disciplines is also haunted by the 'curse of Babel.'

Hence, the sense of the history of science has an internal significance for the sciences as well as a science policy significance. And here we are approaching our special issue, the significance of history of concepts and interdisciplinarity. Again and again the relationship between the disciplines and their highly specialized and formalized language – which become the signum of scientificity – has been characterized as 'Babylonian confusion.'<sup>20</sup>

### **Disciplines, disciplinary configurations and interdisciplinarity**

Let me start in the history of concept vein. The term *disciplina* or *doctrina* has epistemic as well as institutional connotations. Since the Middle Ages the concept *disciplina*, resp. *disciplinaliter* is always associated with knowledge/science acquired by methodical stringency.<sup>21</sup>

A discipline is thus characterized by canonized knowledge, which is imparted as certain knowledge – body of knowledge. Recent theory of science has demonstrated that the disciplinarity, defined by epistemological criteria, is rarely embodied in the concrete practice of academic disciplines, since the requirements of professional training are in constant tension with the ideals of the epistemic purity and integrity of a discipline. Roland Posner, whose taxonomy aims at defining the criteria of disciplinarity, points out the epistemological eclecticism of the praxis-oriented disciplines. This, for Posner, raises the question of the 'forms of communication [...] between participants in a given field and persons in other fields of studies.'<sup>22</sup> Even for philosophers of

science the question concerning the manner and basis facilitating interdisciplinarity has become more pressing.<sup>23</sup>

From the sociological perspective of science R. Whitley defines a discipline with reference to the 'identity of an occupational group with intellectual goals and procedures.' The protocols which govern the procedures within the disciplines 'are occupational ones which combine individual prowess and competence with positional dominance and controls.'<sup>24</sup>

In a similar rigorous manner the sociologist of science Peter Weingart defends the conception of 'pragmatic interdisciplinarity' which lay at the foundation of ZiF (Centre for interdisciplinary research, Bielefeld) against a 'reductionist image of the sciences, in which a hierarchy of the disciplines can be construct on the basis of a unified epistemology and a universally binding concept of rationality.'<sup>25</sup>

Weingart argues against the Unified Science movement and implies a concept of discipline configurations, which are neither hierarchically arranged (as in Auguste Comte's model) nor can they be integrated by an ideally intended common language. Rather, they mutually complement each other in a sort of cyclical interdependence, as Jean Piaget proposed,<sup>26</sup> or can be modeled like an overlapping fish-scale model.<sup>27</sup> In other words, a discussion about the interdisciplinarity of history of concepts cannot avoid a discussion about the cognitive and institutional conditions of the production of knowledge.

By contrast, the concept of interdisciplinarity is a very young neologism. Difficult as it is to date the first appearance of a new term, it seems certain that 'interdisciplinarity' as a science policy program appeared much earlier in the Anglo-Saxon, especially in the American, world – OED refers to a citation in the *Journal of Educational Sociology* of 1937<sup>28</sup> – than in other languages. In Germany, interdisciplinarity as a '*forschungsorganisatorisches Postulat*' appeared in the rhetoric of science policy in the early 1960s, in particular in the context of the foundation of the reform university of Bielefeld.<sup>29</sup>

### **Interdisciplinarity – the international discussion**

The relationship between disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity has an institutional as well as an epistemological dimension – the intricate distinctions between inter-, multi- and trans-disciplinarity will be left aside here. Disciplines, as we know them today and refer to with the traditional abbreviations, are the result of a protracted historical process of cognitive differentiation, academic institutionalization and professionalization linked up with credentialism. The configuration of disciplines, and the borderlines between them, are not stable but constantly shifting.<sup>30</sup> No single discipline can be precisely characterized by either an exclusive object of study or by a domi-

nant method.<sup>31</sup> New disciplines developed from trans-disciplinary and problem oriented cooperation – interdisciplines (J. Th. Klein).<sup>32</sup> From the perspective of sociology and psychology of science, there are always the issues of power, prestige and resources to be considered too.

In the United States, Canada, England and Australia there has been a vigorous debate for years about the function and status of interdisciplinary cooperation and about the continuing role of the so-called base disciplines.<sup>33</sup> This controversy has somewhat climaxed in the last few years, not for reasons internal to research and teaching, where the issue is one of enabling innovations,<sup>34</sup> but also and foremost for reasons of science policy. Wolfgang Frühwald, the then president of the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*, noted: ‘The interdisciplinary tune, to be sung between the stools, is [...] rather a political tune, a garstig Lied, as the skeptical word says.’<sup>35</sup>

In my view, the crux of all debates on the pro and con of interdisciplinarity lies in this unholy alliance of trends internal to the sciences and the pressures external to research and teaching. From the science policy view, interdisciplinary curricula are advocated for reasons of so-called efficiency of teaching. In this sense, the merger of departments to larger units is infected by the ‘economic rationalism,’ which has forced the humanities and social sciences in particular into a continuing legitimization crisis. To put it in the words of Bill Readings, one of the most skeptical critics of the ‘idea’ of the university in the contemporary situation of ‘economic rationalism’ and ‘economic globalization’ – ‘The contemporary situation of the humanities is one of profound legitimization crisis, not merely a crisis in the marginal utility of the liberal arts for a technocratic society.’ Readings argues sharply ‘that the decline of the nation-state that accompanies the globalization of the world economy means that the notion of culture no longer matters to modernity [...] that is, as the symbolic and political counterpart to the project of economic integration pursued by the capitalist nation-state, it has lost its *raison d’être*.’<sup>36</sup>

Readings, whose concern is a fundamental critique of the role of universities in contemporary society, comes to rather skeptical-melancholy conclusions in his larger study *The University in Ruins*.<sup>37</sup> Somehow, he submits, the humanities have to nestle in these ruins without recourse to the ‘idea of the university’ once proclaimed in the great tradition of Humboldt, Schiller or J. Newman and J. J. Pelikan.

### Scylla and Charybdis of interdisciplinarity

In this situation of ‘very real organizational problems’<sup>38</sup> complex alliances and rather ragged frontlines between the protagonists of interdisciplinarity and the defenders of clear disciplinary identities developed. In the context of our question about the

18 Cf. Harald Holzhey, ‘Interdisziplinarität,’ HWPPh 4 (1976) 476-478.

19 Mattei Dogan, ‘The Moving Frontiers of the Social Sciences,’ in: *Grenzüberschreitungen*, ed. by Weingart [fn 8] 87-105, qu. 98.

20 James J. Bono, ‘Locating Narratives’ [fn 8] qu. 140.

21 Cf. G. Jüssen/O. Schrimpf, *doctrina*, HWPPh 2, 1972, 256-261.

22 Roland Posner, ‘What is an Academic Discipline?’ in: *Gedankenzeichen*, ed. by Regina Clausen/Roland Daube-Scharat, Tübingen, 1988, 165-285, esp. 167ff, 179ff.

23 Gerhard Frey, ‘Methodenprobleme interdisziplinärer Gespräche,’ in: *Ratio* 15 (1973) 53-172.

24 R. Whiteley, ‘The rise and decline of university disciplines in the sciences,’ in: *Problems in Interdisciplinary Studies*, ed. by R. Jurkowich/J. H. Paelinck (=Issues in Interdisciplinary Studies 2) Rotterdam, 1984, 10-25, qu. 13.

25 P. Weingart, ed., *Grenzüberschreitungen*, 11.

26 Jean Piaget, ‘Problèmes généraux de la recherche interdisciplinaire et mécanismes communs,’ in: *Tendances principales de la recherche dans les sciences sociales et humaines I: Sciences sociales*, Paris, 1970, ch. 7.

27 Cf. Muzafer Sherif/Carolyn Sherif, *Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences*, Chicago, 1969.

28 OED 7, 1989, 1098; since then there is a number of journals devoted to interdisciplinary perspectives, cf. for example Robert I. Rotberg/Theodore K. Raab: ‘Interdisciplinary History,’ in: *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 1 (1970) 3-5.

29 P. Weingart, *Grenzüberschreitungen* [fn 8] 7.

30 Cf. Michel Serres, ed., *Elemente einer Geschichte der Wissenschaften*, Frankfurt a. M. 1998.

31 Cf. Irmline Veit-Brause, ‘The Disciplining of History. Perspectives on a Configurational Analysis of its Disciplinary History,’ in: Rolf Torstendahl and Irmline Veit-Brause, eds, *History Making. The Intellectual and Social Formation of a Discipline*, Stockholm, 1996, 7-29.

32 Julie Thompson Klein, *Crossing Boundaries. Knowledge, Disciplinarity, and Interdisciplinarity*, Charlottesville/London, 1996.

33 Cf. David Hollinger, ‘The Disciplines and the Identity Debates, 1979-1995,’ in: *Daedalus* 126 (1997) 333-351.

34 Cf. Mattei Dogan/Robert Pahre, *Creative Marginality: Innovation at the Intersections of the Social Sciences*, Boulder, Col. 1990.

35 Wolfgang Frühwald, ‘Zum Verhältnis von Spezialisierung und Interdisziplinarität in der Grundlagenforschung,’ in: P. Weingart, ed., *Grenzüberschreitungen* [fn 8] 206.

36 Bill Readings, ‘For a Heteronomous Cultural Politics: the University, Culture, and the State,’ in: *Constructive Criticism: the Human Sciences in the Age of Theory*, ed. by Martin Kreiswirth/Thomas Carmichael, Toronto/ Buffalo/London, 1995 169-189, qu. 169.

37 Bill Readings, *The University in Ruins*, Cambridge, Mass./London, 1996.

38 Immanuel Wallerstein et al. *Open the Social Sciences*.

interdisciplinarity of history of concepts it is primarily the internal arguments pro and contra a reconfiguration of the human sciences – which however are not completely unaffected by the external science policy pressures. I am referring, as an example, to the Report of an International Commission, which was concerned with today's organizational problems in the human sciences.

The summary of the current situation, which is submitted in this Report, distinguishes correctly between the logic of the present differentiations between the disciplines – which are not at all as homogeneous and paradigm driven, as Posner wants it to be in his taxonomy – and the problem of resources.

'While social scientists, because of the pressures generated by their intellectual dilemmas, are seeking to expand the number and variety of pedagogical and research structures, the administrators are looking for ways to economize and therefore to consolidate [the finances]... It is only a matter of time for the two contrary pressures to collide, and collide severely' (96).

The Commission appeals to the social scientists themselves to think about and propose a 'meaningful division of labor' in the light of present lack of resources. In its own plea, the Commission emphasizes:

What seem to be called for is less an attempt to transform organizational frontiers, than to amplify the organization of intellectual activities without attention to current disciplinary boundaries... In short, we do not believe that there are monopolies of wisdom, nor zones of knowledge reserved to persons with particular university degrees. (98)

The defenders of interdisciplinarity and the protagonists of a reconfiguration of disciplines, in particular in the human sciences, conjure up the innovative potential for the progress of knowledge, which arise from such boundary crossings. What is at issue is to overcome the limitations and restrictions (Bornierungen), which can develop when 'domains of research' are assigned to one or the other discipline – for example, Kant is owned by the philosophers, not by the cultural scientists, as was deplored at a postdoctoral seminar of historians. Dogan and Pahre celebrated, with a stylish pun, the 'creative marginality' by studying the intellectual biographies of some important innovators in specific disciplines. With the same kind of aplomb, Julie Thompson Klein critically discusses the conditions and possibilities of boundary crossings and underlines in particular 'the integrative habit of mind' of a 'critical interdisciplinarity'.<sup>39</sup> In our context her attempt to specify the 'communicative competence' necessary for successful interdisciplinarity is particularly interesting.

How are we to describe this dialogical enterprise? My own attitude to interdisciplinary teamwork I used to describe metaphorically as 'bilingualism'. Others, like Klein prefer to speak of 'Pidgin and Creole' (220). Perhaps it is this hybrid conceptuality and the possibly resulting conceptual vagueness, which brings to the barricades the defenders of a definite disciplinary identity and conceptual 'rigour'.<sup>40</sup>

### **The duplex interdisciplinarity of the history of concepts**

In which form are we to imagine the interdisciplinarity of history of concepts? I wish to argue that it is of a dual kind. Firstly, history of concepts has to work in an interdisciplinary way – and it does so *de facto* despite being classified as a sub-discipline of philosophy<sup>41</sup> or located within political theory.<sup>42</sup> Secondly, and that is in my view the most interesting aspect, the achievements of history of concepts are a *sine qua non* of interdisciplinarity. In other words, our attention should focus on the achievements of history of concepts as enabling interdisciplinarity, in particular with respect to the interaction of history of science and history of concepts. As early as 1967 in a discussion about the continuation of the *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, Karlfried Gründer pointed out the inner connections between history of science and history of concepts and argued that '[t]herefore all disciplines, where this is the case, should have a say here...'<sup>43</sup> In the same debate about the idea, function and method of history of concepts, Hans Blumenberg stated: The structure of the genesis of concepts has become interesting as such and independently from historical facticities... Blumenberg emphasized: "Under the heading of history of concepts, a more encompassing task has been shaped for some time and by different disciplines, the task of research into terminologies, which comprehends the formation of concepts as processes with consequences and can help to critically practice them." Blumenberg also underlined 'that terminological problems exist in almost all disciplines ... and that these put excessive pressure and difficulties on the communication between the disciplines.' For these reasons, Blumenberg submitted, the collaboration with the natural sciences was imperative. With these new directions, history of concepts was given an important task in facilitating the interdisciplinary dialogue, which went beyond 'the area of philosophical competence'.<sup>44</sup>

We thus see in most recent research a convergence of history of concepts, history of science and history of disciplines. Even in the history of science, which follows its own impulses towards specialization, there is an increasing trend towards conceptual investigations, which runs counter to a positivist theory of science. In 1973, Gerald Holton attempted a 'thematic analysis of science', as he called it.<sup>45</sup> He meant by '*themata*' the prestructuring of empirical and analytical research by the 'eternal questions',<sup>46</sup>

which are incorporated, according to Holton, in not even that numerous metaphors and allegories.<sup>47</sup> *Themata*, Holton concluded, can neither be proven nor refuted. One example for such a ‘theme of the scientific imagination,’ pre-structuring empirical research, is the idea of atomism; under this heading quite different empirical findings have been proposed during the long course of the history of the sciences.<sup>48</sup> Another of such a pre-structuring allegory is the concept of ‘force’ (*Kraft*), which found ever new concrete definitions in the human sciences, e.g. with Herder.<sup>49</sup> There are other cosmological metaphors.<sup>50</sup> Holton even proposed a ‘new discipline’, that is ‘the thematic analysis of science’<sup>51</sup> and for him, who came from a scientific tradition, it was important to emphasize, ‘how these terms can help us to overcome the usual antithetical confrontations of natural and human sciences.’<sup>52</sup>

In recent years, James Bono has further radicalized this re-orientation, noticeable with Holton, towards a ‘rhetorical turn.’<sup>53</sup> Bono argues for a ‘cul-

tural history of science,’ concentrating on the diverging ‘epistemic styles.’ His attention is focused on the central question of how exactly conceptual diffuseness of metaphors is being hedged in by the embedding in narratives, and on the manner in which the negotiation about ‘contesting narrative emplotments of key scientific metaphors’ is being carried out in scientific discourses.

### Conclusion

Metaphors migrating from one discipline to another, one might propose, facilitate – as a medium of exchange (Bono) – the interdisciplinary discourse, on the condition that variants of meaning are clarified in a history of concepts manner. In this sense, I am arguing for the duplex interdisciplinarity of history of concepts, firstly for history of concepts as an interdisciplinary project, and secondly for history of concepts as a bridge between the disciplines, enabling interdisciplinarity.

*Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences*, Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1996.

39 Klein, *Crossing Boundaries*, 213, 211.

40 Wulf Koepke, ed., *Johann Gottfried Herder. Academic Disciplines and the Pursuit of Knowledge*, Columbia, 1996.

41 Helmut G. Meier, ‘Begriffsgeschichte,’ *HWPh* 1 (1971) 78ff.

42 Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, Oxford, 1995; Hermann Lübke, *Säkularisierung. Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs*, Freiburg/München 1965.

43 Karlfried Gründer, ‘Bericht über das *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*,’ 68.

44 Hans Blumenberg, ‘Nachbemerkung zum Bericht über das *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*,’ in: *Jb. Ak. Wiss. u. Lit.*, Mainz 1967, 79f.

45 Gerald Holton, *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought. Kepler to Einstein*, Cambridge, Mass., 1973.

46 Gerald Holton, *Themata. Zur Geschichte der Physik*, Braunschweig/Wiesbaden, 1984.

47 Cf. Harald Weinrich, ‘Metapher,’ *HWPh* 5 (1981) 1180-1186.

48 *Thematic Origins*, 99ff.

49 *Ibid.*, 58; *Themata*, 16, 19; cf. Klaus Mainzer: *Kraft* (engl./franz. Force), in: *Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie* 2 (1984) 490-492; Friedrich Kaulbach, ‘Kraft,’ *HWPh* 4 (1976) 1177-1184.

50 Cf. on these wide ranging issues Hans Blumenberg, *Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie*, Frankfurt a. M. 1998.

51 *Themata*, 18.

52 *Ibid.*, 26.

53 James Bono, *Locating Narratives*, [fn 8] 119-151.

## The history of counterconcepts: “Latin America” as an example

JOÃO FERES JR. (*Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro*)

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Since its inception the history of concepts has been chiefly concerned with the study of key-concepts (*Grundbegriffe*), be it through individual essays or collective national and transnational projects. Through his invaluable contribution to the methodology of the discipline, Reinhart Koselleck sorts out some of the most crucial characteristics of political and social key-concepts, among them, their polysemy and high level of contestability. Nonetheless, despite the focus on the study of key-concepts, or maybe because of it, a distinct class of political concepts was practically left unattended by conceptual historians. I am speaking of counterconcepts, more specifically, that which Koselleck has called asymmetrical counterconcepts. We know what to expect from the history of a key-concept — semantic instability, ruptures, discontinuities, polysemy, translations, mistranslations, and so on — but what to expect from the history of a counterconcept? The study of the history of key-concepts might contribute with valuable insight to the political debate in modern democratic societies, but what is the importance of exploring the meanings harbored by counterconcepts?

There is another intriguing question that I want to address with this short piece. The history of political concepts usually studies concepts as they operate in everyday language. But what happens when a concept becomes the object of a scientific endeavor, the object of an entire “discipline”? How does the language of the expert interact with everyday language and what are the consequences of that interaction for conceptual formation?

In this article I will try to address these two clusters of questions through a brief analysis of the history of the concept of Latin America in the US. Although it might sound surprising to some, “Latin America” has been construed in American English as a counterconcept to America, as I intend to show below. Furthermore, despite its conciseness, this abbreviated summary of a much larger study (Feres Jr. 2003) aims at illuminating some methodological aspects of conceptual history as well as the political import of writing the history of counterconcepts nowadays.

Before delving into the historical account, however, the notion of asymmetrical counterconcepts must be restated. According to Koselleck (1985), asymmetric counterconcepts are conceptual pairs used by a given human group to confer a universal character to its own identity while denying others a claim to self-assertion. He examines the counterconceptual pairs Hellene/barbarian, Christian/Heathen, and Aryan/non-Aryan, to show that despite semantic innovations introduced by historical circumstance, counterconceptual pairs share a common semantic structure: the other is construed in opposition to the group’s self-image, usually through derogatory expressions and stereotypes that denote perversion, incompleteness, retardation, and lack of the group’s self-bestowed qualities. That is, the positive element of the pair is widely accepted by the group as a true representation of their particular collective being, whereas the negative element is generically used to name peoples who are perceived as “not belonging”. Those formations are called asymmetric because although the ones who are seen as outsiders may acknowledge the name they receive, they do not feel properly recognized by it.

The history of the concept of Latin America in the US starts before the expression “Latin America” became current in English. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* “Latin America” only started to be employed around the end of the nineteenth century. The first usage of “Latin America” annotated by the dictionary dates from 1890 and pertains to a document authored by the American president Benjamin Harrison, *Reciprocity Treaties with Latin America*. A search for the term in databases of nineteenth century American periodicals yielded six articles containing “Latin America” in their titles, three of them published in 1898, one in 1894, one in 1892, and one in 1889 – findings that confirm the information provided by the *OED*. The term “Latin America” is most likely an import, for evidence shows that the usage of *América Latina* in Spanish and *Amérique Latine* in French preceded its incorporation to the English language by at least three decades.

Still according to the *OED*, until the early 20<sup>th</sup>

century, “Spanish American” was the preferred term to refer to things “of or pertaining to Latin America or its peoples.” Assuming that the *Oxford English Dictionary* is correct, and, thus, that “Latin American” replaced “Spanish American” in everyday English, one can rightfully formulate the question: did Latin America also inherit the semantics of its predecessor? Before answering that question, however, we must first examine the semantic inheritance accumulated by Spanish America during the century that preceded the inception of its sister concept in the English language.

Pejorative references to things Spanish and to the peoples of the Southern republics have existed in English long before the term “Latin America” entered the language. The religious controversies of the sixteenth century and the war against the Spanish Armada contributed to the consolidation of a strong anti-Spanish sentiment in England, which is often referred to as the Spanish Black Legend, or just the Black Legend. Expressions of this sentiment can be found in British fictional literature, political treatises, journals, and speeches of British statesmen, military, and intellectuals (Gibson 1971; Maltby 1971; Powell 1971). Black Legend accounts of the horrors and misdeeds of the Spanish colonization in America were often used as a contrasting rhetorical strategy to praise the “orderliness” and “fairness” of the British colonization – such practice can be found, for example, in John Locke’s *Two treatises of government*.

The Black Legend also crossed the Atlantic and found a new place to develop in the United States. In a similar fashion, the anti-Spanish sentiment was extended from its original target, Spain, to the Spanish colonies in the “New World.” In the early nineteenth century US, manifestations of contempt for Spanish Americans were constructed along hidden asymmetric oppositions. For each negative qualifier attributed to them — priest-ridden (Catholic), indolent, ignorant, superstitious, and incapable of enterprise or exertion — there was a positive counterpart in the American self-image — Protestant [thus anti-Catholic], disciplined, educated, rational, and industrious. Given that these qualifiers described life-styles, customs, habits, and institutions, we can group them under the category of cultural asymmetric oppositions.

The semantic contents associated with the inhabitants of Spanish America started to change around mid-nineteenth century, especially during the Mexican War. Arguments asserting the undoubted racial superiority of Anglo-Saxon Americans vis-à-vis Mexicans and Spanish Americans were used by both advocates and critics of territorial annexation. Beyond contrasting opinions about what to do, one should notice that the racial characteristics commonly attributed to Mexicans lacked specificity. They were said to be an incongruous mass of Spaniards, Indians, and mongrels or a medley of mixed races – that

is, their ultimate racial nature was being non-white. Here we witness the operation of what could be called racial asymmetric opposition.

Still around the period of the Mexican War, some brands of American nationalism coalesced around the ideology of Manifest Destiny, which was premised on the idea that the American Anglo-Saxon race was chosen by God to be the vessel of His will on earth; the true and legitimate agents of human history. In opposition to this self-image, the others were portrayed either as savage or senile, that is, as lacking proper historicity. This can be called temporal asymmetric opposition. Although Manifest Destiny affirmed American exceptional qualities against all peoples and countries of the world, Mexicans, Spanish Americans and Spaniards were its most common target during the nineteenth century, particularly during the Mexican War and the Spanish American War, almost fifty years later.

When the concept of Latin America entered the English language in the late nineteenth century, Spanish America had been in use for more than a century. Predictably, Latin America inherited from its sister concept most of its semantic load. The association of derogatory terms to “Latin America” in everyday language recurred throughout the twentieth century. Examples of such usage can be found in the news media (Johnson 1980), in the discourses of US government officials and politicians (Park 1995; Schoultz 1998), and in literature (Pike 1992). Assuming the role of a counterconcept for America, the semantics of the concept of Latin America became denser around the three main clusters of asymmetric oppositions already identified in the definition of Spanish America: cultural, racial, and temporal. Further evidence of this state of affairs was given by a nation-wide poll conducted by the Office of Public Opinion Research in 1940, where respondents were asked to attribute qualities to Central and South Americans. The results were:

Dark-skinned	80%
Quick-tempered	49%
Emotional	47%
Religious	45%
Backward	44%
Lazy	41%
Ignorant	34%
Suspicious	32%
Friendly	30%
Dirty	28%
Proud	26%
Imaginative	23%
Shrewd	16%
Intelligent	15%
Honest	13%
Brave	12%
Generous	12%
Progressive	11%
Efficient	5 %
No answer	4 %
No opinion	0% <sup>1</sup>

With the exception of “friendly,” all the adjectives in the first column are negative. The most salient characteristic, dark-skinned, is overtly racial, while the two following ones have racialist overtones. “Temperament,” a category that encompasses “emotional,” has been a common concept of racialist theories since Linnaeus. More importantly, “dark-skinned” is not a specific “racial” characteristic, but just the quality of being “non-white” – a striking evidence of the crucial role racial asymmetric opposition plays in imagining Latin Americans. Religious, lazy, ignorant, suspicious, dirty, and proud (and also shrewd) clearly are cultural categories. Temporal asymmetry is represented in the list by the word “backward,” which implies being retarded or in another era. Furthermore, terms such as religious and ignorant also have a temporal flavor for they can be associated with a pre-secularized, undeveloped past.

The history of the concept of Latin America in the US would be incomplete, however, if we did not take into consideration the elevation of Latin America to the status of a social scientific concept. Since its institutional consolidation, after WWII, Latin American Studies have produced an enormous amount of expert social scientific literature on Latin America as a whole and on Latin American countries as case studies. Although a few academic works about Latin America were produced before the war, the institutionalization of Latin American Studies in the form of an extensive network of university programs, research centers, journals, publishers, associations, conferences, grants and funding structure only occurred as a response to the Cuban Revolution (Martz 1971; Needler and Walker 1971; McCaughey 1984; Berger 1995).

Latin American studies started its ascension in the early 1960s in a context dominated by modernization theory. In the academia, modernization theory was an endeavor embraced by economists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and psychologists who intended to explain, enable, and control the development and modernization of third world nations. Before becoming an academic pursuit, however, modernization appeared as a political project — launched by the Truman administration and embraced by subsequent American presidents — that aimed at hampering communist infiltration in the Third World through the promotion of technological and economic progress and cultural Westernization (Escobar 1995).

Despite its multidisciplinary reach, modernization theory was strongly influenced by the culturalist interpretation of Talcott Parson’s sociology. Promoting modernization was seen as a matter of instilling the correct modern cultural values and rejecting the traditional ones. This theoretical frame fitted well with some of the perceptions of Latin America already present in American everyday discourse. Authors who approached Latin America from the perspective of modernization theory, such as Seymour

Martin Lipset (1967), John Gillin (1955), Everett E. Hagen (1962), and Thomas C. Cochran (1960), explicitly used an idealized American yardstick to describe Latin America, by opposition, as traditional, Catholic, feudal, irrational, personalistic, authoritarian, particularistic, and so on; in sum, as a people who held value-orientations that were inimical to modernization. One should notice that these qualifications fit two types of asymmetric oppositions: cultural and temporal. All adjectives have cultural connotations and most also carry temporal overtones. Interestingly, those texts give little attention to the subject of race.

The most significant challenge to modernization theory, dependency studies, came not from within the US academic milieu but from “Latin America” itself. Despite internal disagreements, the criticism raised by the most influential dependency authors, such as Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1969), and Andre Gunder Frank (1967), had direct consequences to the way Latin America was perceived. They argued that underdevelopment should not be confused with traditionalism or feudalism, showing that, in historical terms, underdevelopment was the product of a synchronous relation between central and peripheral societies within the world capitalist system, and not a function of the internal capacity of a society to mimic universal developmental patterns. The so-called traditional societies had not been frozen in time. On the contrary, since their appearance, they have been integrated into the world capitalist system, first as colonial appendages, then as peripheral markets, and finally, in some cases, as industrialized peripheries. In other words, for dependentistas, Latin America did not suffer because of a lack of proper Protestant, achievement oriented, American values. Its underdevelopment should be understood as a consequence of its particular historical path and economic situation rather than as a product of pathological cultural values. Besides attacking the cultural asymmetric oppositions put in place by modernization theory to speak of Latin America, dependentistas also rejected perceptions that reproduced temporal asymmetric opposition, such as Latin American feudalism, traditionalism, and historical incapacity.

Hence, dependentistas deny that economic inequality should be understood in terms of temporal asymmetric opposition. Second, dependency theorists focused on economic structures rather than on culture, therefore, they tended to see cultural values more as products than as causes of economic situation.

Dependency started being received in the US academia already in the late 1960s. Most of its Ameri-

<sup>1</sup> In this poll, respondents were asked to describe Central and South Americans choosing from a fixed list of nineteen words. For more information on this poll see Hadley Cantril, ed., *Public Opinion, 1935\_1946* (1951).

can advocates were young Latin Americanists with leftist political leanings; critics of the way modernization served the US cold war agenda and of US foreign policy in Latin America, which by the late 1960s had turned toward the covert support of military dictatorship and of political repression.

Around the same time dependency was penetrating Latin American studies, the early 1970s, a new approach to the study of Latin America appeared in the US: corporatism. In regards to the perception of Latin America, corporatism basically repeated the same ethnology already systematized by modernization theory, which, as we have seen was pregnant with everyday language derogatory perceptions. But, at the same time, exponents of this literature such as Howard Wiarda (1974), Ronald Newton (1970), Frederick Pike (1973), and James Malloy (1977) argued that modernization theorists and American governmental officials were wrong to think that Latin America could be modernized by the assimilation of modern American values. According to those authors, the traditional, hierarchical, corporative, elitist, and authoritarian orientations of Latin culture are as strong today as they were five centuries ago, when the first *conquistadores* reached the coasts of the New World. Some corporatists, such as Glen Dealy (1996), stretch the Latin cultural and historical paralysis back to the Roman Empire. The element of comparison is again the United States, which corporatists endow with all the positive cultural and temporal qualities that Latin America lacks.

Whereas sociologists were the largest contingent of authors behind modernization theory, corporatism was chiefly a “theory” embraced by political scientists. These academics defended that the authoritarian corporatist state was the true political manifestation of the Latin culture, and, because of that, was able to resist the passage of time and the modernizing influences arrived from “abroad.” In practical terms, corporatism produced a well-rounded justification for accepting or even cooperating with Latin American right-wing dictators and authoritarian rulers in a period that US foreign policy was doing just that.

From the 1970s to the present, Latin American studies continued to grow and expand. Nowadays, the most prominent association for the study of Latin America, LASA, organizes conferences with 3,000 participants divided in twenty-eight thematic areas. The academic literature on Latin America produced in the US has become highly specialized and diversified. Rather than examining the representations of Latin America propagated in each one of these sub-literatures, something that would far exceed the purpose of this piece, I would like to end this analytical effort by focusing on an important category of works about Latin America: the textbook literature of introduction to Latin American studies. This literature not only brings us back to the present, but also

gives us a glimpse into the interface between specialized academic languages and everyday language.

Social scientists, writers, journalists, bureaucrats, businesspeople, and other professionals responsible for the circulation of discourses on Latin America in American society acquire their education on Latin America in the benches of American universities, frequently through introductory courses to Latin American studies, where these textbooks are employed. Thus, knowing what these people are taught is crucial for understanding what is the present status of and perspectives for “Latin America” in the United States. Finally, some of those professionals eventually become involved with dealing with “Latin America,” either through the private or public initiatives. Given that American influence and power over its southern neighbors has been vast, understanding the way Americans think about Latin America is capital to understanding the way they act toward the ones they see as “Latin American.”

Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith’s *Modern Latin America* (2001) is undoubtedly the best seller of the textbook literature. Among the books most frequently seen in the syllabi of courses on Latin America one also finds *A History of Latin America* (Keen and Haynes 2000), *Latin America: a Concise Interpretative History* (Burns and Charlip 2001), *Latin American politics and development* (Wiarda and Kline 2000) and *Born in blood and fire: a concise history of Latin America* (Chasteen 2001). With the exception of Wiarda, all authors claim they have incorporated contributions of dependency theory to their analysis. However, the terms they use to present Latin America to students reminisce of the same asymmetric oppositions systematized by modernization theory and reaffirmed by corporatism. Prominent in the texts is the argument that Latin America has experienced plenty violent conflict but no actual change<sup>2</sup>; that the “pull of history” has continued to be strong in Latin America; that Latin America has been caught up in tradition: images of temporal asymmetric opposition. Cultural asymmetric opposition is also explicit in all texts, through the effort of displaying a coherent Latin American culture that is in all aspects “other” to the US’s, through qualifiers such as traditional, paradoxical, inherently violent and unstable, and allusions to irrationality.

Textbooks do not communicate exclusively through text, all textbooks have colorful covers sporting pictures representing Latin America – either paintings by “Latin American” artists or “Latin American” folk art. The level of homogeneity of this pictorial material is remarkable. All settings de-

<sup>2</sup> With the exception of dependency analyses, this trope of movement without actual historical change is recurring in the Latin American studies literature. The image seem to be extracted from Hegel’s description of the incapacity Oriental Empires had for being truly historical (1956).

picted on the covers are rural, with people dressed in non-western and traditional clothing engaged either in leisure activities or parading rifles and bandoleers – images suggesting that Latin Americans are good at having fun or at promoting violence and disturbance but not prone to the rational pursuit of their own improvement through work. Images have the powerful communicative property of alluding to several meanings at once. In this particular case, the cultural oppositions expressed by the pictures are deeply interwoven with temporal oppositions, for the same scenes suggest backwardness, traditionalism, underdevelopment, and pre-capitalist social forms.

The most striking feature of the textbooks' covers, however, is the presence of an element that had been mostly repressed in textual social scientific discourse: race. All human beings depicted in the paintings are, without exception, dark-skinned. That is, every time students reach for their books, they are reminded of the Latin American looks: non-white – racial asymmetric opposition is back.

Interestingly, most textbooks present the social scientific study of Latin America as an instrument to combat stereotypes. As we have found, however, these textbooks as well as some of the most influential approaches to the study of Latin actually end up giving authoritative credence to age-old stereotypes that have defined the American perception of their southern neighbors.

Now that we have arrived at the end of the narrative, the questions raised in the introductory paragraphs can be reassessed. The enlightening aspect of social scientific discourse should not be taken for granted, for the social sciences have also been used to perpetrate several types of prejudice. This is particularly true when the object of knowledge is a counterconcept. Like contemporary Americans, ancient Greeks, medieval Christians, and Nazi Germans also produced rationalized ethnologies about the ones they perceived as Others. In relation to the effects of social scientific discourse on everyday language, our study suggests that the social sciences might have contributed to undermining open racist bravados against Latin Americans, so common in the nineteenth century, while, at the same time, preserving, or even strengthening cultural and temporal stereotypes. As the textbook covers indicate, the editors and authors of these works seem to know that racial stereotypes about Latin Americans are available in everyday American English, for they use those stereotypes in ways that unfortunately seem to confirm them.

My study shows, as I tried to indicate in some passages of this short piece, that socio-scientific conceptualizations do not occur in a political vacuum. Defining Latin America entailed producing expectations about it, interpreting past experiences with it, and justifying actions toward it. The discourses

about Latin America produced by the social sciences might not have produced profound semantic change but their systematic and rational character served for guiding and/or justifying policymaking. Modernization through acculturation, political stability through military dictatorship, transitions to democracy under conservative leadership, and democratic stabilization under neo-liberal economic policies; those policy guidelines were strongly backed by social scientific reasoning. Beyond, or below, these more explicit policies, lies an extensive historical record of abuses suffered by “Latin Americans” in the hands of their Northern brethren: military and political intervention, territorial occupation and dispossession, cooperation with political repression and persecution, open and covert support for counterinsurgency measures, economic boycott, *et coetera*. Thus, the debased representations reproduced by the conceptualization of Latin America have very concrete and objectionable counterparts.

As the present analysis indicates, one should not expect severe semantic upheaval from the history of a counterconcept. This is a predictable finding, given that the populations represented by the counterconcept are either outside the territorial boundaries of the politico-linguistic community operating the conceptualization or occupy a marginal or subaltern position within it. In other words, they lack the means to challenge the perceptions reproduced by counterconceptualization. On the other hand, counterconcepts are updated and re-presented by each succeeding generation, approach, and/or political agenda. Therefore, the historiography of counterconcepts should be particularly concerned with the political projects that make use of counterconcepts and pay attention to the range of expectations generated by their use.

Finally, there is a case to be made for including the study of counterconcepts in the agenda of the conceptual history practiced nowadays in multicultural democratic societies. As it is the case of “Latin Americans” in the US, groups that are counterconceptualized may live within the national territory boundaries. Thus, unearthing the network of debasing meanings that comprise counterconceptualization is an important step to fight the unequal treatment and the political and social marginalization to which many of these groups are subjected. And this can be done without assuming that human beings are bearers (or prisoners) of authentic ethnic identities. In sum, the present moment that we live in is in much need of the history of counterconcepts.

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# Adriaan Koerbagh and the comparative history of concepts - The past and the future

## Introduction of the fifth Conference of the History of Concepts Group

PIM DEN BOER (*University of Amsterdam*)

Welcome to Amsterdam. I have given my introduction an ambitious title but I can assure you I will touch only briefly on these two large subjects.

### The Past

Permit me to introduce a relatively unknown forerunner, predecessor of the study of concepts, appropriate in this setting because his life and death are closely related to Amsterdam. He is a tragic predecessor, for he found an early death in the world-famous prison of Amsterdam, the so-called Rasphuis, where the prisoners were obliged to work, to 'rasp', to scrape wood. The prison has been demolished, it is a shopping center now, but you can still admire the gate of the building on the Heiligenweg, two hundred meters from here. So give Adriaan Koerbagh, for that is his name, a thought when you pass through the street. I will not elaborate on the details of the martyrdom of this historian of concepts. For a recent study on Koerbagh in English I can refer to Jonathan Israel's *Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the making of modernity 1650-1750* (Oxford University Press 2001). Koerbagh died in 1669 shortly after he was sent to prison by the magistrates of Amsterdam because of his offending and dangerous publications.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, we see in multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-religious Amsterdam, the largest and most prosperous harbor of the world, an extraordinary movement to promote the vernacular and in particular the use of Dutch concepts. In different ways this movement was ideologically related to freethinking, the early or radical enlightenment as this is called nowadays. Adriaan Koerbagh took part in a kind of intellectual underground, just as the better known Louis (Lodewijk) Meyer, close friend of Spinoza and editor of Spinoza's Latin work. Both Koerbagh and Meyer published a Dutch dictionary. Both wanted to promote the Dutch language by translating foreign words, in particular scholarly Latin concepts and commonly used loanwords. Louis Meyer was a prudent man. He had earlier published anonymously a philosophical interpretation of the bible, inspired by the Cartesian method.<sup>1</sup>

The dictionary Meyer published was a dictionary, no more no less, but a very successful one, with numerous editions.<sup>2</sup> Koerbagh was a reckless radical however, his dictionary was also an encyclopedia for freethinkers, its first and only edition was almost completely destroyed and only a handful of copies have survived.

The title of Koerbagh's dictionary was very long, as was usual in those days and states his conceptual program. 'A Garden of all kinds of loveliness without sorrow, planted by peaceful Truth-mouth, researcher of the truth, for the utility and service of everybody, or the translation and explanation of all Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French and other strange loan-words and ways of speaking which (that being important) are used in theology, law, medicine and other arts and sciences and also in daily common speech in Dutch, by Adriaen Koerbagh, jurist and doctor', (Amsterdam 1668).<sup>3</sup> It was a truly interdisciplinary dictionary of nearly seven hundred pages, containing about 10,000 lemmata with short translations and synonyms, of interest for a lexicographer but also about 125-135 entries which are much longer, sometimes several pages (approximately one and a half percent of the total of lemmata).<sup>4</sup> These entries include etymological and historical explanations, bible-criticism (especially on the official Dutch translation of the bible), anti-clericalism aimed at Catholic priests as well as Protestant ministers, social complaints and aggressive atheism. I hope to publish an analysis of this remarkable book, a kind of predecessor to the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, in the near future, but it seems appropriate to speak a few words about it here in order to remind us that our generation is not the first to study the use of concepts in different disciplines.

Obviously, the dictionary was a subterfuge, an original answer to that eternal question in authoritarian societies: how to fool the censors. Let me give you three examples of Koerbagh's conceptual history, considered very offensive by contemporaries.

He translates 'Christ' into 'the besmeared', with the connotation of being dirty. Koerbagh insisted that the usual translation of Christ into 'the anointed' is incorrect Dutch (p. 139). According to him: "The

besmeared is one who is besmeared with fragrant resin or oil on his head. Jewish kings/ prophets and priests were besmeared or soaked on the head with fragrant oil or grease. But THIS besmeared is not besmeared or greased with balsam but with the holy ghost *as is said*". This is an ironical, even debunking formulation, the comparison with the incomparable son of God is blasphemous and the expressed disbelief is a capital crime.

A second example: Koerbagh notes that 'duyvel', 'devil', a Greek loan-word from 'diabolos', has not been translated in the Dutch bible, giving the impression that it is a proper Dutch word. And he adds forcefully: "more concepts have not been translated in order to prevent common people to understand the concepts and come to real knowledge" (p.258). So Koerbagh not only criticises the recent official Dutch bible-translation, but also gives a radical explanation why the translators have not done their job properly. The use of complicated strange concepts is, according to Koerbagh, clearly part of a conspiracy to hold power and to promote the interest of the church at the expense of the common people. According to Koerbagh who had studied law and medicine, the academic professions use the same strategy of using difficult and foreign concepts to trick the ignorant into paying lawyers and doctors high fees. Koerbagh had earlier published a New dictionary of laws. Similar forms of radicalism occurred in England during the civil war,<sup>5</sup>

A final example: creator, which he ironically translates into 'the digger', adding "the tool to dig", the root of the Dutch word for creator, 'schepper', being 'schep' or 'spade'. Followed by a kind of philosophical instruction: "that he who does not believe that the world in general has not existed from eternity, has to deny the principle that 'nothing comes from nothing'" (p.206). It is tempting to see in this remark proof of Spinoza's influence. But is that not an over interpretation? This kind of rudimentary reasoning was part of a much broader popular current of naturalism that we can already trace in medieval texts. Of course it is not my intention to deny that Koerbagh had been in contact with Spinoza and may have picked up some of his arguments. It has also been proven that a close friend of Koerbagh, Abraham van Berckel translated Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* into Dutch. Van Berckel, born in Leiden, was a fellow-student, became also doctor in medicine and took also refuge in Culemborg as Koerbagh did. It is therefore plausible that some of Koerbagh's criticism of the translation of biblical concepts was inspired by Hobbes.<sup>6</sup>

It seems a fallacy to me however to adduce everything that was written by minor philosophers like Koerbagh to the influence of great philosophers like Spinoza or Hobbes. Whatever the case may be, there is a considerable difference between the way Koerbagh and Spinoza reasoned. In contrast to

Spinoza's methodological deductions and his procedure "more geometrico", Koerbagh had no systematic mind. There was no clear system to his atheism, although he did try to publish a treatise, which was partially published in Utrecht. The title of this unfinished work is 'A light shining in dark places, to enlighten the principal things of divinity and religion, enlightened by (again) peaceful Truth-mouth, alias Adriaan Koerbagh'. Its printer denounced him to the authorities and the proofs were confiscated by the magistrates of Amsterdam. It was published posthumously three hundred years later. According to the enthusiast modern editor, Hubert Vandenbossche, it was the first book on Spinozism in the history of philosophy. Vandenbossche calls it a declaration of paganistic hedonism and spinozist worldview, a revolutionary manifesto written in common Dutch in order to be understood by the ordinary man.<sup>7</sup>

Koerbagh was a libertijn, in his own description: a free spirit that is a human being who lives on his own, without joining to this or that kind of religion, but goes at a certain moment to this or that religion or adheres to no religion at all (p.406).

1. *Philosophia S. scripturae interpres* ( Eleutheropoli [=Amsterdam] 1666).
2. *Nederlandsche Woordenschat*, second edition by L. Meyer (Amsterdam 1654, fifth edition Amsterdam 1669).
3. *Een Bloemhof van allerley lieflijkheyd sonder verdriet geplamt door Vreederijk Waarmond, ondersoeker der waarheyd, tot nut en dienst van al die geen die der nut en dienst uyt trekken wil, of vertaaling en uytlegging van al Hebreesche, Grieksche, Latijnse, Franse an andere vreemde bastaardwoorden en wijsen van spreken die ('t welk te beklaagen is) soo in de Godsgeleerdheyd/ regtsgeleerdheyd/ geneesconst/ als in andere komsten en weetenschappen/ en ook in het dagelijks gebruyck van spreken in de Nederduytse taal gebruykt worden, gedaen door mr. Adr. Koerbagh, regtsgeleerde en geneesmeester* (Amsterdam 1668) 672 p.
4. Precise figures 10080: 127 = 1,27 %.
5. *Nieuw Woordenboek der Reghten van Adriaen Koerbagh* (Amsterdam 1664), cf. Gerard Winstanley, *The laws of freedom and other writings* ed. Christopher Hill (1973 repr 1983).
6. T. Hobbes, *Leviathan of van de stoffe, gedaente ende magt van de kerkelycke en wereltlycke regeeringe* (Amsterdam 1667), on the Dutch translator Abraham van Berckel (1639-1689) see C.W. Schoneveld, *The Intertraffic of mind. Studies in seventeenth century Anglo-dutch relations* (Leiden 1983).
7. *Een ligt schijnende in duysteren plaatsen, om te verligten de voornaamste saaken der Godsgeleertheyd en Godsdienst/ onsteeken door Vreederijk Waarmond/ ondersoeker der Waarheyd . Anders mr. Adr. Koerbagh/ regtsgeel. en geneesmr. t' Amsterdam/ gedrukt voor den Schrijver int jaar 1668, first critical edition by H. Vandenbossche, Flemish Society for philosophy (Brussel 1974, Freethinkers Lexicon: text edition 1).*

Koerbagh may have been impressed by Spinoza, but his encyclopedia in alphabetical order for the “common man” is completely different from the systematic treatises of the cautious Spinoza, who was firmly opposed to the translation of his works into the more widely accessible Dutch language. Any kind of popular radicalism was completely foreign to Spinoza’s work, such radicalism being incorporated into spinozism only in the nineteenth century. It has to be said that Koerbagh’s interest in the common man was not gender neutral: his interest in the common woman is difficult to distinguish from pornographic curiosity, in which male pleasure predominated.

Contemporaries condemned Koerbagh’s dictionary and Spinoza’s *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* as “an accumulation of concepts forged in hell”.<sup>8</sup> Spinoza was very cautious. His famous work was published in 1670 in latin without the author’s name (the book was forbidden four years after first publication, in 1674).

Koerbagh was a reckless radical propagandist and paid for it with his life. In Amsterdam the protestant consistory was outraged and asked the magistrates to take action. His brother, a theologian, already dogged by the Protestant consistory for his unorthodox opinions, was arrested. Adriaen Koerbagh fled to Culemborg a village south of Utrecht and later, wearing a periwig in disguise, to Leyden, but he was betrayed, probably by an old fellow-student. Caught by the police in Leiden, he was handed over to the magistrates of Amsterdam in 1668. He was severely interrogated and hastily sentenced in secret. This all took place in the new town hall of Amsterdam, the present Royal Palace on the Dam square, the most important monument of the Dutch Republic from the Golden Century. His books were burnt in the fireplaces of that magnificent town hall. His physical condition deteriorated rapidly. A member of the consistory paid Koerbagh a last visit to see if he persisted in his impious convictions. According to the merciless report his attitude was not considered humble and submissive enough. Koerbagh died shortly after the Protestant minister’s visit.

So much for the past. Why all this attention paid to Koerbagh? Because he gives a perfect example of an Early Modern national project on conceptual history. Like others, he stood at the beginning of a long tradition of vernacular purification. In many countries there was a strong desire to translate every concept into one’s own language and to invent new words for old concepts. The project undertaken by our Finnish colleagues has revealed that nineteenth century Finnish offers a striking example of the translation of foreign concepts and the invention of new concepts for use in the public political space. That brings me to my second point: the future.

## The future

The Germans have given the example for the history of concepts, the French are working in a different but also stimulating way, the Finns and others, the Dutch too, are well on their way. What is the prospect for the history of concepts after all these different national projects have been completed? All these national projects are important, but there is the danger of a national tunnelvision, of ignoring the transnational intellectual exchange, the intertraffic of mind as the title of a study on English-Dutch intellectual relations in the seventeenth century reads. Permit me to quote Saint Augustine in this respect. It is, you will agree, high time to refer to one of the Church Fathers after all this attention paid to a freethinker.

Saint Augustine wondered about the relationship between words and things: “the sounds are one thing in Greek, another in Latin, the things themselves are neither Greek, nor Latin, nor any other language”<sup>9</sup> A similar observation was made by Johan Huizinga in the doom laden 1930s dominated by nationalistic rhetoric and propaganda: “it is curious that the most important words for expressing human experience are not exactly the same in different languages”. You would expect the key concepts of human experience, of human feelings, concepts called ‘internationalisms’, or better ‘transnationalisms’, to be the same in different languages, but that is not the case.

Huizinga gave the example of the English word ‘soul’ which is not the same as the French ‘âme’, the German ‘Seele’ or the Dutch ‘ziel’. We could add the example of the English word ‘art’ which is not the same concept as the French ‘art’, pronounced differently, but having a common Latin root and exactly the same spelling. Striking is also the difference in meaning between the translated concept in German ‘Kunst’ and the Dutch word ‘kunst’, spelt the same, apart from the German capital ‘K’ and a small difference in pronunciation of the one consonant, ‘u’, but loaded with different connotations in the two languages. Many other examples could be given. To study these differences is important but not enough. In order to communicate across the linguistic boundaries we need a common language. That is the reason why English is the language at this conference. Alas, universities should never have abandoned Latin, so useful to the wandering scholars and students of medieval times. Later, during the Renaissance, Latin, or rather Neo Latin, became the intellectual language of the educational system called humanism. (Neo) Latin persisted during the Enlightenment and into the nineteenth century. Even today we see Neo Greek and Neo Latin concepts in law, psychology and most prominently in modern medical terminology.

As for the future organization of this kind of research, I think it would be most practical to start a series of different volumes on transnational concepts, or clusters of concepts, or semantic fields and not to

aim at a kind of monumental European Lexicon in alphabetic order, not a Handbuch according to strict, uniform rules. We could form working groups of experts of different nationalities, with the appropriate linguistic skills. I hesitate to call this the Dutch model of multi-disciplinary study of concepts, for compared to the German *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, to the *Handbuch* on French concepts, or to the innovative lexicometrical studies of the Saint Cloud group, the four volumes in Dutch are very modest indeed. But as a small nation surrounded by scientific superpowers we have some experience in European collaboration. I am convinced that we need a flexible structure and have to accept differences, asymmetries, inequalities, even contradictions. That is nothing new, for in the end, all interesting scientific work, either in national or international context, is dependent on that fundamental prerequisite: academic freedom, sometimes hard to distinguish from anarchy. Our goal would be a series of collective monographies on selected key transnational concepts. We have one Finnish-Dutch proposal: the penetration of the eighteenth century French-Scottish neologism 'civilization' into other languages.

Let me come to the present meeting of the history of concepts group. We have already organized a number of conferences: five years ago in London, hosted by Finnish Institute and its director Henrik Stenius, one in 1999 in Saint Cloud, organised by Raymonde Monnier, one in 2000 in Copenhagen by Uffe Jacobsen and Jan Iversen, last year in Tampere by

Matti Hyvarinen, and now we are in Amsterdam. Since the beginning, Northern Europe and the United States have been over represented in our group, although in Tampere we had, as could be expected, an important number of participants from Eastern Europe, particularly of Russian specialists and from outside Europe one very interesting Turkish participant. We now have Spanish participation in our program for the first time.

The present conference has a tripartite organization. The last day of the conference, is the day of the historians. The morning session, organized by Niek van Sas, editor of the Dutch volume on the concept of 'fatherland', will be devoted to the concept of 'modernity'. The afternoon session will address the concepts of 'republic' and 'citizenship'. It has been organized by Karin Tilmans, co-editor of the Dutch volume on the concept of 'citizen' and Wyger Velema, co-editor of two volumes, one on the concept of 'freedom' published in 1999 and the other on the concept of 'republic' to be published next year. Tomorrow the sessions have been organized by Frances Gouda director of the Belle van Zuylen Institute, specialist on colonial history and gender studies and will concentrate on the concepts of 'power' and 'gender'. Today the afternoon session has been organized by Ellinoor Bergvelt, art historian, and will explore the relation between word and image: 'painted words'. This morning, the session will operate on a more abstract, theoretical level. First, Irmline Veit-Brause will deliver a key note address on the interdisciplinarity of the history of concepts.

8. The expression is from a Dutch theologian Willem Blyenbergh, citation in lists of books owned by Spinoza, see "Bibliothèque" in the recent French edition of Spinoza's, *Ethique* (Paris 1999) 658.

9. *Confessiones* X, XII,19.

## Questioning the Present by the Past New German Studies on Conceptual History

KARI PALONEN

Sometimes we may have the impression that nowadays *Begriffsgeschichte* is studied eagerly outside Germany, whereas it tends to be out of fashion in Germany. The volumes of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* have been completed, Reinhart Koselleck himself no longer supervises doctoral theses and is perhaps more interested in war memorials, mounted statues and other forms of political iconography than *Begriffsgeschichte*. Bookstore tourists and readers of academic journals sometimes gets the impression that the historians of mentality, historical linguistics of political languages and post-Luhmannian system theoretical historical semantics appear to be of greater interest to German scholars than the Koselleckian style of conceptual history. From a recent dissertation by Thomas Etzemüller on Werner Conze (*Sozialgeschichte als politische Geschichte*. München: Oldenbourg 2001) we might even receive the impression that the origins of *Begriffsgeschichte* lie within a group of nostalgic social historians and sociologists, with a more or less compromised past during the Nazi years.

As a practicing scholar in the field, I think, of course, that we should not concern ourselves with fleeting fashions but focus instead on that what appears interesting to us, regardless of whether or not anyone else happens to be conducting similar types of studies. Still, I am now also convinced that the impression of *Begriffsgeschichte* as being out of fashion is, upon closer examination of the newest research, a misleading one. A number of conceptually oriented historical studies on political thought have been published recently in Germany, making use of conceptual history, in the wider sense of including, for example, the works of Quentin Skinner and John Pocock. Most of them are based on the academic theses of the younger generation of scholars from the departments of history and political science, some of whom already have obtained professorships.

In the present review article I have selected such theses as the focus of closer scrutiny. The first is a *Habilitation* theses, the three others dissertations.

Hubertus Buchstein: *Öffentliche und geheime Stimmabgabe. Eine ideen- und wahlrechtsgeschichtliche Studie*. (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2000, 788 p);  
Norbert Götz: *Volksgemeinschaft und Folkhem. Die Konstruktion von nationalsozialistischer Volksgemeinschaft und schwedischem Volksheim*. (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001, 598 p.);  
Jörn Leonhard: *Liberalismus. Zur historischen Semantik eines europäischen Deutungsmusters* (München: Oldenbourg 2011, 800 p.);  
Marcus Llanque: *Demokratisches Denken im Krieg. Die deutsche Debatte im Ersten Weltkrieg*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2000, 365 p.).

Although the theses are unrelated to each others (two of them (Buchstein, Llanque) were defended by the chairs of political science departments, the other two (Götz, Leonhard) in history), they have much in common. By this I don't only mean a very German thoroughness, which is becoming almost impossible, if not administratively forbidden by regulations of length etc., in dissertations elsewhere. Unlike many other German theses, the authors of the studies under review have managed to avoid the tendency of writing the first third of the book on the subject of studies before daring to come to their own topic of focus.

The common concerns surrounding all four books may first be expressed in negative terms. They all explicate the possibilities of a *Begriffsgeschichte* or related field independently of the "straitjackets" (as Koselleck himself once said) of the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* volumes, the lexical intention and the *Sattelzeit* thesis. Leonhard's Heidelberg dissertation also illustrates what can be accomplished by replacing the German-centered orientation with a comparative one. This often required yet seldom practiced comparative dimension is explicit in Götz's comparison of Swedish and German 'popular community'-concepts, as well as by Buchstein, for whom the British and American debates on the modi of voting are perhaps the main sources. Llanque's dissertation is a German case study of the debates surrounding de-

mocracy during the World War I, although it also includes obvious references to the formation of a concept of “Western Democracy”, as well as to the opposed responses to it in Germany,

A connection to conceptual history studies can clearly be identified in the strong intention to replace received views with various anachronisms by detailed historical studies which make ample use of primary sources in contemporary debates and arguments. Llanque’s book belongs in this respect to the category of trying to assess late Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany without an awareness of the tragic result of the Nazi rule, which allows him to forgo the strong tendency to consider the *Vernunftsrepublikaner* as unauthentic and half-hearted ‘democrats’ or ‘liberals’. Götz’s project is in so far parallel that it contextualizes the Nazi vocabulary of *Volksgemeinschaft* as merely one of the contemporary uses of the word, relating particularly it to the respectable Swedish *folkhem*, made popular by the Social Democratic Prime Minister P.A. Hansson in the 1930s. Buchstein’s project is more ambitious in so far as he historializes the wide consensus since the early 20th century that a democratic suffrage must be connected with the secret ballot. He does this by analyzing the multiple palette of politically opposing projects and arguments in favour of public and secret voting, especially during the 18th and 19th centuries. Leonhard’s project is even more ambitious in that it challenges the widely unhistorical understanding of a concept which since the 1980s has become increasingly difficult to oppose in the Western countries, namely liberalism.

This exposé of the common critique of anachronisms also indicates a clear reference to contemporary political theory, although it has in most cases been left rather implicit. Buchstein is perhaps most explicit in this respect in his connection of the classical debates on secret voting to the current controversies surrounding the modes of and the need for secrecy in the postal and electronic voting practices. More generally, all the books are clearly written in a political and intellectual climate in which democracy and liberalism are simultaneously widely shared slogans and highly controversial concepts, which in their everyday usage have lost their historical connections to past political struggles. All the four authors practise a *Verfremdungseffekt* that not only renders their books highly valuable as historical studies on key political concepts but also actualizes the role of conceptual histories which subvert existing normative political theory (cf. my article on Koselleck and Skinner in the *European Journal of Political Theory*, vol. 1/1, 2002).

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Hubertus Buchstein presents a monumental thesis in which the point of departure lies in certain debates

of both the so-called critical theory and the rational choice schools, as well as in the new voting practices and possibilities of representative democracy. Without committing himself to an *a priori* view on the advantages and pitfalls of either public or secret voting, the author ponders the question of, why nobody has written about the history of the disputes, after which he himself precedes to undertake the task. He does so in the form of a ‘world history’ of these competing voting practices, departing from the ancient Greek and Roman practices and of their theoretical legitimations. Next, Buchstein enters into the realm of the largely unknown debates that took place in the North American colonial assemblies prior to the U.S. independence, also illustrating the crucial role played by the debates in the Australian states in the introduction of the secret ballot throughout Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The most thorough analysis concerns the U.S. legislative history from 1776 to 1900, manifesting, above all, the diversity of the legitimations and the contingency of the outcome of the almost universal adoption of the secret ballot.

Buchstein’s subtitle *Eine ideen- und wahlrechtsgeschichtliche Studie*, refers to two aspects that are worth mentioning. First of all, he makes a clear distinction between the ‘empirical’ analysis of the debates on the modi of voting and the theoretical legitimations in the context of the debates. The order of presentation corresponds to the Skinnerian principle that it is “the political life itself” that outlines the problems to be examined by the political theorists and that the discussion of principles concerns legitimating practices as opposed to setting the principles, from which practices could be ‘drawn’ or even ‘deduced’. This also means that he treats questions of electoral and voting practices as questions that would deserve political theorizing, thus opposing to the hegemony of the traditional questions of good order and constitution. Still, his presentation of debates and legitimations in separate chapters seems to presuppose a clear distinction between practioners and theorists, who, unfortunately, have not dealt sufficiently with such questions, instead of regarding those writers, officials and politicians suggesting ballot reforms as theorists in their own right.

Perhaps this also corresponds to the author’s view of himself as doing *Ideengeschichte* instead of *Begriffsgeschichte*. Similarly, despite his warnings against backward projection, he clings to the notion that voting as a speech act has a certain degree of continuity from the ancient and medieval institutions to the modern practices in the democratized polities. All this enables him to produce such a study that comprises the entire Western history of political thought, although the doubt arises as to, whether he considers certain distinctions, in particular that between the private and the public, as having a transhistorical conceptual significance.

Despite these reservations, Buchstein's historical argumentation is an impressive piece of research. I particularly admire his detailed analysis of different American states from the days of pre-independence to the general adoption of the secret ballot in the years preceding World War I, although I also value his discussions of the Australian, British and German debates. What he manages to illustrate above all is how thoroughly contingent the almost universal adoption of the secret ballot was. It resulted from various constellations that were closely related to the actual political conflicts and controversies in question, as in Britain in 1872, and of the variety of and opposing even grounds of legitimation that were used successfully in favour of the ballot. He is also able to show that the adoption of the ballot in the United States was a partially intended and partially non-intentional consequence of a reduction of the electoral turnout among the poor, black and immigrant population. Buchstein's analysis also manages to question the thesis of much of the later historiography of democratization, in which the secret ballot has been considered to be an inherent aspect of democratization and the motives for upholding a public mode have been, correspondingly, discredited.

From this we should not, however, conclude that the author would reject the secret ballot or advocate a return to an open voting procedure in general elections. From this perspective his discussions on the scarce theoretical legitimations for both practices in the 19th century literature in Britain and Germany are worth closer examination. Here he treats "grand theorists" like Bentham or Robert v. Mohl similarly to anonymous pamphletists and M.P.s intervening in the debates. He especially stresses the defensive character of much of the advocacy for the secret ballot, based on the dangers of corruption or pressure on the voters. Only the "separation of spheres" and "defence of privacy" arguments are of more principled character. The history of losers, the apologists of the open ballot, is discussed in a more extensive way, but with the result that most of the arguments are directly authoritarian, anti-egalitarian and anti-individualistic. Both the British and the Prussian defenders of open voting clearly feared that the simple voters would have seen themselves as political agents with a secret ballot and were not shy to invoke various modes of intimidation against them (for Germany cf. now also the excellent study of Margaret Lavinia Anderson, *Practicing Democracy. Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany*, Princeton UP 2002). According to Buchstein, however, the opposing arguments were based on the concept of the common good (*Gemeinwohl*) and on the value of public deliberation.

In the concluding chapter it becomes obvious, that for the author the historical grounds in favour of the secret ballot, based on the dangers of intimidation and pressure by officials or groups are no longer

valid. Today, voting has become less based on social structures due to the tendencies, which he calls, pace Ulrich Beck, individualization. From this perspective he also upholds, explicitly in an article published in the *Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought*, 7, 2002, Weber's argument that as a citizen the individual is treated independently of her social being, as obsolete.

Buchstein's argument on the role of individualization is extremely interesting, although I still cannot subscribe to his critique of Weber. My argument is that of a conceptual historian. In particular, the concepts "common good" and deliberative "publicity" (*Öffentlichkeit*), as presented by J.S. Mill and other 19th century authors, appear to me as rather obsolete in the sense of being a criteria beyond political controversies and decisions, remnants of a search for a good order beyond politics. In a world of democratic contestability and of a Nietzschean *Umwertung der Werte*, such extra-political criteria should be regarded as "homesick" nostalgia, to use an expression dubbed by William Connolly. Correspondingly, the defence of the secret ballot need not to be connected to the apology of privacy or with the distinction of political and social spheres, but, rather, should focus solely on the advancement of the *citoyen-individu*, as Pierre Rosanvallon puts it, or, in Sartrean terms, on being condemned to freedom in the ballot box. The existential necessity to escape from the eternal discussions should not only be deplored but should also be seen as a chance to manifest one's individuality as an "occasional politician" in the Weberian sense.

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If Buchstein's study requires a reconceptualization of the link between democracy and secret voting, a similar and, due to the key role of the topic, even a more comprehensive reconceptualization is implied by Jörn Leonhard's monumental study on liberalism. Leonhard also takes his point of departure in the critique of an ex post construction, of "liberalism" as a comprehensive normative idea, as practiced in the conventional history of ideas, but he too is unwilling to split the collective singular into various prefix-liberalisms. The author wants to retain the concept of *Liberalismus* as a temporalized European concept in the era following the French Revolution, analyzing the "seismographic" movements in its space of experience and horizon of expectation, and applying a systematic comparison between French, German, Italian and English uses of the concept.

The debt to the strict Koselleckian view on concepts and their history is generally speaking affirmed by the author. What seems particularly remarkable is the author's insight that if you want to carry out a comparative study, you must to concentrate the work on a single concept of crucial political significance

and not fall into the trap of engaging in the analysis of broader semantic fields (cf. Koselleck's *Vorwort* in GG, vol. 7, 1992). Or, if you will, he illustrates how just *Liberalismus* in itself is no mere *Schlagwort* in the sense intended by the critics of single concepts, but rather that it has its own semantic field. Leonhard distinguishes the pre-political from political usages, outlines a difference between the noun and the adjective, or between the *Bewegungsbegriff* and the partisan naming of persons. In addition, the problems of translation are also recognized regarding political and cultural differences: the author, indeed, makes use of the fact that *libéralisme*, *Liberalismus*, *liberalismo* and *liberalism* have meant slightly different things and have had different rhythms of conceptual change. By playing with such distinctions, a definite and clearly dated image of liberalism begins to emerge that tends to render the previous studies on the concept virtually obsolete.

In the style of German dissertations, Leonhard too has a long methodological discussion that recapitulates much of the discussion in the aftermath of Koselleck's programme for the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, and he adapts it, in most respects with valuable insights, to his own topic. When he speaks of the "Umbewertung, Aufwertung, Neubesetzung und Politisierung" of concepts (p. 71), he also, obviously unwittingly, adopts similar micro-strategies to conceptual change to those defined by Quentin Skinner in his more recent rhetorical work.

What is most remarkable, however, is the author's attempt to revise Koselleck's famous *Sattelzeit* thesis in order to make it more applicable to his own purposes. This concerns particularly the four "hypotheses" of democratization, temporalization, politicization and ideologization. For Leonhard, temporalization is the most comprehensive concept, and it indeed frames his entire study. In this sense it becomes extracted from his specific stage-model, and, although for different reasons, the same holds true for democratization, a concept ambiguously related to liberalism and therefore part of the subject matter. The relationship between politicization and ideologization is also rethematized into the dichotomy "ideologische Relevanz" and "semantische Ligaturen," which roughly correspond to a politicization in the sense of actual controversialization, and to the limitation of the concept to an integrative normative view. By these means the author distinguishes between the successive stages of a pre-political dimension of meaning, of fermentation, a politicization of the concept as controversial and an ideological polarization of the concept (p. 73-74). It is through this type of model that he attempts to construct a kind of political life-cycle of the concept.

The well-known objections against evolutionary and organismic metaphors could also be directed against this kind of stage model. If understood as a purely heuristic tool for a specific conceptual history

of liberalism, the model does, however, offer obvious strengths. Above all, it illustrates both the difficulty of a strict dating of "liberalism" and the significance of the diffuse but crucial distinction between pre-political and politicized usages of "liberal," the former dating back to the ancient *liberalitas* and having quite different connotations in the four political cultures studied.

Deviating from the received view that it was in England that "liberalism" first gained support and became a political dividing line, Leonhard takes, using the criteria of strict conceptual history, the post-revolutionary and, rather, the post-thermidor French debates as his point of departure. One surprising finding is that Bonaparte's *coup d'état* was legitimated by *idées libérales*, marking both a break with the *ancien régime* and a return to the 'original' heritage of the revolution by using a name that was not used in any party label in the revolutionary era. In the turbulent years following 1814 "liberal" ideas or institutions were advocated both by those who favoured a return of the Bourbons under a constitutional *Charte* and by the adherents of the revival of Napoleon. Only following 1818 was *libéralisme* launched as a concept that divided the royalist *ultras* from the proponents of the parliamentary elements of the *Charte*. The polarization of the political conflict between the royalists and the parliamentary opposition led to the rise of an antagonism between *libéraux* and *conservateurs*, in the newspapers and pamphlets between the years 1818 to 1820. It is also characteristic that the first uses of *libéralisme* around 1817 (by Saint-Simon and Comte) were still synonymous with *idées libérales*, and that it was among the royalists *ultras* that a pejorative use of *libéralisme* slightly preceded the adoption of this terms as a partisan label among the adherents.

In his detailed analysis Leonhard then takes up topics of inter-cultural and inter-linguistic aspects of conceptual change. The German and partly also the Italian debates on the politicization of liberalism into an 'ism' and more specifically into a separate party name followed with a delay of a few years the French practice by means of contamination and through conscious imitation. In Britain, however, "liberalism" was first rejected as a continental term and was only adopted in the late 1820s in the *Westminster Review* for the use by of what J.S. Mill later by an oxymoron called "moderate radicals". The constitutional situation, the differences in the existence and character of representation in the German 'states' contributed to the acceptance of liberalism as a party or parliamentary grouping. Political events, especially the 1830 French Revolution, which turned the "liberals" of the 1820s into a leading governmental party, also contributed to the evaporation of liberal radicalism and even to attempts to use it as a name for a party of order and to merge with conservatism, as in the case of Guizot.

The adoption of liberalism also remained highly dependent on its synonyms and counter-concepts. The late 19th century 'isms' did not yet exist in the first half of the century in any country, at least not as a ready-made package of alternatives, and the locus of liberalism in the divides such as the "party of order" vs. "party of movement" remained highly disputed. In Italy liberalism became above all a counter-concept for Catholicism, whereas in England it had been adopted as a counter-concept to the Whigs since the 1830s, and also used to represent economic views favouring free trade and a free market economy since the anti-corn law movement in the 1840s. The formation of the Liberal Party in the 1860s was a utilization of this specific conceptual conjecture, which had no correspondence to any of the other countries studied.

To support his phase thesis, Leonhard uses the geological metaphor of *Halbwertzeit* to represent the time when a political concept could still serve as a critical and distinctive instance for a political movement. According to his thesis, time tended to be reduced during the 19th century. I am not convinced that this unilinear scheme holds true for liberalism, for both the late success of this term in Britain and its occasional renaissances in the 20th century political thought could equally well be used against it. Despite this, I think that for any students of "liberalism" Leonhard's book, including his massive bibliography, should now be an obligatory lecture.

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As compared with the huge and ambitious studies of Buchstein and Leonhard, Marcus Llanque undertakes a much more modest task. He analyzes and reassesses the German debates on democracy during World War I. In this analysis, not only the fate of the Weimar republic, but also the final outcome of the war and the character of the German Revolution in 1918-1919 must be bracketed, in order to understand the contributions as moves toward a contemporary debate. In addition to the Skinnerian demand of contextualization and the Koselleckian thesis on the growing gulf distancing the horizon of expectation from the space of experience, the author introduces a third tool of conceptual analysis, namely the role of political events as historical watersheds (*Zäsuren*). By these means he manages to distinguish short-term chances to and requirements of changing the content or acceptance of concepts that remain outside the core interest in the Koselleckian *Begriffsgeschichte*. Such changes can definitely be better summarized in terms of conceptual changes through rhetorical redescription, as programmatically advocated by Skinner.

Llanque distinguishes four phases that served as challenges and chances to rethink democratization from August 1914 to July 1917, and he analyzes

the responses of leading German intellectuals and politicians to each of them. Unlike the common tendency, it is not the anti-democratic wave of *Ideen von 1914* of a Plenge, Sombart or Schlegel, but the stepwise acceptance of democratic and, in some cases, even of parliamentary ideals that form the main bulk of his study. The point is that the strength of the various obstacles that had to be removed in order to render democracy and even more so parliamentarism acceptable in the German context was virtually unimaginable. The thesis of the author is that each of the events was, indeed, used as a chance to further the retreats from the previous commitments to some aspects of the German *Obrigkeitsstaat*. This tendency is most explicit in the case of the war historian Hans Delbrück, but also for example Friedrich Meinecke and Otto Hintze also follow a roughly similar path.

The author's key thesis is that the ideal of "Western democracy" was itself created only in the first years of the war and soon turned into one of the war aims of Britain, France and later the United States. This made the task of advocating "Western" ideals even more difficult in Germany, and parliamentarism was in this respect much more notorious than democracy. Perhaps in this respect the author could also have speculated on whether the distinction between "words" and "deeds" was also more deeply rooted in German thought than in the English or French, and parliamentarism as a political "speech regime" was thus easily refuted as demagogical. In this sense, Max Weber also had to rehabilitate the value of the demagogue with parliamentarism, as an inherent practice of parliamentary and electoral politics, which according to Llanque, he did only after the failure of the *Reichstag* to use its powers in favour of parliamentarization in July 1917.

Another current topic to overcome is the divide between "socialist" and "bourgeois" democracy. The pro-democratic literature of the war years has largely been neglected, with the partial exception of Max Weber's suffrage and parliamentarism pamphlets. In place of them, the chances of the post-war revolutionary movements, the claims for direct democracy through worker's and soldier's councils, as well as the significance of the presidential powers in the Weimar constitution have dominated the discussion. Llanque illustrates, how during the war "bourgeois" authors, such as Hugo Preuss, partially adopted the topic of mass democracy from socialist debates, whereas the reformist socialists, especially those writing in *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, became interested in the "bourgeois" debates on parliamentarism. It is interesting to note that among the German socialists, the anti-parliamentary current relied on Ferdinand Tönnies's critique of the "public opinion," whereas the pro-parliamentary authors followed Max Weber's arguments of the parliament as a counterforce to bureaucracy.

Llanque's thesis is an interesting piece which rehabilitates some of the losers of history, continuing in its own manner the current tendency, both in the German and anglophone debates, to demythologize the German politicians and intellectuals in the late Wilhelmine and Weimar era. Some of his theses, as that of Weber's "conversion" to parliamentarism after July 1917, may be overstated. Nonetheless, they also indicate, similarly to certain arguments in Buchstein's and Leonhard's work, the close connections between political events and conceptual changes, which have tended to be played down in conceptual histories linked to social or mentality history.

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An explicitly comparative history of parallel yet politically rather opposed concepts, that of *Volksgemeinschaft* ("community of the people") in German and of *folkhem* ("home of the people") in Swedish, is the topic of Norbert Götz's thesis defended at the Institute of the North European Studies at the Humboldt Universität in Berlin. The topic has been provocatively suggested since the 1980s by some Swedish scholars, in particular Lars Trädgård, and a book edited by Bo Stråth in 1990 also had pictures of Adolf Hitler and the Per Albin Hansson on its cover. Götz's aim is to test the validity and significance of the parallel expressions by means of a detailed study on the conceptual history of both expressions in their own historical context. Or, at least this is the aim of the first part of his study, which in my opinion, would have been a sufficient dissertation in itself while I cannot get anything specific out of the second, sociological part of his study. The idea that the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft* was an exclusive "concrete order" in the sense intended by Carl Schmitt, while the Swedish *folkhem* was an inclusive "provisory utopia," in the well-known terms of Ernst Bloch, is rather a commonplace.

Götz's approach is exclusively oriented toward the German-style history of concepts, both of the GG and the Handbuch varieties. The works of Quentin Skinner or John Pocock are not even mentioned in the literature, which I think is related both to the empirical strength and to the theoretical weakness of the thesis.

The author has studied a massive amount of both German and particularly of Swedish literature of various kinds spanning from the late 19th century to the 1990s, with the main emphasis on the years in between the wars, to which the provocative comparison is mainly connected. In this respect he manages to reject or question a number of previous interpretations, and especially to manifest that the concepts were widely used in the political field. *Volksgemeinschaft* was neither a Nazi invention nor left to the Nazi monopoly, but rather was used even

among some resistance groups. Neither was *folkhem* an exclusive "property" of the Social Democrats in Sweden, but also others, from the extreme nationalist right via the liberals (*folkpartiet*) to the Communists (searching for a "true" *folkhem*) made attempts to capture the concept for their own usage. Götz also analyses the use of *folksgemenskap* in Swedish and is able to illustrate that neither this word was limited to the use of the extreme right, although it was favoured by it, but was also at least sometimes used by the Social Democrats, even after 1933. His main conclusion is that despite the differences in the vocabulary, connotations and the political orientation of their users, the terms *Volksgemeinschaft* and *folkhem* constitute a single concept.

Here, however, is where I think, we can see the limits of the author's analysis. His conceptual history is not reflective, but frequently remains on a rather registrative level. A recourse to the rhetorical analysis of speech acts and the use of concepts in "linguistic action" (Skinner) could clearly have improved the analysis. It would have been especially interesting in the Swedish case to have questioned, why it was that *folkhem* was so popular throughout the political spectrum and why those who rejected it were almost entirely marginalized, despite the compromising of the term by the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft*. How did the ideological defence of an inclusive harmony differ from the instrumental recourse to the community vocabulary? Did the right wing ideology and the social democrats share a similar harmonious utopia, whereas the liberal and communist use was more instrumental? Or is this question already a projection of a conventional party division to a debate, in which the conceptual distinctions lie elsewhere? What were the conceptual limits of the rhetorical use or, vice versa, the rhetorical limits that the same term set for its users in Sweden from the 1920s to the 1940s?

In Germany there was, of course, also a strong opposition against the pathos of *Gemeinschaft* in general, especially in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber and Helmuth Plessner. Götz mentions this criticism, but does not reflect further on its politico-cultural significance. In my opinion this critique is still decisive in distinguishing the distinctively political mode of thinking from the totalizing "social" one. Unlike Götz, I would put forth the hypothesis that thinking in the political mode either never was properly introduced in Sweden nor eliminated in the inter-war years in favour of the "social" one and has hardly surfaced there until today. The pathos of *Gemeinschaft* still dominated for example the electoral campaign in September 2002, while no party advocated the political 'values' of contingency, contestation and controversy.

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To sum up, despite the rumours and the current fash-

ions in the history departments of universities, conceptual history is clearly present in the German academic world today, although in slightly different versions than the lexical paradigms of the past decades. The studies I discussed here allude to a few interesting tendencies toward a new German profile, which can also be discovered in the academic journals.

It is now clear that the links of the conceptual to the social history of the Conzean and Brunnerian variety, with a certain nostalgia for stable concepts (cf. the above-mentioned study of Etzemüller), have now been severed or perhaps rather happily forgotten. Instead of this, the significance of political events to conceptual changes is now thematized more closely and, unlike the narratives of “basic concepts” in the

*Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, also short-term and sudden conceptual shifts have gained an increasing amount of interest. From this perspective we can also see that the long-term German adversity to the Skinnerian style of analysis of speech acts and rhetoric, based on a strange alliance of classicist philosophers and social historians, is now turning down towards a more open reception. Finally, we can see that the old animosity between historians and political scientists is also, at least in some academic circles, on the decline, with conceptual history acting as a bridge that forces the practitioners to forget their disciplinary affiliations (cf. also my forthcoming contribution in *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 44).

## Concept & Image. The Fifth Conference of the History of Concept Group in Amsterdam 19-22 June 2002

ELLINOOR BERGVELT, EVELINE KOOLHAAS-GROSFELD, MARGRIET SCHAVEMAKER AND LIESKE TIBBE

Central theme in our meetings in preparation of this afternoon session was: how useful can the study of the history of concepts be for art historians and what can art history offer to the study of the history of concepts?

Certainly the study of language (or in this case of concepts) and the study of images have different traditions and fields of interest. But art and art history do have their own concepts, which have been studied within their own contexts for at least a century. For example, aspects of language like art theory,<sup>1</sup> art criticism, and concepts like “mannerism”, “baroque” or “romanticism” have been studied.

In the recent Dutch series of publications on the history of concepts (“Vaderland”, “Vrijheid”, “Beschaving” and “Burger”) art historians specialized in fields related to those concepts were invited to contribute.<sup>2</sup> In the introductory volume to the series, art historian Eddy de Jongh wrote an article about the relation between image and language in seventeenth-century Holland in which illustrations themselves were regarded as concepts.<sup>3</sup> In the series of volumes itself, art historians have dealt only with the *illustrations* of those concepts, however. Images play only a marginal, subordinate or illustrative role. Furthermore, the emphasis has been placed on illustrations of concepts formed in the Renaissance.

As art historians of the 19th and 20th century we offer four papers as the fruit of our first encounter with the study of the history of concepts (or Begriffsgeschichte). The first paper deals with the relation between language and image in the conceptual art of the sixties of the 20th century in a way comparable with what de Jongh did for the 17th century in his above-mentioned article. The changing concept of time is the subject of the second and third paper. The second pertains to the future and ideas about Utopia; the third to the past, in relation to ideas about museums. The subject of the last paper is ‘unity and diversity’, which borders on one of the topics of the second day of the Amsterdam conference: the power of concepts. In the case, the power or expressiveness of the pictorial means.

In the long run we are interested in the question whether Koselleck’s four criteria for the modernity of concepts and by implication for their selection (Verzeitlichung, Demokratisierung, Ideologisierung)

keit and Politisierung) should be applied to art and its institutions. May be other concepts will turn out to be more relevant. That could lead to research of specifically art historical concepts like ‘Academy’, ‘Museum’, ‘Tradition’ and ‘Art’ itself, but also of concepts like ‘Form’ or ‘Colour’, which have changed considerably after the advent of abstract art in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Ellinoor Bergvelt  
1.4.2003

### LANGUAGE IN THE VISUAL ARTS OF THE 1960S: THE METHOD OF ‘BEGRIFFSGESCHICHTE’ VERSUS ‘VISUAL CULTURE’

Margriet Schavemaker (Institute of History and Culture, University of Amsterdam)<sup>4</sup>

In the 1960s many visual artists started to use language in their work. In the decades that followed, the meaning of this cultural phenomenon was often sought in a radical break between two paradigms: the appearance of verbal signs in visual art was interpreted as a fundamental shift from a visual modernist paradigm to a textual postmodernist paradigm. The texts, words, letters were thus read as iconoclastic devices, used by artists to attack the purely visual quality of their work that had been so highly celebrated in modernist times.

In my dissertation I try to counter this anti-visual and language-oriented interpretation of the 1960s. Inspired by the ‘visual’ or ‘pictorial turn’ of the 1990s (that redirected the gaze of many cultural historians from textual to visual sources) I explored a more visual approach. I started *looking* at the verbal artworks instead of just *reading* them. It is still unclear

1 For instance P.-E. Knabe, *Schlüsselbegriffe des kunsttheoretischen Denkens in Frankreich von der Spätklassik bis zum Ende der Aufklärung*, Düsseldorf 1972.

2 The series Reeks Nederlandse begripsgeschiedenis consists of: N.C.F. van Sas (ed.), *Vaderland: een geschiedenis van de vijftiende eeuw tot 1940*, Amsterdam 1999 (vol. 1); E.O.G. Haitsma Mulier and W.R.E. Velema (eds.), *Vrijheid: een geschiedenis van de vijftiende tot de twintigste eeuw*, Amsterdam 1999 (vol. 2); P. den Boer (ed.), *Beschaving: een geschiedenis van de begrippen hoofsheid, heusheid, beschaving en cultuur*, Amsterdam 2001 (vol. 3); J. Kloek and K. Tilmans (eds.), *Burger: een geschiedenis van het begrip burger in de Nederlanden van de Middeleeuwen tot de 21ste eeuw*, Amsterdam 2002 (vol. 4).

3 E. de Jongh, “Painted Words in Dutch Art of the Seventeenth Century”, in: I. Hampsher-Monk, K. Tilmans, F. van Vree (eds.), *History of concepts: comparative perspectives*, Amsterdam 1998, pp. 167-189.

4 Margriet Schavemaker is working on a Ph.D. entitled: *The word-image relationship in the visual arts and theory of the 1960s*.

if this move towards *visual culture* is not just a move back to the modernist visual paradigm as Thomas Crow suggests in his 'Modern Art in the Common Culture' (1996). In this paper I will investigate if perhaps more is to be gained from a history of concepts or Begriffsgeschichte. Looking carefully at the slow changes in the concepts of 'language' and 'the visual' in the 1960s might lead to a balanced interpretation of the meaning of language in the visual arts of the 1960s. If it also means the end of the method of visual culture remains to be seen.

#### THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE FUTURE IN THE VISUAL ARTS AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH CENTURY

Lieske Tibbe (History and Art, University of Nijmegen)<sup>5</sup>

A theme frequently occurring in the visual arts at the turn of the 20th century was 'the cycle of life': the change of night and day and the seasons, the stages of human life, periods in the history of mankind. This lecture concentrates on the concept of 'future' within representations of the cycle of history. At the end of the 19th century, traditional pictorial imagery of the future as the result of a cyclical development (the Golden Age, the Garden of Paradise) did not coincide with anarchist and socialist convictions favoured by many artists of the avant-garde. The golden age of the future had to be conceived as an outgrowth of the modern world rather than the return of a mythologized past. Consequently, the artist had to develop a new, corresponding imagery.

Contrary to contemporary utopian literature, visual artists did not have at their disposal the idiom to present a 'blueprint' of their society of the future; they had to summarize their ideas and ideals in a few concentrated images.

Exemplary is the imagination of the future in the tile mosaic by Jan Toorop in Berlage's Stock Exchange Building in Amsterdam (1902). Toorop visualized the concept of a utopian future by merging the old pictorial theme of the 'Golden Age' with a Biblical theme and anarchist symbols. While designing this mosaic, Toorop was converting from anarchism to Catholicism. In this lecture I try to disentangle the diversity of traditions in his work.

As for the anarchist aspect, Toorop's imagery is related to the works and ideas of the Neo-impressionists, for instance the large painting of Paul Signac *In Times of Harmony. The Age of Gold is not in the Past, It is in the Future*, showing a pastoral summer landscape in combination with elements of promising technical developments of recent times in the background. Former research has linked *In Times of Harmony* with anarchist theory and the utopian novels of William Morris. Also related to Neo-impressionist/anarchist iconography is the 'Old Wanderer' – the link between Past and Future – in Toorop's

mosaic.

Christian religion is represented in an unusual way by the central theme 'Christ and the Samaritan Woman at the Well'. Toorop and Johan Thorn Prikker, a like-minded artist, often associated images of Christ with anarchist symbols of revolution. The Well as a motif also might be associated with one of Morris' utopian writings, *The Earthly Paradise*.

Thus, the idea of a cyclical movement in history implied both the ideal of a new and better society and the return to a primeval, purer way of life.

#### BETWEEN 'NATIONAL HISTORY' AND 'AETAS AUREA': THE CONCEPT OF TIME EXPRESSED IN THE DECORATION OF EUROPEAN NATIONAL MUSEUMS (1800-1950)

Ellinoor Bergvelt (Institute of History and Culture, University of Amsterdam)<sup>6</sup>

The decoration programmes of national museums seem to have been developed along two lines: on the one hand the depiction of (art) historical specific events (National Gallery, London, Versailles, Munich, some of the scenes on the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam) and on the other hand the depiction of a kind of Pantheon or Parnassus, situated in a *Aetas Aurea*, in a space where time has disappeared, where artists from several centuries and countries meet (Ingres, *Apotheosis of Homer*, Louvre).

Inside the museum building, in the presentation of the works of art as decorative ensembles, we also see two different principles. In the 18th century art was assumed to express a timeless, eternal beauty and in the 19th century, when works of art were gradually arranged in specific schools, beauty in art was regarded as specific to a time, place or person.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century several attempts have been made to identify a Golden Age. The Neue Museum in Berlin depicts one in the 16th century, whereas the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam and the Museum of Fine Arts in Antwerp portray the 17th century as such. Are these representations of an *Aetas Aurea* meant to be read in the 18th-century sense or are they time-specific and as such typical for the 19th century?

#### THE UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF MAN IN ETHNOGRAPHIC PRINTS FROM ABOUT 1800

Eveline Koolhaas-Grosfeld (History, University of Amsterdam)<sup>7</sup>

This paper focuses on the often neglected power of artists to influence an intellectual debate – voluntarily or not – by visualizing concepts in a surprisingly new and attractive way. Even less attention has been paid to the influence of the publisher as producer and distributor of such seductive images.<sup>8</sup>

I take the case of the Amsterdam artist Jacques Kuyper (1761-1808) who at the beginning of the 19th

century designed the illustrations for two different ethnographic works. The hand-coloured copper engravings after Kuyper were made by Louis Portman. The first work was published by Johannes Allart and titled: *De Mensch zoo als hij voorkomt op den bekenden aardbol* (*Man as he appears on earth*, 1802-1807), six volumes of recent travel reports by Cook, Forster and other explorers, compiled and commented on by the historian Martinus Stuart. Forty-one illustrations show the different populations whose recent discovery stirred up the scientific and philosophical debate on the unity and diversity of man. Stuart is a universalist, he believes in the 'volstreckte eenheid bij de hoogste verscheidenheid' of man (absolute unity with the greatest diversity). His advice is to study human diversity to counter-balance national prejudices and stereotypes.

Conceptualizing national character is exactly what Allart's competitor Evert Maaskamp does with the publication of *Afbeeldingen van kleding, zeden en gewoonten in de Bataafsche Republiek met den aanvang der negentiende eeuw* (*Representations of dresses, morals and customs [...] at the beginning of the nineteenth century*, 1803-1807), the other work for which Kuyper designed the illustrations. Twenty prints show as many different local costumes and customs of the Netherlands, while the explanatory text stresses diversity as the specific hallmark of the inhabitants. Besides nationalizing human diversity, Maaskamp also popularises and commercialises the concept, by publishing the prints in a smaller size for his tourist guide book *Reis door Holland* (*Travel through Holland*, 1807-1812). For obvious political reasons Maaskamp dedicated the French edition of this work to the French king Louis Napoleon.

With the two works representing different viewpoints in the debate on the concept of unity and diversity of man, intriguing questions arise. In what way did Kuyper choose to satisfy the authors he cooperated with? What do his illustrations tell us when seen without the texts? How do they look compared to older ethnographic images? Is there a reason to believe that his images are meant to influence the reading public in one way or the other?

5 Ph.D.: L. Tibbe, R.N. Roland Holst - *Arbeid en schoonheid vereend. Opvattingen over Gemeenschapskunst*, Amsterdam/Nijmegen 1994 (Nijmeegse Kunsthistorische Studies, II).

6 E. Bergvelt, *Pantheon der Gouden Eeuw. Van Nationale Konst-Gallerij tot Rijksmuseum van Schilderijen* (1798-1896), Zwolle 1998.

7 Eveline Koolhaas-Grosfeld is working on a Ph.D. on the early 19th-century Dutch publisher of books and prints Evert Maaskamp).

8 This paper will be published as part of a larger article entitled: 'Exotism in motion. Ethnographic prints around 1800', in the forthcoming issue of the Netherlands Kunsthistorisch Jaarboek (May 2003).

## Historical Time and the Orders of Temporality

HELGE JORDHEIM

The *International Scientific Conference on Reinhart Koselleck* took place in Sofia, Bulgaria between the 23<sup>rd</sup> and the 24<sup>th</sup> of November 2002. The works of Koselleck was the chosen theme for this year's *Sofioter Dialoge*, an annual event co-organized by the German Goethe-Institute, the French Institut français and the Bulgarian House of Sciences on Man and Society. Every year the works of a different thinker is selected for this conference. Apart from being widely read and commented upon he or she should also have a particular relevance for the present political and cultural development in Eastern Europe. Among the names from the last years are prominent figures such as Jürgen Habermas, Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida. The lectures were held in the Hilton Hotel and were open to everyone. At most the audience counted about 200 people, primarily from the University of Sofia. The languages of the conference were German, French and Bulgarian, which meant that all lectures as well as all questions or comments were simultaneously translated into two languages, in, I must say, an impressive way.

The title of the conference was, in my own English translation, "Historical Time and the Orders of Temporality", with the subtitle "Modes of the Plurality of Historical Time in Western Europe and on the Balkan – the problem of modernization". In other words it didn't address the works of Koselleck as such, but only those essays and articles which are concerned with questions of temporality and temporal layers or strata and have been collected in the volume *Zeitschichten* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 2000) – which is also the first volume of what is supposed to become a three-volume edition of his collected works. *Zeitschichten* has just been translated into Bulgarian, by Christo Todorov of the University of Sofia, who also chaired the first session of the conference.

After the greetings from the organizers Koselleck gave his opening lecture on the topic of "Structures of Repetition in History". Such structures, Koselleck claimed, can be observed on three different levels: a natural (the changing seasons), an anthropological (dichotomies such as *Oben-Unten*, *Früher-Später* etc.) and a cultural (politics, law, theology etc.). Subsequently he spoke of the different ways of trying to control this structural repetition – the prophecy, the prognosis and the planning – and how the ways and conditions of repetition have changed over the last 250 years. The second session of the conference was entitled "Historical Time and the Discourse on Historical Time", with Alban Bensa of Paris presiding, and was primarily concerned with the writing of his-

tory. Both theoretical questions such as the notions of historical epochs and more philosophical aspects such as the semiotics of historical experience were discussed. The session concluded with a brief, but lively discussion. The third session on the first day, called “Temporalization of the historical experience”, chaired by François Hartog of Paris, consisted of four lectures which all brought up subjects from the political and social history of the Balkan, such as the projects and ambitions of Bulgarian intellectuals after the end of the Cold War, the history of Greek identity and the historical chronology of the Balkan. These lectures were, as one could expect, met with a lot of question and comments from the audience. Here ended the first day.

The second day of the conference started off on a more philosophical, less historical and empirical note. The theme of the fourth session was “Temporality and Historical Knowledge”, with Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner as chair. The dominant theme of the lectures and discussions in this session was the anthropological level in Koselleck's thought as well as

the philosophical status of his anthropological absolutes such as *Oben-Unten*, *Früher-Später* etc. At the end of the session, however, history became dominant again, in lectures about the theme of progress in the Middle Ages and the notion of “the Underground” as a mean of temporalization in post-communist writing of history. The fourth and last session was chaired by the Bulgarian philosopher Dimitri Ginev and its topic was “Historical Concept and National Experience”. This session contained a mix of theoretical and empirical subjects, including discussions of key concepts in European thought and culture such as *Klassik*, *die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen* and *der Übermensch*. On this second day too, both lecturers and audience engaged in several interesting discussions, in which Koselleck was one of the most active and eager participants – to an extent that seemed to make any concluding remarks from his part all but superfluous. Still he rounded off the conference by thanking all the participants – when it was really us that should have been thanking him.

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#### PUBLICATIONS FROM PAST CONFERNECES

*Dix-Huitième Siècle*, n° 34, 2002, p. 371-418.

Papers of the Saint-Cloud/ Paris Conference: *History of Concepts and Abuse of Words*, October 14-16 1999, ed. Raymonde MONNIER (translated from English into French).

Melvin RICHTER, The concept of despotism and the Abuse of words

Raymonde MONNIER, Concerning the uses of an indistinct noun : “People” in the French revolution  
Martin BURKE, “Papists” or “Catholics”? “Popery”

or “Catholicity”. Confessional terminology and political culture in Ireland and the United States in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth Centuries

*French Historical Studies*, vol. 26, n° 1 (winter 2003), p. 87-118.

Raymonde MONNIER, Republicanisme et révolution française (Paper first given at the Conference : *Rhetoric and Conceptual Change*, Finland, Tampere, June 27-July 1 2001).

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#### PROJECTS IN PROGRESS

Geoff Stokes (Deakin University): “Australian cosmopolitanism”.

Imrline Veit-Brause (Deakin University): “National identity - origins and evolution of a paradigm”.

Walter Veit (Monash University): “The philosophical concept of identity” and various entries for the *Historisches Woerterbuch der Rhetorik*.

## V CONFERENCE OF THE HISTORY OF CONCEPTS

Bilbao/Vitoria  
June 30 - July 2, 2003

### Call for Papers

Following on the success of the past conferences in London (1998), Paris (1999), Copenhagen (2000), Tampere (2001), and Amsterdam (2002), we would like to invite you to submit a paper proposal for the **V Conference of the History of Concepts** of the *History of Political and Social Concepts Group*, which will take place in Bilbao/Vitoria (Spain) from June 30 to July 2, 2003. This event is being sponsored and organized by the field of History of the Political Thought of the Universidad del País Vasco and by the Institute for Social History "Valentín de Foronda". The organization of the V Conference of the History of Concepts encourages the participation of scholars from Spanish and Spanish-American academic communities, in an effort to increase the communication among academics from different countries and to further the diffusion of the history of concepts approach. In order to accomplish that task, we are contacting research centres and universities in Spanish-speaking countries, and also inviting publishers to participate in the conference.

### General structure of the conference

Professor Reinhart Koselleck has been invited to be the keynote speaker of the opening session, which focuses on methodology. The session will examine the conditions for the application of key concepts of the present to the study of societies of the past. The crucial historiographical-hermeneutical movement of making sense of the past in the language of the present involves risks, such as anachronism and prolepses, of which scholars engaged in conceptual history must have a critical awareness.

The second session addresses the application of the methodology of the history of concepts to specific cases, and thus, it must be comprised of studies of the history of particular concepts in their own context.

The other sessions focus on the following substantive themes:

- Session 3 - Public Opinion
- Session 4 - Intellectuals
- Session 5 - Citizenship
- Session 6 - People (People)

For the last session of the conference, Profs. Melvin Richter and Kari Palonen have been invited to present a balance of the *History of Political and Social Concepts Group's* five-year existence.

### Paper Presentations

The conference organization is accepting paper proposals for sessions 3, 4, 5, and 6 (Public Opinion, Intellectuals, Citizenship, and People).

### General structure of the sessions

- Each session will begin with a keynote presentation by an invited Professor.
- The time allocated for each paper presentation will depend on the number of papers accepted for the conference, but, as a general guideline, authors should be prepared to deliver their presentation in no more than 20 minutes.
- Following the paper presentations, a discussant will comment on the works presented.
- Next, the session will open for questions from the audience and debate.

### Guidelines for submitting a paper

The papers presented at the conference should take the following criteria into account:

- Papers must start with a brief exposition of their methodological framework, which must be somewhat related to the history of concepts, languages, and/or discourse.
- Comparative studies of conceptual history that involve two or more countries and/or languages are particularly welcome.
- Papers can be presented in Spanish, English or French (services of simultaneous translation will be provided for all sessions).
- In order to submit a paper proposal please send an abstract, 500 to 1,000 words in size, to the conference's Organizing Committee, pointing out the session of your choice.

### - The deadline for submitting paper proposals is April 30, 2003.

- A final version of the paper should be sent to the Organizing Committee before June 1, 2003, so that the papers can be made available to people attending the conference.

- Paper proposals must be sent to either of the following addresses:

GONZALO CAPELLÁN DE MIGUEL  
Universidad del País Vasco  
Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y de la Comunicación  
Barrio Sarriena s/n  
48090 Lejona  
(España)  
goncapellán@terra.es

INSTITUTO VALENTÍN FORONDA  
C/ Comandante Izarduy, 2  
01006 - Vitoria - Gastéis  
(España)  
ih@vv.ehu.es

### Organizing Committee

The Committee responsible for the organizational and academic aspects of the V Conference of the History of Concepts is composed of the following members: Javier Fernández Sebastián (Universidad del País Vasco, Bilbao), Juan Francisco Fuentes (Universidad Complutense, Madrid), Santos Juliá (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid), Pedro Ruiz Torres (Universidad de Valencia, Presidente de la Asociación Historia Contemporánea), Javier Ugarte (Instituto de Historia Social “Valentín de Foronda”, UPV, Vitoria), Gonzalo Capellán de Miguel (UPV, Bilbao), Secretary.

The Organizing Committee has been working in close collaboration with the International Advisory Committee of the *History of Political and Social Concepts Group*, which is composed of the following members: Melvin Richter (Hunter College, City University of New York), Pim den Boer (University of Amsterdam), Lucian Hölscher (Ruhr Universität, Bochum), Raymonde Monnier (CNRS/ENS LSH Lyon), Kari Palonen (University of Jyväskylä), Henrik Stenius (Renvall Institute, University of Helsinki), Jan Ifversen (Aarhus University), Hans Erich Bödeker (Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte, Göttingen), Martin J. Burke (City University of New York).

### Invited Professors

**Álvarez Junco, José** (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

**Ball, Terence** (Arizona State University)

**Bödeker, Hans Erich** (Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte, Göttingen)

**Boer, Pim den** (University of Amsterdam)

**Chignola, Sandro** (Università di Padua)

**Forment, Carlos** (Centro de Investigación de la Vida Pública, Buenos Aires)

**Fuentes, Juan Francisco** (Universidad Complutense, Madrid)

**Guilhaumou, Jacques** (CNRS-ENS Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Lyon)

**Hampsher-Monk, Iain** (University of Exeter)

**Hölscher, Lucian** (Ruhr Universität, Bochum)

**Ifversen, Jan** (Center for Kulturforskning, Aarhus, Denmark)

**Ingerflom, Claudio S.** (University College London-CNRS)

**Juliá, Santos** (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia)

**Koselleck, Reinhart** (Universität Bielefeld)

**Monnier, Raymonde** (CNRS/ENS LSH Lyon)

**Palonen, Kari** (University of Jyväskylä, Finland)

**Palti, Elías J.** (CEI- Programa de Historia Intelectual, Argentina)

**Pérez Ledesma, Manuel** (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid)

**Prochasson, Christophe** (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris)

**Richter, Melvin** (Hunter College, City University of

New York)

**Ruiz Torres, Pedro** (Universidad de Valencia)

**Schaub, Jean-Frédéric** (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris)

**Steinmetz, Willibald**, (Ruhr Universität, Bochum)

**Stenius, Henrik** (Renvall Institute, University of Helsinki)

**Villacañas, José Luis** (Universidad de Murcia)

**Zermeño Guillermo** (El Colegio de México)

\*\*\* Updated information about the Conference will be soon available in the website of *Instituto de Historia Social “Valentín de Foronda”*, and also in the website of the *History of Concepts Group*.

## Constituting Communities – Political Solutions to Cultural Differences in Europe

International Conference convened by the *Danish Research Group on Cultural Encounters*, Copenhagen, 23-25 October 2003.

What holds political communities together is a question as old as the social sciences. In the present environment of ‘cultural pluralism’ – a contested category with many empirical forms and possible meanings – the political and social integration of old nation states and new political orders like the European Union are high on the agenda. Pluralism is nothing new. It informs modern world history from religious wars in the seventeenth century and the institutionalisation of doctrines of tolerance in the eighteenth. Diverse nationalisms reacted to it or employed it as a doctrinal component in the nineteenth century, and we have multiculturalism today. Most commentators agree that the puzzle of living together and sharing institutions in a world of many colours and creeds, somehow, requires *political* solutions. But what this means, could mean, or has meant through history is a complicated matter. That ‘culture’ calls for ‘politics’ is only the beginning of a discussion. This discussion is the central theme of the conference, pursued under the triple heading: Constitutional and citizenship remedies, conceptions of political community, and the blurring of political boundaries.

The existence of cultural minorities calls for constitutional remedies. But should they take majority culture out in the name of state neutrality, or bring minority culture in for the sake of a negotiated pluralism – apart from the fact that both majority and minority culture may be dubious constructs in the first place? If federalism is called for, what are its possible forms? If universalistic citizenship roles and membership criteria have a future how could the often noted normative ambivalence between equality and exclusion in this concept become recast in new ‘po-

litical' manners? Are signs visible of such innovation taking place? Given that nations must do without ethno-cultural backbones, what then is really the stuff of 'political' or 'patriotic' or 'liberal national' identities, and do we need such constructs in the first place? In struggles over such matters the very representation of what is cultural and political, and what separating the two means, is at stake. Nor do the struggles over such matters merely represent a 'return to culture'. Indeed the very representation of what is cultural and political, and what separating or negotiating the two means, is nowadays politically contested, e.g. as evidenced in discussions about secularism and religion. In and through these representations parameters of inside and outside in political communities are constructed anew. But contours are steadily blurred and rendered insecure. This may give cause for hope. But so far, in the context of late modernity, this seems to enhance forms of identity conflict whose traditional remedies (procedural, identity-building, welfare surplus) are at the same time increasingly obsolete, unable to speak to realities of supra- and trans-national governance structures, economic globalisation, extra-legal migration and the cultural hybridity of Diaspora experiences.

States have diverse experiences with, and representations of, political solutions to cultural difference, as each 'constituted their communities'. Such differences may be investigated in the context of internal nation state pluralism as well as in terms of how state traditions throw their light upon European Union level dilemmas. Here, the wider perspectives of American or Canadian experiences and debates may complement familiar European archetypes like France and Germany.

Under each heading the conference welcomes

papers addressing political solutions to cultural differences which take a comparative and empirically oriented perspective (i.e. different state perspectives and citizenship policy), papers with a more historical, including conceptual historical, content (i.e. on early state patriotism or the history of the passport), and papers that primarily adopt a theoretical and/or normative perspective.

This international conference, convened by the *Danish Research Group on Cultural Encounters* under the joint auspices of the Danish Research Council for the Social Sciences and the Humanities, takes place in Copenhagen 23-25 October 2003 with the participation of a range of eminent key note speakers. For more information see website: <http://www.constituting-communities.dk>.

## The 2003 IPSA World congress

will be held in Durban, South Africa, from June 29 to July 4, 2003. (Unfortunately just the same days as the History of Concepts Conference in Bilbao.) See more information: <http://www.ipsa.ca/en/research/meetings.shtml>

## Inaugural Association for Political Theory Conference

to be held October 17-19, 2003, at Calvin College's Prince Conference Center in Grand Rapids, Michigan. For more information please see the website: [www.oneonta.edu/organizations/apt](http://www.oneonta.edu/organizations/apt).

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## NETWORKS

### The PHED Network of the European Science Foundation

KARI PALONEN

Already the last History of Concepts Newsletter contained news on the acceptance of the European Science Foundation Network in the Humanities and in the Social Sciences, Politics and History of European Democratisation (PHED and the legitimating chapters of the application from November 2001. The Network is chaired by myself and has a Coordination Committee of ten members.

The ESF is a major source of funding for the inter-

European and interdisciplinary projects, consisting mainly of conferences and publications resulting from the conferences. An excellent example of this kind of work are the volumes of the Republicanism Network, chaired by Quentin Skinner in 1996-1998, of which the two volumes, edited by Martin van Gelderen and Skinner, were published in autumn 2002 by the Cambridge University Press.

When the Republicanism Network ends just before the French Revolution, the PHED Network deals with the time since then. This periodic difference is also characterised by the names: a claim on "democratisation," using this *Bewegungsbegriff*, could hardly be imaginable before the French Revolution. The point of the Network is, however, to contest the textbook view that the time since then has

been a more or less linear period of “democratisation,” by insisting on the both historical and thematic diversity of this concept and on the politico-rhetorical struggles around it.

Now the PHED Network has started its work for the period of 2003-2005 (cf. now the ESF website [http://www.esf.org/esf\\_article.php?section=2&domain=5&activity=2&language=0&article=299](http://www.esf.org/esf_article.php?section=2&domain=5&activity=2&language=0&article=299)). An organising meeting of the Coordinating Committee took place with lively discussions in the ESF offices in Strasbourg end of January. Tuija Pulkkinen was chosen to act as the Vice-chair of the Coordination Committee of the Network. The programmatic statement is contained in the “flyer” <http://www.esf.org/articles/299/PHED.pdf>. The preliminary program of the Network, including the five planned Workshops - The Formation of “Representative democracy,” Democratisation and Political Rhetoric, Representative Democracy and the Politics of Gender, Temporalisation and Professionalisation of Politics as well as Current Challenges to Representative Democracy - and the Coordination Committee members can also be found at the PHED website.

The Network is already organised, and here it roughly followed the example of the Republicanism Network, an open Europe-wide competition on the young scholar’s grant, with the intention of getting a number of regular participants on the Network (<http://www.esf.org/articles/299/Call.pdf>). To this competition we got 73 applications from most European countries and the process of selecting the permanent participants will be completed in the next days. I am delighted with the impressive response that our Call for applications has received and I am convinced that we, broadly speaking, selected the proper procedure by using the open competition. I have always had the impression that students can invent themselves the best topics for their theses, we professors can then modify them in some respects, but never dictate that this would be an interesting topic. Also in this competition, I admire the imaginativeness of young scholars in the present-day Europe, even of those whose application fall, in my judgment, outside the core of the Network. Although the lack of historical sense and of links to those recent studies and approaches that have inspired the formation of the Network is sometimes disturbing, I am also happy to get an overview of what is going on today around the topic of democratisation.

The next Workshops of the Network will be held in Malaga 10-11 October 2003 on The Formation of “Representative Democracy”, with an emphasis on the historical revision involved in the works of Pierre Rosanvallon and Frank Ankersmit in particular and in Jyväskylä 28-29 May on the Democratisation and Political Rhetoric with Quentin Skinner as the guest speaker.

The Workshops of the ESF are usually rather small

gatherings of about 30 persons in two days. Persons interested to present a paper in one of Workshops should contact either the local organiser of the workshop or me as the chair of the Network. The ESF will pay the costs of the papergivers and for the regular participants of the Network. Also a simple presence without presenting a paper in a workshop at one’s own costs is possible. I think it would be highly recommendable to get for example doctoral students to spend their travel funding for participating in one or two of the PHED workshops. Similarly, politicians at both national and at the EU level could be welcome guests in the workshop. Due to the localities and other practical matters, a contact with the organiser of the workshop should be taken.

To sum up, this kind of inter-European and interdisciplinary Network actualises the relationship of conceptual history approaches with other styles of analysis and allows concrete comparative studies on both the different modes and rhythms of conceptual change. In this respect the Network can be seen a step towards the often recommended but seldom practised forms of a comparative conceptual history. This could be done either by putting national or thematic studies in a wider European context or by an actual engagement of comparing democratisation struggles and practices in various countries.

### **The scope and range of the Network**

The rise and growing acceptance of democracy constituted one of the major political and cultural changes during the 19th and 20th century in Europe. The received view of both citizens and scholars tended to regard this change from the perspective of its results, by neglecting the language and the political agents. The politics of democratisation was subordinated to philosophy of history, to “progress”.

New approaches to political theory have emerged, embracing recent conceptual and intellectual history, constitutional law, women’s studies, and cultural studies along with other related fields. Previously neglected and unanticipated consequences of democratisation are also being explored, leading to crucial revisions of both political theory and the contemporary political situations.

The purpose of this Network is to coordinate the various studies now taking place and with a view of improving our insight into the subtle differences between countries in the dating and rhythm of democratisation. This will help answer a number of important questions concerning the rate and timing of change, such as why franchise reforms occurred either suddenly through extraordinary measures or in a series of steps, but with little in between the two extremes.

Democracy may now be the established political regime throughout Europe, but an understanding of why it prevailed and how it was introduced through

political struggles in different countries during the 20th century has remained superficial. All political concepts are controversial, and competing theories of democracy form both academic and political enrichment. This Network aims to render the competition of perspectives fruitful to the European discussion, in turn inspiring new comparative, thematic or national projects around the topics under consideration. For example, did late-comers to a political change simply take advantage of the experience of others in legitimising a radical change? The Network is also exploring regional and cultural differences, such as between old and new democracies, between central Europe and the peripheries, and between the Atlantic and continental traditions. The current challenges to representative democracy invite a rewriting of the politics and history of democratisation and the ongoing revisions of this history also allow us to see the challenges from new perspectives

The Network is focusing on five workshops to discuss the main themes of democratisation. These are:

**The formation of “representative democracy”.** The concept of a representative democracy was introduced in the late 18th century but was more widely accepted only after 1830. Within this workshop the differences between representative democracy, based ultimately on universal suffrage, and competing constitutional systems such as direct democracy will be discussed, similarly its relationship with parliamentarism. The machinery of representative democracy, such as the principles and practices of voting will also be considered, along with the need for rethinking the process of government and exercise of power.

**Democratisation and rhetoric.** Rhetoric offers a new perspective on the study of democratisation. The rhetorical culture of speaking for and against has served as a paradigm for parliamentary politics. Democratisation has extended this model to the world of campaigns and party meetings, and eventually to the radio and TV. How far does all this alter the agenda, the styles and the conditions of political agency? How far did these changes diminish the role or the rhetorical culture of controversy in democratic politics? Which new forms of democratic political rhetoric do new audiences, new media and new types of political agency offer?

**Representative democracy and the politics of gender.** In the 19th century, the question of women’s

vote was marginalized in the debates over “universal” suffrage. The enfranchisement processes in European democracies differed, and in some cases women’s vote did not rise to the top of the political agenda. Do the political cultures with militant suffragists still differ from those in which the vote for women was granted smoothly? The contemporary theories of democracy increasingly identify gender as a significant challenge regarding the universalistic assumptions of political agency. Is the rhetoric, professional performance and representation in politics gendered and gendering? Does gender matter, and to what extent does it matter, in representative democracy?

**Temporalisation and professionalisation of politics.** Representative democracy is a temporal regime and its main actors are professional politicians. The limited time span of office, as well as the ‘calendar’ of parliamentary and partisan politics offer instruments for political action. All this is also related to professionalisation of politics. Democracy itself has created the professional politician, partly by making it impossible to thrive in politics without devoting a full life to it, although the recognition of this has been subject to fierce debates. Questions to be discussed include how politicians are recruited and controlled, the funding in politics and the way individuals juggle professional careers with periods in political life.

**Challenges to representative democracy.** Today representative democracy is subjected to various challenges from above, below and within. Such phenomena as the European unification and the globalisation process both subvert national democracies and offer new chances for democratisation. The relevance of parliamentary democracy to the daily lives and activities of citizens as reshaped for example by the new media and new technologies is also in question. The relationships between the state and the citizens, the government and the parliament, the elections and other forms of political participation are similarly subject to change. Which kind of political innovations, technologies and procedures could be constructed to face such challenges?

A selection of contributions from the five conferences will be published in the ESF series in two volumes.

## Publications

Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, vol. 44. (im Satz) <http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/series/band44.htm>, Inhalt: Michael Theunissen, Griechische Zeitbegriffe vor Platon; Werner Theobald, Spuren des Mythos in der Aristotelischen Theorie der Erkenntnis. "Hypolepsis" bei Aristoteles, De anima und Anal. post; Josef G. Thomas, Skepsis und Pistis. Einige Überlegungen zur akademischen und pyrrhonischen Skepsis; Paul Hensels, Einige Bemerkungen zu Origines' Auffassungen über die Erkennbarkeit Gottes in De Oratore und Contra Celsum; Reinhold Hülsewiesche, Redefreiheit; Sven K. Knebel, Distinctio rationis ratiocinantis. Die scholastische Unterscheidungslehre vor dem Satz  $*A = A$ ; Christian Bermes, Lebenswelt (1836-1936). Von der Mikroskopie des Lebens zur Inszenierung des Erlebens; Melvin Richter, "That Vast Tribe of Ideas". Competing Concepts and Practices of Comparison in the Political and Social Thought of Eighteenth-Century Europe; Kari Palonen, Begriffsgeschichte und als Politikwissenschaft.

Hans Erich Bödeker Hrsg. Begriffsgeschichte, Diskursgeschichte, Metapherngeschichte, Mit Beiträgen von Mark Bevir, Hans Erich Bödeker, Lutz Danneberg, Jacques Guilhaumou, Reinhart Koselleck, Ulrich Ricken und Rüdiger Zill, Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag, 2002, 423 s.

S. Chignola (ed.), An Anthology of translation in Italian of essay relating to Begriffsgeschichte (Koselleck, Gadamer, Dunn, Pocock, Skinner, Brunner, Rothacker, Lovejoy), forthcoming.

S. Chignola, An Essay on the theme of Koselleck's Begriffsgeschichte, History of Political Thought 2/2002; also in translation in Spain, Res Publica 2/2003.

G. Duso & S. Chignola (ed.), collecting the papers of the conference in Naples on The History of political and Legal concepts (contributions by: M. Richter, J. Coleman, H. Hoffman, R. Bellamy, J.L. Villacañas, T. Hügelin, Y-C. Zarka, K. Jaume, B. Karsenti, P. Costa, S. Chignola, G. Duso, R. Borrelli, P. Grossi, P. Schiera), forthcoming.

Wavier Fernáandez Sebastian & Juan Francisco Fuentes (dirs.), Diccionario político y social del siglo XIX español. Madrid, Alianza Editorial 2002, 772

Javier Fernández Sebastian, "Historia de los conceptos. Nuevas perspectivas para el estudio de los lenguajes europeos" (History of concepts. New perspectives to study the European political languages), AYER (Journal of the Spanish Association

for Contemporary History), number 48.

Martin van Gelderen & Quentin Skinner (eds): Republicanism. A Shared European Heritage. Vol. 1. Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, 432 p., ISBN 0521802032, ££ 45,-; Vol.2. The Values of Republicanism in Early-Modern Europe. 414 p., ISBN 0521807565, ££ 45-.

Jacques Guilhaumou, La connexion empirique entre la réalité et le discours. Sieyès et l'ordre de la langue Marges linguistiques 1, 2002, <http://www.marges-linguistiques.com/>.

Jacques Guilhaumou, Sieyès et l'ordre de la langue. L'invention de la politique moderne, Paris, Kimé, 2002, 235 p.

Des notions-concepts en révolution autour de la liberté politique à la fin du 18e siècle, Journée d'études du 23 novembre 2002, Paris Sorbonne, Dir. Jacques Guilhaumou et Raymonde Monnier. To be published in the Collection "études révolutionnaires", n° 4, 2003, Paris, Société des études robespierristes, 17 rue de la Sorbonne, 75231 Paris Cedex 5 (Diffusion CTHS/SODIS), [http://www.revues.org/Annales\\_historiques\\_de\\_la\\_revolution\\_francaise](http://www.revues.org/Annales_historiques_de_la_revolution_francaise).

The history of political and social concepts, that has already gained a longstanding interest in Germany (*Begriffsgeschichte*) and in the Anglophone world (history of discourse), is taking an unequalled extent since these trends of research confront and come to share their common reflection to the conceptual history of politics and to the linguistic history of political discourse, so specific of the French school of analysis of discourse. Are the methods of research linked to the "linguistic turn" - semantic history, analysis of discourse, linguistic history of concepts - able to introduce, if not to a better, at least to another intelligibility of the history of the French revolution? The authors of the articles investigate the uses, signification and symbolic dimensions, notably through images, of some key concepts and major socio-political notions situated in the semantic field of political freedom. Light *versus* darkness, constitution, republic, freedom of the press, citizenship, public space, rights of the woman, individuality, nation, extreme centre... so many notions which are questioned through texts and prints, in the light of some great authors and politic key figures, from the Philosophes to the Ideologues, Rousseau, Diderot, Sieyès, Humboldt, Marat, Mary Wollstonecraft, Romme... only to quote the major subjects of the analysis set out in this volume.

**Contents:** Maurice TOURNIER, Préface; Jacques GUILHAUMOU, Raymonde MONNIER, Avant-propos; Rolf REICHARDT, Visualiser la logomachie entre *Lumières et Ténèbres* ou Les étranges métamorphoses de l'éteignoir dans les estampes

(1789-1830); Michel PERTUÉ, La notion de constitution à la fin du 18e siècle; Raymonde MONNIER, La république de Rousseau : science de la législation et art de gouverner; Christine FAURÉ, L'espace public selon Sieyès; Agnès STEUCKARDT, La notion de liberté de la presse: défense et illustration dans *l'Ami du peuple* de Marat; Serge HEIDEN, Illustration d'une méthode lexicométrique des cooccurrences sur un corpus historique; Serge ABERDAM, Droits de la femme et citoyenneté. Autour du séjour de Mary Wollstonecraft à Paris en 1793; Pierre SERNA, Existe-t-il un "extrême centre"? ou le point aveugle de la république directoriale. L'exemple de *La Décade*; Jacques GUILHAUMOU, Humboldt et l'intelligence politique des Français : autour de Sieyès.

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Jussi Kurunmäki (2003): The Reception of Political Concepts in the Wake of Finnish Parliamentary Life in the 1860s. In Jussi Kurunmäki & Kari Palonen (Hg./eds.): Zeit, Geschichte und Politik. Time, History and Politics. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research. (forthcoming).


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Renvall Institute  
P. O. Box 59 (Unioninkatu 38 A)  
00014 University of Helsinki  
FINLAND

Henrik Stenius  
Tel. (+358-9) 191 23188  
Fax (+358-9) 191 23107  
[henrik.stenius@helsinki.fi](mailto:henrik.stenius@helsinki.fi)

Suvi Ervamaa  
Tel. (+358-50) 304 5103  
Fax (+358-9) 191 23107  
[suvi.ervamaa@helsinki.fi](mailto:suvi.ervamaa@helsinki.fi)