

- van Berkel, R. and Møller, I.H. (eds.) *Active Social Policies in the EU*. Policy Press, Bristol.
- Voges, W. and Kazepov, Y. (eds.) (1998) *Armut in Europa*. Chmielorz Verlag, Wiesbaden.
- Weber, M. (1922) (1972 edition) *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Mohr Verlag, Tübingen.
- Williamson, O. (1975) *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications*. Free Press, New York.
- Wilson, W.J. (1987) *The Truly Disadvantaged, the Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- World Economic Forum (2004) *Global Competitiveness Report 2003–2004*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

## 2

## The European City: A Conceptual Framework and Normative Project

---

*Hartmut Häussermann and Anne Haila*

### Introduction

Attempts to construct theories of cities not only face the problem that the city is not a “theoretical object” (Saunders 1981), but also run into the dilemma of generalization. Theoretical formulations cannot avoid making generalizations, but abstract urban models fail to describe the rich reality of cities. On the other hand, detailed and empirical descriptions of particular cities are far too accidental to be useful in comparing other cities. Such problems have always vexed urban scholars.

One early attempt to make generalizations and theorize the city was Max Weber’s concept of the “Occidental city.” Weber defined the concept of the European city by comparing European cities with cities in the Orient and by identifying several characteristics of cities in the West and in the East. Weber’s object of study was the medieval city, and therefore it is no surprise that urban historians were challenged by his concept of the European city. In the community of urban scholars studying modern cities, however, Weber’s ideas did not find followers. His concept of the European city was considered obsolete after the consolidation of worldwide capitalist relations and the emergence of the territorial states that demolished the autonomy of cities, because autonomy was of importance for Weber’s concept of the European city. Instead of the Weberian approach, in the twentieth century urban scholars analyzed cities from an

ecologic perspective or used the political economic framework. Both of these frameworks regarded cities as universal formations without paying attention to, for example, national differences.

In recent years, some European urban scholars have begun talking about European cities invoking Weber's notion of the "European city." The category of the European city is a tempting and challenging idea in different ways: in contrast to the overall pessimistic views of the declining significance of cities as actors in a globalizing world, the basic assumption of the reconsideration of a "European City" of this type could be – and to a certain extent is – a social and political actor with a higher degree of autonomy compared to the big metropolises in other parts of the world. In this chapter we will take up the challenge and discuss the usefulness of this category (see also Häussermann 2001). We also attempt to contribute to the debate on the question of making generalizations in urban studies.

We will begin by introducing some scholars and theoretical traditions in urban studies. These are Georg Simmel, the Chicago School, the Marxist-influenced political economy approach and the global city paradigm. Second, we will recall Weber's concept of the "Occidental city" and discuss a recent revival of Weber's ideas. After that we will explore the usefulness of the revived notion of the European city by analyzing some recent trends in cities in contemporary urban Europe.

#### Four Theoretical Traditions

##### *Georg Simmel*

It is fair to say that Georg Simmel was the first social scientist to deserve the title "urban sociologist." He provided a sociological definition of "the urban" and analyzed the interaction between spatial density, social behavior, and economic differentiation.

Simmel was born in 1858 and wrote his significant works *Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben* (The Metropolis and Mental Life) and *Philosophie des Geldes* at the turn of the twentieth century. He was interested in the question of what makes the urban culture of big cities distinctive. This distinctive character was found by contrasting big cities to small towns and rural villages. Big cities created the space of modernity, because they were dominated by the money economy and impersonal social relations (characteristic of the market economy). Impersonal relations constitute the mode of living and interacting in big cities. Unlike in the countryside, interactions between people are predominantly functional and segmented. This enables individuals to cope with the frequency of interactions and the heterogeneity of the people. The scarcity of close personal relations and

emotional outbursts are, in Simmel's view, a precondition for living together in big cities. When people ignore each other they can live side by side without seeking to control each other or to repulse others because of their difference. City people, therefore, seem aloof and arrogant, but the distance they maintain makes it possible for them to preserve their personal freedom and develop as individuals; big cities liberate urbanites from social control and the traditional ties that restricted the life of peasants in the countryside and inhabitants of small towns.

Thus, Simmel presented a thesis that spatial density and social heterogeneity create a certain mode of behavior and "mentality." Because the density and heterogeneity were only to be found in big cities in Simmel's time, big cities (identified with the "money economy"), with their impersonal social relations, became the theoretical starting point for a sociologic definition of the urban. Based on this definition, Simmel also made important remarks on the cultural productivity of big cities: competition in dense and heterogeneous cities leads to economic specialization, cultural diversity and division of labor. This further increases the innovations and cultural productivity typical of cities.

The concepts of an urban mentality and the money economy refer ultimately to the heterogeneity of actors and the density of their interaction, not to the city as such. Simmel's object of study, therefore, was the effects of the intensified interaction between urban dwellers under the condition of the money economy, not exactly or exclusively (geographically defined) cities. The reason why Simmel connected individualized social relations and the money economy to big cities was that in his time modernity and developed economic relations were still limited to big cities. Indeed, at the beginning of the twentieth century a characteristic feature of Germany was the sharp contrast between rural and urban areas, both in social and cultural terms, and Berlin in particular – where Simmel had been living at that time – was at the cutting-edge of economic and cultural innovation. This context sheds light on Simmel's concept of the urban space as the space of modernity.

Simmel took one specific aspect of the modern city (aloof and arrogant urbanites), and regarded it as a straightforward and universal trend. Similar to Weber's method of identifying the ideal type, Simmel's general definition of the urban is based on one characteristic of the big city and ignores, for example, different types of cities and the neighborhoods that served as communitarian social spaces for the working classes, which also existed in Simmel's Berlin and which were vividly described, for instance, in Alfred Döblin's *Berlin Alexanderplatz* written in 1929. Simmel's addiction to one aspect of the city turned out to be fatal. The contrast Simmel made between big and small cities, which he equated with the distinction between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society), soon lost its validity and

in the modern world communication technologies spread urban culture around the human landscape. "The urban" was no longer bound to a specific geographic type of space – dense and heterogeneous.

### *The Chicago School*

Simmel was born in Berlin and his "big city" was there. However, there was nothing specifically European in his thinking and his ideas found a receptive audience outside Europe and became popular in the USA. Simmel's ideas matched well with the intellectual tendencies at the University of Chicago. Robert Park, who had met Simmel in Berlin, americanized Simmel (Smith 1988: 121), and Louis Wirth reproduced Simmel's ideas in his famous essay on "Urbanism as a Way of Life" (1938).

The Chicago School, consisting of Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, Louis Wirth, and others, took Simmel's conception of the interrelation between the urban mentality and the density and heterogeneity as its starting point and gave a universal definition of "the city" as a heterogeneous, dense and large place. This definition was meant to be applicable to all cities irrespective of the differences in their cultures, economies, social relations and structures. Perhaps Berlin, known as *Chicago at the Spree* (Smith 1988: 44–5), was too similar to Chicago to make urban scholars question whether cities around the world have some universal qualities or whether there are merely individual and unique cities; different kinds of cities in different nations.

Chicago was divided into Polish, Italian, and Irish neighborhoods. Reflecting this, the Chicago School conceptualized the city as a "mosaic of small worlds", as a patchwork of communities in which the urban lives of individuals were embedded and restricted. In this the Chicago School differs from Simmel. The Chicago School saw individualization as endangering social integration, not as a form of emancipation as Simmel had perceived it.

The Chicago School added Darwin's theory of evolution to Simmel's thought. Competition and struggle were seen as the basic forces of urban development. Ethnic, national, racial and social groups competed for limited urban space and the segregation that was the result of this competition was conceived as "natural" and typical of cities. As Neil Smith says (1997: 123), "The Chicago School of urban research explained how social differences, squeezed through a sieve of economic and geographic competition, were the hallmark of a distinctly holistic, American urbanism (and this model was quite successfully exported)."

The approach of the Chicago School became the dominant paradigm for urban research in the 1940s and 1950s. This paradigm implied the idea of a trend towards similar structures of cities; competition between ethnic groups for urban space will produce a segregated city. The ecologic

approach explained the urban structure by referring to natural forces. These natural forces were viewed as the same everywhere; hence there was no difference between cities in the East and West, between cities in America and Europe, between cities in the "First" and "Third Worlds." In this universalistic strain, the Chicago model naturally seemed to contradict empirical studies on cities (see, for example, Berry 1973; Castells 1977). This contradiction further urged urban scholars to carry out empirical studies on the diversity between cities in different cultural contexts. What soon became clear after the accumulation of empirical studies on real cities was that in addition to the neglect of cultures, another reason limiting the applicability of the Chicago model was its ignorance of politics. To amend this shortage, a new line of thinking, the political economy of cities, was developed. Political economists offered an alternative approach to understanding "the city".

### *The political economy perspective on the city*

The ideas of the Chicago School were challenged by the "New Urban Sociology" in the late 1960s. The revival of Marxist theories and concepts simultaneously in European countries and in the USA produced a novel way of seeing cities. The ecologic approach was a target for criticism, particularly because of the lack of any political analysis of urban development. Critics such as Manuel Castells (1977) and David Harvey (1973) argued that cities are part of societies, and instead of analyzing cities as heterogeneous, dense, and large formations, they defined cities as units of collective consumption and analyzed them in the framework of investment flows and class struggle. The struggle for amenities in cities (as places of collective consumption) was seen as part of the class struggle that had its basis in the sphere of production. The "new urban sociologists" regarded the capitalist economy as a crucial force affecting the development of cities; hence the term "political economists".

Compared to the Chicago School, political economists paid more attention to politics. This could have opened up the possibility of treating cities with different political traditions and contexts differently. However, like Simmel and the Chicago School, they tended to analyze the structures and development of cities as universal rather than different and unique. The laws of capital were regarded as similar around the world. Although most political economists thought that "the logic of capital" had different manifestations in different localities (see, for example, the empirical case study by Harvey [1985] on the Basilica of the Sacred Heart in Paris), the critics (e.g., Gottdiener 1985), occasionally taking an exaggerating and simplifying tone, blamed political economists for ignoring urban

politics and analyzing cities as too straightforwardly determined by economic forces. They argued that political economists postulated a universal model of urban development based primarily on economic forces – and not always without justification – while occasionally a certain economic determinism and functionalism can be discerned in some neo-Marxist studies on urban affairs.

Marxist theory was only considered applicable to capitalist cities. Cities in non-capitalist social formations did not have a role in the “new urban sociology.” It was widely agreed that socialist cities could not be analyzed using Marxist concepts. Therefore, little attention was given to cities in socialist countries.

The Regulationist School, which further developed the historical materialist approach, gave more space to politics than some earlier versions of the political economy approach. The concept of Fordism was introduced to emphasize that relationships between capital, labor and the state vary in different historical periods. This concept – implying an idea of different types of contracts between capital, labor and the state in different historical periods and locations – paved the way to recognizing differences between cities, such as national differences. The concept of Fordism, referring to power relations in various phases of capitalist development and various national paths of welfare regimes, could easily have led to abandoning the idea of a universal model of “the capitalist city.” However, the paradigm of the universal capitalist city stood firm and in most regulationist writings a focus on similarities replaced the search for differences (for a different perspective see Chapter 6).

Compared with the Chicago School, political economists took a step towards more realistic theories and recognized the cultural and political differences between cities. Unlike the Chicago School, political economists did not analyze cities as determined by ahistorical and natural forces. They postulated a specific historical phase of economic development – capitalism – which affects the pattern and inequalities of cities. Nevertheless, political economists preferred to regard cities in the capitalist world as similar, influenced by the same economic forces: the capitalistic logic. In the next phase of the history of urban studies, economic forces, celebrated by political economists, were taken as an object of study by global city theoreticians who postulated the emergence of a new type of city – the global city – thus differentiating various types of capitalist cities.

### *The global city*

In the early 1990s, global cities became a hot topic in the community of urban scholars. The category of “global city” refers to the specific economic

functions of the global economy. Some specific economic functions that are necessary for the global economy are concentrated in a few cities that have become strategic places for the control of this new economic system. Global cities have more producer services, headquarters of transnational corporations and financial institutions than other cities. As in the political economy approach, economic factors are seen as determining the social structure of cities, their income distribution and the accommodation of immigrants.

When Saskia Sassen originally formulated the global city hypothesis (1991), she used three cities, New York, London, and Tokyo, to exemplify the effects of global trends in cities. Characteristics of global cities, in Sassen’s model, were spatial and social fragmentation, segmentation, and polarization. She saw global cities as dual cities: on the one hand there is a small world of high-salary elite workers active in transnational transactions, and on the other hand there are growing numbers of poor and relatively low-paid workers who produce services for the new transnational elite.

Saskia Sassen’s global city hypothesis was a great success. Urban scholars around the world started to analyze their home towns to see whether they satisfied the criteria of global city. In this frenzied hunt for new global cities, the critical attitude that should have been a quality of academic urban scholars was forgotten and the structures Sassen postulated for a specific city type were understood as general and universal effects of globalization. The reason for this unwarranted generalization is that Sassen did not differentiate the economic trends forming “global cities” from general trends of post-industrial and transnational economies, and did not pay enough attention to national and local variations and to cultural and political differences, which are crucial in different labor markets. Here again, as in the cases of the Chicago School and the political economists, we find an inclination to identify cities around the world as similar and to neglect their differences.

Saskia Sassen’s work has been harshly criticized from various perspectives. Some European scholars have refuted the idea that global cities are dual cities. Edmond Préteceille (2000) and Chris Hamnett (2003) have analyzed Paris and London, and have shown that the polarization of income – the central assumption of the dual-city thesis – does not hold for these cities. Instead of dualization, they found rapid increases in the salaries for highly qualified professional service jobs but also growth in the earnings for lower paid jobs. In these two “global cities” all income groups are earning more. The poor and the low-income groups seem to be better protected from the effects of globalization than the global city thesis would suggest. Increased polarization might be true for New York, and also for some other cities, but not necessarily for all “global” cities, and certainly not for all cities in general. The cities that perform as nodes in the global

economy are not a new type in the sense that there exists only one type of income or residential pattern. Rather, it seems to be the case that there are different types of "global cities" and the differences depend on the national contexts and on local politics and traditions. The criticism by Preteceille and Hamnett and other European scholars made urban scholars more sensitive to national and continental differences.

As a result of several empirical studies on the effects of globalization in urban areas, urban scholars now widely accept the idea that there are no direct and simple links between economic globalization and local outcomes. There are remarkable differences between cities with different welfare regimes and different political-institutional and cultural contexts, despite the fact that most cities are now embedded in the capitalist system and influenced by the laws of capitalist development (Lehto 2000; Burgers and Musterd 2002).

The attempts to develop theories about cities we have discussed so far characteristically analyzed cities as universal formations. Simmel saw dense and heterogeneous cities producing aloof and arrogant behavior. The Chicago School constructed the model of the segregated city. The political economy approach postulated the model of the capitalist city, and regarded cities in capitalism as more or less similar, determined by economic forces. The global city paradigm, although originally focusing on a few particular cities, continued the tradition of regarding cities as similar and universal. In this tradition of searching for a universal definition of the city, does it make sense to recall Max Weber's old concept of the "Occidental City" as some contemporary European urban scholars are doing? Before answering this question we have to briefly discuss Weber's concept and the present-day invocation of Weber's ideas.

### Max Weber

#### *The Occidental city*

In *Die Stadt* (2000), Max Weber defined the concept of the European city and contrasted it to the Oriental city. Weber was puzzled by the fact that European cities had become the birthplace of a new mode of economic development – capitalism – whereas the cities in the Orient did not have this incubating role. European cities, in contrast to Oriental cities, had the following characteristics in Weber's writings: the European city had fortifications (walls), a locally controlled market and a court of its own; European cities were associations, politically autonomous and had administrations of their own. The medieval cities, on which Weber focused, were city-states with their own politically representative bodies and self-governing. The

concept of the "burgher" was most important in Weber's thinking. Burghers had a privileged status and an important role in European cities. The role of city dwellers also differentiated European cities from cities in Asia. Whereas in Europe citizens participated in the local administration, in China urban dwellers belonged to their families and native villages, while in India urban dwellers were members of different castes.

Landownership was closely connected to the status of being a burgher. European burghers owned land in cities and as urban landowners they established formal associations, or fraternities (*schwurgemeinschaftliche Verbrüderung*). Fraternities had the task of protecting the property of their members. They represented the interests of the city bourgeoisie. The concept of the burghers and their political participation explain Weber's concept of the city. The city, for Max Weber, was not a physical structure but a political association, a corporation. Weber was not interested in cities in the spatial sense, but the question that concerned him was that of the consequences of a distinct social and political institution. At the core of this social and political institution, the city as a corporation was the self-administering urban *Bürgertum*. The *Bürgertum* formed the city as a political and economic actor. Because the burghers were not completely suppressed and exploited by superior powers, together with their local associations they could develop unchained energies that were used for the benefit of European cities. Thus, the cities developed as a revolutionary power for dispelling the supervising and controlling power of clerical landlords and the aristocracy.

For Max Weber, cities were special kinds of societies. In Europe, the contrast between the city and the countryside was clearly defined. Up to the beginning of modernity, the border between the urban and the rural was demarcated by walls. The walls also separated different types of societies. Cities distinguished themselves sharply from the surrounding feudal countryside. Inside the city walls, economic and political life flourished and cities became the breeding ground for the new mode of production – capitalism – and Occidental modernity. In the city, people were free from the peonage that restricted the life of the rural population. Belonging to the urban community meant upward social mobility, compared with those left in the countryside. Cities were also sites of social and cultural innovation. This gave European cities the honor of symbolizing modernization and civilization.

Over the years and after several struggles, in the age of Absolutism the autonomous cities of medieval Europe were incorporated into the territorial states and lost their special legal status. Cities became part of nation-states and national economies. They were no longer special societies. This development made Weber's concept outdated for urban scholars studying contemporary cities. Textbooks on urban sociology, such as Peter Saunders'

(1981) *Social Theory and the Urban Question* and Savage et al.'s (1993) *Urban Sociology, Capitalism and Modernity*, bypassed Weber with a brief reference, as a scholar who was not interested in cities as such.

### *A new evaluation of Max Weber*

Recently, two European scholars, Arnaldo Bagnasco and Patrick Le Galès (2000; see also Le Galès 2002) introduced a notion of the European city reviving Weber's old ideas. They begin by stating that "Europe is inconceivable without its cities" (Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000: 1) and provide a collection of studies in which "European cities are analyzed both as political and social actors and as local societies: not as metropolises, but as cities" (ibid.: 3). They appeal to Max Weber and characterize European cities by the participation of burghers in local government, rules applying to landed property, the legal status of citizens, and citizens' associations with relative freedom. Their basic argument is that the diminishing significance of nation-states (as a consequence of globalization) in Europe (and promoted by the European Union) has created a "power vacuum" that has provided new opportunities for local and regional action. Cities have quickly grasped this opportunity and have become political and economic actors and increasingly created identities of their own (Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000: 5–6; for more empirical information see Le Galès 2002).

Max Weber contrasted European cities to cities in the East, whereas Bagnasco and Le Galès contrast European cities to North American cities. Typically, European cities consist of a built-up area around a focal point (which can be administrative and public buildings, churches, squares and open spaces). They are relatively old and stable; their built-up form is old and has developed gradually. Europe is characterized by a large number of small- and medium-sized cities in relatively close proximity to each other; population mobility is relatively low. Public services are important in European cities. State intervention and town planning have regulated land use; public landownership and public infrastructure have a part to play; public investments are important in European cities. There are numerous civic associations and citizens are involved in local affairs. The urban has an important role in the European imagination.

How is this revival of Max Weber's notion of the European city to be understood? Is it a description of European cities? Or is it a new research paradigm to replace the Chicago School model, the political economy framework and the global city paradigm? In the following we examine the usefulness of this neo-Weberian perspective by analyzing some recent trends in European cities. We discuss landownership, burghers,

metropolitanization, public services, the relationship between the state and cities, and "Americanization" in contemporary European cities. We will begin by a brief look at the history of so-called European "moderate modernism," because it forms an important historical heritage for European cities.

## **Moderate Modernism and Recent Trends**

### *Modernism in America and Europe*

The American city, in the models of the Chicago School and urban economics (Alonso 1964 and his followers), was the place of a radical modernity. Its spatial and social development has been subject to the power of the market. The use of land follows the profit-seeking of private investors, and the value of a place is determined by market forces. Minimal regulation leads to a sharp segregation of different groups in terms of income, status, and ethnic identity. The survival of neighborhoods is dependent on economic cycles. Local traditions, social concerns or urban cultures do not have a role in such urban models. The city center is not a place of identification, but is a *central business district* (CBD), in which culture and housing do not survive. In the American city, the tenement houses are owned by landlords who live outside the city, who are not interested in *the city* from a social point of view, but in the gains they can make out of their properties.

Unlike in such US cities, where market forces dictate the pace of urban development, in Europe, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, an opposition emerged to fight against market-led urban development. This opposition consisted of left-wing radicals and reformers, but also included members of the enlightened bourgeoisie. These philanthropists saw market-led urban development as responsible for the social contradictions and inhuman living conditions of the lower income classes in cities. Friedrich Engels' report on Manchester (1845) is one example of this concern about the antisocial effects of radical market development on the urban fabric.

European cities developed an urban regime that found a compromise between particular economic interests and social responsibilities and tried to take into account the interests of the city as a whole; examples are healthcare and anti-poverty initiatives, but also interventions into the provision of housing for the poor. This European urban regime felt responsible for "the city" and can be characterized by what Kaelble (2000) has called the model of "moderate modernity." Essential to it is the strong influence of the public administration on urban development and it has the following five characteristics:

- 1 Public landownership in European cities enabled the cities to play an important part in the decisions on land use and gave cities the opportunity to plan the urban structure from a long-term perspective (2291, 2864).
- 2 After some negative experiences with private provision and management of infrastructure, such as water, energy, and the transport system, these were organized as public services (6391, 5324, 3544). This so-called "municipal socialism" turned out to be an effective method of organizing such services and brought in revenue for the public purse.
- 3 The growing influence of economic interests in urban development was balanced with the development of legal instruments for town planning, legitimizing public intervention. Since the last third of the nineteenth century, local governments have increased their influence in the formation of cities. The laws regulating land use and development schemes were developed and implemented at the local level. The regulations became even more extensive and efficient in the twentieth century when the national states took over and unified legal regulations for urban development.
- 4 A typical feature of European countries was the development of welfare states, which began fighting against poverty and social exclusion and which succeeded in preventing homelessness from becoming an urban problem on a mass scale. After the take-off of industrialization and urbanization, and the concentration of proletarian masses in rapidly growing cities, programs of "social housing" (4427, 2779, 1983) were developed in order to break the connection between the quality of housing and the economic power of the tenant (Harloe 1995). To this day, European states and cities are significant providers of social housing (2231, 6504, 2864). Because of the social housing programs, European cities lack the type of slums and ghettos found in American cities. Also, the European states, through their urban renewal programs, attempted to improve the quality of high-density quarters constructed during early capitalist urbanization (5934, 2290, 4235). Although some of the urban renewal programs had unwanted consequences in relocating the working class and the "underclasses," it was never doubted that "the city" as a whole should feel responsible for the living conditions in the inner-city areas and for the poor, and that the city center or dilapidated neighborhoods should not be reconstructed solely by capitalist logic (5255, 5081, 3438, 0809).
- 5 Thanks to the tradition of the burghers' influence in urban development, there developed in Europe, during the first decades of the twentieth century, visions or ideal models of the good city. The most famous was the garden city (0697, 2947, 4428). Encouraged by the antipathy towards the capitalist city of the nineteenth century, urban reformers

and social revolutionaries envisioned a "modern city" that would overcome class contradictions and social inequality. They proposed the nationalization of land, the provision of public services and the building of sound infrastructure.

These features – city landownership, municipal socialism, the tradition of town planning, the welfare state and visions of urban development – moderated the effects of modernism in Europe and still make European cities different from those in the USA, which are predominantly organized through market processes. However, in recent years these features have been challenged. Cities have begun selling their properties, what used to be public services are increasingly provided by private entrepreneurs, public-private partnerships have replaced the tradition of regulatory town planning, the welfare state is in crisis, and the plans drawn up by town planners are contested by citizens. European cities seem to be modernizing along the lines of American cities. In the following we will discuss these challenges in more detail.

#### *Regulation and public landownership*

Rules applied to landed property, public landownership, the tradition of town planning, and public intervention were among the characteristics of European cities identified by Bagnasco and Le Galès, as well as by Kaelble. The struggle to influence urban development continued in Europe and during the first decades of the twentieth century a new city model, the garden city, was invented. This development is characteristic of European cities, and Bagnasco and Le Galès are correct in emphasizing this. The use and legitimacy of town planning also distinguish European cities from American and Asian cities (Haila 1999). Although there are differences among European countries – such as the UK following the tradition of planning applications which give landowners and developers the right to draw up plans, and Germany and Finland accepting plans as laws – the tradition of town planning and the idea that public intervention in land use is legitimate have an enduring influence and can still be read in the pattern of European cities today.

Connected to town planning is public ownership of land, which has enabled European cities to have an important role in land-use decisions. The fact that cities owned large areas of land has made it easy for them to implement plans and use the sites in their possession for social and public utility purposes. Because of extensive public landownership, ideal city models were not left ideal, but were implemented in European cities (2281, 6462, 2439, 6501). Therefore, a characteristic of European cities,

which distinguishes them from cities in America and Asia, is an extensive public realm and space, created and protected by planners, local politicians, and the urban public (4978, 4189, 2118, 4204, 0919).

The impact of town planning and public landownership in European cities is affected by the delicate relationship between the state and the city. We will take Helsinki as an example, but similar stories can be found, for example in Germany and the Netherlands. In Finland, the king donated the land to cities when they were established (this is the origin of the large city landownership in old towns), and the city further gave the sites to "good burghers" (this is how burghers got their possessions). Cities began drawing up detailed plans as early as the seventeenth century. In 1931, the state of Finland intervened and passed the Detailed Planning Law, which was applicable to the whole nation. Until the 1931 Detailed Planning Law, cities could draw up plans only for the land in their possession. Since 1931, cities can also plan private lands. This involved an extension of the regulatory ideology; cities were not only managing their own properties but planning the city as a whole. The Planning Law of 1958 further reinforced this regulationist ideology by introducing the idea of a hierarchy of plans; the point of the general plan was to take care of the interests of the whole city and guide detailed planning and development. The purpose of these planning laws was to give the power to plan to public authorities and to introduce the idea of a collective interest. In the Finnish vocabulary this is called "the planning monopoly of municipalities." Belief in the collective interest and town planners as legitimate representatives of this interest began fading away simultaneously with the passing of a new Land Use and Construction Law in 1999. This law provided more opportunities for citizens to participate.

Very similar observations can be made in Germany, where between 1918 and 1970 a continuous body of planning laws had been developed, granting the municipalities rights for regulating and intervening in the process of urban development. Since the 1960s, public participation rights have been expanded simultaneously. France, for a long time a very centralist state, has started to decentralize and to empower local administrations since the 1990s. In Spain, Barcelona has witnessed phenomenal change in its degree of autonomy since the end of the Franco regime.

### *The legacy of the burghers*

Connected to town planning and public landownership is the question of burghers, a significant landowner group in European cities. The *Stadtbürger* in Weber's time was an owner of a building and, at the same time, the user of the building. The bourgeois city houses had shops on the street

level and offices and living rooms on the upper floors. The site formed a social and economic unit. When the businesses of the burghers prospered, the economy of the city prospered. This coincidence of private and collective interests also guaranteed the social integration of the city, based on the patriarchal system of caring for dependants.

The enlightened bourgeoisie played a part as the harbinger of humanist urban development. Civilized burghers opposed market-led urban development which was seen as responsible for the deep social contradictions and inhuman living conditions of the lower classes in cities. Naturally, the Left was also concerned about the inhuman effects of market-led urban development as Friedrich Engels' famous report on English cities shows.

The portrait of the European city as a city where land use is regulated by public authorities, town planning is important, cities and burghers own land, and private and collective interests coincide is a true picture of old European cities. However, is it also true of cities in contemporary Europe where industrialization has ended the bourgeoisie's landownership and where real estate in the city center is owned by financial institutions; where users and owners of buildings are no longer one and the same person; where cities have begun selling their landed properties; where public regulation of land use has given way to new methods of control, like contracts and public-private partnerships that are more interested in separate projects (and whose performance is assessed by the success of the projects) (Häussermann and Kapphan 2000; Moulaert et al. 2003) than in planning the whole city in the interest of the whole city; and where political power is dispersed to various project organizations and ad hoc elite clubs? Do these changes make the concept of the European city based on landowning burghers obsolete? Is the neo-Weberian approach, postulating public landownership, collective interest and burghers' participation, relevant in analyzing contemporary cities that seem to be so very different from the cities in Weber's time?

To answer these questions we will discuss the example of Vuosaari, a neighborhood of Helsinki (5180, 3098, 3209). The Vuosaari Office was the first separate project organization in Helsinki. It was separated from the City Planning Office in 1989 and had a duty to draw up a general plan for Vuosaari. The plan the Vuosaari Office proposed would have increased the density of Vuosaari by drawing more inhabitants to the neighborhood. Citizens living in Vuosaari organized themselves to oppose the plan. Citizens were not the only group that did not like the plan drawn up by the town planners. In the center of Vuosaari there was a coffee factory, owned by Paulig, the largest coffee trading house in Finland. Paulig learned from a newspaper that its industrial site was zoned for housing. This zoning regulation turned the coffee company into a developer. Paulig wanted to keep its coffee factory in Vuosaari and to

draw up its own plan for its large landed property in the area. The plan promoted a mixed-use development, including housing, offices, and a shopping center (4157, 4160, 3191, 3196). Paulig was not just acting as a developer and trying to make money through its real estate, but acted as a town planner devising a plan for a whole neighborhood. What is interesting is that the citizens of Vuosaari found an ally in the private coffee corporation, not in the city planning office that was supposed to defend the interests of citizens.

To explain the Vuosaari case we find the neo-Weberian framework useful. It is true that the city, in allowing a private owner to plan and by accepting the plan drawn up by Paulig, gave away its rights to determine the development, conceding its "planning monopoly." One might take this as evidence of the American model of private urban development. However, the reason why citizens allied themselves with the private coffee corporation rather than the city planning office was that Paulig was acting as a town planner interested in the whole neighborhood, and not simply speculating with real estate. In this Paulig took on the role of the old European landowning bourgeoisie that was concerned with the collective interest of the neighborhood and felt social responsibilities connected to that ownership.

#### *Cities or metropolises*

One of the main claims Bagnasco and Le Galès make to support their neo-Weberian approach is that cities in contemporary Europe have regained some of the autonomy they lost to the rising nation-states. It is true that in some respects cities have become more autonomous. For example, states have shifted the burden of provision of social services to cities. However, it is also true that in the era of globalization some cities have grown beyond their administrative borders and this has undermined the power of the central city. Population growth has spilled over from the old core city to suburban municipalities, and people's daily lives are stretching across city limits. The users and the inhabitants of cities are not one and the same (see Chapter 4; Martinotti 1999). Do these trends make the concept of the city as a political unit inapplicable?

To defend the usefulness of the neo-Weberian concept of autonomous cities we will take our example again from Helsinki. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) decided to draw-up a series of reports analyzing the problems in forming metropolitan governances. The report analyzing the Helsinki metropolitan region was the first report it published in November 2002 (Helsingin Metropolikatsaus 2002). The report suggested that the autonomous cities that form the

Helsinki metropolitan region – Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen (whose autonomy is guaranteed by Constitution), with their different political traditions and practices – should increase their cooperation. All these cities disagreed with the OECD report. The strong resistance of cities to any form of metropolitan governance is rather surprising. Cities forming functional economic regions would surely find it beneficial to cooperate in order to compete in the global world. Helsinki, with half a million people and located on the edge of Europe, needs partners to compete in the global world. However, the resistance of the cities in the Helsinki metropolitan region becomes a little more understandable if we recall the long tradition of autonomy of cities in Europe. Similar examples could be presented from Germany, where the relationships in territories no longer coincide with the juridical borders and where attempts to form regional governments are contested by local politicians and inhabitants (Salet et al. 2003). The autonomy of European cities seems to be far from dead, just as the neo-Weberian framework suggests.

#### *Private or public services*

Bagnasco and Le Galès mention the public provision of services as an important characteristic of European cities. Indeed, a typical feature of European cities was the development of an urban regime that made a compromise between particular economic interests and the interest of the city as a whole. Citizens and decision-makers felt social responsibilities and developed programs for social housing, public health, poverty alleviation, and public education. It is important to remember that it was European municipalities that introduced social policies long before the nation-states started their programs of social insurance, healthcare, and public education. Today it is the cities again that are responsible for the welfare of citizens because of the cuts in state subsidies. However, both the state and the city, in the neoliberal era, have reconsidered their provision of public services and become less generous.

In spring 2002, the City of Helsinki decided to cut its welfare spending and announced its intention to close down some libraries and day-care centers. When the city made known its plans, the citizens of Helsinki came out on the street to demonstrate and defend their city's public services. The city had no alternative but to cancel the cuts. These spontaneous and immediate protests show that citizens in Helsinki still conceptualize their city as one with public provision of services. They defended their European city and upheld their right to public services. In Cologne, also, the local parliament resisted the privatization of the municipal housing associations. In Finland, in their manifestos for the parliamentary

elections in March 2003, some political parties promised to cut taxes (which are heavy in countries with extensive welfare states). Interestingly, the polls repeatedly showed that people prefer public services to lower taxes. They are willing to pay high taxes if they get public services. Europeaness is here understood as a normative category, like Göran Therborn (2001) understands it, as a collection of civic ideals such as democracy, progress, equality, and human rights (Soysal 2002: 274). The depiction of Helsinki as a city with public provision of services and citizens identifying themselves as citizens entitled to public services is an apt description. In this sense Helsinki is a European city, just as the neo-Weberian framework describes. And this applies – to different degrees – to other European cities as well.

### Conclusions

Max Weber contrasted “Occidental” cities in Europe and “Oriental” cities in Asia. Bagnasco and Le Galès contrast European and US cities. This change of reference point is understandable for two reasons: first, in terms of urban development American cities have long been a source of influence; and, second, the comparison between European and American cities implies a criticism of the narrow view that American urban studies sometimes have in neglecting the institutional and cultural differences among cities in different parts of the world. In this second sense the neo-Weberian framework is proposing a new paradigm for urban analysis.

In this chapter we have so far argued that despite the trends in European cities making them resemble American cities, public landownership, town planning, the political role of cities, public services, and an appreciation of urban culture are still important in European cities, and therefore the Weberian categories are still useful for analyzing European cities. By way of conclusion we will discuss two points – slums and the physical layout of cities – that are important topics in urban studies and urban practices in Europe and the USA.

Traditionally, slums have been viewed as a problem affecting US cities. Now many urban scholars, together with city mayors and the European Union, warn about the danger of the emergence of slums in Europe and the increasing segregation in European cities. Instead of focusing on the outcome, for example judging whether male unemployment rates and concentrations of immigrants in some European neighborhoods are high enough to make such neighborhoods slums, we would like to focus on the processes and discuss the question of slums from this perspective. The national and local social policies in Europe since the late nineteenth century have attempted to prevent the deterioration of neighborhoods. Urban

renewal programs, which in the USA and Asia displaced the urban poor, were carried out differently in Europe. It was never doubted that “the city” as a whole should feel responsible for the living conditions of the people in inner-city areas. The development of the inner city was never left completely dictated by capitalist interests. The passion with which the European Union today emphasizes antipolarization strategies in its agenda for European urban policy (see Chapters 11 and 14), or the enthusiasm with which some cities, like Helsinki, which is among the most homogenous cities in the world, launch their strategies to fight, in advance, against the threat of polarization (Haila 2001), show that the spirit to fight against slums is still alive in Europe.

The second issue we would like to discuss concerns the role of economic interests and the physical layout of cities. Both American and European cities have CBDs, suburbs and a tendency to shift consumption from the CBD to suburban shopping malls. Behind these similarities, however, there are differences. In Europe, although there are market-led and speculative projects, there is still a remarkable share of public housing, and land is used for public utility functions. Neighborhoods are more mixed and less segregated than in the USA (Préteceille 2000). State subsidies and regional policies protect cities from economic cycles. The variety of policies in Europe (see Oberti 2000) shows the importance of local traditions. Suburban shopping malls, although emerging in Europe, are also contested in many European cities – in fact their development has been almost stopped in Germany because of local planning regulations and in Finland because of new national laws. The new urbanism in the USA, which some take as a sign of convergence between American and European cities, is just imitating the European design, simulating the “community,” and does not reflect the social content and urban way of life of European cities.

Those who argue that there is a convergence between European and American cities mistake the physical appearance for social and political forces. Behind the similar physical appearances are different policies, different kinds of cities as political actors. The convergence, if any, is superficial. The power of the category of the European city is that it guides us to focus on social and political processes instead of seeing the city as a physical layout, or prevents us from privileging economic forces as political economists and global city scholars have done. European cities function as collective actors, and it will depend on the national power relations how far the process of deregulation and privatization will go.

The contribution of the neo-Weberian framework is to disclose the good qualities of European cities and to emphasize the political role of cities, together with the political role and responsibilities of citizens. In other words, the neo-Weberian framework is a conceptual framework as well as a normative one.

## REFERENCES

- Alonso, W. (1964) *Location and Land Use: Towards a General Theory of Land Rent*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Bagnasco, A. and Le Galès, P. (2000) European societies and collective actors? In: Bagnasco, A. and Le Galès, P. (eds.) *Cities in Contemporary Europe*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Berry, B.J.L. (1973) *The Human Consequences of Urbanisation*. St Martin's Press, London–New York.
- Burgers, J. and Musterd, S. (2002) Understanding urban inequality: a model based on existing theories and an empirical illustration. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 26 (2): 403–413.
- Castells, M. (1977) Is there an urban sociology? Theory and ideology in urban sociology. In: Pickvance, C. (ed.) *Urban Sociology, Critical Essays*. Tavistock, London.
- Döblin, A. (1929) *Berlin Alexanderplatz. Die Geschichte vom Franz Biberkopf*. S. Fischer Vlg., Berlin.
- Engels, F. (1845) [1972 edn.] *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England*. In: Marx, K. and Engels, F. *Werke*, Band 2, Dietz Verlag, Berlin/DDR.
- Gottdiener, M. (1985) *The Social Production of Urban Space*. University of Texas Press, Austin.
- Haila, A. (1999) City building in the East and West: United States, Europe, Hong Kong and Singapore compared. *Cities*, 16: 159–267.
- Haila, A. (2001) How to manage globalization: the case of Helsinki. *Helsinki Quarterly*, 3: 15–30.
- Hamnett, C. (2003) *Unequal City: London in the Global Arena*. Routledge, London.
- Harloe, M. (1995) *The People's Home? Social Rented Housing in Europe and America*. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Harvey, D. (1973) *Social Justice and the City*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Harvey, D. (1985) Monument and myth: the building of the Basilica of the Sacred Heart. In: Harvey, D. (ed.) *The Urban Experience*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Häussermann, H. (2001) Die europäische Stadt. *Leviathan*, 29: 237–255.
- Häussermann, H. and Kapphann, A. (2000) *Berlin: Von der Geteilten zur Gespaltenen Stadt?* Leske and Budrich, Opladen.
- Helsingin Metropolikatsaus (2002) *OECD Territorial Reviews: Helsinki, Finland*. Raportin suomenkielinen epävirallinen tiivistelmä. Aluekeskus: ja kaupunkipolitiikan yhteistyöryhmän julkaisu, 2.
- Kaelble, H. (2000) La ville européenne au XX siècle. *Revue Économique*, 51 (2): 385–400.
- Le Galès, P. (2002) *European Cities*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Lehto, J. (2000) Different cities in different welfare states. In: Bagnasco, A. and Le Galès, P. (eds.) *Cities in Contemporary Europe*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

- Martinotti, G. (1999) A city for whom? Transients and public life in the second-generation metropolis. In: Beauregard, R.A. and Body-Gendrot, S. (eds.) *The Urban Moment*. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.
- Moulaert, F., Rodriguez, A., and Swyngedouw, E. (eds.) (2003) *The Globalized City: Economic Restructuring and Social Polarization in European Cities*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Oberti, M. (2000) Diversity and complexity in local forms of anti-poverty strategies in Europe. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24 (3): 536–553.
- Préteceille, E. (2000) Segregation, class and politics in large cities. In: Bagnasco, A. and Le Galès, P. (eds.) *Cities in Contemporary Europe*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Salet, W., Thornley, A., and Kreukels, A. (eds.) (2003) *Metropolitan Governance and Spatial Planning*. Spon Press, London–New York.
- Sassen, S. (1991) *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Saunders, P. (1981) *Social Theory and the Urban Question*. Holmes & Meyer, New York.
- Savage, M., Warde, A., and Ward, K. (1993) *Urban Sociology, Capitalism and Modernity*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Simmel, G. (1900) *Philosophie des Geldes*. Duncker & Humblot Verlag, Berlin.
- Simmel, G. (1903) Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben. In: Simmel, G. (1995 edition) *Aufsätze und Abhandlungen 1901–1908* (Band I, Gesamtausgabe Band 7). Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
- Smith, D. (1988) *The Chicago School: A Liberal Critique of Capitalism*. St. Martin's Press, New York.
- Smith, N. (1997) Social justice and the new American urbanism: the revanchist city. In: Merrifield, A. and Swyngedouw, E. (eds.) *The Urbanisation of Injustice*. New York University Press, New York.
- Soysal, Y. (2002) Locating Europe. *European Societies*, 4: 265–284.
- Therborn, G. (2001) European modernity and European normativity: the EU in history and in social space. In: Andersen, S.S. (ed.) *Institutional Approaches to the European Union*. Proceedings from an Arena Workshop. ARENA Report, 3.
- Weber, M. (2000) *Die Stadt*. (Studienausgabe der Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe. Abt. I, Schriften und Reden, Bd. 22. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte; Teilband 5), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen.
- Wirth, L. (1938) Urbanism as a way of life. *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV: 1–24.