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### **On Vital Systems Security**

#### Abstract

In *Security, Territory, Population*, Michel Foucault examines how three “general economies of power” – discipline, sovereignty, and liberalism’s “security” of populations – have combined in “complex edifices” to shape modern political government. This article argues that in the last fifty years we have seen the emergence of another general technology of power: vital systems security. It traces a genealogy of vital systems security through three steps. First, it examines the emergence of vital systems security as an adjunct to a problematic of sovereign power in post-World War II civil defense, when the specter of nuclear war emerged as the central strategic question, and the “vulnerability” of cities and national infrastructures became a military problem. Second, it examines the “autonomization” of vital systems security from the military theme, as the “protection of vital systems” – such as the electricity grid and public health infrastructures – became, in their own right, objects of a form of security that was not (necessarily) connected to clashes between sovereign states. Finally, it examines how specific techniques, understandings, and organizational modalities connected to vital systems security are being articulated today, both in new domestic security initiatives (such as the Department of Homeland Security and Critical Infrastructure in the United State) and in response to international crises such as humanitarian catastrophes and global warming.

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Stephen J. Collier and Andrew Lakoff

Presentation at the University of Helsinki Collegium

June 2008

### ***Draft – Not for Citation***

In the past few years we have been engaged in a project on the rationalities, techniques and objects of contemporary security expertise. Our work has been part of a collaborative project, which combined individual research with collective reflection on concepts and problems.

We started from an interest in new organizations and strategic concepts related to security in the United States, such as critical infrastructure protection, the Department of Homeland Security, preparedness, and biosecurity. These organizations and initiatives have featured centrally in discussions of national security. But they do not deal with threats from conventional foreign enemies. Rather, they are concerned with uncertain future events such as pandemic disease, terrorist attacks, or natural disasters. They do not aim to deter or prevent these events but rather to mitigate their impact by organizing preparedness for response and recovery and by reducing the vulnerability of critical systems potentially affected by these threats – health systems, transport and energy infrastructures, economic mechanisms. Some of the questions we have tried to address in this project are: How can we think about the significance and novelty of these forms? How do they relate to prior approaches to national security? Or to social welfare and economic management – the domains in which concern for these “critical infrastructures” of domestic life usually fall?

Our approach to investigating these questions has drawn on Michel Foucault’s genealogical work on different ways of “problematizing” security, that is, different ways

of understanding and managing threats to collective life. In *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault described the rise of a new form of security focused on the well-being of populations that was distinct from the existing form of sovereign state security. Sovereign state security, which dates to the rise of the modern territorial state, is concerned with state integrity in the face of foreign and domestic threats. Its principle apparatuses of warfare and diplomacy are oriented to maintaining sovereign power, whether that is understood to inhere in a monarch or in a group of legal subjects. By contrast, what Foucault called the “security of populations,” which took shape in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> to early 19<sup>th</sup> century, deals not with external enemies, but with the regularly occurring “pathologies” of collective life: disease, poverty, and crime, for example. Foucault argued that population security was based on what he called an “entirely new economy of power,” one that operated not on legal subjects but on living beings. This form of security gave rise to a series of new governmental apparatuses – public health, social welfare, and economic regulation – through which life and population were taken up as political problems, and objects of collective security. This process was central to what Foucault called “the birth biopolitics.”

We initially sought to understand new security initiatives in terms of these two existing technologies of power. However, for reasons that we will describe in this talk, we gradually came to think that they were better understood in relation to a novel form of security – what we call “vital systems security.” Vital systems security is a way of “problematizing” threats to security that can be contrasted to the forms of sovereign state security and population security. Vital systems security takes up events that are uncertain and unpreventable but potentially catastrophic. Its object of protection is the complex of

critical systems or networks on which modern economies and polities depend. The normative rationality of vital systems security is oriented to the resilience of these systems, and preparedness for response to events that might disrupt them. Finally, vital systems security deals with the population insofar as it is dependent on these vulnerable, vital systems. Vital systems security is in this sense to “reflexive modernization” in Beck’s sense – the idea that the very success of industrial and social modernity in managing risks has in fact generated new risks.

	<b>Sovereign State Security</b>	<b>Population Security</b>	<b>Vital Systems Security</b>
<b>Object of Protection</b>	Territorial sovereignty	The population	Vital system, critical infrastructure
<b>Way of constituting “event” or threat</b>	Enemy attack, based on strategy and capabilities	Regularly occurring pathologies of the social field	Unpredictable, undeterrable, potentially catastrophic
<b>Normativity</b>	Prevention, deterrence through military superiority	Health, welfare	Resilience, preparedness for response
<b>Relation to population</b>	Population as collection of legal subjects	Population as domain of regularly occurring processes	Population as dependent on vulnerable PS systems

In this talk we will outline some elements of the genealogy of vital systems security to show how this distinctive style of reasoning about security problems has been linked to increasingly potent techniques and robust organizations. First, we outline a schematic story of the mid-to-late-20<sup>th</sup> century development of vital systems security – focusing on some fairly obscure episodes and sites: the development of strategic bombing in the U.S. Air Corps Tactical School between the World Wars; the rise of post-World War II civil defense; and the invention of new approaches to managing systems

vulnerability in the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the 1960s and early 1970s. We will also try to offer some indication, in the second part of the presentation, of how the techniques and styles of reasoning developed in these sites have been redeployed outside of superpower confrontation: from terrorism to energy crises, from natural disasters to pandemic disease.

A qualification should be made at the outset. Following Foucault's admonition in *Security, Territory, Population*, we do not mean to suggest that there has been an epochal shift from population security or sovereign state security to vital systems security – or that VSS is the dominant paradigm of security today. Rather, our point is that techniques oriented to securing vital systems have become increasingly significant as possible responses to security problems – often in combination, or in tension, with other forms of security.

### **Vital Systems as a Military Problem**

The genealogy of vital systems security can be traced back along various lines. For example, as Timothy Mitchell has shown, the *object* of vital systems security was identified by early 20<sup>th</sup> century industrialists facing strikes that could disrupt key nodes in chains of industrial production. In response, we see an early effort to think about the economy not in terms of productivity and wealth but as a collection of vulnerable, vital systems. Alternately, the distinctive way of treating *events* in vital systems security – as uncertain future catastrophes not “knowable” through analysis of past events – is found beginning in the 1930s when insurance experts took initial steps in establishing an actuarial framework for assessing earthquake risk.

But the most important area for the initial development of the concepts and techniques of vital systems security was military conflict and military preparedness, the classic domains of sovereign state security. In particular, this development was linked to a specific moment in the history of warfare, when the paradigm of sovereign state security was undergoing a significant transformation related to the rise of total war. Total war, of course, involves the systematic incorporation of the national economy and population into the war effort – in other words, it was one intersection between population security and sovereign state security. But it was simultaneously a context in which national economies began to be rethought as collections of vital systems.

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, total war was associated with the advent of national armies and mass conscription. But by the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it referred to a form of warfare that enlisted the full resources of a country – including its productive apparatus – into military effort. This new form of *industrialized* total war consolidated during World War I, when all the major combatants introduced new forms of economic planning and coordination – particularly of energy, critical materials, and manufacturing – to contribute to the war effort. This development opened a significant new horizon of strategic thinking for military planners. If national populations and domestic economies were key instruments of warfare, then they could also be conceived as strategic targets. In the waning months of World War I, and then with increased intensity during the interwar period, this new understanding of the domestic economy and polity – as a key instrument of war and thus as target of attack – was developed in the theory of strategic bombing.

After World War I, there were two distinct schools of strategic bombing. One focused on “terror” bombing that targeted civilians in order to break their will to

contribute to the war effort. The other, which explicitly rejected terror bombing, introduced a different rationale for air war: not to attack enemy forces or civilian populations, but to attack the industrial systems, and the transport and energy infrastructures, upon which an enemy's war effort depended. Theorists of this second approach developed a new understanding of the national economy – as an interlinked network of critical systems that might be disrupted through air attack. One important locus for developing this new understanding was the U.S. Air Corps Tactical School, the most important institution in the development of strategic bombing in the United States.



*Air Corps Tactical School, Map Problem Room*

Theorists at ACTS began to think of enemies not in terms of their military forces and capabilities but in terms of the productive capacities and infrastructural networks that were necessary for the enemy to engage in full-scale war. They focused in particular on


“choke points” or “vital nodes” – key factories, transport arteries, and energy systems – that, if destroyed, could disrupt important parts of an enemy’s industrial system. In doing so, they outlined a new way to “know” national economic systems: not in terms of productivity and welfare – the concerns of population security – but in terms of their *vulnerability* to attack and disruption. It is worth noting here that the qualifier “vital” was widely used in military discussions to designate targets or objectives that were critical to strategic goals. With strategic bombing, “vital” came to bear an additional meaning, referring to the systems upon which society and economy depend.

The emphasis on targeting ‘vital nodes’ was important in formulating U.S. air strategy during World War II, although there is dispute about its effectiveness. Moreover it should be distinguished from the more well-known U.S. air war strategy of carpet bombing. Here, however, our concern is just to illustrate the style of reasoning found in an approach to strategic bombing oriented to disrupting an economy’s vital systems. In some cases, it was used to aim at targets that were vital to a specific theater of battle. For example, before and during D-Day the Allied forces carried out a Transportation Plan that targeted specific sites such as the Juvisy Train Yards, pictured here before and after aerial bombing. The vulnerable, vital system, in this case, was a local node in a transportation network used for moving materiel and troops to an active front. In other cases, vulnerability was conceived in terms of entire economic sectors, for example in the Allied campaign to destroy the German chemical industry.



*Juvisy Train Yards, before and after aerial bombing*

This chart from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, which reviewed the effects of strategic bombing after the war, shows the relationship between output of key chemical products and total tonnage of allied bombing in the “oil offensive” campaign. By destroying key factories or sources of inputs, a broad part of a war economy could be disabled. What is of interest here is that an entire sector of the German economy – articulated by a collection of enterprises and transportation systems – could be constituted as an object of knowledge and as a vital target. In strategic bombing, thus, we see a new understanding of the national economy – as a collection of vital systems that are vulnerable to disruption.




*“Rise and Fall of Germany’s Chemical Industry”  
United States Strategic Bombing Survey*

### **The Vulnerable Homeland**


Let us turn now to a second point of inflection in the genealogy of vital systems security, through which this approach to thinking about the enemy was transposed onto the U.S. as itself a target of strategic bombing. This shift took place after World War II, with the rise of the Cold War and the nuclear era. Two domains of security planning and organization were particularly important in this development. The first, civil defense, was concerned primarily with the protection of civilian populations. The second, defense mobilization, was concerned with assuring that the U.S. economy could sustain the level

of industrial production required for the conduct of war, even, potentially, after a nuclear attack. If strategic bombing theorists asked how national economies could be conceived as a target, then civil defense and defense mobilization planners asked how it could be conceived as an object of protection.




*Organizations Involved in U.S. Emergency Response and Defense Mobilization*

Let us turn first to civil defense planning, which, beginning in 1949, was conducted by the U.S. Federal Civil Defense Agency. In civil defense a number of important techniques and organizational forms were developed that were crucial in the evolution of vital systems security. For example, civil defense planners developed techniques of “catastrophe modeling” to understand the effects of nuclear detonations in cities. They began with spatial models of nuclear detonations, which indicated the dispersion of “blast effects,” firestorms, and radiation over a certain geographical locale. On the same map planners placed structures and other features such as roadways or communication systems that would be affected by the event. By combining these two elements – initially through very rudimentary methods employing transparent overlays – civil defense planners could produce a “vulnerability map.” Through such maps apparatuses of population security were problematized in a new way. Water systems, transportation networks, social services and emergency response organizations – all initially created to promote health and welfare, and to deal with regularly occurring social pathologies of disease, crime, and poverty – were understood in terms of their vulnerability to attack, and in terms of their role in post-attack response. Here, again, we have a fundamentally new kind of knowledge about collective life: not a statistical analysis of actual prior events but enacted knowledge about potential future events. Such techniques of enactment have played a central role in the subsequent development of vital systems security, from imaginative scenarios to highly formal catastrophe models.



In civil defense, the most important function of vulnerability maps was to plan for emergency response. Civil defense officials recognized that various organizations not normally involved in managing large emergencies – such as public health services, police, and social service departments – would be crucial to post-attack response. They also realized that these local organizations would not be able to cope with an emergency on their own, and would require assistance both from other localities and from state and regional governments. In the U.S., civil defense authorities defined a distinctive organizational form for response planning that adapted the structures of U.S. federalism to new challenges presented by the prospect of nuclear war. Assuming that the capacities of local governments would be overwhelmed in the event of a nuclear attack, they

organized patterns of emergency coordination between cities, states, and the federal government. They also applied a series of military preparedness techniques – such as exercises and contingency planning – to domestic emergency response. Thus, we see in civil defense another key element found in subsequent articulations of vital systems security: an apparatus of domestic “distributed” preparedness.



### System Vulnerability


In Cold War civil defense planning, vulnerability mapping and emergency response were geared to the relatively local effects of a specific catastrophic event – the detonation of a discreet bomb in a U.S. city. Techniques for modeling such “local” detonations became more sophisticated through the 1950s, particularly as defense planning agencies employed computer models that could take into account patterns of weather and population movement that would affect both the immediate impact of a nuclear detonation and preparedness requirements

During the 1960s, however, we observe a significant shift in US civil defense and mobilization planning. Civil defense strategists and technicians turned their attention from modeling single nuclear explosions in a given city to modeling complex attack scenarios – potentially involving many detonations – in order to understand their impact on the vital systems of the U.S. as a whole.

An important site for these developments was the Office of Emergency Planning, a federal agency founded in 1962. OEP was one successor organization to the U.S. Civil Defense Administration, and it inherited civil defense concerns with modeling catastrophes and with developing techniques for response preparedness. But OEP's mission extended beyond civil defense. The executive order establishing the office identified civil defense – focused on reducing civilian mortality – as only one function of domestic emergency preparedness. Another set of problems taken up by OEP were related to “defense production.” Defense production was concerned with a central problem of total war: that the U.S. maintain the capacity to produce the strategic inputs required for an industrial war economy. But after World War II, with the rise of the air-nuclear age, the officials and technicians in organizations like OEP became preoccupied with the vulnerabilities of these systems. The question, then, was not just whether the U.S. had the productive capacity required to conduct war, but whether, as a 1962 OEP report noted, the U.S. could "achieve a mobilization base for whatever contingencies are determined to obtain." In this light, OEP took up the problem of knowing the economy in a new way – as a complex of vital systems.

The task of modeling the effects of nuclear war on the broader system of industrial production in the United States was taken up by the National Resource

Evaluation Center, a division of OEP that focused on the mathematical analysis of resource availability using new computing capabilities. NREC was founded in 1957, and in the early 1960s was working on so-called “survival models” that simulated the condition of the U.S. economy after a nuclear attack. These survival models were a kind of vulnerability mapping. But rather than focusing on a single detonation in a specific city – as in civil defense planning – they simulated attack patterns over the entire U.S. economy, examining specific sectors both individually and in their complex interdependence. Here, to offer just a glimpse of how these models were assembled, is a diagram of the PARM model. PARM was a major NREC effort of the early 1960s that combined an attack simulator, an input-output model of the American economy, and logistics models of post-attack recovery, into a single program.



It is important to note that these models entailed a crucial shift in the object domain of catastrophe modeling and vulnerability mapping. The concern is no longer with the specter of a threatening enemy and a single nuclear detonation. Rather, it is with the *intrinsic* vulnerabilities of vital systems. Correspondingly, OEP began to focus on the concept of “survivable” systems – or, as they were increasingly called, “survivable networks” – such as oil pipelines and electricity grids. This interest in survivable networks was structurally similar to the concern with mitigating the vulnerabilities of communications systems that led, also during the late 1960s, to the development of the internet by ARPA; more research is needed to understand the links among these developments.

The role of operations research and systems analysis in these new system vulnerability models bears note. Much as statistics, on Foucault’s observation, provided a crucial knowledge-form for population security, systems analysis provided key technical instruments that made knowledge about the vulnerability of vital systems possible. As is well known, systems analysis was developed during and after WWII in relationship to military problems, such as building missile guidance systems or planning bombing runs. These were effectively optimization problems, in which the task was to maximize military “outputs”: kill rates or damage ratios, for example. In OEP and other contexts these techniques were redeployed. The scope of these models expanded, from relatively restricted technical problems concerning, for example, a weapons system, to a much broader understanding of the “system” or “network” that included much of the national economy of the United States, or at least important strategic sectors. And techniques of systems analysis – such as linear programming and Monte Carlo simulations – were used

not only for optimization problems but in analyses that focused on the *disruption* of vital systems. Effectively a shift had taken place, from an emphasis on the singularity of a nuclear attack to the inherent vulnerability of the U.S. economy's vital systems.

### **Generic Emergency**

So far we have looked at how concepts and techniques oriented to the security of vital systems emerged in the military context during the early-to-mid 20<sup>th</sup> century. We now want to trace their extension beyond this context, as vital systems security was “autonomized”, becoming in itself a goal of national security rather than just a part of military strategy. This process began within the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the late 1960s, and has gradually extended into other institutional arenas, including several recent initiatives in the Department of Homeland Security.

From its inception, OEP's mandate was not limited to nuclear war, but, as a 1962 Organizational Study put it, was concerned with “the development of planning assumptions and broad general objectives with respect to various conditions of national emergency” (p. 3). But in the early 1960s its focus was nonetheless firmly linked to the the problem of superpower conflict. By the mid- to late-1960s, however, OEP's reports and activities reflected a concern with the vulnerability of vital systems to a range of possible disruptions. Thus, the Preface to a 1968 report on the design of pipelines noted that “the United States is covered by a complex of networks for communication, transportation and the distribution of goods and energy. These networks not only play a vital role in the economy but are also critical factors in national security.” “The Office of Emergency Preparedness,” the Preface continued, “is an agency with responsibilities that

relate to the effects upon these networks of natural disaster or enemy attacks. To fulfill these responsibilities the OEP is required to have a thorough understanding of the analysis and design of such networks.”

By the late 1960s OEP had substantially broadened the scope of its activities to encompass a range of problems that involved “crises” and emergency response outside the context of war: natural disaster modeling, preparedness, and response; the management of economic crises, including strikes and economic shocks; and modeling energy crises. Thus, for example, OEP played a central role in hurricane response and recovery efforts beginning in the late 1960s. It also was the lead federal agency in organizing the wage-price freeze under U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1971, and produced reports on energy system vulnerability, conducting studies of pipeline security and of conservation measures that figured in a broader national discussion about energy security.

The critical point is that officials in OEP increasingly recognized that the tools, such as catastrophe modeling and vulnerability analysis, that they had developed in order to anticipate and prepare for nuclear war might be useful in dealing with a range of emergencies outside the traditional concerns of national security. The type of threats these tools focused on shared certain common characteristics. First, they were uncertain but potentially catastrophic events that could not be deterred or interdicted. Second, such potential emergencies could disrupt the country’s vital systems – the infrastructures, industrial systems, and economic mechanisms – upon which the U.S. polity and economy depended. Third, these events could be “managed” primarily by reducing the vulnerability of these systems and by developing generic response capacities.

What was underway during this period, we suggest, was a generalization of system-vulnerability thinking: that is, the application of its characteristic techniques, forms of reasoning, and practices beyond the context of nuclear war to a range of potential emergencies. This generalization also entailed a shift in the relationship between system-vulnerability and national security. Some of the new threats identified by OEP – economic shocks, energy crises, terrorist attacks – were indeed seen as problems of national security. But this was true in part because the concept of “national security” was itself in a process of significant extension and expansion. During the 1970s, issues other than superpower confrontation – such as energy and terrorism – were increasingly identified as national security problems. This is not to say that vital systems security was completely separated from military concerns. But in some sense vital systems security had become “unblocked” to become a more general framework that itself could serve to redefine what counted as national security problems.

We can illustrate how this process worked by examining two cases in which techniques initially associated with Cold War military preparedness were applied to objects traditionally associated with population security – creating an autonomous field of vital systems security. Each of these cases illustrates a key feature of vital systems security. First, its *object* of knowledge and intervention, the “vital system”. And second, its treatment of *events* – the imaginative enactment of uncertain, potentially catastrophic threats.

### **Infrastructure: From Population to Vital System**

Let us begin with a case of the “object” – namely, the vital system itself. Vital systems, as we have seen, are systems that are essential for the continued functioning of modern polities and economies, such as transport and energy networks, financial systems, health systems, and communication systems. Of course these systems are longstanding objects of population security, and were crucial to strategies of economic development and social welfare throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. What is general in such efforts is an emphasis on infrastructure construction, integration, and standardization, and an orientation to norms of reliability, productivity, and welfare. But beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, these systems were constituted as objects of knowledge and intervention in relation to an entirely different set of problems. These problems did not have to do with the absence of infrastructure, its fragmentation, or routine breakdowns – the traditional concerns of population security. Rather, they were linked to the very success of infrastructural modernization: the fact that collective life depended on complex, integrated infrastructural systems that were vulnerable to disruption.

To illustrate, let us take the example of energy infrastructures. The vulnerability of infrastructure systems to enemy attack – and in particular energy systems – had long been addressed in the context of civil defense and defense production planning. In the 1960s, OEP was using new tools of systems and network analysis to think about the complex patterns of disruption that a nuclear attack would have on oil and electricity infrastructures. Key figures in OEP clearly saw the organization’s mission as concerned broadly with the vulnerability of these vital systems. Thus, for example, in a 1969 report on “Critical Networks in a Post-Attack Environment,” Robert H. Kupperman, the head of the Systems Evaluation Division of OEP, wrote “During a nuclear attack on the United

States, many of the nation's large networks will be damaged. Most important are the transportation, energy distribution and communication systems. Energy distribution facilities include oil and gas pipelines as well as the electric power grid.” He argued that there was a “vital need to determine realistic planning factors concerning the economic impact of damaged networks and the capabilities for restoration,” suggesting that “network analysis provides a new method for both short and long range recovery plans.”

But soon these concerns about infrastructure vulnerability were focused by events other than nuclear war: terrorist attacks on the electricity grid, particularly by domestic groups; the oil shocks in the early and late 1970s; major blackouts in the United States; and catastrophic natural disasters such as Hurricane Agnes in 1972. For Kupperman and a group of like-minded national security thinkers, these events indicated that the nation’s dependence on critical systems was a vulnerability that could be exploited by enemies who lacked the military strength to directly challenge the U.S. But the same dependence on vital systems created vulnerabilities to other kinds of threats. Kupperman noted that disruptions such as the 1965 blackout “gave an indication of what would happen to portions of this country in case of a widespread power failure.”

Such arguments followed the concern, first developed in strategic bombing theory, with critical nodes of a production system that, if disrupted, could knock out an entire industrial web. There was a crucial difference, however. The threat now came not from an enemy’s military attack, but from non-deterrable threats – terrorism, and “threats without enemies” such as technological failures and natural disasters. In short, preparedness was no longer viewed as an adjunct to superpower confrontation. Rather, it was a security problem in its own right, one that was reflected in a range of discussions

through the 1970s. Concern about the infrastructure vulnerability was thus one important context in which vital systems thinking was de-coupled from military problems.

These concerns were reflected in a number of government reports throughout the period. For example, in 1977, the Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production held hearings and published a two-part report on the nation's "civil preparedness" programs. The report criticized the nation's emergency management plans, and recommended a broadening of these efforts to include non-nuclear threats. The first volume of the report articulated, in now-familiar terms, two key aspects of the vital systems security framework: the dependence of contemporary society on complex technological systems, and the vulnerability of citizens to multiple types of threat: "An increasingly complex, technology-dependent, industrial economy in the United States," the report argued, "has made citizens more than ever vulnerable to the effects of disasters and emergencies over which they have little or no control and to which they cannot successfully respond as individuals" (United States. Joint Committee on Defense Production 1977, 3). Here the state's obligation to provide security to its citizens explicitly includes the demand to mitigate vulnerabilities to a wide variety of potential emergencies.

In July 1977, soon after the Committee's *Civil Preparedness Review* was published, a major blackout occurred in New York City. The blackout, which was accompanied by extensive riots and looting, brought widespread attention to the frailty and vulnerability of the nation's electrical grid and other critical systems. The Defense Production Committee held hearings shortly after the blackout on the implications of the event for federal emergency preparedness.

At these hearings, the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency testified about military efforts to protect key defense industries from attack. He noted that the scope of his agency's activity was limited to those industries that had a direct impact on defense needs. Considering the widespread impact of the New York City blackout on economic and social life, he suggested the need for a broader program to secure critical facilities. This would begin with a cataloguing effort: "It might be well if there were some sort of national list, if you please, of facilities that would be a key to our economic and societal well-being. Then at least, we would know what they are and whether or not the Federal Government would see fit to involve itself in providing for their security or would provide at least some advice on what these facilities could do for themselves" (United States. Joint Committee on Defense Production 1977, 117).

What is significant in these recommendations is the proposal that the Federal Government should generalize its efforts to assure critical infrastructure: from a specific emphasis on those systems essential to military production, to a broader concern with the vital systems essential to the economic and social well being of the nation as a whole. Broadly speaking, by the late 1970s the framework of contemporary Critical Infrastructure Protection initiatives had been established. It is visible in many contemporary initiatives, for example, a recent Presidential Report on Critical Infrastructure Protection which led to the "National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets". In this strategy, the term "critical infrastructure" refers to technological systems for sustaining social and biological life, often initially developed as part of population security. Among the sectors included in the "National Infrastructure Protection Plan" are: agriculture and food, public health and healthcare, drinking water

and waste water treatment, energy, banking and finance, defense industrial base, telecommunications, chemical, transportation systems, and emergency services. Here are the basic elements of Critical Infrastructure Protection, which we can talk about later if there is interest.

### **Constituting the Event: Imaginative Enactment**

Let us now turn to another key feature of vital systems security – how it constitutes potential future *events* as objects of knowledge and intervention. It does so not through statistical analysis based on historical incidence, but rather through what we call practices of “enactment.” Specifically, we’ll look at one form of imaginative enactment, the scenario-based exercise. The scenario-based exercise is a classic sovereign state security technique – as is well known from the traditional “war game”. But increasingly, since the 1970s, it has been applied to “threats without enemies” such as terrorists, catastrophic disease or large-scale natural disasters.

First: how are scenarios used within sovereign state security? From this vantage, they are part of military strategy: they help in understanding and intervening in the actions of foreign adversaries. Thus Cold War scenario-based exercises involved simulated conflicts between a “red team” (representing the Soviet Union) and a “blue team” (the US). The goal of such exercises was for officials to envision the likely behavior of the enemy in a diplomatic or military crisis and to learn in advance how to respond strategically.

However: once events other than military confrontation are taken up as national security problems, we see the use of scenario-based exercises without a red team as an

opponent – rather, it is used to generate knowledge about internal system vulnerabilities. This can be seen in the use of scenarios by the Department of Homeland Security. Formed in the wake of 9/11, DHS is often thought of as a counter-terrorism agency – but it is perhaps better understood as a collection of multiple agencies with diverse missions: counter-terrorism, disaster response, border security, etc. Critically, it includes FEMA, the federal emergency response agency that was itself an extension of the civil defense establishment. One issue DHS is faced with is: how to deal with an array of potential threats that cannot necessarily be prevented or deterred but whose consequences might be catastrophic? Here DHS has adopted and extended Cold War planning techniques – focusing not on a foreign enemy but on a “generic” emergency.

In its recent planning documents, DHS has outlined a broad strategic rationale of what it calls “national preparedness.” Its *National Preparedness Guidance* elaborates a set of administrative mechanisms for making preparedness a measurable condition. The plan is a guide for decision-making and self-assessment across multiple governmental and non-governmental entities concerned with problems of domestic security. It seeks to bring disparate forms of threat into a common security field.

What is key to this normative rationality is that the threat DHS must address is conceptualized not in terms of a foreign enemy’s capabilities and intentions, but in terms of the nation’s own vulnerabilities and response capacities. So, how does it make this kind of calculation? Here is where scenario-based planning proves useful. DHS selected 15 disaster scenarios as “the foundation for a risk-based approach.” These scenarios are not predictions or forecasts: rather, they map readiness for a wide range of threats. These potential events – including an anthrax attack, a flu pandemic, a nuclear

detonation, and a major earthquake – were chosen on the basis of plausibility and catastrophic scale. Again, these events differ both from traditional sovereign state security threats in that they are difficult or perhaps impossible to deter, and they are unlike traditional population security threats in that there is no archival record of their occurrence on which one could base risk evaluations.

As an alternative, the DHS scenarios make it possible to generate knowledge of current vulnerabilities and the capabilities needed to mitigate them. Using the scenarios, DHS has developed a menu of the “critical tasks” that would have to be performed in various kinds of major events; these tasks, in turn, are to be assigned to specific governmental and nongovernmental agencies. It is through the technique of imaginative enactment, then, that diverse and unpredictable events are brought into an apparatus of preparedness.

Thus, the goal of DHS preparedness planning is to “attain the optimal state of preparedness.” As the plan defines this state: “Preparedness is a continuous process involving efforts at all levels of government and between government and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources.” In other words, preparedness is the measurable relation of capabilities to vulnerabilities, given a selected range of threats. Scenarios make it possible to do “Capabilities-based planning”:

“[Capabilities-based planning] addresses the growing uncertainty in the threat environment... Target levels of capability will balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.”

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, let us quickly summarize our argument: first, we traced part of the genealogy of a new technology of power, vital systems security - focusing especially on the role of developments in the conduct of war as they have been extended into new domains. Second, we showed a couple of features of how vital systems security works through two cases, energy infrastructure and homeland security scenarios: it is distinctive from prior forms of security in its object of knowledge and intervention, and in its treatment of potential future events.

The identification of vital systems security is significant, we think, not only in the context of recent national security initiatives in the US and in other countries, but also internationally – one can see its elements in current approaches to a number of global “threats without enemies”: including “resilience” based approaches to climate change; or “preparedness” based methods for dealing with humanitarian emergencies. Arguably – and this is a point we would be glad to take up in discussion – the techniques of vital systems security prove especially useful in non-state settings in which the implementation of population security measures – such as poverty reduction or public health – proves impractical, whether for technical or political reasons. Indeed, we would suggest that the next step in a research program on vital systems security would be to investigate precisely these points of articulation – and disarticulation – between sovereign state security, population security and vital systems security.

## **“Seeing” Like a National Security State**

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This paper seeks to understand the dramatic re-scaling of “national security” policy discourse in the UK as a result of the terrorist bombings in London on 7 July 2005. Prior to this – and in the context of 9/11 - the UK government had already imagined such a scenario. Post 7/7 a much more robust security problematic was signaled with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s declaration that the ‘the rules of the game have changed’. This was a stark reminder that the key challenge for the 21st century nation state would be formulating an integrated security strategy to mitigate and manage evolving ‘blended’ risks, threats and harms. This paper considers “what has changed”, from a state perspective, since 7/7 and subsequent terror attacks. To do so, it interrogates the “National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom” document published by Downing Street in March 2008. This highly significant policy text is examined through the following questions:

- What internal and external security threats, risks and harms does the UK state face in the 21<sup>st</sup> century?
- How are these “security weaknesses” understood and conceptualised from a governmental perspective?
- What securitisation strategies and solutions are mandated by the National Security Strategy?
- How is a state of insecurity redefining the “doing” of contemporary “state work”?
- What is the imagined ‘endpoint’ in this new security landscape?
- What are the unresolvable ambiguities of security?

**‘UNCERTAINTY MAKES US FREE’  
SECURITY, LIBERALISM AND MODERN GOVERNMENT.**

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**Abstract.**

Security associated with ‘the state’ easily is imagined only in terms of Hobbesian problematics of the transfer of rights to a sovereign. Yet internal to liberal government is a Benthamite concern with security as the provision of a calculable environment in which rational actors may plan. A central dilemma arises within liberalism over what are optimal levels and forms of calculability. Modernist governmental demands for scientific predictability, universality and rationality clash with traditional liberal visions of individual freedom envisaged as fundamentally incompatible with a future that is ‘excessively’ calculable. Through an historical analysis of insurance, the paper traces the contours of this struggle over security-calculability, and how this genealogy has shaped the current tension between risk and uncertainty.

**Introduction: Bentham’s ‘Scales of Security’.**

In the post-911 world, we have become all too familiar with the arguments over an apparent opposition between freedom and security: that in a Hobbesian fashion, we must give up certain freedoms in order that security can be provided. Freedom in the form of certain rights is sacrificed in order that other rights may be exercised or protected more fully. While this doubtlessly has been a crucial model for much Enlightenment governance, it is also a foundation upon which other imaginaries of security have been invented that have rather different foci than the trading of rights. In particular, in Bentham’s liberal construction ‘security’ guarantees to subjects a specific form of freedom: the political conditions that allow them to *plan* – a characteristic that for Bentham is definitive of the ‘free’ agent.

In order to form a clear idea of the whole extent which ought to be given to the principle of security, it is necessary to consider, that man is not like the brutes, limited to the present time either in enjoyment or suffering, but that he is susceptible of pleasure and pain by anticipation, and that it is not enough to guard him against an actual loss, but also to guarantee to him, as much as possible, his possessions against future losses. The idea of his security must be prolonged to him throughout the whole vista that his imagination can measure. This disposition to look forward, which has so marked an influence on the condition of man, may be called expectation – expectation of the future. It is by means of this that we are able to form a general plan of conduct. (Bentham, 1962: 308).

In this formulation, which I will argue has been a pivotal one for much of liberal governance, the question of security does not emerge in terms of the sacrifice of rights in order to create freedom. Bentham hardly thinks this way. Rather, security emerges as the attempt to render the future calculable so that freedom can be exercised. In the Hobbesian vision, freedom itself was barely formulated except as the absence of subjection. Clearly this ‘freedom from’ as Isaiah Berlin stresses, has been influential in liberalism. But in the Benthamite formulation security is formed more in the sense of a ‘freedom to’, and more precisely as the condition of a certain *kind* of freedom: *a calculating freedom, and in this sense a rational freedom*. Thus imagined, security was to create the conditions that for Bentham and succeeding liberals did not protect mere license, the opportunity to live for the moment. Nor did this form of security reduce freedom to discipline in Foucault’s sense of ‘docility’. Bentham’s intended subjects planned and created their futures in a way scarcely consistent with the creatures of habit that supposedly were intended to emerge from the Panopticon. Security in this imaginary was the provision of conditions that created a rational but creative freedom.

This specific liberal imaginary of security and its correlative freedom(s) created a new problem for government. It was not exactly what Foucault (1991) mapped out as the legacy of governmentality: the problem of when have we governed *too much*. (Burchell 1991: 140) It does share with Foucault’s construction the centring of self-governing entities that are in turn the subject of governance, and whose ‘freedom’ is a pivotal resource mobilised by government tactics. But its emphasis was more specific. Rather, the emergent problematic of Benthamite security was the question of *to what degree and by what techniques should the world be made calculable* in order that rational planning by free individual is optimised. Planning must be possible, and a calculable environment is essential to this. But on the other hand security should not create an environment so calculable and predictable – so free of uncertainty - that individuals could abandon the need to exercise foresight on their own behalf.

In key respects, as Bentham illustrates, this problem may be seen as internal to liberalism, with its constitution of good government as facilitating the activity of rational and agentive subjects. Yet clearly enough other forms of government – especially authoritarian governments – have also and perhaps even more so imagined security as the process of rendering the future rationally calculable, notably through such mechanisms as state planning and the so-called ‘command economy’. Under such regimes, life is optimised where security/calculability is maximised. In the Benthamite liberal problematic, such interventions were not imagined as part of security so much as examples of government pursuing the maximisation of some other end of law, such as ‘abundance’ or ‘equality’ (by which Bentham meant equality of wealth). By governing to create equality and abundance, for Bentham the ‘correct’ balance of security was disturbed by rendering the future too calculable. Individuals would no longer have the spur of insecurity, the fear of the unknown but imaginable threat of destitution that made planning necessary. In this liberal problematic, in short, there could be *too much security*: uncertainty was vital to the exercise of a certain kind of freedom.

In the past twenty years, the spectacular collapse of ‘socialist’ regimes, and the ascendancy of global capitalism, has been associated with a recalibration of the relationship between security and calculability in liberal political imaginaries. In

current constructions, both polemic and analytic, the attempt to maximise security through the maximisation of calculability has failed. By direct analogy, the project of social security, which was envisaged as following the same agenda, represented an excess of security. The recalibration within the Benthamite problematic of socio-economic security/calculability has moved in from the margins of politics in the past thirty years. In the 1960s, the advocates for increasing uncertainty largely consisted of a rump of backward-looking liberal reactionaries. By the 1970s, they had been reinvented as the new (neo) forward-looking face of liberalism. By the 1980s they had invaded the corporate sector and pressed forward as ‘new managerialists’ to invigorate economic governance. By the 1990s, even ‘critical’ and quasi-revolutionary voices heralding the rise of ‘risk society’ paradoxically had converged on the theme of states attempting to govern in terms of ‘too much’ calculability. Even as 911 has us scrambling for more expert-driven security, attempting to correct a ‘security deficit’ a Benthamite problematic of security has been turning us in exactly the opposite direction

### **Liberalism, modernism, and risk.**

‘Uncertainty makes us free’ is the message of Peter L. Bernstein’s (1998) best selling *Against the Gods. The Remarkable Story of Risk*. In Bernstein’s view, risk is problematic for freedom. Probabilistic prediction of the future creates a ‘prison’ that consigns us to an endless repetition of past statistical patterns over which we have no control. Bernstein says that ‘nothing we can do, no judgement that we make, no response to our animal spirits, is going to have the slightest influence on the final result’ (Bernstein 1998:229). In his eyes, risk is a deeply troubling technology because to the extent that risk does render the future calculable it renders us unfree. Bernstein therefore celebrates uncertainty. He quotes with approval John Maynard Keynes who rejected the possibility of using statistical methods to forecast such events war or stock market prices. These are matters subject to ‘uncertain knowledge’. ‘About these matters’ said Keynes, ‘there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatsoever. We simply do not know!’ (quoted by Bernstein, 1998: 229). Bernstein concludes that ‘a tremendous idea lies buried in the conclusion that we simply do not know. Rather than frightening us, Keynes’ words bring great news: we are not prisoners of an inevitable future. Uncertainty makes us free.’ (Bernstein, 1998: 229).

While currently engaging much attention, these are not at all novel concerns. For many years liberals have regarded statistical probability and government through predictive techniques as compromising freedom. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, concerns were voiced about the implications of statistical prediction for the sanctity of free will. As Theodore Porter (1995:164-65) argues, after the publication of Buckle’s quantitative *History of Civilisation* in 1847, debates on this issue became at least as prominent and urgent as those generated by Darwin’s *The Origin of Species*. Porter quotes an outraged commentator from 1860 protesting against this ‘modern superstition of arithmetic’ that threatened mankind with a ‘worse blight than any it has yet suffered –not so much a fixed destiny, as a fate falling upon us, not personally, but in averages’.

Fear of the ‘overly’ calculable future is also something that profoundly concerned Max Weber, both as a liberal politician and sociologist. For Weber, the development

of modernity was characterised by increasing rationalisation. Through scientific, legal, bureaucratic and economic changes, the process of rendering the future more rationally calculable diminished freedom and consigned us to an 'iron cage'. In this sense, for Weber, modernity appears to confront liberalism's core visions of freedom, even while liberalism acts as one of its principal promoters and beneficiaries. More recently, a new wave of sociologists have renewed such concerns. For James Scott (1997), picking up on Weber's fears of the 'axiomatisation' of modern life, 'high modernism' even represents the equivalent of a Foucaultian governmental rationality in its own right a – 'map that when allied to state power would enable much of the reality they depict to be remade.' (1997:3-4). High modernity is characterised by 'the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws', a world 'regimented and orderly in a geometrical sense'. (1997:4). It is a rationality that aims to produce

an artificial, engineered society designed, not by custom and historical accident, but according to conscious, rational, scientific planning. Every nook and cranny of the social order might be improved upon: social hygiene. Diet, child rearing, housing, posture, recreation, family structure and, most infamously, the genetic inheritance of the population'. (Scott 1997:92).

Perhaps equally interesting is that Scott identifies key 'obstacles' to high modernism as 'the existence and belief in a private sphere of life in which the state and its agencies may not legitimately interfere' – and in particular of 'the private sector in liberal political economy'. For Scott, problems emerge, in short, when 'high modernism (is) unimpeded by liberal political economy' (1997:101-102).

Likewise in the neo-liberal and 'new management' literature, enterprise is equated with uncertainty and eulogised. Popular best-seller Tom Peters, of *Thriving on Chaos* fame, pays tribute to the entrepreneur and promotes a new market-based liberalism. He sees the interventionist state and the planned economy as defeated by a resurgent liberal-capitalism driven forward to prosperity by enterprise. Peters 'pays tribute to the entrepreneur' by quoting George Gilder:

the entrepreneurs sustain the world. In their careers there is little of the optimizing calculation, nothing of the delicate balance of markets ... The prevailing theory of capitalism suffers from one central and disabling flaw: a profound distrust and incomprehension of capitalists. With its circular flows of purchasing power, its invisible handed markets, its intricate plays of goods and moneys, all modern economics, in fact, resembles a vast mathematical drama, on an elaborate stage of theory, without a protagonist to animate the play. (Peters, 1987: 245)

In place of a scientifically calculated future epitomised by risk, uncertainty provides the creative art of the possible that will drive prosperity and innovation. This neo-liberal imaginary of uncertainty involves techniques of flexibility and adaptability, requires a certain kind of 'vision' explicated at great length by other gurus such as Osborne and Gaebler in their iconic *Reinventing Government*. Dispensing with technocracy, they promote 'anticipatory government' and 'governing with foresight' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993: 229). They also promote 'communities' over experts in the governance of local problems. They suggest that scientists do not govern as well as communities, but have created a kind of learned helplessness that must be overcome by ordinary people taking back the reins of power from experts.

As such writings make clear, there is to be a *re-subordination of technocratic modernity* to the uncertain direction of enterprise and popular preferences. They line up superficially with Ulrich Beck, who also calls for the democratisation of risk and subordination of experts. Of course, is not my intention here to accuse Beck of being a closet neo-liberal. Rather, it is that the particular turn that this Benthamite problematic of security has taken – that there is ‘too much calculability in government’ – in diverse ways shapes the thinking of all sides of politics. I wish to argue that Beck’s theoretical challenge to risk and expertise in the name of a new security, his analysis of risk and uncertainty as alternative forms of government, ignores the long-term and troubled relationship between modernity and liberalism, a relationship to which his own work is related.

In what follows I want to explore the historical nexus between liberalism and modernist governmentality, the politics and genealogy of the specific configuration of security that might be termed Benthamite, and some of the implications of this understanding security and freedom in a liberal polity. I will do this through a somewhat cursory analysis of changes in certain forms of insurance. This is not simply because insurance is one of the central institutionalisations of risk and security in liberal societies. Equally it is because insurance has been at the centre of the braided genealogies of liberalism and modernity with which I am concerned.

### **Security, independence and uncertainty.**

In Britain, insurance for the working classes emerged during the late 18<sup>th</sup> century with the activities of the Friendly Societies – fraternal and benevolent insurance arrangements formed among skilled artisans. Despite some liberal suspicions of the Friendly Societies as a form of combination in restraint of market relations, during the early part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, successive political administrations legislated to encourage the Societies’ role in providing life, burial and sickness insurance for the working class. This was regarded not only as fostering self help and industry but also as alleviating pressure on the poor rates. Fraternal societies were characterised by ‘intentionally organising themselves around notions of “friendship, brotherly-love, charity”’ in which ‘any self-understanding in terms of “risk” or “insurance” (was) largely absent’ (Doran, 1994: 134) It was clear at the time that the frequent failures of these funds followed from an inability of fund managers to predict liabilities and to balance these against contributions and funds in hand. The reason for this lay in the benevolent principles of the early Societies, which distributed payment of benefits to members according to their need rather than in proportion to their premiums or levels of risk.

In order to facilitate thrift and self help, legislation ‘encouraged’ the societies to replace their traditional emphasis on fraternalism and benevolence with actuarially-based principles of fund management. From 1819 onward statutes required that the data tables and distribution guidelines of societies applying for registration be approved by ‘two persons at least, known to be professional actuaries or persons skilled in calculation’. The uneven contest between the representatives of these competing principles – the workers on the one hand, and on the other the government and the actuaries - resulted in the displacement of a horizontal, fraternally-based and essentially amateur organisation by a hierarchical, actuarial and managerial form of insurance which distanced the rank and file members from the professionals who

operated the funds. The monthly meeting in the local inn, which was simultaneously a convivial social gathering and a business committee, had largely disappeared by the middle years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. (Gosden, 1973: 23) In its place there emerged the domination of this field by large-scale Fraternal Orders, which operated out of centralised offices and held annual meetings at which the membership was rarely able to wield effective power. More than that, the principles of actuarial methods that were set in place further eroded benevolent ideas and introduced a ‘disciplinary element into membership’ (Doran, 1994:175). In particular, graduated contributions were imposed, and members became divided and ordered according to their levels of contribution and risk categorisations. Likewise, the help in kind that had characterised early mutual societies – for example through the provision of food or work on allotments by fellow members – disappeared. The form of solidarity of Fraternal Orders of old was thus fragmented and transformed. While the resulting insurance arrangements were still collective, this collectivity was increasingly abstract, individuated, fiscal and mediated by third parties. By the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, such ‘industrial life insurance’ had become the principal institution for governing working class thrift, and few households were not enlisted in this regime (O’Malley 2002).

It is easy to read this as the triumph of risk over uncertainty, and in limited respects this is true. Certainly we can see this as a shift in the *technologies* of security-calculability. But it may be more important to note that risk was valued and promoted as a technology that promoted thrift and foresight. Thus in this context liberals did not find the ‘triumph’ of risk as problematic for freedom– quite to the contrary. Risk facilitated liberal freedom. It was an instrument that promoted a certain kind of freedom and security associated with economic independence. By reducing the ‘wasted thrift’ and the assumed demoralizing experience that went with the failure of each little insurance fund, risk encouraged the practices of foresight and prudence among working people. In this sense, risk appears as a *subordinate* technology to a liberal freedom that was characterised by the governance of uncertain conditions in the free market, and for this reason raised few liberal qualms. Risk in private insurance took its place as one of the voluntary techniques of prudence to be practiced by the free subjects who lived out their lives in the uncertain world of the free, laissez faire economy.

In light of this, perhaps what we should attend to is that the transformation in insurance was the triumph of contract, for in this process formal contracts displaced informal mutuality in a far more thoroughgoing fashion than did risk displace uncertainty. While the imagery of the contract has focused extensively on the figure of voluntary exchange between free individuals, and this was to become a liberal mantra with the rise of ‘compulsion’ under the interventionist state, we should attend to the ways in which contractual governance was itself a form of compulsion. Contract, which became the principal technique for governance in 19<sup>th</sup> century civil society, was a liberal, disciplinary technique through which all subjects were made to be free in a specific fashion. Behind each contract, was the enforcing power of the state. This does not invoke a Marxist ‘last instance’, but rather the simple fact that the courts enforced contracts not just between businesses but also between employers and employees. In turn, contracts’ key role was to render the uncertain future less uncertain, by rendering some things directly calculable. Significantly these certainties were created by mutual agreement, by voluntary parties seeking to secure their own

welfare. Dates of delivery, qualities of goods, penalty rates for non-performance and so on were guaranteed by law. Employers took on employees at a mutually agreed wage, and both parties supposedly factored into account the potential cost of exposure to the foreseeable 'risks' of workplace injury.

Contract became a general model for governing many aspects of life in the 19<sup>th</sup> century – in many ways the liberal 'telos' of government. In this process, *foresight* became a legally enforceable duty owed to others. In contract law this expectation was developed primarily in relation to the requirement that subjects take into account the foreseeable impact of a breach of contract on contractual partners. The converse of this was that none should be accountable for outcomes that were not 'reasonably' foreseeable. Much contract law in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and beyond, thus came to focus on the elaboration of exactly what 'reasonable foresight' entailed. What kinds of eventuality should be foreseen? How unlikely should a possible event appear in order that it can be ignored? What should parties tell each other so that each can make 'reasonable' forecasts of the future? What should count as the level of prudence and foresight that can be expected of reasonable people? (O'Malley 2000)

The generalisation of contractual models across social relations also meant that such standards of foresight were to be applied with respect to 'accidents'. In tort law, negligence emerged during the 19<sup>th</sup> century as a key requirement for attributing responsibility and liability in relation to accidental harm. People should be held responsible for those events they could foresee, but are responsible *only* for these events. Consider the field of workplace injury. An injured worker would only be able to sue the employer for compensation if he or she could prove that the employer had been negligent. But in turn if the employer could prove that the worker's own negligence had contributed to the accident, then this 'contributory negligence' would limit or remove the right to compensation. Likewise, if it could be shown that the accident resulted from the negligence of another employee, then the so-called 'fellow servant rule' cut in, again limiting or removing the responsibility of the employer. Instead, an action would lie against the fellow worker, who of course was usually too poor to be worth pursuing. Rather than imposing a 'paternalistic' relationship between employer and employee, this legal imaginary assumed that the worker, or the fellow worker, was a responsible adult who acted as a free subject, and thus should have exercised foresight and prevented the accident. Not only did this appear 'just', but it also appeared efficient and effective because as the workers were the ones on the scene, they were the ones best placed to act preventatively. Even in work known to be dangerous, recovery of compensation for injured workers was often difficult. Following along the same assumptions of foresight and independence, it was assumed that the worker would have checked to see if the work was dangerous, and if so would have negotiated a higher wage to reflect this risk. Having made this 'voluntary assumption of risk', and having been paid a higher wage for it (which of course rarely happened in reality), then the worker could not double dip by claiming compensation if injured.

All of this appeared reasonable because it embodied a specific vision of freedom in a free and thus uncertain world. In this sense, contract was a characteristic invention of the classical liberal era: a way of rendering the future more calculable, while at the same time creating a space within which independence was required to be exercised. At the core of this form of freedom is *foresight*, the critical resource or attribute that

Benthamite security was to foster because like security, security it ‘necessarily embraces the future’ (Bentham 1962:302)

Security would be provided through the guarantees of property law and through control of predation through crime. Equally it would be provided by minimising the drain on resources created by relief to the poor. The principal solution to both crime and poverty was to train these problematic segments of the population in the ways of independence or ‘self reliance’ – a theme that became almost the defining characteristic of classical liberal problematics. In Bentham’s view a vital task was to impart to all a particular kind of rationality: the ‘disposition to look forward’. Discipline was not only (and perhaps not even) intended to create habits of blind obedience. Even more importantly it was to ‘accustom men to submit to the yoke of foresight, at first painful to be borne, but afterwards agreeable and mild: it alone could encourage them in labour – superfluous at present, and [the benefits of]which they are not to enjoy till the future’ (Bentham, 1962:307).

Foresight involved an attitude to the future which, inter alia, took account of the possible calamities there were a corollary of being free. It was closely linked with the application of prudent techniques for governing this uncertain future. Foresight – by aligning labour with frugality and thrift – secured the means to relief ‘from accident, from the revolutions of commerce, from natural calamities and especially from disease’ (Bentham, 1962: 316). *Insecurity in the face of uncertainty was the spur to action that secured the independence of the subject.* Thus for Bentham, a principal justification for illiberal despotism over the masses – the coercion explicit in criminal law and the defence of private property, in disciplinary institutions such as the prison and the Poor Law and implicit in contract with respect to accidents – was the necessity of ‘encouraging the spirit of economy and foresight among the inferior classes of society’ (1962: 316).

Foresight, as a practical and moral duty of every citizen, was a form of calculative attitude that was to pervade the everyday life of liberal subjects. In this way uncertainty came to represent to liberals not simply the ‘incalculable’, as Beck sometimes puts it, but a specific set of techniques centred upon foresight: particularly contract, prudence and enterprise. *For such liberals, in this way economic uncertainty made them free.* Modes of scientific calculation, as opposed to the calculations of rational individuals exercising their own capacities for governing the future, are to remain subordinate to this form of non-expert calculation in order that the ‘right’ degree and form of calculability be achieved.

### **Making security social.**

Various commentators on the development of social insurance have focused on its status as a *social* technology: that is, as a technology that operates at the level of the entire society or more precisely of the nation state. One effect of this kind of analysis is that it overlooks important continuities with the liberalism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, via insurance. It was not at all the case that social insurance, even compulsory social insurance was alien. Bentham, to take a foundational argument, had complained in the early 1800s that private insurance was flawed:

This remedy is imperfect in itself because it is always necessary to pay the premium, which is a certain loss, in order to guarantee one’s self against an

uncertain loss. In this point of view it is to be desired that all *unforeseen losses that can fall upon individuals without their fault*, were covered at the public expense. The greater the number of contributors, the less sensible is the loss to each one.’ (Bentham 1962:579 emphasis added).

For Bentham it was clear that this insurance would be ‘founded on the calculation of probabilities’. Risk was no problem for such liberals in this context, quite the reverse. But it had to be subject to foresight in the form of negligence. Fault-linked insurance, in other words retained the subordination of expert calculations of risk to foresight as the key technology of uncertainty. What was emerging, as will be generally recognised, began to cut clean across this. The development of Worker’s Compensation insurance, for example, largely displaced the array of tort doctrines that denied workers compensation under the rules of contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule, or voluntary assumption of risk.

In some measure this displacement of tort was based on the sense of injustice that had been associated with the denial of compensation that the legal category of negligence inflicted on injured workers. But in at least equal measure it was based on the observation that industries had constant rates of accidents year after year. In practice, it appeared that the focus on fault merely assigned harms to specific individuals, while the overall distribution of harms in an industry, however, remained constant from year to year.(O’Malley 2004a). Likewise, in fields such as joblessness, the focus on distinguishing the culpable and feckless ‘idle poor’ from the deserving poor came under attack from those whose examination of statistics suggested to them that unemployment was not a characteristic of individuals but a property of another entity, the ‘economy’ (Walters 2000). In both instances, scientific investigation had discovered (or invented) meta-individual entities such as ‘industries’, ‘economies’, ‘societies’ and ‘populations’, that appeared to obey their own quasi-natural laws of motion. The social sciences, in their turn, were to render these observations scientifically real.

From one point of view, this interpretation of the social world depended on the growth of statistics and is integrally associated with risk. Yet the invention of these entities was not in any straightforward sense a ‘statistical’ discovery, for statistics do not speak for themselves. With reference to Germany, for example, Eghigian (2000: 43-44) argues that elementary statistics had long been compiled by the absolutist states, as part of their project of the omniscient Police without this leading to the discovery of the social. Thus early 19<sup>th</sup> century governments ‘remained individualistic, psychological, and prescriptive in their approaches.’ Statistics, from their viewpoint, revealed the patterns of individual behaviour, mapped the activities and distributions of ideas and behaviours of individuals. However,

The statistics and probability theories applied to social life in nineteenth-century Europe were of a profoundly different character. Advanced by individuals and groups from government, industry and science, the new statistics was part of a self-consciously social science of social motion ... It was offered as an eminently empirical, quantitative method for discerning the laws of a changing society. Yet equally important were its political implications. Statisticians of the early nineteenth century saw their science as an attempt to bring a measure of expertise to social questions, to replace the contradictory preconceptions of the interested parties by the certainty of

careful empirical observation. They believed that the confusion of politics could be replaced by an orderly reign of facts.

In light of my earlier comments what we are seeing here are the foundations of a political struggle between two rationalities of security. One, a socio-technical, *modernist* rationality in which society and economy are to be managed efficiently through scientific knowledge of entities that operate according to quasi-natural laws 'revealed' in probability and risk. The other, a *liberal* rationality in which security and freedom are founded (and morally founded) in techniques of individual foresight and uncertainty. The struggle was registered in many sites, and was to persist more or less unabated throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Most significantly, the struggle was etched into the foundations of social insurance itself. Private insurance's contractual form provided a legal right of benefit to the insured party in the event of specified harms occurring – whether or not these were actuarially calculated. A relation of mutual obligation is established, a legally enforceable right rather than a relationship of dependence. In most of these respects there was a marked contrast with the operation of poor laws and charitable relief. Private insurance had nestled in a prudential diagram of freedom, risk and security that takes the form of 'freedom of contract' and prudential 'independence'. It is no coincidence that the social insurances introduced after the early 1880s were contributory in nature: the members of the scheme paid regular – if compulsory – premiums from their wages. It was what Beveridge (1942) was later to refer to as 'compulsory thrift'. This was a key reason why social insurance appealed to so many liberals and appeared consistent with liberal principles. It was true, significantly, for Bismarck's pioneering 'Sickness Insurance Law' of 1884-85. The National Insurance Act of 1911 in England – partially modelled on Bismarck's scheme – introduced compulsory contributory insurance relating to health and unemployment. As Ogus (1982: 183) put it, social insurance

maintained, in a somewhat modified form, the exchange or reciprocal basis to social welfare: it was based on past performance in employment, and from financial contributions from the individual himself; benefit could thus be justified as having been 'earned'. In legal terms it gave rise to something akin to a contractual right. In moral, cultural terms, it incorporated the traditional puritan, capitalist virtues of thrift and foresight.

Writing more than a quarter of a century later Beveridge was still adamant that his blueprint for the post-war welfare state carried through the central principle of social insurance. It should be 'benefit in return for contributions rather than free allowances from the state'. He was personally opposed to the means-tested forms of unemployment assistance, introduced in the 1920s and 1930s as a benefit for those whose unemployment insurance coverage had been exhausted. In his eyes such increasingly prevalent non-contributory schemes created asymmetrical relations of dependence, and penalised those who had 'come to regard as the duty and pleasure of thrift, of putting pennies away for a rainy day'. (Beveridge, 1942: 182-85). Beveridge the liberal here surely is giving voice to Bentham: social insurance is not to displace foresight, only to augment it.

Set against this was the more 'systematic' modernist or technocratic imaginary in which problems generated at the level of the social or the economic were to be

addressed at that level. Individual contributions were of secondary importance where a single process of funding, i.e. taxation, could do away with so many complications created by the vagaries of markets and the vicissitudes of life that, after all, were understood to be generated primarily by systematic forces rather than individual wills. What mattered was not individual thrift and diligence, but membership of a social collectivity or distribution whose motions were comprehended only by expertise. Risk and calculability came to dominate uncertainty. The result was often a patchwork of uneasy compromises, of contributory and non-contributory schemes, of 'earned' versus universal benefits where the latter followed simply from membership of the social distribution. It was the latter that were to become the principal target of neo-liberals.

### **Reasserting uncertainty: freedom of choice and revised liberalism.**

This paper opened with Bernstein's view that freedom lies in uncertainty, and argued briefly that this was a perspective that had found its time again in the present. Nevertheless, the uncertainty-championing of Tom Peters, and Osborne and Gaebler, and of Giddens's vision of the enterprise society, clearly do not simply resurrect the liberalism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. As many have pointed out, there are multiple and significant differences that impinge on the ways that uncertainty now is mobilised. To begin with, the market has ceased to be an economic domain that should be left alone by the state. Rather the market is a technique for governing a multitude of problems and processes regardless of whether they are within or outside of the state. States themselves have to become enterprising (Considine 2001), even professions come under the sway of markets when 'freedom of choice' is used to insist – for example – that formerly deviant health regimes, from chiropractic to aromatherapy, become available competitors to professional medicine. We should recognise, therefore, that this emergent liberalism was not merely the rebirth of classical liberalism, but an assertion of the former against the impact of a modernist rationality and its technologies. It has been, in certain key respects anti-modernist in its orientation toward socio-economic calculability in a way that was not evident in its 19<sup>th</sup> century forebear which – until the end of that century – had retained technocratic governance in a subordinate position

This new rationality of security and freedom has reshaped areas of insurance. In the name of increasing the autonomy of subjects, and of expanding their 'freedom of choice', defined-benefit life insurance policies have been challenged by market-based policies. In these, benefits will depend upon the performance of the individual investment portfolio. This insurance is not about 'the taming of chance' and the maximisation of scientific calculability. Rather, market risk and speculation – key techniques of uncertainty – are to be given their head. Insurance itself has begun to come unravelled in this process. Distinctions between insurance and other forms of 'financial product' such as gambling and financial speculation are blurring. For example, as Kreitner (2000) argues, it is now legal to buy the life insurance policies of HIV/AIDS sufferers in the US. This appears as a gamble on when the victim will die, for the purchaser who must take over the premiums, the sooner the better. An insurance policy based on stock market performance readily appears as a speculative investment little distinct from shares themselves. To this extent uncertainty has become not merely the resort of insurers under pressure, where actuarial data are not

effective or available. Increasingly, with the blessing of neo-liberal governance, uncertainty is becoming a front-rank technology of preference for the industry.

Even in the domain of civil law, this shift in the register of security and freedom is being registered (O'Malley forthcoming). The development of workers' compensation insurance back at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century provided a model whereby 'rational' insurance models progressively displaced tort law with its stress on fault, negligence, 'reasonable foreseeability' and so on. By the early 1970s, tort law had been largely displaced by a comprehensive accident scheme in New Zealand, a model that was being closely examined in Australia, Britain and the US. In the United States, where such direct social insurance schemes had not taken hold, tort law itself had been revised along such lines as 'enterprise liability' that effectively did away with many of the issues of foresight and created a system of no-fault law intimately connected to the liability insurance industry. After the 1970s, however, a new regime began to be aggressively instituted across the common law world. Negligence and its allied concepts made a return, in the name of making those who created harm more individually responsible, and thereby to restore foresight as a key technology for governing accidents. While insurance remains vital to funding this area, pressures have grown to displace no-fault third-party schemes by privately funded first party insurance models that – through the impact on insurance premiums – would discipline those who created accidents.

In all of these changes, it is not that actuarial expertise confronts new reflexive-modern problems it cannot solve. The neo-liberal claim is simply that expertise creates dependency and usurps decision-making, and that risk-taking is a choice governed by the uncertain skills of investment rather than by probabilities alone. The market, that enduring but adaptable technology of uncertainty, is to give another freedom – freedom of choice – to which experts and risk itself are subordinated. Insecurity is to be revalorised through such governmental problematics of freedom, in order to create the 'right' state of calculability. This involves the reassertion of uncertainty over risk, of the freedom of the individual over domination by modernist experts: a recalibration of the apparatuses of governance in the direction of a newly configured optimal level of security.

### **Conclusion. Security, calculation, freedom..**

Current tensions between risk and uncertainty in the broader domain may have much to do with the modernizing processes to which Ulrich Beck alerts us. But a less holistic approach may reveal more complex and diverse processes at work. With respect to the domain of socio-economic security (after all, the birthplace of the risk/uncertainty binary) they can also be seen as the latest manifestation of a long-term tension between competing rationales of governance. It is a struggle that runs like a fault line in liberal politics dating back almost to the foundations of liberalism itself. I have traced some of the broader aspects of this familiar fault line with special focus on insurance as a principal technology of socio-economic security.

In this respect, state-centred security emerges as something other than a Hobbesian transfer of rights from states to individuals or vice-versa, a kind of zero-sum game between security and freedom. Nor is it simply a question of security creating or protecting a state of freedom in which the latter simply is the freedom from

interference or coercion. Understanding security involves exploring the relationship between specific reconfigurations or apparatuses of security and specific configurations of freedom. What kind(s) of freedom does 'security' create, make possible or protect? And what kinds of freedom require what kinds of security in these respects? I suspect this is not a logical or functional question, in which the nature of one can be read off from the other. Rather it is a genealogical one, simply because all the rationalities and technologies involved necessarily are subject to politics, compromises, inventions, unanticipated developments, hybridisations and so on.

So we may recognise that at if any time there may be multiple 'kinds' of freedom at issue, there will be multiple configurations of security being assembled and mobilised. In principle, these various configurations of security/freedom need have comparatively little in common. Perhaps we have yet properly to explore, for example, how the diverse governmentalised 'freedoms' that are salient in any social formation are connected, and what degrees of forms of difference may be tolerated. In turn, this raises the question of the kinds and degrees of conflict, tension, symbiosis that arise between diverse configurations of security and how these in their turn generate new configurations of security and freedom

It is beyond the present paper to attempt even a cursory consideration of the braided genealogies of Hobbesian security and Benthamite security-calculability. However, I would suggest that under the same neo-liberal framework of government while Hobbesian security of the state has become profoundly modernist, technocratic and illiberal in the post-911 era, Benthamite security remains committed to – and mobilises – a certain kind of democratic populism rather hostile to expertise or technocratic governance. In each case security and freedom are imagined and articulated in distinct fashion. Thus while Hobbesian governance currently develops a program that increasingly impinges on individual rights in order to optimise security, the Benthamite governance of security-calculability currently seeks to reduce security and *increase* individual rights by creating or restoring the uncertainty of the 'free market' and 'freedom of choice'.

I would close by suggesting that for such reasons we need to untangle the diversity of governmentalities of security-freedom rather than collapsing them, for example, into one grand vision of the 'risk society'. One way of reading the argument in this paper would be to suggest that Beck is expressing, in a revised form, a fairly well entrenched and now familiar anti-modernist position that seeks to bring scientific government to heel in the name of 'freedom'. Beck's desire to isolate yet another radical break in history has led him to collapse security into a single but all-embracing binary of risk and uncertainty. In his imagery, 'government' and 'science' are reduced to a uniform and mutually reinforcing entity. In light of what I have argued, and in light of Scott's analysis of modern government also, Beck rather assumes that modernism had triumphed. In the domain of socio-economic security, however, I suggest this was always and remains a contested politics in which liberal rationalities were ever at odds with modernism. The problem of the calculability or incalculability of the future – of risk versus uncertainty – thus does not appear as a recent issue brought on by historically unprecedented problems with expertise. It is the latest round in an enduring contest between liberal and modernist governance over how, and how far, the future should be calculable..



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Abstract for the interdisciplinary workshop *Scales of Security*  
Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland  
June 26–27, 2008

### **The social risk of ‘reconciliation of work and family life’ and citizenship**

Reconciliation of work and family life, or work–life balance, has been recently discussed as a ‘new social risk’ in comparative welfare state research (e.g. Bonoli 2007; Taylor-Gooby 2004). According to this literature, European and other western welfare states are currently facing new challenges as a part of the ongoing shift to post-industrial society. These challenges result from complex changes in population structures, employment practices and family life (e.g. women’s labour force participation, single-parent families, and the ‘care deficit’). The social security systems of traditional welfare states, which were built during the postwar years to protect family (male) breadwinners against the ‘old social risks’ – the consequences of interruptions to market income from employment e.g. due to retirement, unemployment, disability or sickness – are partly inadequate for dealing with them. Whereas most countries are just starting to develop policies to address these new types of social risks, it has been suggested that the Nordic countries are already effectively dealing with them, because of the relevant social policy action taken since the 1970s.

In this paper, I analyze the ways in which the ‘social risk’ of reconciliation of work and family life is diagnosed and managed in Finland from 1980s to 2000s, and explore its implications for (women’s) citizenship. Drawing from Foucauldian ideas of governmentality as well as from feminist research, I examine the contours of citizenship – rights, duties and responsibilities – that are produced in a set of Finnish policy texts and other documents on reconciliation of work and family. The analysis indicates that despite of some historical continuity in the articulation of the social risk of ‘reconciliation’ as well as the Nordic model of women’s citizenship (citizen worker or working mother) from the 1980s to the 2000s, there is a significant change in the policy proposals concerning child care and responsible welfare agents since the 1990s.

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Paper for the interdisciplinary workshop *Scales of Security*  
Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland  
June 26–27, 2008

Preliminary draft – please do not quote without permission.

## **‘RECONCILIATION OF WORK AND FAMILY’ AND CITIZENSHIP**

### **Introduction**

*“It is not surprising that the Nordic countries, where support for the worker-citizen is a central policy objective, lead Europe in new risk policy-making, nor that new social risks are seen by the European Union as a relatively undeveloped area, in which policy leadership can be offered and through which a transnational agency can seek to increase its contact with the lives of ordinary citizens.” (Taylor-Gooby 2004b, 236.)*

Reconciliation of work and family life, or work–life balance, has been recently discussed as a ‘new social risk’ in comparative welfare state research (e.g. Armingeon & Bonoli 2006; Taylor-Gooby 2004a). According to this literature, European and other western welfare states are currently facing new challenges as a part of the ongoing shift to post-industrial society. These challenges result from complex changes in population structures, employment practices and family life (e.g. increase in women’s labour market participation and in single-parent families, tertiarisation and flexibilisation of employment, the ‘care deficit’ resulting partly from population ageing). The social security systems of traditional welfare states, which were built during the post-war years to protect family (male) breadwinners against the ‘old social risks’ – the consequences of interruptions to market income from employment e.g. due to retirement, unemployment, disability or sickness – are partly inadequate for dealing with new risks. It has been suggested that whereas most countries are just starting to develop policies to address new types of social risks, the Nordic countries are already effectively dealing with them, because of the relevant social policy action taken since the 1970s.

Peter Taylor-Gooby (2004, 8-11) has delineated central features of new social risk policies, including work-life balance policies, from the perspective of government. According to him, new risk policies do not involve substantial transfer expenditure like old risk policies. Rather, these policies are often concerned to help more people support themselves through paid work. New risk welfare politics, he argues, thus often are part of a national strategy to mobilise the population and to enhance economic competitiveness, and open up particular agendas for business and unions. As Taylor-Gooby (2004, 10) sums up, “new risk policies meet needs mainly by encouraging and enabling different choices and behaviour patterns rather than providing benefits. [...] They involve issues of responsibility for providing income and for domestic care that cut across the boundary between public and private spheres.”

Such policies – concerned with changing behaviour and assumptions about responsibilities, making interventions in people’s lives and crossing the public/private division – thus come close to the notions of government and citizenship. In this paper, I therefore take part in the discussion on reconciliation of work and family as a (new) social risk by elaborating on the problematics from the perspective of citizenship. I argue that being high on the policy agenda of the EU and its member states, ‘reconciliation’ is a powerful discourse through which citizenship, especially women’s citizenship, is defined. I analyse the contours of citizenship that are forged in reconciliation policies, in the changing context of Nordic egalitarian traditions, new European influences and major societal changes in Finland. I pay attention to the ways in which rights, responsibilities and practices of citizenship are constructed, defined and modified in the policy texts on reconciliation of work and family, from 1980s to 2000s. A central question in this context is also, how policy innovations are legitimated and how shifts in the approach of policy-makers are to be understood” (Taylor-Gooby 2004, 11).

## **Interpretative framework**

### ***Citizenship and care***

The theoretical framework of my paper is informed by Foucauldian analytics of government and feminist theories on welfare state and citizenship. I understand citizenship as ‘a creation of techniques of social discipline’ (Burchell 1995, 543); an important component in the (self)management of populations, groups and individuals, which is not limited to the state but involves multiple, and conflicting, authorities and agencies (see e.g. Helén & Jauho 2003, Dean 1999). Citizenship is closely linked to the notion of biopolitics, which involves

administration of the conditions of life and vital resources and processes of the population. Historically, men have been tied to citizenship through their soldiering (Hobson and Lister 2002, 27). Later the ability to work, and for women, reproductive capabilities and care work, have offered grounds for claiming citizenship.

As the Nordic conception of citizenship combines elements of the two historical traditions of citizenship, the liberal and civic republican traditions (e.g. Siim 2000, 21; Holli 1992), I pay attention to key categories of both of them (see Lister 1997). First, I consider citizenship as a status defined by individual citizenship rights, especially social rights, which is typical for liberal social rights tradition. Second, I take into account citizenship as a practice accentuating citizens' civic duties and obligations to the wider society (e.g. political participation, paid work or care), as is characteristic of the participatory republican tradition. Moreover, I analyse citizenship as membership of a community and the patterns of inclusion and exclusion, as well as social divisions, which shape that membership (Hobson & Lister 2002, 23).

A central aspect of gendered-differentiated citizenship is care (e.g. Lister 1997; Hobson & Lister 2002; Lister et al. 2008, 109–166). I illuminate the multiple dimensions of care rights, responsibilities and practices with the concept of social care. Mary Daly and Jane Lewis (2000) have defined social care as "the activities and relations involved in meeting the physical and emotional requirements of dependent adults and children, and the normative, economic and social frameworks within which these are assigned and carried out". At the macro level, the concept draws attention to the relationship between services and cash benefits. It also highlights the division of care labour, responsibility and costs between the family, the market, the state and the voluntary/community sectors. At the micro level, the concept of social care brings to light the distribution of care (giving and receiving) between women and men and among families, as well as the conditions under which care is carried out, and the state's role in affecting such conditions.

### ***Methods and materials***

The empirical data consist of textual documents on the 'reconciliation of work and family', published between 1980–2008 in Finland. They include mainly official policy texts that explicitly address the theme. Official policy texts are a good source of documentation for changing governmental rationalities and policy goals (see Stratigaki 2004). They are

themselves policy outcomes that reflect an average position and a consensus achieved at a particular historical time and political environment.

My research strategy is inspired by a Foucauldian genealogy (e.g. Foucault 1984). Even though my analysis does not cover broad periods of time, the approach is historical. I analyze not only the elements of citizenship, such as rights, responsibilities and practices, but also the historical principles that make them useful or problematic at a given time and place (see Lehtonen 2003). I pay specific attention to the shifts in vocabularies and language, and to the gendered rationalities and hierarchies that guide and structure practices of citizenship.

### **Rights, responsibilities and practices of citizenship**

The feminist analyses typically abstract two historical models of Finnish women's citizenship. Both are based on collective rather than individualistic conceptions of citizenship (Bergman 1998). The first model, the "mother-citizen", was formed in the context of the women's movements in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. It was based on the ideas of maternalism and essential sexual difference between men and women. The value of women's caring and maternal qualities for children, families and the nation was highlighted to promote women's education and political participation.

The second model, the "worker citizen" or the "worker-parent-citizen", gradually unfolded in the wake of sex-role debates of the 1960s (Bergman 1998). The students' and academics' equality movement *Association 9* was the initiator of many objectives of Finnish equality policy that still bear relevance today (Holli 1992). The aim of the association was to change the existing division of labour between the sexes, and it promoted equal family and occupational roles, as well as civic and political participation, for both men and women. The activists campaigned for the rationalization of household tasks and child care by means of collective services. Emphasis was laid on the equality and similarity of men and women. Full-time employment became gradually the norm and reality for female citizens (Simonen & Kovalainen 1998, 231).

Echoing the two familiar identities of women as workers and carers, the discourse on 'reconciliation of work and family life' well exemplifies the traditions of Finnish women's

collective political action and citizenship. The term itself seems to have emerged in the Finnish language and social policy at the turn of the 1980s. However, it was only after Finland joined the EU, that it gradually became a central social policy objective.<sup>1</sup>

I start the analysis by providing an overview of the changing context and elements of citizenship by contrasting rationalities of reconciliation of work and family from 1980s and 2000s. I then look into the contours of citizenship – rights, responsibilities and practices – as they are constructed in policy texts. The texts discuss primarily three reconciliation measures with historically changing importance: child care arrangements, workplace policies and family leave entitlements. In these discussions, citizenship is renegotiated as a relationship between gendered individuals and three wider entities: the welfare state, the labour market and the family community.

### *The changing context and contours of citizenship*

To make visible the historical transformations in citizenship and its national context, I first contrast two policy texts on the same topic and with almost identical institutional position from different decades; namely two working group memoranda on reconciliation of work and family life from 1983 and 2001 (STM 1983:28; STM 2001:28). These texts do not cover all the existing ways of discussing the topic in their time, but they represent probably the most powerful ways. Despite some similarities, the two memoranda give diverse answers to the following essential questions: What is the nature of citizenship? Which social actors are responsible for supporting it? What is the role of the public sector in facilitating people's work-life balance?

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<sup>1</sup> In the European Community, reconciliation of work and family has been incorporated in the social policy agenda since late 1980s (Duncan 2002). This discourse has partly superseded the earlier policy objective of 'equal opportunities at work', which become subject to a whole range of critiques. Concerns about socio-demographic trends have brought the topic high on the policy agenda. Especially low and falling fertility rates is feared to threaten the future of the labour supply and sustainable dependency ratios between those in employment and those dependent upon them (MacInnes 2006). In the 1990s, the reconciliation of work and family life has become incorporated in the European Employment Strategy. According to Maria Stratigaki (2004), the term has gradually shifted in meaning from an objective with feminist potential to a more market-oriented objective (see also Mahon 2002).

	<b>Memorandum 1983</b>	<b>Memorandum 2001</b>
<i>Members of the working group</i>	Officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (all women)	Representatives of different governmental departments & labour market organizations (men & women)
<i>Dichotomy of work and family</i>	Existing but not absolute	Strong
<i>Central objective</i>	Enable (female) parents' labour market participation	Enable (male) parents' participation in child care
<i>Instruments</i>	Different public services, especially day care, and other benefits	Parental leaves
<i>Reference group</i>	Nordic countries	EU countries

The memorandum from 1983 apparently is the first publication in Finland that focuses solely on the topic of reconciliation of work and family life. The working group was set up by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, and it consisted exclusively of female officials of the ministry. The group was assigned to work on defining the composition and the commission of a prospective committee on parenthood and paid employment.

As the name *Working Group on Work and Family Life* indicates, in the memorandum from 1983, the dichotomy of paid work and family is already well established. This does not mean, however, that these two areas are represented as the only important spheres of life. For example, the starting point for the proposed committee is “an identical responsibility of women and men for child care and home work as well as their equal right for paid work, education, civic activity and leisure” (p. II). This reflects the historically strong framework of citizenship in the Nordic countries which embraces participation in different spheres of life: the political, the market, and family (Hobson & Lister 2002, 35). Similarly to the Nordic sex-role movement of the 1960s and its idea of multiple roles, the emphasis is laid – besides division of labour between men and women – even on political citizenship as a practice; an active participation in the society and the in public sphere (e.g. Lister 1997, 23–29; Holli 1992). It comes as no surprise that the most important national reference group are other Nordic countries, as one of the tasks of the working group is to collect “both domestic and foreign, above all Nordic accounts for the use of the possible committee” (p. II).

In the memorandum, the underlying objective is to enable the labour market participation of (female) parents of young and school-aged children, as can be read in the subsequent extract. For that reason, various public services and subsidies for families, which would ease this kind of reconciliation, are reviewed in the text: maternity allowance, day care for children, home care subsidy, home help service, for example (p. 6–13). The importance of the supply and improvement of municipal day care services is highlighted (p. 11–12). Moreover, different working time arrangements and part-time work are mentioned in the text (p. 18–19). The conclusion is:

*“The working group proposes the appointment of a committee whose assignment is defined as follows:*

- 1) to clarify the needs for change in the working life that are required for meeting the familial responsibilities of working parents of young children*
- 2) to clarify the developmental needs in the day care system and child care forms, starting with the premise that child care and familial responsibilities should prohibit or hinder as little as possible parents’ participation in employment; and*
- 3) to clarify the ways in which public services for families with children may be directed and improved so that they support working parents of young children.” (p. 20)*

The proposals of the working group had little success, since the committee was never set up. Over and above, the public discussion on the topic remained relatively weak during the decade.

The memorandum of the *Working Group on Reconciliation of Work and Family Life* from 2001, tells quite a different story. The group was set up by the same ministry, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, but its make-up was quite different from the working group of 1983. The members – both male and female – represented different administrative sectors and labour market organizations. The task of the tripartite working group was to explore the possibilities of reforming the existing family leave system in the following ways:

*“The working group was assigned to investigate the possibilities of creating a system that would guarantee fathers a right to one month’s parental leave of their own, and that would guarantee a right to take maternity or parental leave on a part-time basis. In its report the working group should also deal with the annual holiday costs caused by parental leaves by paying attention e.g. to how effective the redistribution of the annual holiday costs of family leaves is and how to simplify the application process and whether the costs of temporary care leaves to employers could be relieved through funding from sickness insurance.”*  
*(Documentation page)*

The memorandum focuses exclusively on the paid work and family, and does not mention any other spheres of life, such as voluntary work or political activism. It concentrates on social rights to parental leave only, accentuating thus the nature of citizenship rather as a passive status, with the government and ‘social partners’ as active respecters and supporters of individual’s private sphere (e.g. Lister 1997, 14–15). Even though Sweden and Norway still offer an important example when discussing the “father’s month” (p. 36), the most important national reference group is found in the EU countries (p. 31–33, and appendix 2).

The reforms proposed in the text aim “to improve the chances of parents of young children to take part in caring for their children and to make the use of care leaves more flexible” (doc. p.). They involved changes in the legislation under all the points mentioned in the earlier excerpt, except the very last on the costs of temporary care leaves. During the following years, most of the reforms were brought into effect. This is no wonder, since the reconciliation of work and family had moved higher up on the policy agenda from the 1990s onwards.

Overall therefore, these two policy texts illustrate significant changes in the concept of citizenship. The political citizenship with civic participation, which is still present in the memorandum from 1983, is no longer to be found in the memorandum from 2001, emphasizing social citizenship and social rights. The texts also outline a very different picture of the functions, roles or responsibilities of different social actors, especially the welfare state, in facilitating such rights and the reconciliation of work and family. As regards the public sector, its omnipotent role in the 1980s has been transformed to a more moderate and delegative one in the 2000s. The focus has clearly shifted from day care and other services to parental and other family leaves as the best way to support work-life balance. In the memorandum from the 2000, along with the government, the so called ‘social partners’ – the labour market organizations representing capital and labour – are represented as important players in the field. This, together with the new national reference group of EU countries, highlights the powerful example of the European Union.

I next turn to these discontinuities and their implications for citizenship in a more detail. First, I analyse the discussions on child care in the policy texts on reconciliation, and pay attention to the ways in which citizenship is redefined as a relationship between individuals and the

welfare state. More specifically, I examine the significance of social rights in the transformation of the organization of child care from 1980s to 2000s.

### *Child care: Social rights and the step from care services towards cash benefits?*

In the few policy texts on reconciliation of work and family life from the 1980s, social rights are rarely mentioned. Even though the Act on Children's Day Care had come into force already in 1973, the right to day care is mentioned only once in the following statement: "After parental leave and possibly after new extended home care leave, families should have a right to get their child in municipal day care, if desired" (STM 1983:28, 11). As the choice of words implies, the actual right, of all citizens in need of municipal day care, was not fully realized in the early 1980s. More important, public day care was still commonly discussed in other terms that underscored – rather than individuals and their rights – the obligation of authorities to organize day care for children under school age. For example, in the texts, the "day-care system" is to be developed, the availability of "day-care services", or alternatively "family day care", improved, and the quality of the "day-care centres" enhanced according to a nationwide plan (e.g. Kom. 1980:23, 100–101; STM 1983:28, 11–13). This reflects the collectivist tradition in Finland, in which public welfare services were understood as tools for reducing social and regional inequalities. Trust in authorities was high, and citizens did not have to attend to their interests actively (Pylkkänen 2007; Holli 1992). First and foremost, the welfare state appears as the provider and regulator of child care services, but it has not reached the goals entirely yet.

By the 1990s, the "rights talk" has added up in discussions on the reconciliation of work and family. This is mostly a consequence from the legislation and promulgation of the subjective right to day care for all children, while the number of day care places had also grown steadily (Simonen & Kovalainen 1998, 237). Since 1990, parents enjoyed an unconditional right to day care for children under three years of age in municipal day care. Alternatively, if they decided to choose this option, they were entitled to child home care allowance to be able to care for their children at home. As from 1996, all children under school age had the right to a public day-care place (STM 2000:21). The emphasis on this kind of subjective right pertains to the fact that the universal social rights of citizens were to be guaranteed in the context of increasing municipal autonomy (Ryynänen 1993). More generally, an individualistic rights

frame typical for liberal regimes had gained ground in Finland as a result of international and EU legislation (Pylkkänen 2007).

Alongside the extension of the right to day care, the child to staff ratio – a simple measure for the quality of services – had deteriorated (Simonen & Kovalainen 1998, 238). Even the extension had not progressed without trouble:

*“In accordance with the law passed by the parliament in 1991, the right to day-care will be further extended. Day-care had to be arranged, by law, as from the beginning of 1993 to all children under the age of four. The government has got, because of its retrenchment program, to postpone the effective date of the law in this respect until the year 1995.” (STM 13/1992, 13).*

In the early 1990s, Finland experienced an economic crisis, which resulted in high unemployment rates and severe state budget cuts, including cuts to welfare services. Besides, the public sector received ideological criticism for its alleged bureaucracy and inflexibility. The reform of state subsidies in 1993 increased municipal autonomy and variation in service provision, including contracting out and more private services, which may have contributed to growing regional inequalities among citizens. (Simonen & Kovalainen 1998.) As in other Nordic countries, the prospective membership of the European Union was seen as a further threat to women’s social and participatory rights, since the male-breadwinner model shaped the policy landscape of many member states (Duncan 2002).

For these reasons, the policy texts on the reconciliation of work and family communicate pessimistic prognoses about the threats for the “women-friendly” welfare state (e.g. TM 1994, preface). Even though “child-care services” had been considered in the European policy texts on the reconciliation of work and family, from the Nordic point of view, they did not necessarily correspond to the traditional national standards of equality and universalism:

*“In Finland, where viable public day care has at least so far been seen as a central prerequisite of women’s paid work, it is hopefully not necessary to turn to the aid of structural funds in the basic organisation of children’s day care” (TM 1995, 24–25.)*

From the mid 1990s onwards, the references to day care, its volume and quality, become increasingly brief and scarce in the policy texts on the reconciliation of work and family. The acquired right to day care is largely ignored in the texts, and the main focus is now laid on questions of work (e.g. TM 1994; STAKES 1999). In the 2000s, the few references

demonstrate significant changes in concepts and their meanings around the theme: The former “day-care system” has become a “child-care system for small children”. The substance of the “subjective right to day care” is presented in a novel way, accenting the options of private care: <sup>2</sup>

*“The child-care system for small children enables a family to choose between home care and day care, as regards children under the age of three. Concerning children over three years of age, the subjective right to day care remains for families, either in the form of a right to municipal services or an allowance for private care” (Perhe ja työ 2004, 37.)*

Since 1997, it had been possible for families to receive private child-care allowance for providing their children with private care (STM 2000:21). In the policy texts, this reform is legitimized by liberal ideas of consumerism; increasing the freedom of choice of parents between cash and care in the consumption of social services (STM 1994:11; Perhe ja työ 2004, 35, 37). Shifting a part of the responsibilities to parents (and to social care professionals) is justified by their individual autonomy and right of self-determination (see also Simonen & Kovalainen 1998). The welfare state appears now as legislator, coordinator and financier of child care, in the form of family leaves and allowance for private care.

According to Leila Simonen and Anne Kovalainen (1998), the developments of the 1990s promoted the private care of children in two ways. First, the child home care allowance increased in popularity among parents, especially during the economic downturn. Second, the private child-care allowance encouraged day care professionals to start their own private firms and municipalities to choose contracting out services to them. Along publicly financed and/or provided social care, also a small, local private sector, with privately financed and delivered services, was emerging (ibid., 233).

It is noteworthy that in the 1990s, during the creation of the child-care system for small children, no reference is made to the reconciliation of work and family in the preparatory texts. Neither the committee report (STM 1994:11), nor the numerous government bills (e.g. HE 121/1995) justify this reform by increasing the chances of parents to find an optimal work-life balance for them, for example. Instead, emphasis is laid on the possibilities to choose the “most convenient child-care arrangement” (STM 1994:11, 10). It is only around

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<sup>2</sup> As the extract indicates, some suggestions had also been made for dissolving the unconditional right to day care.

2004 that the child-care system for small children, as well as the home care allowance and the private child-care allowance, are rhetorically connected to the reconciliation of work and family in the policy texts. For example, increases in home and private child care allowances are rationalized by suggesting that this would “improve the possibilities of families to reconcile work and family” (HE 162/2004; see also STM 2007:1, 38–39).

It is my tentative interpretation that because the increased options of private child care were, in the 1990s, discursively strongly connected to the retrenchment of the welfare state, they could not be justified by reference to the still relatively marginal discourse on reconciliation of work and family, which stressed heavily the social right to public day care services. By the 2000s, however, the topic of reconciliation, or work-life balance, had become very popular in public, as well as private, discussions. The term, open to multiple interpretations, lend itself to pursuing various objectives (MacInnes 2006). Questions about labour market and working hour policies, as well as of family leaves, had largely occupied the discourse.

The concept of reconciliation has thus been co-opted to practice a very different child care policy (see Stratigaki 2004). This policy is based on a new kind of mixed economy of social care, in which child care services are in part replaced by cash benefits for stay-at-home parents and other private carers (Simonen & Kovalainen 1998). One may ask, whether the intensification of “rights talk” already at the turn of the 1990s, turned the attention from day care services to the individual citizens, and thus paved the way for ignoring public social care services in the policy texts on reconciliation of work and family.

I now turn to the discussions on family friendly workplace policies in the texts on reconciliation. I analyze the ways in which corporate social responsibility is demanded from employers, as a reciprocal duty in the context of economic liberalization and increased flexibility requirements for employees. The analysis thus sheds light on the ways in which citizenship is increasingly redefined as a relationship between individuals and the labour market.

## ***Family friendly policies: towards responsible corporate citizenship?***

*“As regards the environment, structure and organization of work, it is recommended that Member States [...] should take and/or encourage initiatives to: 1. support action, in particular within the framework of collective agreements, to create an environment, structure and organization of work which take into account the needs of all working parents with responsibility for the care and upbringing of children” (The Council Recommendation on childcare 1992)*

In the 1980s, the reconciliation of work and family life, primarily family leaves, was discussed in the context of labour legislation and collective labour agreements in Finland. Yet in the policy texts of that time, the obligation of employers to facilitate the reconciliation receives little emphasis. The focus is rather on the public entitlements of working parents, as well as on the function of government in guaranteeing them, e.g. through “regulation of working life” (STM 1983:28, 14).

In the 1990s, the trend was more towards the deregulation of labour market and working relationships (e.g. Antila 2005). At the same time, new ideas – similar to the extract above from European Council Recommendation on childcare – about work-life balance, and the employer’s responsibility to support it, gained weight in Finnish policy texts. These ideas resemble those of ‘corporate social responsibility’ or ‘corporate citizenship’, meaning that corporations should assume responsibility for protecting and facilitating social, civil and political rights of workers and other citizens; thus partly taking over functions for which an expectation was formerly placed solely on the government (Matten, Crane & Chapple 2002). The diffusion of these kind of ideas was closely linked to the process of European integration, and it happened largely under equality and employment policy.<sup>3</sup>

The most obvious example of this policy is the reform of the Finnish Act on Equality between Women and Men, which began in 1991. At the time, the Act, which had come into force in 1987, was criticized by gender equality experts. It had not met the expectations and had left the private industry untouched (Bruun 2000, 106; STM 1992:13). Furthermore, it was topical

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<sup>3</sup> Since 1990, Finland and other member countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) had negotiated with the European Community about the Agreement creating the European Economic Area (EEA). The EEA Agreement – which would make the EEA states to take over Community legislation on “the four freedoms” of the Internal Market as well as on relevant policy areas – was signed in May 1992, the year that Finland had also submitted the application for EU membership. The EEA Agreement came into force in 1994. Three of four Finnish government bills from the 1990s that mention ‘reconciliation of work and family life’ are bound up with the enactment of EC directives.

“to assess the possible requirements for revision of Finnish equality legislation due to the Equality Directives of the European Communities” (Kom 1992:35, 2). The report of the committee responsible for the reform emphasizes the necessity to facilitate the reconciliation of work and family responsibilities “in practice”. It affirms twice that “attention must be paid more than today to the facts that may impede this reconciliation in the working life” (Kom. 1992:35, 50, 97; see nearly identical paragraph in STM 1992:13, 14).

Eventually in 1995, the term “reconciliation of working life and family life” was taken up in the Finnish law. In the revised Equality Act, it is referred to as “employer’s duty to promote gender equality”, and it states that the employer must “facilitate the reconciliation of working life and family life for women and men” (206/1995). In general, the employer’s obligations to promote equality were tightened up in the revised Act (Bruun 2001, 106). The Equality Act is still the only act in Finland in which reconciliation is mentioned.

All the documents that focus on the reconciliation of work and family, published during the period of (1985–)1994–1998 under public administration, call attention to the environment, structure or organization of work, and indicate close links to the European Union as well as to equality issues (e.g. TM 1994; STM 1995; TM 1996;1998). Adjustments to the new duty were not without problems, however. Still at the turn of the millennium, the notion of “family friendly workplace” was critically discussed:

*“In Finland, the reconciliation of work and family life has been perceived mainly as a challenge for social policy. An extensive day care system and family leaves make it easier for parents of young children to take part in the labour market. In countries where the tax-paid welfare state is weaker than the Nordic model, the workplaces have their own policies for the reconciliation of working and family life. Especially under labour shortage, companies attract employees with a “family friendly” image.” (Kom. 1999:1, 47).*

Despite such doubtful remarks, the monopoly of the public sector in supporting the reconciliation of work and family was increasingly called into question, and companies were encouraged to promote equality and wellbeing by introducing family friendly measures. First, starting from the mid 1990s, several European Social Fund projects with the objective of improving work environment from the perspective of work-life balance were introduced. Many of these community research and development projects, often carried out by different training centres or institutes, were at least partly targeted at work organizations representing different branches. The project workers typically surveyed workplace attitudes towards

employees' family responsibilities, and interviewed supervisors and staff about the family (un)friendly everyday practices, rationalities and moralities in the organizations. They organized workshops and in-service training on work-life issues, or designed special training programs for planning and initiating good practices in the companies. Project publications, magazine articles and open seminars communicated these results to a wider audience (e.g. TM 1994; 1996; 1998; STAKES 2004; Palmenia 2007; MONIKKO-hanke 2008).

Second, labour market organizations readily accepted the offered role as social partners in discussing the reconciliation of work and family, and more generally, in implementing EU regulations on working life in tripartite cooperation (Bruun 2000, 107–108). Already in 1998, for example, a tripartite working group was set up to discuss the gendered take-up of family leaves and the (possibly new) division of their costs, but the group, divided in opinion, did not make any proposals (STM 2001:28). This was followed by a considerable public debate about the costs of family leaves to employers. The costs fell chiefly on organizations employing women in Finland, such as the service sector, and were also a reason for discrimination of young women in the labour market (see e.g. Kom. 1999:1, 39–41; TemaNord 1999:559, 65–66, MLL 2001, 48–50). One of the employers' organizations, Employers' Confederation of Service Industries, had even proposed an equal division of parental leave between men and women by law. The proposal was refused by other labour market organizations.

As a result, all the three parties put their hope in male parents' free choice to take more leave. They communicated optimistic calculations about the minor effect of father's parental leave on the family economy, and made an effort to change 'family unfriendly' attitudes towards men's leaves in work communities. The incomes policy agreements 2000–2001 and 2001–2003 included measures for the reconciliation of work and family (STM 2001:28; Aikalisä perheelle 2002). In 2001, another tripartite working group (mentioned above) discussed paternity and parental leaves and proposed a reform (STM 2001: 8). In 2002, the central labour organizations organized a campaign for a more equal use of family leaves between men and women. They arranged six regional seminars with press conferences that promoted fathers' use of those leaves (Aikalisä perheelle 2002).

In these and similar efforts, the responsibilities, were often translated into a new, positive language. They underscored the "business case" and a win-win situation, as the extract below demonstrates:

*“Family-friendliness may provide a competitive edge when recruiting employees. In particular, the most sought-after experienced professionals between 30 and 40 years of age – above all, in information-intensive sectors requiring individual top-level expertise – might value an enterprise’s family-oriented image. An enterprise loses a key motivation factor if the personnel policy does not value the requirements of family life at a time when family is a crucial value in employees’ lives.” (Kom. 1999:1, 37; English translation Com. 1999:1eng.)*

This kind of new perspective on employees’ family life questioned the predominant ‘negative’ view, according to which family leaves cause the organization only additional economic costs and other complications. It was argued that, on the contrary, the leaves also provide benefits for the workplace community and the whole organization. Since balanced family life was not regarded as a burden but a resource for employees’ wellbeing at work, both employers and employees would benefit from it.

Writing from the contexts of the United States and the United Kingdom, Dirk Matten, Andrew Crane and Wendy Chapple (2002) contend that the socially responsible role of businesses is a consequence of the “neo-liberal revolution of the 1980s”, where government drew back from many of its previous functions in order to “facilitate a greater variety and intensity of civil rights, such as those embodied in the ‘free’ market” (e.g. property rights). They argue that in the industrialized world, ‘corporate citizenship’ consists of a “partial attempt, motivated by self-interest, to take over those unserved governmental functions that were the result of a cutback in social rights two decades ago”.

Although this argument does not entirely apply to the case of reconciliation of work and family in Finland, it may indicate one possible future direction. In Finland, the new responsibilities seem to have emerged gradually through cross-border influences and policy learning in a context of welfare state redesign, globalizing economy and increasing flexibility of work. However, reconciliation policies at workplace – if taken into consideration at all – have not come to imply major undertakings, such as setting up workplace nurseries (e.g. Salmi 2004, 174). They are rather about creating a positive attitude towards family leaves, organizing information campaigns about them or maybe hiring a temporary nanny for the child of a key employee. The national version of corporate citizenship has therefore a ‘third way’ image rather than a neo-liberal one.

I next analyse the rights and responsibilities attached to these family leaves in the policy texts on reconciliation. In them, citizenship is renegotiated as a relationship between gendered individuals and a particular community, the family, and between individual citizens within that community. I pay special attention to the aspect of gender, as well as other patterns of inclusion and exclusion.

### ***Family leave: Gendering rights and gendered responsibilities in families***

By 2007, the list of family leaves with cash benefits had become long. All were justified by the need to facilitate reconciliation. During the first year of the child, parents were entitled to maternity, paternity and parental leave, including partial parental leave and a father's quota. After that they had access to child care leave until the child turned three. Then there were the options of partial child care leave, temporary child-care leave and absence for compelling family reasons; the latter a European newcomer of 1998 in the Finnish family leave system.<sup>4</sup> In addition, people who took care of other family members or fellows were entitled to job alternation leave. Many of these leaves were intensively developed during the 1990s and 2000s, creating thus new possibilities for refamilialization of care.

I suggest that the public investment in family leaves denotes a communitarian emphasis on the individual's responsibility to her or his family, as part of a more general appeal to 'family/basic values', 'community' and 'personal and collective responsibility' (Lister 1997, 20). In the communitarian tradition, citizenship involves an informal membership of a community, "inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging" (Werbner & Yuval-Davis 1999, 4, in Hobson & Lister 2002, 23). I now look at the ways in which some of these attributes figure around two of these leaves with different gender implications.

The first example, parental leave with an income-based allowance, is often discussed in terms of rights during the decades from 1980s to 2000s. The rights frame is used mostly in the context of gender equality, in sentences that remind readers of equal rights between men and women. The status of rights is enunciated especially when addressing parental leave of male

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<sup>4</sup> In the 1990s and 2000s, the policy texts on reconciliation of work and family life no longer mentioned public home help service as a solution for urgencies in which a sick child needed a caretaker or a dirty house a clean up. Instead, parents were advised to buy commercial household services to manage their everyday life (e.g. STAKES 1999, 2) or take a temporary leave.

parents, e.g. “the committee sets great store by encouraging fathers to use their right to parental leave” (Kom 1980:23, 98; see also STM 1983:28, 6, 15, 17; STM 2001:28, 15).

The crucial question remained, however, as to why did not fathers exercise their legal right to parental and other family leaves. In this respect, equality policy, with its function of equalizing social rights and roles between the sexes (Holli 1992, 82), had not succeeded. To redress this failure, an incentive for male parents was designed during the 2000s, and the father’s month came into force finally in 2007. It means that if the male parent has the two last weeks of the parental leave, the family is entitled to an extra paternity leave up to two weeks. Moreover, partial parental leave was introduced in 2003 as another means to encourage male and female parents to take turns in caring for their child by working split shifts.

In these policies, gender is explicitly considered, and the traditional feminist idea of sharing familial responsibilities between women and men is discursively connected to the reconciliation of work and family (Stratigaki 2004). The sharing is, however, largely limited to heterosexual nuclear families. For example, partial parental allowance was not payable to single parents. A male parent, who did not live in the same household as the mother, was not entitled to any parental leave. Similarly, it was only from 2007 that same-sex partners in a registered partnership were able to share the eligibility for parental allowance, with the exception of the father’s month. This is in contrast to heterosexual couples, for whom cohabitation, but not marriage, was a precondition of the entitlement. These restrictions are one example of the exclusionist character of citizenship rights.

The second example, child care leave with the related flat-rate allowance, was integrated in the Finnish family leave system in 1985. It offered a compromise to the old political conflict between left-wing and centre parties on child care, which had existed since the late 1960s. It is predominantly partial child-care leave, however, that has been thought to increase the “individual chances of parents to reconcile working and family life” (HE 166/1987). The possibility to reduce working time (normally to six hours/day and 30 hours/week) due to child care was introduced in 1988. At first, partial child-care leave was available for children under the age of four, and for children attending the first term of the first year in basic education. During the 1990s and 2000s, the entitlement was gradually extended to apply to children up to the end of the second year of their education, or even until the age of 18 in case of a disabled

or chronically ill child. In 2003, it was specified that although both parents were not entitled to partial child-care leave simultaneously, they both were allowed to share it during the same period of time (HE 22/2003; see also HE 37/1998). The specification demonstrates that the leave was not primarily designed for sharing occupational and familial responsibilities between the heterosexual couple, but rather for supporting the individual reconciliation of a parent (Stratigaki 2004).

So, of which gender is this “parent”? The draft laws give some indication of this. Even though partial child-care leave is written into labour legislation, its’ rights status remains questionable. The use and detailed arrangements of the leave are based on an agreement between employer and employee. An employer may decline granting such leave only if the leave would “cause serious inconvenience to production or service operations” that could not “be avoided through reasonable rearrangements of work”. The conditions, under which such refusal would be allowed, are discussed in the government bills (HE 166/1987; 37/1998; 22/2003):

*“In branches and jobs, in which employees must work simultaneously in equal shifts, reducing daily working time [...] may be difficult to the degree that the employer cannot, within (reasonable) limits, be presumed working arrangements that would enable the partial child care leave of a single employee. On the other hand, if there are already many part time employees in the workplace, this may be regarded as sort of proof for that the working hours of a whole time employee may be reduced by mutual consent. [...] the production and service techniques used [...] may be a reason to justify the employer’s refusal to agree on partial child care leave.” (HE 22/2003).*

In this extract, one constraint on the freedom of choice is inscribed in law-drafting documents. Despite the gender neutral language, the conditions are in fact deeply gendered. To illustrate, in an earlier government bill on the subject, the equal shifts are explicitly connected to processing industry and manufacturing industry using shift work (HE 166/1987). In general, in the gender segregated labour market of Finland, the great majority of employees in manufacturing industries are men, whereas the service sector is more filled by women (Maliranta & Napari 2007). Central lines of the named process industry, e.g. chemical and steel industries, are clearly male-dominated branches (ibid.). Part time employees, instead, are most commonly found in branches such as retail trade, restaurant and hotel businesses (Hulkko & Pärnänen 2006). In these lines of business, most of the employees are women; and in fact, women work part-time more than twice as much as men in Finland (ibid.). The reference to “production and service techniques” is also emblematic, since the whole

expression “service technique” is rather rare in Finnish language, compared to the term “production technique”.

This example demonstrates the gendered undertone of the discourse on reconciliation of work and family, as well as the way in which it is used to define particularly women’s citizenship. It also makes obvious the false universalism typical for Nordic countries, which tends to render forms of gendered discrimination invisible (e.g. Hobson 2002). According to the law, if the employer and the employee do not reach agreement on the leave arrangements, the employee is still entitled to one period of partial child-care leave in a calendar year, which would reduce the regular working hours to 6 hours per day (HE 22/2003). However, this option does not undo the unequal positions of different parties and different employees in the negotiating processes aiming at agreement.

## **Conclusion and discussion**

*“New social risk policies can be broadly understood as investment, supporting economic competitiveness by expanding the workforce, rather than as an additional burden of welfare consumption. They thus fit the discourse shift from neo-Keynesian to ‘pragmatic monetarist’ strategies at the economic level” (Larsen & Taylor-Gooby 2004, 183.)*

In this paper, I have analyzed rights, responsibilities and practices of citizenship in (European) Finland, by examining policy texts on reconciliation of work and family life from 1980s to 2000s. In Finland, this discourse is nowadays more about care than paid work obligations, which might be in contrast to some other European countries. The analysis indicates that, beside the Nordic ‘social democratic’ tradition of citizenship, there are two other, ascending and intertwined conceptions of citizenship, that appear in the problematization of social care in the texts. First, a liberal tradition of citizenship, emphasizing social and consumer rights and the freedom of choice of individual citizens, has intensified in the policy texts gradually during all the three decades. Second, a communitarian tradition of citizenship, articulating civic virtues, duties and citizenship obligations to the citizenship community, especially the family, appears to have gained strength by the turn of the millennium.

This new re-articulation of citizenship is combined with a move towards a mixed economy of social care in the discourse on reconciliation of work and family life. In this discourse, citizenship as a relationship between individuals and the welfare state has been transformed. The social right to public day care is largely ignored in the texts on reconciliation, while the rights to family leave receive much more attention. At the same time, citizenship as a relationship to the market (labour market or the market of care services) and to different communities, primarily the family, has become stronger. The re-privatization or re-familialization of care implies that above all families are to assume more responsibility for the care of their children, whereas employers and organizations are asked to support them, by means of family leaves and flexible working time arrangements.

It is noteworthy that especially when the new partners for care, such as employers and male parents, are addressed, the obligation talk disappears and is replaced with a rhetoric of freedom of choice. This manifests how the emphasis on obligations, duties and responsibilities can be found both in a strand of neo-liberal thought and in communitarianism (see Hobson & Lister 2002, 31–32). In addition to communitarianism, neoliberal economic ideas emphasise the privatisation of responsibility for others, and the withdrawal of the public sector from many aspects of care (Stychin 2003, 3). As regards communitarianism, in this case, it represents child care both as a civic duty and as the highest calling through which the (female) citizen's full potential is realized (cf. Hobson & Lister 2002, 24).

### ***Reconciliation of work and family as a new social risk?***

In the policy texts I have analysed, the topic of reconciliation of work and family life is not discussed in terms of social risks. One may thus ask, whether it makes sense to conceptualize the 'reconciliation of work and family' – or rather the inability of such reconciliation – as a (new social) risk. One may admit that a kind of risk rationality is often inherent in the reconciliation policies. The policies are usually legitimized through objectifying calculations, which are based on demographic and other statistical knowledge about particular features of the members of the population (see Ewald 1991), even though this practice is rarely discussed in the literature on new social risks.

I argue, however, that there are certain weaknesses in the conceptualization of reconciliation of work and family as a new social risk. First, like modernization theories, this

conceptualization tends to reproduce the idea of a more or less universal social evolution from agrarian to industrial to post-industrial society, which different welfare states go through. In the context of Nordic countries and especially Finland, the differentiation of ‘old’ and ‘new’ social risks is not very illuminating (see Timonen 2004), since the development has not proceeded in such a clear temporal order. Rather, the social security system has been created from the 1950s onwards to include *both* pensions, health care, sickness and unemployment benefits, *and* maternal (and later paternal and parental) leave and child care services. Since the early 1970s, the benefit and service structures have strongly encouraged a ‘universal breadwinner model’. Therefore, it is often assumed in the new social risk literature that “in Nordic countries, [...] where new risk regimes were established earlier, the risks are in general catered for within the existing settlement” (Taylor-Gooby 2004b, 224). As the analysis has shown, this view is somewhat misleading, because it takes no notice of significant changes in relevant welfare policy during the 1990s and 2000s.

Second and more important, in this conceptualization, the existence of certain common challenges for welfare states, the ‘new social risks’, is largely taken for granted. Even though there are interesting discussions about diverse policy-making processes and a certain policy paradigm around new social risks (e.g. Taylor-Gooby 2004a; Larsen & Taylor-Gooby 2004) the question of identifying these new risks – the power of problem definition and policy agenda setting – receives little explicit attention (see Ewald 1991, 199). Similarly to such approaches to welfare state change that highlight either inevitable ‘external factors’ (e.g. globalization, cross-national competition) or ‘internal factors’ (e.g. demographic shifts, changes in family structure) but ignore the political aspect in their articulation, the discussion on new social risks tends to overlook the role of public authorities and different experts, actors and organizations in formulating the risk of reconciliation of work and family, and using it to promote certain policies. In my view, if there is any coherence in the conceptualization of the reconciliation of work and family as a ‘new social risk’, it is based on European-wide governance around the subject, rather than on the process of ‘postindustrialization’ as such.

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## Beyond representational security....

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The intuitive understanding of representation follows the logic of who is to be concerned and what is to be concerned, or who become gathered around the issue, and what is the object of concern, or what is the right procedure and what is the correct account, or what is the publics and what is the audience. The counter intuition reminds us of the importance of witnessing, of how such acts and events make place or our place in the world. Within the realm of non-representational theory the question is about attending differences and witnessing potentially unfamiliar elements by problematizing the representational setup and the forms of knowledge, especially the mechanisms of regulating the act of representation. It needs constant maintenance and loyalty, and it leads to follow its pragmatic power functions (easy communication of ideas to restrict their potential extension; sustainable, defensible and consensual agreement in understanding). Thus the non-representational approach is to excavate the blind spots between the lines of representational meaning in order to see what is also possible. The representational system is not wrong, the problem lies in the belief that it offers complete understanding – in fact there are staggering representation and stable representations whose basic meanings no one any longer contest, they become “immutable mobiles”.

\*\*\* The standard (Enlightenment) model with its emphasis on truth and fact becomes threadbare: seems unable any more to cover instances of knowledge and belief that are crucial to the functioning of daily life; understands that the knower is an individual (shift to the collective was feared because of indoctrination by authority and persuasion by social pressure): is ill equipped to deal with the historical development of knowledge, especially the significance of shifting from substantive to active participles, from knowledge and belief to knowing and believing, as well as the view that the mental and the real, the personal and the objective evolve side by side when the difference between them “is of practical convenience and varies at every moment” (T.S. Eliot).

## The Social (Security) Question <sup>1</sup>

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The human and social sciences replaced the “divine” and the “human” in the aftermath of crisis of religion and metamorphoses of enlightenment intellectualism with social bonds, narratives and social texts, both deserving unprecedented understanding and condemning us to the lightness of provisory orientations and decline of socio-moral authority. How should the subject now connect human beings’ thought and his being in the world? Be it a verge, an ordeal or an unmarked space, it is not an empty space. There is no straightforward loss of sociality, no erosion of texture for society, no clear hole in the fabric of cultural patterns. It is tempting to say that becoming singled out from the others appears rather as reciprocity of stranger and as normative ambivalence. Rethinking the art of “normative conscience” does not get in trouble just with the “malady of *uncertainty*” but also with the “malady of *ideality*” (Kristeva 2007) that confronts us with pre-religious and pre-political forms of belief – the mind that wants to believe may be unable to believe or easily turns itself into its opposite.

Modern society seems incapable of understanding secularized conscience and the structuring need of ideality: it combines its destruction of concrete cultural constellations and weakening of patterning the world with an eagerness to deal innovatively with actions and representations that create their own reality. The quirk or the predicament cannot be solved by incredulity or credulity or by knowingness or ignorance, but by relatedness and engagement that stand as alternatives to (or as emergent forms that

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<sup>1</sup> Social Policy Association Conference 23<sup>rd</sup> – 25<sup>th</sup> June 2008, University of Edinburgh; Scales of Security, Interdisciplinary Workshop 26<sup>th</sup> -27<sup>th</sup> June 2008, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki

supplant) traditional understanding of sociality. Conceptualization of differentiation (of structures, labor, value spheres, social circles, fields of action, functions) seems as the key aspect in understanding it.<sup>2</sup>

Instead of doctrines of positive ties we should look at people's engagements with new objects and events and take a closer look at the notion of *lack*, that is to say, at the path, structure, the symbolic and the *eigenvalue* of lack (deficiency; Mangel). Its origin lies even in the Christian experience of God, in complex figurations of guilt and in old world layers of historical experience. Despite the secularization process, the conscience has persisted. It is still the unsearchable call of problem conscience that is often taken for granted as the standard of life and as the instance to determine legitimacy. Esoteric aspects and corrective liturgies of social questions, virtuous circles that allow the achieving of alleviation and *horror vacui* that often surrounds their absorption may be given as examples (Daston & Park 2001). Below I will discuss three historical paradigms of lack through rethinking of the categories for the analysis of *the plague*, *the social question* and *the social problem*. The focus is on the *social question*, but the first one reveals the problematic of apparitions and the third one the rationales of decisions and definitions – both relevant for the historical understanding of problems. Before coming to them I will present a few preliminary remarks.

### The problematic and the cartography

The world as a *permanent riddle* poses questions and demands answers. It can also encounter *enigma* where no final answers can be given and new questions will always emerge. The cluster of adjacent notions, such as uncertainty, contingency, and unpredictability is often understood normatively as threat and danger, conceptualized by the notion of risk and hardly ever thematized and made explicit. Concrete cultural constellations will require sociological analysis, but this interpretation of the world does not, however, adequately emphasize aspects of the humanly created and therefore problematizable world. To reach this, another stance to the concrete world is introduced as *world interrogation* understood as explicit problematization of the world, in other words as problematization or as questioning that is not satisfied just with mere ways of lending meaning to the world (cf. Duruing 2004). It should be added that the invisible world (horizon of latent meaning contexts) and the visible world (embodied or concrete cultural constellations) provoke different levels of questions and responses. Furthermore, a concept of *shared thematics* – characterized by a tension between abstract guiding

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<sup>2</sup> "At the most general level, differentiation could be interpreted as the assembling of the society in different contexts of action. Each of these contexts have, for their part, disparate criteria of relevance when it come to the subject matter or theme of action and interaction, to the criteria of inclusion and exclusion from interaction and communication and to the criteria of defining the time perspectives of different contexts" which makes "the roots of current problem-issues related to the difficulties of organizational enactments between the differentiated spheres of subsystems of society understandable. When trying to harmonize the incommensurable logic of different action contexts, they find themselves as hollow generalists in the middle of a paradoxical situation – '*lost in translations*'" (R.Eräsaari, A.Hyrkäs, R.Kangas, A.Silvast, M.Virtanen: *Lost in translations*, A Research Plan, 2008).

principles and concrete realities of society – is needed to represent the notions of societal problems that are questioned. Imaginaries, repertoires, and political representations are mediators between general principles and perceived realities.<sup>3</sup>

A more focused attention has to be given to analyses of styles of reasoning, modes of perception, modes of thematization (framing), processes of constructing cognitive structures of different levels and to the discursive processing of cultural models of reality. Normally *framing* is the theory to make out and to tell decisive characteristics that differ from same kind of cases constituted unmoulded outside the boundaries of the frame. A similar content is that of *ostentation*. But when frame emphasizes surrounding or embedding features, ostentation is an inherent quality that, even as a terminative quality structure, may appear as the boundary of it, marking the boundary where the problem constellation reaches itself and is able to sustain. While emphasizing its own specific quality (relevant for example in trying to find out how people conceptualize problems and uncertainty), ostentation also means an act of making demands on its own “skill”, “ability” or “means” of behaving as a “problem”. This “non-descriptive” (not oriented towards correspondence with reality) and “constructive” presentation emphasizes the idea that we cannot jump outside from the inside because things are too closely included in all we experience and because they are entangled in our ways of making sense of the internal goings-on of things. The opposite of this would be the attitude of stripping away the accoutrements of these qualities, also from their threat – if that is possible to think or say. So the ostentatious means giving a chance to imagining the “authentic” – seen from a different angle, to escape the quasi inherent (nature), the ready-made immanent (discourse), or the internal (organized structure or mind) – reality of problems. The aim is to achieve deeper meanings of *prevalence* and *pervasiveness*, of the *marked* (e.g. focused figure) and *unmarked* (e.g. unaccented ground) features of problems, and to get a better understanding on the mechanisms of *scandalization* (bringing into reprehension) of problems, or emerging transitional stages of problematizations.<sup>4</sup>

We might speak about Eigenproblems that are regulated by *Eigenstructures* (Stichweh 2006, Stichweh 2003). They reproduce pre-existent cultural diversity and push it back

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<sup>3</sup> If security as the condition of being protected against loss, as safety, as something that has been secured, as perception of security and as actual security, as fields of security, as an emerging paradigm of human security, as institutionalized social security etc. is reduced to the factual and thematic dimension “security in relation to the non-emergence of future disadvantages does not give anything”, writes Niklas Luhmann (1993, 134). Sociologically seen the security concept represents “social fiction” and “we ought to ask what is in social communication treated as secure”. That’s why the security experts use the risk concept “to exactly define security endeavours in a calculative way”, he concludes. Therefore “the concept of security is an empty concept” and it only works as “a reflexion concept”. See also Heikki Patomäki: “Human Security: A Conceptual Analysis” (Background paper, 2008) who stresses that a conception of security oriented towards future dangers emerged with the European modernity. The Latin *securitas* refers to tranquility and freedom of care and absence of anxiety. Patomäki’s focus is on human security “as a framework for providing alternative causal explanations of violence and war”.

<sup>4</sup> A cartography like this however suffers from lack of conceptual push: explorative analysis gives a promising start out with conceptual frames that yet is then left hanging. Peter Wagner (2006, 3) says the “conceptual labor” permits “the usage of the concept across very different contexts and identifies the common problematique that finds very different expressions according to circumstances”.

over long stretches of historical time, creating new social and cultural patterns of their own. They do not delineate social change as a substitution of new structure in place of old structures, but hypothesizes plural levels of formations which means that new structures overlay but do not extinguish old structures. We may speak about events as significant forms of Eigenstructures: they evolve via reflexive constitution that includes both descriptions and representations, and identify a role for themselves via these reflexive representations. These new levels push back – but do not eliminate – the international relevance of margins and regions. Thus they may be capable of introducing into the discussion specific producers of diversity (functional differentiation, multiplication of organizations, small-world scales of security, pluralization of epistemic communities, and differentiation of problem events). It belongs to the logic of Eigenstructures that newly arising processes of diversity can be observed both as a penetrating Eigenstructure and as interaction processes (Stichweh 2006).

Existing research on these problem constellations is a very small field and small body of literature.<sup>5</sup> Social policy and sociology research is often too rigorous epistemologically (see Boltanski & Thévenot 2006). Social science history needs documents that are difficult to get (Kettunen 2008). History of ideas takes us to the intellectual roots, but the aspect of interrogation is underdeveloped. Conceptual history (Ankersmit 2005) is helpful in bringing new awareness of the nature of social life through interpretation and representational analysis, but does not really have the means to keep the problem concept and the use of that concept as separate. If the disputants are genuinely arguing about problems, they must have the same concept of what constitutes the problem. What I think is needed is a *history of concepts of problems*.<sup>6</sup>

The question of ideas and problems to which those ideas may provide solutions, is necessarily an interdisciplinary process.<sup>7</sup> Studies in science and technology studies as well as in historical epistemology and historical ontology (Hacking 2002) have provided conceptual help. Philosophical anthropology (Blumenberg 2001, Blumenberg 1996, Blumenberg 1986) and related generalist approaches (Hirschman, Sahlins, Stichweh) have helped in trying to grasp broader orientations. The process (the progress), the structure (the furrow), the symbolic (the meaning horizon) or the real (the representation) of the problems need to be approached through specific concepts and definitions, not by the intention of peeling them like an ‘onion’ layer by layer in the hope of reaching the

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<sup>5</sup> New interpretations on certain complacent view of the performance of (emerging elements of) the welfare state speak for example about “over-optimistic view” of “the influence of well-balanced and hard-earned research” (see the interview of Peter Townsend, “Making Poverty History”, The Guardian, 2 April, 2008).

<sup>6</sup> This goes together with greater reflexivity on the part of the researcher with respect to the models in use in his own collectivity. But comparative historical or international perspective, statistical measurements, informative explorations need to be combined with a questioning of moral and political grammars such as one finds in Peter Wagner’s work on the history of the social sciences (Wagner 2001, Wagner 2006).

<sup>7</sup> The (most) exciting thing about interdisciplinarity is not the offering of new ways of rendering science accountable to society or forging closer relations between scientific research and innovation, but the orientation towards effecting ontological transformations in the objects and relations of research, such as recognition of the importance of ontological claims of environment or art-science and the grasp of social life of technical objects (see Andrew Barry, Georgina Born and Gisa Weszkalnys: Logics of Interdisciplinarity, *Economy and Society* 37(2008), 1, 20-49).

essence. So, once more: *ostentation* refers to mechanisms of attracting attention; *interpretation* refers to meanings found and jettisoned within cultural, historical and literary context; *imagination* refers to long term work of images elaborated in great metaphors and comparisons, and to what is grasped or invented of something; finally *representation* refers to an account of social reality and the symbolic through mediating guiding principles and social realities as a mirror or as an “action” of understanding, as something to stand or substitute for something, or as something that makes the absent present through visualization.

### Projecting the Plague

The Plague is both a fatal epidemic and a specific disease. The frames vary from the global (punishment for our sins, conjunctures of the planets, changes in the quality of the air) to the local (unburied corps, public hygiene) and to survival techniques (prayers, flagellants, fending of the miasma, performing autopsies). The reason for the disappearance of the plague from Western and Central Europe after the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century is a disputed question. Depending on the stance taken it can be conceived as a frame for *ambient fear*, as an ostentation that attracts attention as *Zeitschmerz* or *dread* that is used as imagination of *punishment* for sins, and as a representation lumping together the theme of *securitization* or the spread of *quarantine* and *panic*. In his *A Journal of the Plague Year (1721) representing the London plague of 1665* Daniel Defoe could assail the doctrine of the divine right and enjoy the context where his fellow countrymen had rid themselves of a monarch (James II) who had showed absolutist tendencies. In a sense Defoe became a harbinger of modernity and virtuoso to make use of the metatopical space.

In his “*Essays upon Projects*” he developed ideas of the “Projecting Age” whose common denominator is “universal correspondence” and “government by taste”. He was also able to illustrate the above mentioned risk ascription of the plague even if the epidemic was generally depicted as a religious experience. Moreover the context was one where traditional views about eternity and time were undergoing a change (Bruno, Newton, Boyle). Following the distinction between past indicating experience and future indicating expectations, we may say that the sense of time was derived with the help of *apparitions* from interaction between “*Erfahrungsraum*” and “*Erwartungshorizon*” as qualitative change where the future was full of fear but still faced with optimism as possible changes (thus criticizing Milton’s anachronisms in his “*Paradise Lost*”).

Aspects of taste, economic conditions and emergence of the public space should be examined in detail but without forgetting unexpected sights, ghostly figures and the art of becoming visible. At the same time the fear of moral decay, final destruction and the end of the world (interrogation) was startlingly present. Thus the imagination of plague is rather in the context of spiritual awakening than that of modern progress, emergence

of society or constitution of the societal. Defoe's fabricated journal distinguishes these things as "strange facts" from invented marvels.<sup>8</sup>

### Articulating the Social Question

Effects of new industrial and urban civilization that rapidly changed living and working conditions in many European nations during the 19<sup>th</sup> century are collectively referred as "*the social question*" (*die soziale Frage*). The political action to alleviate the lack of basic things and security was based on extensive empirical analysis of the underlying conditions, often formed simultaneously with the question of national identity. In this domain of *first order* problems, avalanche of printed numbers and classification was a novel obsession. Body (population) politic, quantification and sober realism of first order problems helped to reorder the recalcitrant domain where the cohesion could not be taken for granted. A social question need not accurately describe a real state of affairs to be a question: what is required is that it be thought to be an actual condition by some agent.<sup>9</sup>

According to Polanyi's polemic the 19<sup>th</sup> century was both a historical aberration and a societal disaster. The reform-friendly historical school of economics (Schmoller) did neither grasp the economy as a reproduction circle (of abstract value and utilities) nor accepted sentiments as the common sense (sympathy) to resolve the tension between motives and balance, but focused their attention to the natural world of formative drive,

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<sup>8</sup> Instead of empirical discovery or normative definition we ought to speak about deep impressions of reality, the impact of vital traditions and the recognition of *apparitions* (Lewis 2004). Apparition narratives are located halfway between imagination and solid foundation. There is *only* the appearance, thus apparition should not be confused with visits by angels or devils. Nor do apparitions have any necessary moral implication (cf. the cult of the invisible hand). Apparition narratives did not validate the economy of knowledge but the emerging literary practices of representing apparitions. John Frazer's popular 1707 treatise *Deuterokopia (Second Sight)* defined apparitions as "representation[s]" linked to "future contingent event[s]", in other words representations before representation, says Lewis (2005, 89) adding that "[I]f apparitions 'were' anything, then, they were representations of the oddly static conditions of their own sightings".

<sup>9</sup> The social science tradition makes gradually clear the growing importance of cognitive categories in the constituting of society and established a strong relation between collective cognitive categories and the collective to which people are assumed to belong. Categories are understood as people's social memberships and as strengthening and maintenance of order and ensuring its reproduction. The difficulties of coordinating actions (difficulties that greatly preoccupy human beings in their social life) are widely simplified: "they come down to the distinction between collectives due to the disparate representations they are informed by". The difference between cognition and coordination should however be emphasized. First it became explored in terms of the relation between statistics and policy which is the dominant form in social question but has an effect also on social problem tradition which still continues. But in fact they are two distinct cognitive formats. Cognitive representation (cf. cognitive economy) is more closely related to political representation which is characterized by a variety of representing modes (often treated by sociologists as subjection of knowledge to interests and manipulation) whereas cognitive generalization seeks to be valid for a kind of coordination that may potentially extend to humanity at large (evaluation taking the format of the common good), but it also characterizes "the actor's access to reality", and the way the actor grasps it so as to coordinate his behavior within a certain apprehension of time (Thévenot 2007a, 410, 414-415).

sensibility and need as the basis for *Volkswirtschaft* and productivity. Economy was the first dimension of civil society to achieve independence from the polity, but in this case the economic alone was not seen as competent of achieving the ordered, peaceful and productive condition without the active state. The presuppositions of this domain were to tell what seems problematic and questionable and determine under the aegis of “transparent representation” what became to be viewed as social question.

Besides commercial profitability, also value judgments of *Sozialpolitik* based on ethical standards, principles of *Sittlichkeit* and of historical evolution became an orientation factor. This created a dispute with the analytically oriented academics (Max Weber) who thought that the descriptive economists had succumbed to superficialities and banalities of value relations. Thus the management of the social question and the society that emerge to make sure the revolution is closed, were based on invariable value of tradition and patriotic quasi-municipalized administration, fusion of evaluation (*Wertung*) and value-relation (*Wertbezug*), tension between development stages and ideals types, blurred boundaries between religion, thought and glorification of culture (Rabinow 2003). The ideology was honored as a model of collective order until the second world-war, but as a consequence civic culture broke down, social order was linked to spectacle and the state, and an end was spelled to ideas of societal self-regulation. The unprecedented problems were seen as transitional problems in the way to a new social order or as the birth bans of modernity whereas today’s “persistent problematiques” emerge in specific situations and depend on interpretation and weighting of urgency.

The social question was invented to shortcut the nation state and society, not to discover the available models for conceiving of the social bond, the contract (political decision), the market (economic links), and solidarity and insurance (invisible hand of solidarity). The rise of the social referred to a particular sector, to jurisdiction, to new intersections of things, to an innovation, to “civilizing mores” and to governing of population, and came to be accorded something like the sense it was to have at least for the next hundred years. That’s why it is perhaps not correct to say that the social is no longer a “key zone”, target and objective of societal strategies.

### Society as Social Problems

The cosmic context of plague and the historical determinism of the social question seem to be old world issues when compared to the secular vicissitudes characteristic for the context of social problems. Rude objectivism took for granted that societal conditions make the general growing ground for problems. The gradual withdrawal of this landscape brought sensitive diagnoses, political players, community movements and processes as mechanisms by which conditions come to be defined as problematic. An idea of common issues revolves around conflicting viewpoints and tensions between different stances (cf. John Dewey: *The Public and its Problems*, 1927).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> John Dewey (-1952) thought that democracy should be like a giant conversation: the nation talking to itself about its hopes and fears and listening to what other people have to say. The Austrian economist

Neither pure knowledge nor a state authority turned out to be decisive, shared or common semantics that confronts with clash of opinions. Still the consequences of the erosion of old structures, disrupted social life and human misery and the guiding principle that social policy or social engineering brings alleviation had to be taken seriously even if very few scholars any more felt an objective diagnosis or a lucid summation would be possible. In the beginning the threats were seen by an implicit analogy to medical diagnosis (pathology, etiology), but gradually the investigation of diagnostic social scientists was required. This brought functionalist perspectives, subjectivist epistemologies and cultural analyses into the picture. Contextually the affluent society was leveling up standards, broadening choices and enabling provision of public goods but also a new genealogical perspective.

Originating questions had to be dealt with through consideration of the “*rationale of the question*”, i.e. what will be the implications of a successful resolution. Social conditions once regarded as serious problems (witchcraft, miscegenation, homosexuality) are no longer so regarded (both standards of legitimate lifestyles or public perception and social legislation have changed). So, when there no more is consistent relationship between prevalence of given conditions and the public official designation of those conditions and problems, far-reaching problems (cf. race problems) or campaigns (cf. war on poverty) are effectively dropped from the national agenda (but often reappear). The conditions may be real but to term them problems (or to make them become absorbed by the welfare state) requires a judgment (acquisition of its standing as a recognized social problem) not inherent in the condition itself.

Social problems are best seen as projections of collective sentiments and political representations that reflect – not just mirror – judgments emanating from interests of the persons who allege the existence of a problem. As objective conditions and the ebb and flow of problem can vary independently, the study of the process by which putative conditions come to be defined as problems and the re-conceptualizations and institutional practices through which definitions are constructed, become a challenge. The traditional objectivist paradigm dominates (even if definitions more and more depend of claims-making activities) because the phenomenological epistemology is often too abstract even for research personnel. Social problems discourse applies a *concealed normality* conception that speaks in favor of constancy and tried to tame the tension between stability and change. Social problems are “problematic perturbations” which sustain the duality of “*conditions*” of events and events in their “*actual process of change*”. The first conception captures formation and consequences of problems – their historical bloom and decay – through *descriptive representation*. The second one

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Joseph Schumpeter (in *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, written in 1942) pointed out that most people do not think much about politics at all, “the typical citizen drops to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field”, Schumpeter wrote, “he argues an analyses in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests – becomes a primitive again – becomes associative and affective”.

underpins the change itself, *representing (constructing)* the event, trends or processes where the change itself takes place.<sup>11</sup>

To term deviances, inequalities and other conditions *problems* requires an evaluative judgment – a standard or a normality – not inherent in the condition itself. Thus there is a distinction between a real or imagined social condition and its acquisition of the standing as a recognized social problem. In this way, social problems are best seen as projections of collective sentiments and representations rather than as mirrors of social (objective) conditions. Collective sentiments and representations reflect judgments emanating from political, economic, cultural, moral, religious and other interests of the persons who allege the existence of a problem.<sup>12</sup>

### The Uncanniness of Problem Issues

Second modernity has been characterized as a wholesale product of industrialization where problems lose their normality figure and become *risks*. Even if some fascinating openings have been reached from more anthropological and epistemological positions (Douglas) via modernity risks (Luhmann) to precautionary principles (Ewald) and to anthropology of security (Collier), the historical semantics of risk still is somewhat obscure. It refers to technologies of taming and organizing of threats and dangers, to precautionary manoeuvres, to governing of ambiguities and uncertainties, to calculation of possibilities etc., but may also stand for a metaphor of Machiavellian notion of contingency (chance).

“*Security*” has become and is becoming a key organizing concept. It is effectively used on multiple levels. There are active disputes on how to achieve and maintain it. But as the machineries (overwhelming authorities) have been unscrewed, what, in fact, are the means of fundamentally defining the scope of the possible in the contemporary world and how has the present position been attained in terms of understanding, measuring and weighing “security”? Perspectives such as symbolic modeling of the world, performative guidance of events, living in virtual landscape or agora seem to refer to politics of collecting and political representation that gathers the legitimate people around some

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<sup>11</sup> We can imagine *who* are the legitimate people that are gathered around the issue of welfare and *what* is the object of their concern, i.e. the *procedures* have or should have been followed and the matters that have or should have been *portrayed* accurately. This is however schematic and obscure. The problem of representation is not solved by obeying epistemic rules or by having the adequate technical means, but by clarifying the *synchronism* of representing the presences and the causal mechanisms involved in the production of representations, by recognizing the denial of the present by reference to episodic moments or Zeitdiagnose, by clarifying the capacity for symbolic representation, and by clarifying the representative structures.

<sup>12</sup> The objectivist paradigm evaluates certain conditions as problems by definition, and taking for granted the evaluation of those conditions as problems. The subjectivist paradigm tries to gain political acceptance of certain “undesirable” conditions as “social problems”; it focuses on the political processes by which those conditions come to be defined as problems. The two paradigms proceed from different epistemologies and study different topics. The lack of correspondence between *objective social conditions* and the ebb and flow of social *problems* means that the two phenomena can vary independently.

issue in novel ways, following novel procedures of faithful representation for example through representing what is the object of concern to the eyes and ears of those who haven been assembled around it. The hitherto distinction between the *circulation of facts* and the *dissemination of opinions* both seem to be graduating now to the same type of visibility.<sup>13</sup>

To be understood and discussed as problems, their conditions and coordinates need to be opened up (Osborne 2003). When they are uttermost intransparent, complex, ambiguous and unpredictable, they no more are or never emerged as problems but meta-problems. The context maybe out of joints and out of the roots, and it may look like an empty horizon (*Leerhorizont*, Blumenberg). But it has to be filled with something (an observation, a diagnosis, discussion etc.) to find out whether there is a *boundary* whose integrity we must respect (cf. *sensus communis*). Endless pedantic cleaning up of stipulations and preconditions in the hope of getting into the heart of the issue may lead to destruction of the qualifications and conditions of discussion. On the other hand a return to constitutionally good, to conviction (strong evaluation and strong values, Taylor) invites us to think that theories that do not accept the moral typography of self, have to be rejected. Thus they become primarily “theoretical problems”, but as they have an influence on our practice, they are also practical problems that we try to solve with our cultural repertoire. Problems have, consequently, uncanny and unaccountable qualities.

*New plagues* keeps returning, finding resonance-realms within the mind both as a metaphorical event and as a reminder on inevitable irrationality of life (*Camus: La Peste*) and as a condition of infectious pandemic that have been furnished with specific alert levels.

The *new social question* is a frequently used term not only referring to ideological and philosophical crisis of welfare (Rosanvallon, Castel etc.; cf. Weymans 2005) or unintended consequences and side effects that cannot be directly recognized, but also to the contemporary reality in which the “social question” has shifted from the overall system to the most vulnerable segment of the population, people and groups whose exclusion is a result of a process, not of a given social condition, within which society is seen to be unable to keep groups and individual within reach of what is expected as a society. The notion that order and meaning somehow emerge out of innumerable individual decisions appears as an assumption to ensure a level of playing field – the marketplace of ideas, of goods, or of new technologies – in which the best outcome would emerge

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<sup>13</sup> Contemporary advances encourage the shifting of the focus of the question: “Instead of faulting the realism of the savant, one takes an interest in that of the agent and of his modes of apprehension of reality since, in the case of the sciences of society, that agent is an integral part of the object”, Thévenot (2007, 238) remarks. Thus beyond the conventional oppositions between implicit and explicit or informal and formal forms of knowledge and beyond the normal knowledge requirements, “new fields of research open when one turns attention to the variety of formats in which the agent grasps the environment”.

*Everyday social problems* solving is aiming at the social impact of individual behavior, and not at moral correction for example through arguing in terms of cost efficiency and not of personal conversion. At the same time there is greater continuity between individual and collective action as well as addressing beneficiaries of services like customers and citizens as shareholders. It is leadership – not people – who inherit social bureaucracies, welfare (wellness) ethos and professions (expertise), and no one believes that broad masses of a nations worry about societal problems.<sup>14</sup> They worry about imaginable problems influenced by mediating epistemologies, political representation and politics of cognition, and may be influenced by neuroscience seeking to explain conscience as a function of the human brain, by psycho-analysis seeing vicissitudes (“guilt”) as originating in the superego, or by many types of new collective “inner voices” of world consciousness. At the same time we seem to embrace problems as products of evolving, ostensive (they can be perceived) processes, some emerging weakly (as part of the language or a model) and some strongly (needing to be treated as perspectives, not as exclusives).

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<sup>14</sup> According to Craig Calhoun (2004, 392) “the language of emergencies naturalizes the dangerous sense of global order as if it were a well-oiled machine periodically disrupted by unpredictable, outside events”.

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## **Networked Governance: Openings and Closings**

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Technology has become a constituent part of the reorganization of governance practices. As new public administration has in many countries increasingly assumed principles of market-co-ordination, information technology has laid the foundation for the new forms of democratic governance. When customer-orientation replaces bureaucratic production-centricity, it also brings out various methods of assessment, based on customer groups, as the basis of public services. In a post-industrial state, the logic of governance is based increasingly on hierarchical market segments and risk analyses instead of equal citizenship. Underlying the spread of client-orientation and the governance by client group is a broader view of the organization of political governance by virtue of steering behaviour in a market-like environment. This broader interpretation of consumerism is an expression of a shift from the production-oriented Fordist state to the consumer-oriented post-Fordist state. Information and communication technology is a fundamental part of not only consumerism but also the project of “networked democracy”, that is, e-democracy. One of its main objects is to lower the barrier to political participation and to bring in groups that do not usually participate in politics or civic engagements. However, there is a growing tension in this network-based political realm between the advancement of citizen participation, e-democracy and the self-serving potential of civil society, *and* the inevitable need to retain a conception of this realm as a systemic whole for the purposes of efficient governance. The paper will analyse this tension and its implications.

## Networked Governance: Openings and Closings

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*Networks have come to define the space within which politics is being thought about and policies are formulated and implemented. On the one hand, a network is an open, boundaryless, and inclusive whole, yet on the other hand it is an enclosing, exclusive one that tends to form an interiority of its own. Once the network becomes a political concept, in other words a concept enabling political projects to be articulated and executed, it seems to get caught in the logic of closure. This tension, in which the network does not appear only as a liberating but also as a locking conceptual resource, is manifested prominently in recent public administration reforms and the underlying ideas of self-organization. It is visible in these reforms including, in particular, the electronic governance movement which is largely about switching many public services to the Internet. This paper investigates electronic governance as a political arena in which discourses promoting networks as means for transparent and co-operative governance are constantly susceptible to become defined in terms of assumedly apolitical mechanisms with inherent boundary-drawing tendencies.*

**Keywords:** e-governance, self-organization, public administration, networks, enclosures, ontology

## **Networked Governance: Openings and Closings**

In recent decades a sweeping shift has taken place in the rationales and conceptual frameworks through which public administration is both practised and thought of. As is known, the public administration reforms were part of the global reform movement that has spread since the 1980s from New Zealand, Canada, Britain and the United States to a number of other countries and regimes. While there has been a marked difference between the reforms of the New Zealand and the UK governments (under the banner of 'new public management'), on the one hand, and the American-style reinvention ('reinventing government'), on the other, they all share an emphasis on customer service, decentralization, market mechanism, cross-departmental collaboration between public officials, and accountability for results (Kettl 2000; Page 2005, 713-4).

New governance practices are withdrawing from governing based on a dominating centre, unambiguous boundaries, and segregated fields of activities. Many of today's key political issues are no longer easily posed in terms of clear administrative or geographical boundaries. What is inside and what is outside has become increasingly difficult to distinguish in a clear-cut way.<sup>1</sup> This is closely connected to the appearance of the term 'network' as one of the key organizing social concepts all over the industrialized world. The establishing of network as one of the defining social and political categories can be seen at the same time as both the reason for and the result of the transformation in which administrative boundaries have increased in number and become fuzzier, especially concerning what is 'public' and what is 'private.' After all, one of the main underlying motivations for the introduction of the network point of view was the possibility to be able to break away from closed systems toward something that was taking place in open spaces, something the closures could not capture. The concept of network became common as a result of an attempt to break loose from a thought that operated in terms of a totalizing system. Network approach was mainly introduced as a way of disentangling from the models of a 'hierarchy' or 'structure' that maintained a certain mechanical systemicity and a persistent presupposition of a pre-given interiority. It enabled one to speak about social and political interrelationships as an intelligible whole while at the same time resisting, in principle, the presupposition of a principle that forms a closure. The concept made it possible to conceive of a whole in a situation in which fixed boundaries seemed to have disappeared (Eriksson 2005).

This has long been reflected in the administrative field. Today, as many problems tend to grow in complexity and interdependence, successful governance necessitates active networking with diverse interest groups and non-governmental actors. Instead of trying to pursue often quite arbitrary administrative distinctions, political governance is increasingly about organizing both public and private actors into networks to create models of cooperation between government institutions, expert bodies, local communities, and focus groups for dealing with different policy tasks (e.g., Rose 1996; 1999; 2000; Dean 1999). The new forms of governance are thus moving from state-centrist governance practices towards multipolar, interactive arrangements that are aimed to share political responsibility concerning the execution of policies as well as the provision of some public services between various both public and private actors. An ever growing part of thus organized public governance initiatives is manifested in a network of contracting, intergovernmental grants, regulations, and other indirect

administrative approaches through which the government is allied with both for-profit and non-profit organizations (Kettl 2002, 127-9). Networks are a crucial part of the new public management strategies which are often based on distributed power. There has indeed been a shift in the governance from the viewpoint of a unified state to the governance in and through networks (Rhodes 1997; Stoker 1999; Marsh 1998). Coupled with the programs based on increasing consumerism and “networked democracy”, in other words e-democracy, its main objects include lowering the barrier to political participation and bringing in groups that do not usually participate in politics or civic engagements. However, there is a growing tension in this network-based political realm between the advancement of citizen participation, e-democracy and the self-serving potential of civil society, *and* the inevitable need to retain a conception of this realm as a systemic whole for the purposes of efficient governance.

In this paper, I am investigating this tension in terms of the enclosing dynamics of political concepts as manifested in recent policy reforms and new political rationales. My focus is on e-governance projects, but I am not going to analyze them as such. Rather I am using them as a representative example of the new forms of governance, their networked strategies and vocabularies, and their inherent tendencies that are partly driving in different directions. This is what is discussed in terms of the metaphor of key in the last section of the paper. Let me begin, however, with the theme of consumerism as means of new governance strategies, after which I will elaborate the idea of fundamental ambiguity of governance, based on these and similar conceptual resources, between its inherent opening and closing tendencies.

### **Consumerism and Self-organization**

Information technology has become a constituent part of the reorganization of public administration (Barry 2001; 2002). As the key paradigm of this process, electronic governance has come to refer to the way information technology, mainly the Internet, has made reinventing government feasible. It is an attempt to change government’s vertical departmental hierarchy with rigid bureaucratic apparatus by taking into account citizens’ diverse needs in a complex and pluralistic society (Holmes 2001, 3, 57-8). This presumes, in practice, crossing administrative boundaries and creating close collaboration mechanisms between various offices, expert bodies and administrative agencies. The ‘joined-up government’ of this sort emphasizes the integration between policies, co-ordinated approaches to government and collaboration across public-service agencies (Perri 6 et al. 2005). Thus, e-government commonly refers to the ways in which public administration uses information technology to make its governance processes more efficient and to deliver public services in a more ‘customer-oriented’ and ‘cost-effective’ way (e.g., Holmes 2001, 2; OECD 2004, 23).

When customer orientation replaces bureaucratic production-centricity, it also gives rise to various methods of assessment, based on ‘customer groups’, as the basis of public services. Digitalization requires considerable standardisation and commoditization in these services. This takes place in varying degrees regarding different client groups, however: customers are grouped for the targeting of public services and for the group-specific individualisation of these services. In Britain this development is already apparent in many policy sectors. For instance, services and information aimed at people involved in the criminal justice system have been

reorganised by the client groups they belong to — ‘victims’, ‘witnesses’ and ‘jurors’. Each of these groups is served by a contact centre with a mix of ‘channels’ such as the telephone, email and websites (Bellamy 2002, 217). Thus standardisation does not mean that services become alike. On the contrary, they have to be individualised according to client segments.

In post-industrial states the logic of governance is based increasingly on hierarchical market segments and risk analyses instead of equal citizenship. Consumers are divided into distinct groups requiring policies and services that match their individual needs. Governance by client group implies the active consideration of differences between citizens in administrative events. Thus governance has inevitably to back away from a neutral and impersonal mode in favour of individual differences. Christine Bellamy and John Taylor (1998, 81) have already posed the question of whether social-security administration in Britain has been moving towards ‘lifestyle targeting’, which emphasises the behaviour and motives of claimants. Grouping citizens into different segments by definition erodes the principles of universal provision according to which political bureaucracies have traditionally viewed their functions and aims. What is problematic is the pigeonholing of customer groups especially when it assumes normative overtones. In that case the categorisation typically entails reinforced stereotyping and labelling, and an increased tendency to treat individuals as part of the stereotypic group they are assigned to (Bellamy 2002, 219; Bellamy and Taylor 1998, 79-81, 89; Ciborra 2005).

Underlying the spread of customer-orientation is a broader view of the organization of political governance by virtue of controlling societal behaviour through consumerism. The consumer-oriented state is, above all, a self-activating state with the capacity for self-organization. Self-organization as a political question — in other words as self-government — is, of course, a core element of democratic governance. In connection with new forms of public governance, however, the questions related to it are much more recent in origin. They have been formulated above all as part of the ‘marketization’ of society in the course of which the market principle has been extended to every sector. From this perspective, self-organization generally denotes two things. Firstly, it indicates the active and enterprising citizenship through which individuals conduct themselves under market-like circumstances without any direct intervention by the state. Secondly, it also refers to the notion that economic order is correlative of consumers’ spontaneous decisions and not of any central planning, and that it is precisely the market principle that provides the most efficient way of coordinating and managing the functioning of countless social sectors.

Thus, self-organization has come to mean the process through which the activity and enterprising capabilities of citizens are promoted in order to render them social actors who can direct themselves within the limits of law and order without the need for any direct intervention by the state. This is underpinned by the shift in societal development from the equal distribution of risks and responsibilities in the form of social security to the individualisation of responsibility (Rosanvallon 2000, 16-9; Rose 1999, 139, 142; see also Passavant 2005). Yet many political and administrative strategies would not, it is true, be feasible without the models, imageries and metaphors adapted from various technical systems, especially from those networked systems which have self-modifying capacities based on the information they gather in the course of their functioning. In both cases, the arrangements have to do with self-directed networks.<sup>2</sup>

It is, however, exactly this ideal that connects the changes in political and technological models to the long-standing need to envision the field of governance as a well-structured whole with clear boundaries demarcating what is inside and what is outside. This is linked to the fact that e-government arrangements have commonly been understood as a technique for automation – a system transferring routine procedures to the background and allowing automated information cross-matching in governmental transactions. This also moves the discussion on networks and network-based governance into the sphere of enclosures – in other words a sphere from which the concept of network was a means to break free in the first place.

### **Self-contained Governance**

The tendency to see governance principally as a technical matter burdens the discussion on new governance practices predicated on information technology. It does not actually help that this discussion is largely structured around the role network technologies have occupied in the reform initiatives of public governance. This focuses attention on the technical dimension of administrative practices. In this sense, the governmental reforms manifests themselves as natural continuation of the tradition in which the potentials opened by technology have been eagerly adopted as answers to essentially political problems. True, information networks are no longer considered exclusively as technical phenomena but more and more as part of the functional whole in which they are employed and the social changes which shape the conditions of this functionality. In spite of this, politics often tends to become understood in terms of technique.

Thus the discussion concerning the e-governance movements receives widely its tone within an instrumental phrasing, especially in the more management-oriented literature. In other words, governance appear, in this approach, as a technical and neutral solution to a given problem, in which case also many social matters tend to be presented above all as problems requiring technical solutions. Simultaneously, networks change from being resources for dialogue and openness to targets of development which can be governed in a systematic and orderly fashion – the management of networks become purely a technical question (Bevir 2006, 434). This ‘managerial’ interpretation in connection with e-governance practices is characterized by such themes as a concern with the efficient delivery of government information to citizens, the use of information technology to improve flows of information within and around the government, and a recognition of the importance to advance the service delivery to “customers” for instance. They stress the significance of efficient service delivery and speeding up information provision and transmission, but do this from the stance in which citizens appear mainly as passive recipients of information without the need for reciprocal generation and interpretation of this information in some discursive context. Similarly, information in itself is treated as relatively simple and unilinear, rather than complex and dialogically generated (Chadwick and May 2003, 272, 278).

However, although the development of e-governance has certainly been directed by a technical vision, it is not about technology alone. This is because it can be conceived of as a linguistic and operational field in which network technology, the reform challenges of administration, and the conceptions of politics underlying these challenges become interlaced and mutually articulated. Thus it constitutes an area of problematization

which opens up different models of political participation and attendant ideas of democratisation and democratic government. E-governance and other recent reforms do not signify a homogeneous concept, nor is their development path predetermined.

### **Openings and Closures**

The discourses around new e-practices are inclined to view governance simultaneously as open and limitless, yet also as enclosing and exclusive. It is *open*, because as it does not base its operations on boundaries but, on the contrary, makes it possible, even necessary, to transcend boundaries regardless of whether they separate government from civil society or different government institutions and organizations from each other. These events and relationships that dissolve the demarcation line separating public and private sectors have resulted from the redefinition of governance strategies: now the premises, means or aims of governance do not commonly rest on preset boundaries but rather on networks and active partnerships, as discussed above. Moreover, it is open due to the belief that information technology enables citizens more active participation to politics and easier dissemination of information to those who would need it, which is what makes governance arguable more open and transparent than before. Governance is increasingly predicated on improved communication between the authorities, civic organizations, and industry and commerce, seeking to involve citizens in the political decision making as well as to open up governance processes to society. Transparency means an openness of the governance system through clear, predictable procedures and easy access to public information for citizens. Openness and transparency are important objectives in the development of public administration and key discursive themes concerning governance for instance in European Union and the OECD (see Kim et al. 2005, 649-50).

On the other hand, governance practices also include *enclosing* elements, because they consists of diverse factors and processes which together have to constitute a functional system. New policy initiatives based on the Internet have thus far been structured mainly on a national framework, notwithstanding the fact that the EU's integration process is bringing about some changes in this, regarding the cooperation schemes among its European member countries. Thus nationality has traditionally been a natural basis for understanding these initiatives, because polity-related questions are normally addressed in a discursive context based on nationhood (e.g. Schnapper 2006). Conceiving the system as a national whole underpins the grounds for perceiving it from the standpoint of an enclosure. In this sense, e-government discourse simplifies the view of government, governance processes and the attendant political rationales into an image of a rather unified and centralized system. The principled questions about the possibilities and conditions for living together as a community receive a technical solution and become encapsulated in an image of the integrity of a governance structure presenting itself as a coherent whole.

But the enclosing capacity is also crucial for more fundamental reasons. This is because it is always a precondition not only for the functioning of but also for thinking about social systems insofar as this thinking seeks to grasp the consistency underlying these systems. Thinking about social processes requires conceptual models that organize the target area of governance – what could be termed ‘the social’ – as a meaningful, intelligible and thus, governable entity with its own limits, characteristics and

regularities (Miller and Rose, 1993, 80). Also Michel Callon has elsewhere pointed out that one has to clearly distinguish between those factors and relationships which actors include to their calculations and those which are excluded from these. He has introduced the concept of framing for the purpose of this distinction, a concept that demarcates the limits for rational, calculative action (Callon 1998, 16). Purposeful action, thus, seems to require envisaging the sphere of action as a sensible system with its own limits and rules.

In this latter approach, networks are promoted as means for making public policies more effective, not for increasing the openness or democratic values of politics as such. The question of networks is formulated from the beginning from the perspective of established aims and interests, in respect of which networks present themselves as technical adjuncts – political techniques. Limitlessness does not represent principally, in this discourse, the dissolution of unified systems of governance or the extension of participation in democratic practices. Rather, insofar as it implies these themes, it does so for the sake of elimination of various internal rigidities and intermediate levels in order to improve the effectiveness of established administrative institutions. Thus Mark Bevir, for instance, has pointed out that networked forms of partnerships serve basically as means for making the practices of public administration more effective: networks represent a technique of producing effectiveness. On the other hand, networks are also conceived of as targets of governance. New political programs are commonly working on the assumption that networks can be systematically regulated and managed according to certain shared objectives (Bevir 2006, 427, 434). In this way, limitlessness can also be a framework for thinking about certain of enclosing configurations.

### **The Metaphor of Key**

Obviously, the coexistence of these discordant tendencies toward both opening and closing is not peaceful but rather fairly strained. Insofar as a political system is flexible, open and limitless, it resists mechanisms seeking to enclose it in some predefined interiority. On the other hand, in order to retain its working order, a system has to have an understanding of its limits and in this sense it has to include some enclosing elements. A hierarchical structure, which has its internal power relations prefixed and its tasks arranged in line with a rather mechanical yet unambiguous responsibility structure, regards openness easily as a source of disturbance and, accordingly, tries to exclude or eliminate it. As mentioned above, the requirements of administration, dictated by practical necessity, both presume and engender concepts and hierarchies to organize action. These stabilize and normalize a given target area, simplify a complex event-space into some key questions, processes and actors, and define the conceptual perspective within which meaningful policies can be thought of. In other words, they enable purposeful action by simplifying and setting boundaries, because ‘action at a distance’ becomes possible only through conceptualizations and representations that render the whole to be governed as a rather coherent and intelligible system (Miller and Rose 1993, 80).

The era of networks has forced many to open up this arrangement and to think the tension described above from a novel angle. This thinking would need to take into account the fundamental openness of networks without compromising system’s efficiency and responsibility structures. The new viewpoint has been found in concepts

emphasizing the mutual articulation of market mechanism, accountability and self-direction which become interconnected in the vocabularies of network governance (e.g. Jones et al. 1997). In any case, boundaries seem to be inevitable for governance. The technicization of administration, especially, has nourished efforts seeking to advance the separation of administration from politics. For instance, information technology has both simplified and reduced the constitutive, ontological dimension of the preconditions of governance to a conceptual whole that assembles this dimension again in the form of an easily recognizable technical images ('digital nervous system'). This effect of simplification has been fostered by a number of different developments which have stabilized the ways to understand practices enabled by information technology in quantitative, numerical terms.

On the other hand, the emerging paradigm of administration based on information and communication technology brings out network technology as a foundation for reforming governance practices. This reinforces the idea that technology is an instrument to some desired ends, not an environment within which these ends come to present themselves, and questions of governance are problems waiting for technical solutions. This conceptual field is thus predisposed to perceiving politics as a technical problem, and suggested policy options as keys for solving this problem. To be sure, the metaphor of a key has effectively organized the rhetoric, vocabularies and explanations used in network governance.

But if technology – including all the political programs and practices based on it – is seen as a key, this always requires a lock to which it fits. A key not only opens but closes as well: it is defined by the opposite movements of opening and closing which receive their meaningfulness from the existence of a lock. Although it is true that the key is commonly regarded of as being able to open the essential meaning content of a problem at hand – and also closing it by providing a fitting solution – actually it is only the existence of a lock what makes the key possible and intelligible. In this sense, lock is the precondition of the possibility of key, not the other way round. Given this interpretation, "lock" is to be conceived not only as an institutional context of a given problem but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a metaphor that the key requires and presupposes in order to be intelligible. The difficulties pertaining to the category of locking are unavoidable consequences of a development in which political reform initiatives are perceived within a discursive field of influence that emphasizes instrumental purposefulness and technical rationality. This is not, however, exclusively related to the changing conditions of governance and governmentality: this constant oscillation between these opposite ends is inbuilt in all political concepts that are provided as solutions, in other words, that present themselves as a key.

## **Conclusion**

The above-said perhaps helps us to better think about the conceptual resources and linguistic means through which many e-governance projects have received their expression. Although they justify their initiatives in the name of increasing openness and political participation, this is done in the shadow of regulated relationships and supervised boundaries. As mentioned above, political thought emphasizing the technical dimension of governance has prepared the ground for the discussion demanding reforms in public administration and directed the ways it has formulated its

questions. So, even if this discussion is set out to promote a political culture structured around networks, involvement, inclusion and deliberation, this generally takes place in terms of a given political system. In other words, the goal is to improve the effectiveness of public policies and make them more legitimate in the eyes of the public instead of expanding democratic participation as such, although this remains as an underlying aim in many pronouncements.<sup>3</sup> If the realms of public sector and the non-profit and private sectors are bridged and reciprocal partnerships are forged by means of networks, this is because networks are regarded as being better suited to these tasks than traditional hierarchies. Similarly, if the boundaries separating various departments and institutions in public administration are knocked down or at least loosened, and arrangements are devised for making easier the access to public information for citizens, this is largely done from a perspective of centralization. In this interpretation, networks are not so much vehicles for opening up political processes and increasing civic engagement but rather for making administrative structures stronger and more effective (Bevir 2006, 427).

Underlying this state of affairs is an idea of the ultimate agreement of a political community in questions concerning values and goals within an essentially market-driven framework. Consequently, networks are placed as objects of thought in a political space that is already defined by an assumption of some pre-existing interiority. Networks present themselves as answers of a fairly technical nature to problems and demands of efficiency, problems and demands stemming from the basis of this interiority. For this reason the new forms of political governance do not – despite the fundamental shift away from hierarchies – in any obvious way give up the principle of exclusion. This is due to the fact that these forms exclude genuine plurality in the name of officially sponsored and managed participation. Thus they retain enclosing and separating elements in a complex and continuously changing relationship to opening and non-totalizing elements.

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<sup>1</sup> Of course, writers such as Bruno Latour (1993) for instance have correctly argued that contrary to the common, 'modern' belief, this has always been the case and the strict divisions between subject and object or words and things have largely existed only in the imagination of the moderns'. Yet seen from the standpoint of public administration, many of these divisions as for instance between the public and the private sectors, taken traditionally as the foundation for various influential forms of knowledge and practice, have comparatively recently been dissolved to give way for a new formation of governance. In this sense, it is not so much about something already there having been unveiled and commonly recognized (the mixture of actors and categories previously held as separate), but rather about the ontological shift toward new configuration of power and governance based on networks.

<sup>2</sup> However, it is not often sensible to distinguish the new forms of governance from network technology in the first place, because they have become conceivable only in connection to this particular technology (see Taylor 1992, 375).

<sup>3</sup> Although a demand for extending democracy has often served as a useful standpoint for criticism, this does not mean it would be an unproblematic or even a feasible objective. There are well-grounded suspicions that the mere extension of democracy would not necessarily give any better results. Despite the improving technical means, the populace do not have the expertise, time or dedication needed to practice good democratic decision-making. Thus according to Norberto Bobbio (1987, 31), a leading political theorist, "nothing risks killing off democracy more effectively than an excess of democracy." This said, however, the demand is not totally invalid because it provides a context for analyzing and assessing some specific political agendas and policy projects from the angle of democratization — a movement demanding the real equality of citizens, which has become an acute political question in Western democracies (see Schnapper 2006).

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### **Scales of Security**

Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki  
26-27 June, 2008

#### **Title:**

Scales of violence: same measures, different power realities.

#### **Abstract:**

On 1<sup>st</sup> October 2006 in the eastern Helsinki suburb of Kontula, a private security guard was secretly videoed kicking a handcuffed man on the ground late at night outside the shopping centre. Posted on *Youtube*, media debate largely turned on legal questions of excessive force in comparison to the higher standards of police patrols.

Debate as to the scale of violence used in the name of security easily misses the point that the security provided by the police and that provided by the private sector represent two different power realities: the market and the state. This paper argues that, as a scale of security, the difference between the public and the private form is better measured not by the extent of the violence each uses but the nature of the power reality that such violence represents. In drawing attention to this fundamental point and exploring it through empirical observation, the paper draws on the progress of the author's current research to consider the cultural and qualitative scale of the private security industry's encroachment into the public spaces of our everyday lives.

As a cultural facet of the postmodern city, the research asks sociological questions as to the normative nature of private security, the symbolic work being done by uniformed private security guards in their more mundane, everyday work and the scale of cultural authority it both generates and by which it is achieved - particularly in mass public spaces such as shopping malls. For despite phenomenal growth in such spaces since legislation in 2002, particularly in Helsinki, such questions have been largely absent in Finland and merit more critical debate.

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Funded by an Academy of Finland postdoctoral research grant (2008-2010), the author is a research fellow at the Police College of Finland. The end goal of his project *The Private Security Guard: A Sociological Study* is a monograph by the same title. A former UK police officer, his PhD in sociology was completed at Goldsmiths College, London, in 2004 on the topic of police reform and cultural legitimacy.

**SCALES OF SECURITY Interdisciplinary Workshop**  
**Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland**  
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**SCALES OF VIOLENCE:**  
**SAME MEASURE, DIFFERENT POWER REALITY**

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**Keywords**

Private security, policing, authorised violence, symbolic violence, power reality.

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## Introduction

I would like to consider authorised violence as a scale (or measure) of contemporary security provision. In whose name is it being used, in what form, and to what end? And I would like to pursue this question through my current study of the private security guard<sup>1</sup> as a highly visible and now firmly established social actor in Helsinki.

For in contrast to the uniformed police officer patrolling much the same urban space, dealing with much the same people for mostly the same things – often drunkenness and petty theft – and exercising much the same form of force in terms of apprehension and arrest, the often overlooked point is that the authorised violence of the uniformed private security guard represents a quite different power reality to that of the police officer in late modernity. Crudely put, it represents the market rather than the state.

This is a simple point of distinction but one usefully explored in our deliberations concerning the scales of security and the emergence of ‘security’ as a defining concept of our time. We could consider the *ownership* of the means of security.

I will draw on an incident from October 2006 of a security guard in the Eastern suburb of Kontula, secretly videoed one night kicking a handcuffed man on the ground. Posted on *Youtube*, it sparked media debate resulting in prosecution.

I will also sketch two views as to the growth and social meaning of private security as a power reality and by way of conclusion offer some working observations as to the cultural scale of its encroachment into the public space of everyday urban life.

## Theorising the Growth of Private Security

From the police studies literature, at least two basic explanations for the accelerated growth of private security since the 1990s can be discerned.

A reform perspective sees private security as an *extension* of the state’s own authority as the state adjusts its modes of policing within late modernity. Here growth is partly driven by the equally rapid proliferation of privately owned but publicly accessed spaces of mass consumption in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, such as shopping malls (Morgan and Newburn 1997; Crawford 2003). Such a development is thought of as tied to the socio-economic forces of globalization that are said to pressure the police to be cost effective and meet public demand (Waddington 1999): a ‘privatisation of public space’ and ‘public spending’ thesis.

A more radical perspective views the growth of private security as one power reality (that of global-capital) *actually replacing* another (that of the nation-state). This sees market growth in terms of neo-liberalism underpinned by deeper historical relations between the state and capital (Johnston 2000a). To a society increasingly pre-occupied with safety and the avoidance of risk (Johnston 2000b; Button 2002), the very appearance of the security guard is what gives the mall its appeal and fuels further growth (Waddington 1999): a neo-liberal ‘risk society’ thesis<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Grant (2008-2010) *The Private Security Guard: A Sociological Study*. J A Hadley, The Police College of Finland.

<sup>2</sup> See also Daniel Gilling (Gilling 2007) concerning the inherent feeling of insecurity within a neo-liberal project of freedom resulting in popular demand for security and its political response

From this critical perspective, private security seems to sit with a wider process of 'global securitization'. This is a process where Eugene McLaughlin (2007:91-99) suggests transnational forms of policing and market based security provision may be reconfiguring traditional police-nation-state relations and possibly even risk a dethroning of the state by the global market forces of private security.

Indeed, David Bayley and Clifford Shearing (1998, 2005) have already famously claimed that the 1990s may be looked upon by future generations as an era when one system of policing began to be replaced another.

### **Background Facts and Figures**

Illustrative private security/police ratios published by Mark Button (2007:111) for the 25 EU member states in 2004 show an EU average of 0.73 private security employees for every 1 sworn police officer. These figures are continually rising and it might be safe to talk of nearing a 1:1 ratio in 2008.

Figures seem to range widely from 2:1 in Hungary, with Poland a close second, to as little as 0.23 in Austria and Italy. Yet at least six countries, including the UK, exceeded the 1:1 ratio and nine others are above 0.5 with Finland at 0.8 and rising.

These figures on private security guards, notably difficult to obtain in some countries, are already four years old. Meanwhile the industry continues to grow, supposedly in line with the scale of market demand for security in various shape and form.

The figures for Finland can be updated a little. Where Button showed 6,000 private security employees for 7,500 police officers in 2004, figures from the Ministry of Interior Police Department's Security Sector Supervision Unit<sup>3</sup> for December 2007 show an increase to 8,000 for much the same police number of 7,700. This clearly exceeds the somewhat symbolic 1:1 ratio. Moreover, the figure of 8,000 only represents an estimate of certificated private security guards currently employed as guards by Finland's 220 licensed private security companies. There are, in fact, a total of 12,857 people with valid security guard certificates<sup>4</sup>.

Budgets also indicate a scale of change. In Finland, research by the head of the Ministry of Interior Police Department's Security Sector Supervision Unit, Chief Inspector Pekka Aho, has compared police and private security sector budgets between 2001 and 2006 (Aho 2006). For the police, these figures show an annual budget of just under €13 Million in 2001 rising marginally to €07 Million in 2006 with an expectation of a decrease due to tax cuts in 2007. Comparatively, overall revenue for private security companies in Finland was €00 Million in 2001 enjoying steady annual growth to an estimated €1,000 Million in 2006. Growth continues.

Perhaps sitting with the reduced public spending thesis, recognition of this scale of change from the public to the private provision of security is traceable within the industry's occupational culture of its workers. As one anonymous Finnish security guard put it on an open international website forum for security guards:

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<sup>3</sup> Prepared by Senior Advisor, Vesa Ellonen, during personal visit 14<sup>th</sup> April 2008

<sup>4</sup> Guard certificates are valid for 5 years and issued by local police after 100hrs training

*“Security here is a rapidly growing industry. The powers that be in their infinite wisdom are cutting the police budget year by year, which results in a security vacuum filled by the growing industry. All in all, interesting times to work security in Finland.”<sup>5</sup>*

Might we also trace here a sense of competitive revelry, if not a little contemptuous rivalry of the private over the public form of security provision in late modernity?

Of course, the form of security the police spend taxpayer’s money on is not always the same as that which the market pays private companies for. Where they do overlap, though, is in the form of uniformed patrol. And this is the growth area for the private security sector, particularly as shopping centre patrols and now residential patrols. This is also true for the police as a community level response to public demand to see more street patrols, often implemented in the growing policy name of ‘reassurance’<sup>6</sup>.

### **A Visual Ratio of Uniformed Patrol**

Having pointed to the statistically dry but otherwise symbolic 1:1 security guard/police ratio, what might be more informative is the visual ratio that meets the eye in urban sites of mass socialisation such as shopping malls and metro systems.

My field research takes in Helsinki’s Metro linked shopping malls between Kamppi and Central Railway Station in the centre, through the large Itäkeskus mall in the east to the smaller Columbus mall at the southern end of the line and includes the Kontula shopping centre on the north eastern line. It represents a single mass public space of joined up private interests.

I spent eight hours from 8.20am to 4.20pm on Friday 25<sup>th</sup> January making a visual survey of my research ‘grid’. Amongst other things, I wanted to note the frequency with which I would see private security guards at work. At a frequency of about every hour to half hour, I counted a total of 17 different guards representing all four major private security companies spread over 13 different locations. This compared to just 1 police patrol car assisting a guard on the Kontula shopping precinct.

That is a visual daytime ratio of 17:1 in favour of the private security guard in places where most people spend most of their time in terms of public consumption. It is different at night but that is another story – the point here is high public visibility that both the police and the private sector would seem to be competing over.

The four major security companies mentioned are<sup>7</sup>: Securitas, G4S, Turvatiimi and FPS. Securitas and G4S are both part of global corporate networks with parent companies in Sweden and Britain respectively. According to my enquiries with the Supervision Unit, they employ something in the region of 2,000 guards each. As market leaders they are followed by Turvatiimi. This is a singularly Finnish national

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<sup>5</sup> ‘Foxghost’, 15/1/2006, [www.SecurityInfoWatch.com](http://www.SecurityInfoWatch.com), accessed 27/3/2008

<sup>6</sup> See Crawford and Lister (2006), Innes (2006) and Johnston (2007) for discussion of ‘reassurance’ policy in the UK police reform context.

<sup>7</sup> Another major company, ISS, provides a range of services from catering to cleaning as well as security systems and patrols. Its alarm systems are quite visible around Helsinki, as are those of the other major and minor companies. Its uniformed guarding patrols, though, are less visible in public spaces around Helsinki, if they exist at all.

company with about 1,000 guards made up over the years from mergers with many small but strong local companies. FPS is one such smaller but locally based company whose operations are largely confined to Helsinki and currently employs 140 guards.

So, rather than the state uniform of the Police, it is the corporate uniforms of Securitas, G4S, Turvatiimi and FPS that meet the eye and win the day in the routine and mundane settings of Helsinki's shopping centres and local transport systems.

And these guards, under the industry initiated<sup>8</sup> *2002 Private Security Services Act*, are authorised by law to use force in order to protect their company's private client interests. They can remove you from the place being guarded if you have no right to be there; they can apprehend you for committing criminal offences on the premises or for being wanted on warrant by the authorities; and they can search you upon apprehension while waiting for the police to arrive<sup>9</sup>. Yet they are not there primarily to assist the police or serve the interests of the criminal justice system.

On the contrary, as Adam Crawford of Leeds University has observed more generally, the private security sector's strategies of loss prevention and risk reduction rather than police strategies of law enforcement, crime detection and criminal conviction, mean that their commercial interests are not even compatible with prosecution (Crawford 2003:152). Perhaps testimony to this as a living sentiment is the dark humour of the above mentioned Finnish security guard's signature quote on the web forum that simply reads: "*shop lifters will be shot.*"<sup>10</sup>

Though use of firearms are restricted to personal and cash guarding duties, for anyone who resists the guards in their everyday patrol duties in Finland, they are visibly equipped with handcuffs, batons and gas sprays to facilitate "*such forcible means as are necessary to remove, apprehend or search such a person and can be considered justifiable in view of the person's behaviour and other circumstances*"<sup>11</sup>.

Hence, violence is authorised, resourced and used on a routine scale. And while such violence may be no more than that constitutionally afforded to each citizen in order to defend their private interests, one can speak of it as organised violence way beyond the scope and command of the ordinary citizen alone. It is power. But it is not that of the state. Nor is it that of the citizen. So whose power is it?

### **The Youtube Kontula Incident, 1<sup>st</sup> October 2006**

Let us look at the incident of a security guard secretly recorded on a phone camera assaulting a man he and his colleague had already handcuffed in Kontula. It happened just before 2am on Sunday 1<sup>st</sup> October 2006. The video was posted on *Youtube*<sup>12</sup> a few days later on 11<sup>th</sup> October and entered the national news on the 14<sup>th</sup>. It resulted in the prosecution of the guard concerned but with minimal punishment by way of a discharge. There was no fine or sentence.

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<sup>8</sup> According to the Ministry's Security Sector Supervision Unit, it was upward market pressure from the companies themselves that led to the creation of the legislation and it was at their request that the police supervise it.

<sup>9</sup> Section 28 *Rights of Guards*:

<sup>10</sup> 'Foxghost' on [www.SecurityInfoWatch.com](http://www.SecurityInfoWatch.com) 15 January 2006. Accessed 27/3/2008.

<sup>11</sup> Section 28, 2002 Private Security Service Act.

<sup>12</sup> By account holder in the name of 'AllSeeingEyeZ'. Accessed for research purposes, 21/1/2008.

According to the Chief Executive Officer of the private security company concerned<sup>13</sup>, the Kontula shopping centre is one of the most dangerous places for security guards to work. Officers can, and do, get assaulted by drunks, drug users, people with mental health problems and other aggressive people, often at night.

Compounding this, guards who apprehend people may sometimes have to wait, often alone, for two or three hours before police arrive. The CEO cited a two and a half hour wait in Kontula with a man breaking into a shop with an axe. Of the 55,000 tasks a year his company deals with, the maximum wait on record, he told me, is five hours.

And though I do not have the reported facts, the CEO also told of a security guard belonging to another company who was stabbed to death in Kontula just a few days prior to the *Youtube* incident that sparked debate over the excessive use of force<sup>14</sup>.

To recap the detail of the video clip: it lasts just under a minute at 58 seconds. From a walkway overlooking a flower shop on a deserted side precinct of the Kontula shopping area, we have an elevated but clear view of two security guards dealing with a lone man below some concrete stairs underneath an adjoining footbridge.

According to the CEO CCTV footage seized by police shows the man was apprehended for viscously kicking a woman in the head outside a nearby bar.

The *Youtube* video does not capture this moment or the woman. It starts with the averagely built man down on all fours. The heavier built guard is walking a few steps away while looking back at the felled man. His colleague stands over him. It seems the man has just been put to the ground by one of the two guards.

He begins to rise. The second guard keeps him at arms length yet he is more cowering away than trying to run. The heavy built guard turns around and walks confidently back toward the man who is by now on his feet. He reaches across the man's shoulder and around the back of his head to secure him by the left side of his face. The guard then takes a moment to aim and with his right fist punches the man hard in the face.

In the night silence, one clearly hears the 'smack' of the punch on the video clip. It throws the man almost a metre away with the shear force of it as his legs recoil from under him. He immediately collapses back to the ground. A disabling preventive blow has been struck and the guard walks away again, brushing his gloved hands together.

His colleague calls for him to return and he walks back. The camera zooms in. It is clear that they have the man face down with both arms behind his back. The first guard helps his colleague bring the wrists together. He is not resisting and the cuffs/restraints are put on in what seems a routine and practiced manner.

Now that he is handcuffed, the guard that punched him in the face gets to his feet and sharply kicks the prone man twice in his left side before stepping over him to walk away for a third time. Again, he leaves the man with his colleague.

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<sup>13</sup> Personal interview 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Google searches and searches of Finnish news sites in English have not traced any public reports of this incident. Inquiries to corroborate the anecdote will be undertaken in the course of the fuller study.

In all of this, the second guard is never seen to use any other force than what one would reasonably expect to be used in handcuffing someone. Indeed, his actions seem to be in keeping with that of a trained restraint procedure.

The first guard, on the other hand, does nothing to help other than when called. Indeed, his only actions are to violently punch the man to the ground and needlessly kick him twice after being handcuffed. Whilst it may, at some stretch of a defence, be argued that the first punch was 'necessary' in order to be able to handcuff a supposedly violent man, there was no sign of the man's violent resistance, nor did the first guard make any attempt to take advantage of the punch's immediate effect and help his colleague handcuff him. The violence seemed almost summary.

Indeed, the CEO's comment to me was that after seeing the CCTV footage of the man's assault on the woman one could understand but not excuse the guard's anger. However, his actions on *Youtube* appeared quite calm and coldly calculated.

When the *Youtube* video entered the news, there was understandable outcry. Both guards were immediately suspended from duty and handed over to the police for criminal investigation. Yet neither the assaulted man nor the second guard wanted to give evidence against the first guard, nor did the local prosecutor want to pursue it. It was only at the insistence of the national prosecutor's office that it went to court in the public interest. The disposal, though, was minimal in the form of a discharge.

### **Media Debate and Different Scales of Violence**

Debate in the media over the Kontula incident turned largely on legal questions of whether or not the guard's use of force was excessive or not. The court clearly accepted it was. The other line of debate, though, hinged on contrasting the excessive force used by less trained private security guards to that used by better trained police officers in similar situations. This prevailing line of debate was perhaps captured by a panellist's comment at the 2007 annual Finnish police research seminar<sup>15</sup>. Referring to the incident it was claimed that 'we could now see the difference between the police and private security guards, and the difference was *violence*'. On one scale this maybe so. But as most observers of the police in many countries would agree, the police are just as capable of using excessive force as anyone else - on or off camera.

So for me this comparison of scales misses the point. The difference between the violence used by the police and that used by the private security guard is not the violence itself. The difference is what the violence represents: one, the values of the state on behalf of the people as citizens collectively, the other the socially selective values of the market on behalf of a private client.

Nor am I alone in this view. Showing concern since the 1980s (South 1988), the wider police studies literature presents policing for profit as socially divisive. The likes of Tim Newburn have previously described the placing of private security in positions of trust over the individual as socially dangerous and likely to undermine the integrity of the state (Morgan and Newburn 1997:137). Similarly, Peter Waddington has argued that having two different power realities at work will undermine constitutional independence in favour of sectional interest and that regulation and licensing has only

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<sup>15</sup> Annual Police Research Seminar, The Police College of Finland, Espoo, June 7<sup>th</sup> 2007.

further facilitated private security's encroachment into public life and ingrained its place (Waddington 1999:248).

Private security is also said to be socially selective. Clifford Shearing and others (Bayley and Shearing 2005) have noted since the 1990s how it serves the interests of communities of employers, owners and institutions rather than geographic communities of equal citizens. And, again, Peter Waddington (1999) has pointedly noted that the private security guard is not an agent of the state constrained by constitutional safeguards but the servant of a private master's particular interests. In this sense, accountability is more likely to be commercial than judicial and legislation a limited form of regulation (Crawford 2003: 150).

The argument is that private security selectively protects the particular interests of the contracting client rather than the wider public at large. Some evidence of this in the Finnish context was found during preliminary web searches in an ex-security guard's comments about the Kontula *Youtube* incident:

Made on an unrelated site about a month after the incident, the ex-security guard denounces the actions of the Kontula guards as disturbing. In recounting how he was himself beaten up by two shoplifters, he reveals the selective interest in which the industry works and how it reproduces its selective interest in his own idea of his job.

*"I have a nice set of CCTV images showing two crack heads beating me up (I'd share them with you if they weren't attached to the police report). I got no day off for my suffering and I lost my favourite pen that day. I did get a new shirt though, which was nice. **The good thing was that those two crack heads didn't get to steal anything from the store I was working in - they later got their booze from the store next door, so I had done my job** (my emphasis)."*<sup>16</sup>

Clearly he sees his job as to protect the private interests of the client and not the wider public interest.

What the international literature signals in this sense is a cultural normativeness over the growth of private security in need of critical study (Wright 2002; Forst and Manning 1999; Waddington 1999). This is what I hope my sociological rather than legal study of the Finnish case contributes to.

A core question is how we as a society are forming ever-more normative relationships with these different scales of power through their personifications as security guards and police officers and in doing so, what do such relationships construct us as – citizens or consumers? In this respect, I think I have already established that the private security guard is by far the more visible street presence for everyday consumption in Helsinki: at least more than the uniformed police patrol.

### ***Youtube Comments***

How else to read this scale of private violence, captured per chance off the street by the urban use of modern technology that did, ultimately, hold it to public account?

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<sup>16</sup> <http://finnmetal.com/blog/?p=61> Posted 14<sup>th</sup> November 2006, accessed 18/3/2008

Les Back (2007) at Goldsmith's College, London, has usefully drawn attention to the idea of *listening* to the city as an ethnographic method. That is, the analytic use of what one hears as a means of reflection not only on powerless voices that try to be heard both visually and audibly but noises that suppress such voices.

Having watched the *Youtube* video many times over, the sound that is most striking is the clinical 'smack' of the first punch to the apprehended man's face. It stands out in the night, clear and crisp above the odd verbal of the guard in the otherwise silent and empty sodium space of Kontula's deserted concrete precinct.

Since being posted in October 2006, the video has attracted over 180,000 viewings and counting. To date there have been up to 800 comments. At a glance they range from utter condemnation to a disturbingly cheering support for the guard's actions.

In them one can trace strong fascistic themes involving the approval of using excessive violence and a sense in which some security guards are seen as at the front line of both social and racial oppression regarding immigrant presence in Helsinki.

For example:

*"There's at least a few of us in here who thinks it (the violence) is OK. Negative comments come mostly from immigrants and 10-21 year old idiots. Immigrants and drug users cause (the) main problems here in Finland."*

*"I myself am thankful that there are more guards about, and couldn't care less if some drunk or narc' (drug user) gets an occasional beating, if that means the GENERAL SECURITY situation is better. They certainly deserve it"*

*"Oikein! Long Live Finland!"*

Can we hear the scales of security ascending to that of a violently asserted nationalism against a contemporary socially, and to some extent racially, scapegoated 'other'?

The 'smack' of the guard's punch acts as an audible conduit to all the violence it refers to and the social positioning of its target in relation to its proponent. In the disturbing context of the above *Youtube* comments, it connects to the idea of 'useless' and 'preventive' violence as spoken of by philosopher and Auschwitz survivor, Primo Levi, in his account of European fascism.

Levi speaks of 'the memory of the offence' that was the Holocaust. He cites Austrian philosopher Jean Améry on the experience of torture by the Gestapo. He tells how all faith in humanity is 'cracked by the first slap in the face', then demolished by torture, never to be acquired again (Levi 1989:12). I do not want to make the connection cheaply or frivolously but the point of studying these extremes of the past is to watch for signs of them in the mundane of the present. I hear Améry's first crack of faith in humanity as resonating with the smack of the Kontula guard's fist to the face.

The guard's punch, it may be argued with cold logic, was a tactical pre-emptive strike to temporarily subdue someone who might otherwise have been difficult to properly handcuff. Once handcuffed, though, the two sharp kicks to the back and head that

followed with equal calculation, could certainly not call on the same reasoning. Despite the development of legal authority for his use of force, the kicks were plainly superfluous to any legitimate purpose for which lawful violence could be used.

With reference to its widespread use in the growth of fascism under Hitler in the 1930s, Primo Levi describes such excessive violence as ‘useless violence’ in that it serves no purpose other than to inflict pain, suffering and humiliation as an end in itself (Levi 1989:83). This was in the streets, by the uniformed ‘brown shirts’, long before the death camps, where Levi himself suffered daily humiliations and acts of ‘useless violence’ on a somewhat incomparable scale.

But based on explanations given by the ex-commandant of Treblinka, Levi concludes that the sole ‘use’ of such useless violence is to degrade the victim in the eyes of the eventual murderer, purely to ease the burden of the act of murder itself (Levi 1989:101). It was to reduce the victim in the eyes of the perpetrator and so make the ultimate offence possible. In other words, it is a *dehumanising* process.

The core message from Levi and other survivors of that dark time is simply that “it happened, therefore it can happen again” (Levi 1989:167). He reminds us that violence, ‘useful’ or ‘useless’, is always there before our eyes and that “*It only awaits a new buffoon (there is no dearth of candidates) to organise it, legalise it, declare it necessary and mandatory and so contaminate the world*” (Levi 1989:167). In this he warns against adopting any theory of ‘preventive violence’ as a means to pre-empt social conflict, for this would only breed further violence. So where is preventive violence on our scale of security and in whose name and to what effect?

Of course, Primo Levi’s *The Drowned and the Saved* deals with the darkest period of our modern history. This may seem a long way from the present context. Yet, having committed suicide shortly after completion, we should remember that it is a work that intentionally speaks to our times.

*“Few countries can be considered immune to a future tide of violence generated by intolerance, lust for power, economic difficulties, religious or political fanaticism, and racist attritions (gradual wearing down/harassment). It is therefore necessary to sharpen our senses, distrust the prophets, the enchanters, those who speak and write ‘beautiful words’ unsupported by intelligent reason.”* (Levi 1989:167).

As changing scales of security, we might recognise some post 9/11 turns in local crime control to the ready use of preventive force, intolerance and suspicion of the socially and racially excluded ‘other’: those most likely to be removed from privately run mass public spaces by our security guards (or even prevented entry to such urban spaces by some future development of their legal rights). Listening to the city, Les Back concludes we again ‘live in dark times’ (Back 2007:167) and it is this we should be mindful of in considering what our different scales of violence represent.

### **Towards a Conclusion: The Symbolic Violence of Private Security**

Violence is not always physical. It is often symbolic. And in serving the interests of power, symbolic violence is ideological. In his theory of cultural reproduction, Pierre Bourdieu (1973) refers to ‘symbolic violence’ as the active assertion of power by a dominant culture over a subordinate culture without appearing to do so in any

physical or overt sense: a latent process of domination (Jenks 1993:131). Similarly, sociologists of mass media and popular culture might use the term ‘symbolic power’ (Thompson 1995) to acknowledge the ideological means by which dominant group interests can be either hidden, justified or legitimated (Giddens 1998:382). So the physical is not the only scale of violence – there is the visual and the symbolic.

Following this, Fran Tonkiss notes that one way power renders itself visible and thereby observable is by occupying or controlling public space in the city (Tonkiss 2005:60). For her, while the primary ideal of public spaces is supposedly based on equality of access, the reality of such spaces suggests they are organized through forms of control and exclusion (Tonkiss 2005:72). Though representing different power realities, we might consider in conclusion how both the police and private security can and do cooperate to jointly occupy mass public space to this effect.

In terms of my research the observations are very much work in progress but a recent police operation at the Itäkeskus shopping centre<sup>17</sup> was focussed on visibly occupying the public space between the entrance to the mall and the metro station. According to the officer on duty at the PR point (intended precisely to explain to the public what they were doing) the purpose of the one week operation was to clear the space of drunks and other ‘undesirables’ that the private security guards within the mall and metro had forcibly expelled. This was because the guards themselves did not have power to operate legally outside the mall and there was nothing to stop those ejected from either coming back in again or congregating outside and disturbing shoppers.

What is interesting here is not only that we can see the social role of the police and private security guard as marking the line between public and private space. We also find the police apparently acting as an *extension* of the private security guard’s client interests, rather than the other way around. It could be said that the police operation was sending a message to the private security guard not to exceed their powers, but this was not how the officer explained it. Maybe what we are seeing here are the scales of security tipping in favour of the power reality represented by the private sector. To be sure, as a symbolic street presence, the police could only afford to be there for a few days. The private security guard is virtually a permanent fixture. As such, it is they, not the police, who own both the space and the means of its security.

In terms of cultural presence, the private security guard also appeared quite unexpectedly in March 2008. This was in the form of a new TV drama series *Suojelijat*. Two working observations here: firstly, it confirmed the place of the private security guard as a legitimate character within popular culture. Secondly, it allowed some consideration of a broader social narrative being articulated via the private security guard at the cultural and symbolic level.

*Suojelijat* was a gritty ten-part drama screened by Nelonen on Tuesday nights from 9pm to 10pm. It had just the right mix of sex, violence, strong language and rough edges of modern urban living to appeal to a mass audience.

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<sup>17</sup> Personal observation 28<sup>th</sup> May 2008

The series<sup>18</sup> centred on a night burglary of a Jeweller's along the expensive Aleksanterinkatu in Helsinki and a fictitious private security company's response to it in absence of the police. Far from dealing with the robbery, though, or the workings and internal drama's of a private security company, each separate episode was about the crisis going on in the private lives of each of the security guards involved and their handling of it. The only exception was the concluding episode, which explained the robbery from the perspective of the shop owner and his own personal crisis that led him to set up the robbery in the first place. The private security guard was merely a setting through which all these different crises of post-modern life could be expressed.

'Post-modern' life, because what I saw to be a recurrent theme was the disruption and breakdown of the old orderings and welfare certainties of modernity. This was particularly so through each character's various crises of masculinity, sexuality, family unity, and overbearing father figures. In this were challenged ideas of strong state and national unity delivered via references to the military, the church and even the police. Job insecurity, crippling debt, unfulfilled ambition, a feeling of abandonment by the state and the spectre of fascism and racial conflict hung in the air.

Despite a pessimistic portrayal the TV drama has further cemented the place of private security guard in Finnish society. The guard is now a legitimate character in popular Finnish culture in a way that it perhaps could not have been ten, maybe five years ago. Furthermore, it has served to articulate a narrative centred on the passing and destabilising of old certainties of the past to the insecurities of what seems to be a neo-liberal future. The scales of security are tipping toward a new power reality.

**End.**

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<sup>18</sup> Written by Veli-Pekka Hänninen and Harri Virtanen

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Depression in great numbers: Epidemiological equipment and the metamorphosis of psychiatry.

The subject of the paper is the becoming of depression a major public health problem in Finland from the late 1980s onwards. In particular, the role of 'epidemiological turn' in psychiatry in facilitating this process is analysed. The main argument of the paper is following: Epidemiological studies have brought symptoms and risks of depression into the focus of psychiatric reasoning and practice. This shift is parallel with the vast expansion of the scope of mental disorders, especially depression, during the past quarter of a century. Consequently, a great part of mental health care has changed from a therapeutic practice to risk management and control of personal living.

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## Depression in great numbers Epidemiological equipment and metamorphosis of psychiatry<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

The subject of the paper is the becoming of depression a major public health problem in Finland from the late 1980s onwards. In particular, the role of ‘epidemiological turn’ in psychiatry in facilitating this process is analysed. The main argument of the paper is following: Epidemiological studies have brought symptoms and risks of depression into the focus of psychiatric reasoning and practice. This shift is parallel with the vast expansion of the scope of mental disorders, especially depression, during the past quarter of a century. Consequently, a great part of mental health care has changed from a therapeutic practice to risk management and control of personal living.

At the turn of 1940s, less than 1% of the Finnish population suffered from mental diseases. This was an estimation of professor Martti Kaila, the grand figure of Finnish psychiatry at that time. Since the majority of people with mental illness was diagnosed as schizophrenics, depression was almost a nonexistent phenomena, related only to a quarter of a thousandth of the Finnish population, according to Kaila’s figures. (Kaila 1942.) 50 years later mental health experts say that ‘almost everybody will fall ill with a minor depressive episode during his or her life and one out of four will suffer from major depression’ (Achté & Tamminen 1993, 10). Thus, something has driven masses of Finns into psychological depression during the very half of a century when Finland has become one of the most prosperous countries in the world and the prerequisites of happy life have grown stronger and reached almost all people.

As is commonly known, the phenomenon has not been restricted to Finland. An exponential increase in occurrence of depressive illness has happened everywhere in the Western world and is even a global public health problem today. On the basis of medical statistics, the amount of people suffering from depression seem to have become thousandfold between the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Healy 2004, 2), and depression will

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2 First draft; **do not circulate or quote!**

become the second severest public health problem worldwide by the 2020, if the official estimate of the World Health Organisation is to believe (WHO 2001).

What lies behind of this upheaval in mental health? A familiar story of medical progress provides the simplest answer: as psychiatry has become more medicine-like and scientific, mental health professionals have learned to observe and diagnose mood disorders more accurately, as well as treat them. From this point of view, a mass of melancholics has always lived among us, but nowadays they can be spotted by psychiatric institutions and experts. Another explanation relates depression epidemic to current mode of living, with tones of cultural critique. In a manner similar to the critics of *fin de siècle* who claimed that neurasthenia and hysteria were caused by the hectic pace and complexity of modern life, today's commentators see the increase of depressive illness deriving from, for example, alienation, complexity of technological society and incompatibility of work and private life, which are seen to characterise the current Western mode of living (e.g. Salomon 2002). Also Alain Ehrenberg's analysis (xxxx) has an aspect of cultural critique when he claims that depression epidemic sweeping through the Western world is symptomatic for contemporary life which engenders endless feelings of insufficiency and failure in people by inciting them to focus their personal life to self-fulfillment.

In this paper, I approach the emerging of depression as a public health problem from a different perspective. My starting point is the following: the increase in depression has happened parallely with the changes in the psychiatric institution and psychological care and with the metamorphosis in understanding of mental illness and psychic problems. During the past century and a half, psychiatry has expanded its terrain beyond the asylum walls, multiplied and disseminated everywhere in society, forming a wide mosaic of mental hygiene and psychotherapies (e.g. Castel, Castel & Lovell 1982; Grob 1991a; Shorter 1997; Rose 2006.) Across the Western world, the control of mentally ill, or the abnormals, management of mental illness and the care of personal psychological wellbeing have fused together epistemically, practically and even institutionally and form a continuum of *mental health care*. The development accelerated after the Second World War and, at the same time, the forms of treatment of mental disorders from psychotherapies to psychopharmaceuticals have become more sophisticated. (Helén 2007, 200-204; see also Rose 2006.) Against this

background my thesis is that mental health care made up depression.

### *Epidemic scale*

‘Nowadays about 5% of the Finns suffer from depressive illness.’ This standard claim about the prevalence of depression could not be presented in the Finnish guideline for depression treatment (Käypä hoito ... 2004) without knowledge and perspective of *psychiatric epidemiology*. For this reason, I begin my analysis from the way *quantity* is conceived of in today’s psychiatry. This can be justified in another way, too. Psychiatric epidemiology has become a cornerstone of psychiatry and mental health care during the past 30 to 40 years. In attempts to make psychiatry more scientific, advocated and guided to a great extent by American psychiatry, the triumph of the styles of reasoning familiar from epidemiology and social medicine – statistical induction, probability calculus and risk calculation – has been much more crucial than the rise of neuropsychiatry, or even psychopharmacology. Without studies focusing on ‘mental morbidity’ in the population mental illness would not have become a phenomenon of great numbers – epistemically, commercially and as a matter of public policy. And in current psychiatric discussion, it is almost impossible to present claims about mental health facts without supporting them by statistical analysis of the data from epidemiological questionnaires or randomised clinical trials. (Healy 200x, 200y; ...)

The epidemiological turn brought about an essential shift in psychiatry: it induced a definition of the object of mental health care as phenomena connected with population. With epidemiological studies, this object emerged beside the case, a traditional object of psychiatry, and eventually case histories have become eclipsed by the new objects (see Healy ...). Psychopathologies, or mental disorders in contemporary terms, as population related phenomena are not made up by a census of lunatics or insane people, i.e. of inmates classified as mentally ill in different sorts of incarceration institutions. In Britain, the USA, France and Germany such censuses were carried out for the purposes of general census and poor relief since the 19th century (e.g. Grob 1991b, 424-425; ...). In Finland, the first census of the ‘insane’ was carried out by the Committee for Poor relief between 1905 and 1908 (Heikkinen 1990, 299-300). However, such a counting is not primary in current psychiatric

epidemiology. What matters are the factors that constitute mental disorders and influence their onset and prevalence. This object is called *psychiatric morbidity*.

Epidemiological approach emerged in Anglo-Saxon psychiatry during the Second World War. In Britain and the U.S., this new 'social psychiatry' originated from two sources. First, studies on psychological effects of wartime conditions and prevalence of psychiatric symptoms in general population were launched and extensive surveys on psychological conditions of the combat forces were carried out, especially in the U.S. Second, some psychiatrists started surveying large numbers of psychiatric patients to search for social factors that cut across all patients.<sup>3</sup> (Healy, 2002: 136-139; Rose, 1996: 133-135.) Toward the late 1950s, the rise of community psychiatry supported the growth of population studies of mental disorders, as did the increasing interest in studying prevalence and treatment of mental illness in primary health care. In the 1960's, more and more studies on mental illness in general population were started both in Britain and the U.S., and Michael Sheppard et al. published a pioneering work *Psychiatric illness in general practice* in Britain in 1966. Epidemiology of depressive illness focusing on general population and primary care practice grew out of this soil. It started in the early 1970s and expanded in the 1980s and 1990s. (Callahan & Berrios, 2005: 133-136; Healy, 1997: 229.)

In Finland, the breakthrough of psychiatric epidemiology happened in the early 1970s, when a great number of monographs and scientific papers were published. The background of these studies was a wider research programme on morbidity and rehabilitation needs of the work-aged Finnish population, launched by The Social Insurance Institution (KELA) at the end of the 1960s. The research programme was to serve the implementation of public health insurance system (established in 1964) and planning and reconstruction of public health system in the early 1970s (Häggman 1997, 161-168). Out of this emerged the studies of Erkki Väisänen (1975) and Ville Lehtinen (1975) and many others which started an on-going tradition of surveying psychiatric morbidity in the Finnish population.

The object of mental health care was defined on the level of population in the KELA studies

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<sup>3</sup> The pioneers in using the methods of social medicine in psychiatry were George Rosen in the U.S. and Aubrey Lewis in Britain (Healy, 2002: 136-137).

in a concrete way. Epidemiological perspective required statistical approach to mental disorders. Furthermore, mental disorders were conceived of as compilations of elements which were seen as ‘factors’; and it was these factors that turned mental disorders comparable and measurable. It is also worth noticing that psychiatric epidemiologists emphasised *impaired functionality* while defining their object of study. This emphasis was reflection of a general definition of epidemiology, according to which

(...) the purpose [of epidemiology] is to investigate prevalence of diseases, of the need of medical care caused by them, and of impairment of functionality in general population and in population groups; in addition, [epidemiology] investigates biological, psychological, social and demographic factors related to prevalence (*Sosiaalipsykiatria* 1989, 129).

In this context, the object of mental health care is not mental disease but a fuzzy entity resembling psychopathology. The psychiatrists and mental health professionals readily avow this while they talk of their object as syndromes or disorders; the epidemiological parallel to these characterisations is psychiatric morbidity. The shift from mental diseases to morbidity has a significant implication: nowadays mental health care is directed toward a wide range of impairment in psychological or behavioural functionality, instead of relatively rigid and medically defined clinical entities. Such a loosening of the target area of mental health is essentially facilitated by three epistemic transitions in psychiatry.

The first epistemic shift is the consolidation of a concept of mental illness as *multifactorial*, a system or synergy of biological, psychological and social factors. This idea emerged alongside with the community and social psychiatry movements from the late 1950s. In Finland, the breakthrough of this notion happened with the rise of social psychiatry in the 1970s. Eventually, ‘multifactorial’ etiology and a ‘system concept’ of mental disorders have become a cornerstone of the Finnish mental health care to the extent that all textbooks of general psychiatry repeat the notion in their opening sections. The development in Finland was similar to what happened elsewhere in the West where the establishment of ‘biopsychosocial’ concept of mental illness was mainly related to mental health policy and reformation by which outpatient care became the main form of psychiatric institution. (Ref)

The increased emphasis on *symptoms* and becoming of the *health risk* as the core concept are two other epistemic shifts in current mental health thought. Historically, their consolidation has happened hand in hand with the above idea of multifactorial mental disorders; however, they are more directly related to psychiatric epidemiology. The main instruments for more intensive focusing on symptoms and risks of mental disorders are structured questionnaires and assessment scales. They are essential in psychiatric epidemiology when the data is analysed and decisions made whether a 'case' belongs to the group of people suffering from the disorder or not. Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression and Beck Depression Inventory are the oldest and the most famous ones of such 'diagnostic instruments' deployed in epidemiology of depressive illness, but by no means the only ones. In the early 1990s, one could find over 30 'rating scales', both general and more specific, in research literature (Snaith, 1993; for a review, see Rabkin & Klein, 1987; Sartorius & Ban, 1986), and the number of them has increased since. However, none of them has succeeded in becoming established as the ultimate criteria for psychiatric epidemiology. On the contrary, each of the scales are under on-going dispute over validity, reliability and applicability of the results they provide. In practice, studies seldom rely on only one rating scale but deploy two to four diagnostic instruments side by side (e.g. Poutanen 1996).

Despite of their problems, rating scales have a key role in epidemiology of mental disorders for two reasons. First, through them the symptoms enter into the field of epidemiological perception; second, they tie up the concept of risk into concrete phenomena and thus made up actual risk factors. On this account, the diagnostics instruments like Beck's Inventory or Hamilton's Scale form the core of the equipment for reasoning and perceiving which epidemiology brought along into the heart of psychiatry. This apparatus enabled both researchers, experts and the public to see psychopathologies – mental disorders, in current terminology – as an extensive public health problem. Furthermore, it transformed *symptoms and risks* the primary objects of mental health thought and practice. Thus, this way of reasoning allowed Finnish epidemiologists to claim that up to 30% of the Finns will suffer from mental disorders during their adult life (Lehtinen & Väisänen 1979, 121) and would benefit from psychiatric consultation or treatment (Lehtinen 1975, 121).

Besides an epidemiological sense, such an understanding requires a new notion of the object

psychiatry. 'Mental disease' has waned in the twilight of history also in Finland during the past three decades and today the object of psychiatric thought and practice is referred by 'mental disorder' in professional discussion. *The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, which APA provides as a handbook not only for the psychiatrists but to all mental health professionals, crystallises well this new understanding by giving the following definition of mental disorder:

Each of mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (e.g., impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom. (...) Whatever its original course, it must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioural, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the individual. (DSM-IV-TR: xxxi.)

The definition makes perfectly clear that the object of mental health care is neither madness nor disease. But what is it? First, mental disorder is always related to the individual, to his or her behaviour or psyche, it is personal, but the person is not at the focus of mental health care. Furthermore, the disorder should be clinically verified; but what shall a physician, psychiatrist or therapist look for? The definition provides a range of options: either personally experienced distress or malady, or impairment, dysfunctionality or risks. Thus, the field of mental health care is defined wide, while object of mental health care evades unequivocality.

It is noteworthy that the rise of psychiatric epidemiology did not immediately conjure a recognition of depression as a major public health problem in Finland. In other words, the epistemic upheaval that psychiatry faced did not automatically bring depressive illness into the focus of mental health care. The Finnish studies on the prevalence of mental disorders in the 1970s and early 1980s did not address depression as a public health problem. They discussed 'psychic impairment which referred to distortion of functionality (see above) and was to great extent reduced to more or less severely diminished capacity to work. The epidemiologists divided psychic impairment to two classes: psychoses and neuroses. With

neurotic disorders, they further separated psychosomatic disorders into a specific group. The main result of the studies was that a great majority of mental disorders in the Finnish population was neurotic and psychosomatic disorders. Further, their main concern was the 'latent' mental disorders, and they discussed quite extensively about a tendency of mental problems to become eclipsed by somatic symptoms.

From the present perspective, one could well assume that these results would have raised discussion on so called masked depression. But it did not, because mental disorders were conceived of quite differently in the 1970s and 1980s. An essential feature of the mentioned psychiatric epidemiology reflected the contemporary understanding of mental problems. In these studies the data was organised with the help of 'psychodynamic' factors and the latter were considered as explanatory factors to psychiatric morbidity in the statistical analysis of the data (e.g. Lehtinen & Väisänen 1979, 69-73, 78). From this perspective, depression was not conceived of as an independent mental disorder but as a similar expression, or symptom, of an actual disorder as anxiety, feelings of tension, phobias or sleeping difficulties.

### *Becoming of depression*

So, epidemiology alone was not influential enough to rise depression awareness in the fields of Finnish mental health care. 'Awakening' to depression epidemic took place at the turn of the 1990s, and besides psychiatric epidemiology four arrays of discussions and activities contributed the process. The first one was the national project for prevention of suicides, launched in the mid-1980s, and the second one was the adoption of the international classifications of mental disorders – the ICD authorised by the World Health Organisation and the DSM authorised by the American Psychiatric Association – in the Finnish psychiatry and mental health care. I will discuss these two developments later.

In addition to the suicide project and the new classification of mental disorders the understanding of depression as a common illness and a public health problem was shaped by intensive pursuits to re-educate mental health professionals and health care personnel, the GPs in particular. The impetus came from abroad. In the early 1980s, the World Health

Organisation took into serious consideration an initiative originated from the pharmaceutical industry (Healy 2005, 8), established the Committee for Prevention and Treatment of Depression and encouraged the founding of similar national task forces of mental health experts in different countries. In Finland the PTD committee was founded in 1985, chaired by Kalle Achté, the professor of psychiatry at the University of Helsinki. The main achievement of the task group was a handbook for practitioners of mental health care, compiled of writings on epidemiology, etiology, diagnostics, treatment and social psychiatry of depression. *Lääkäri ja depressiopotilas* (Achté & Tamminen 1987) was published by Ciba-Geigy, the pharmaceutical company and manufacturer of the antidepressant Tofranil. It was meant to provide 'help for the general practitioners', and it started a series of similar compilations and monographs continuing to the present day (ref). This literature provided the background for the intensification of the discussion on depression among mental health experts and the making of the professional consensus in the early 1990s. It also directed public policy and numerous projects for the improvement of depression management. It is worth noticing that the form, approach to depressive disorders and partly also the writers of the Academy of Finland's consensus report (1995) were similar to the PTD committee inspired handbooks (Achté & Tamminen 1987; 1993).

Furthermore, introduction of the SSRI antidepressants and their marketing have raised and shaped depression awareness among mental health professionals and the lay public in Finland. The National Agency for Medicines approved fluoxetine in 1988 and citalopram in 1989 as medication for depressive disorders. In the early 1990's, quite extensive marketing campaigns by Eli Lilly, Lundbeck and other manufacturers went on in Finland spreading the word to 'all' physicians that Cipramil, Fontex and other SSRIs were as efficient as the tricyclic antidepressants, practically without adversary effects, and easy-to-use because a pill per day dosage suited to all patients. The marketing also had an educational dimension. In leaflets, seminars and sponsored journal articles ordinary physicians were informed about the nature of depressive *disease* and its prevalence in the population. What happened in Finland was by no means unusual, since pharmaceutical companies kept their employees busy with such marketing activities all over the industrialised world at that time (Healy 2004; Rose 2004, 110-1q17; 2006, 478-479; Applbaum 2006). The result is familiar, too. The consumption of antidepressants has eightfolded in Finland in the 1990s, and growth has

continued steadily during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The number of the antidepressant users has doubled since the mid-1990s, and today over 300 000 Finns take antidepressants annually. (*The Finnish Statistics on Medicines 1990-2006*; see also Rose 2004.)

The activities and discourses listed in the **figure 1** established a standard of depression management in Finland, similar to the one which has been implemented in mental health care all over the Western world between the mid-1980s and late-1990s (Callahan & Berrios 2005, 121-153; Helén 2007). There are three elements in the depression management standard. The first one is epidemiological: depressive symptoms and disorders are considered to be very common in the population, and they thus are felt to constitute a genuine public health problem. Underdiagnosis and inadequate treatment of depression are at the core of the problem. The second element is diagnostic: depression is conceived of as a specific mental disorder as it is defined by the international classificatory manuals. The DSM definition of ‘major depression’ is the paradigm of depressive illness. According to this definition depression is a mood disorder, because a necessary requirement of a depression diagnosis is a symptom of low mood or diminished interest or pleasure (see below). The third element of the standard is therapeutic: the treatment of depressive illness falls mainly within the domain of primary health care and is carried out by the GPs; the basic treatment consists of antidepressant medication and follow-up consultations where the physician informs the patient of the medication, supervises that the patient has taken the drugs properly, and gives him or her emotional and social support.

### *Focus on symptoms*

The depression management standard was inconceivable without the authorised classifications of mental disorders – i.e. without the DSM-IV and the section of neurological and psychiatric disorders of the ICD-10. The reason is simple: the object of the standardised procedures is defined on the basis of those manuals.

The mentioned classifications are a milestone in the change of psychiatric style of reasoning<sup>4</sup> which started four decades ago. The United States heralded the change: the advocates of scientific and medical psychiatry who called themselves ‘Neokraepelinians’ defeated ‘Freudians’ when the American Psychiatric Association approved the DSM-III in 1980. The manual made nosography the bedrock of psychiatric thought, and the categories of mental disorders defined on the basis of symptoms acquired a pivotal position in mental health care. (On the making of the DSM classification, see Kirk & Kutchins 1992; Mayes & Horwitz 2005; Wilson 1993.)

The new nosographic reasoning and language in psychiatry and mental health care reached Finland at the end of the 1980s. Then WHO’s ICD-classification (ICD-8 and ICD-9) was officially adopted in the Finnish health care system. Although the Finnish version of the ICD-10, synchronized with the DSM-IV to great extent, was not published until 1996, the shift to international classifications happened a bit earlier and opened the gates to a new kind of concept of psychopathology. In the 1970s, Finnish psychiatrists and other mental health professionals discussed within a framework in which mental disorders were divided into psychoses, neuroses and personality disorders. However, an understanding derived from the U.S. psychiatry was widely deployed already in the depression discussion in the early 1990s. In fact, depression was defined according to the DSM-III-R diagnostic criteria in most of the Finnish professional texts, including the consensus report of the Academy of Finland (1995). The definition of major depression in the APA’s bible became the paradigm of depression in mental health care also in Finland.

Many researchers, clinicians and psychotherapists find the categories and diagnostic criteria of the both DSM-IV and ICD-10 in many ways inconvenient and even misleading or trivial

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<sup>4</sup> Ian Hacking developed this concept by further elaborating A. C. Crombie’s (*Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition*) analysis of six styles of thinking in the history of Western science. He claims that the objectivity of a particular discursive formation considered as science is embedded in the style or styles of reasoning that it deploys. This is because the styles of reasoning determine which propositions can be considered true or false, what is counted as evidence, and what the objects, reality, and ‘laws’ or ‘modalities’ of the science in question are. In addition, he considers transformations in styles of reasoning as crucial for the emergence of scientific novelties, that is, new objects and possibilities of ‘true-or-false’. (Hacking 2002, 159-199)

when applied to individual cases in clinical practice (e.g. Cooper 2004; Riikonen & Mattila 1994; Wakefield, 1992; Wakefield et al., 2002; see also Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Rose, 2006: 477-478). Despite the shortcomings of the authorised classifications and the criticism they have faced, they are a main cog in the mental health machinery because they enable the *translation* of mental disorders from one context to another. The checklists of symptoms provide a common point of reference and a clear delineation of psychiatric phenomena especially for administration, policy makers and health insurance institutions. Moreover, they can be easily adopted and deployed in epidemiological, pharmaceutical or clinical research, in clinical and therapeutic practices and institutions, as well as in drug marketing and self-help guidebooks or websites. The lists of symptoms are both specific and flexible enough to allow, for example, depression or anxiety to move between different mental health settings. In fact, the expansion and metamorphosis of psychiatry into mental health care working in every corner of society would have been impossible without such a medium of communication. Thus, the DSM provides the common language. (Lakoff, 2005: 12-14; Mayes & Horwitz, 2005: 250-251, 263-266; Wilson, 1993: 408-409.)

The most important modification and mediation facilitated by the classificatory language is the treatment of depressive illness in primary health care. As mentioned, the core of the current depression management standard is the practice to diagnose and treat the most of the patients with depression in primary health care. In Finland, this means municipal health care centres and occupational health care. The concept of depressive disorder as a compilation of symptoms which can be presented as a checklist provides the basis for making of diagnostic devices for general practitioners to help them in recognition of depression. These ‘toolkits’ are simplified questionnaires and rating scales aiming at indicating if the patient show symptoms or not. The DEPS scale (**figure 2**) is an example of such a depression detection device for primary health care. Originally, the scale was developed in the context of Tampere Depression Study, an extensive epidemiological study, as a diagnostic tool for the GPs (Salokangas, Poutanen & Stengård 1995). As a part of an array of efforts to improve depression treatment by the health authorities and mental health professionals, the Finnish physicians were familiarised with the scale by widely disseminating notepads with empty DEPS forms to them.<sup>5</sup> Today, a great variety of depression scales are easily available for

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5 The notepad and distribution were sponsored by Lundbeck, the manufacturer of Cipramil

physicians either in the Internet or as notepads with fill-in forms. In addition, the DEPS and similar simple checklists of symptoms are available in the websites of public health authorities, professional and patients' organisations and pharmaceutical companies to be used as self-assessment devices. (Hautamäki, 2007: 126-127; Martin, 2007:177-196.)

The emphasis on symptoms in depression treatment are further increased by the other kinds of diagnostic tools provided for the GPs. The device for differential diagnosis of depression shown in **figure 3** were introduced to the GPs in a Finnish model for recognition and treatment of depression authorised by the health authorities (Lehtinen 1994). This scheme was adopted from an authorised depression management guideline in the U.S, and a similar type of diagnostic path is also presented in the appendix A of the DSM-IV.

Outlining of this kind of pathways for diagnosis is an attempt to solve a problem caused by the fact that the symptom list of 'major depression', the paradigm of depressive disorders consolidated by the authorised classifications, does not suit well to primary health care. Originally, the category of major depression was defined on the basis of clinical and epidemiological research in psychiatric hospitals and out-patient clinics. However, it has been shown by numerous studies that the appearance of depression in primary care is considerably different from the one in the specialised psychiatric care. The general practitioners predominantly encounter patients with rather non-specific symptoms of dejectedness or disorderly mood, and various forms of depression 'masked' in somatic or behavioural symptoms, instead of patients showing symptoms that readily indicate major depression. Thus, mild, mixed and chronic forms of depression and a great variety of depressive symptoms form the core of depressive illness in primary health care. (E.g. Blacker & Clare, 1987; Freeling, 1995; Freeling et al., 1985; Goldberg, 1979; Paykel & Priest, 1992; Poutanen, 1996; Widmer & Cadoret, 1978.)

A noteworthy route in the diagram leads from the symptoms of 'sad mood or low interest' to the diagnosis of 'depression not otherwise specified'. Although the latter is considered a residual category, it nevertheless is a diagnostic option that a physician can use when deciding whether or not a patient showing few depressive symptoms is suffering from a

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which is the most sold SSRI antidepressant in the Nordic countries.

treatable mental disorder. Even the official classifications of mental disorders gives support to such practice of diagnosis since they define low mood as a required diagnostic criterion for depression. Thus, there is a tendency in the standard diagnostics to reduce the depressive disorder to single symptoms of *mood*.

### *Risk and anticipation*

The changes I have discussed above can be seen as reflection of the fact that the object of psychiatry is historically contingent. The metamorphosis can be presented as a narrative of vanishing of the mental diseases and becoming of the mental disorder as the main object of mental health care. Regarding depression, the paradigm of medical understanding of dejection and despondency has changed from manic-depressive illness to major depression, while the latter refers both to a psychopathological entity and a compound of symptoms. However this description of the change lacks a crucial element, a step that is pivotal for the epidemiological turn in psychiatry, namely, entering of the concept of *risk* into the epistemic and practical focus of mental health care.

The definition of mental disorders by focusing on symptoms is closely related to the risk rationale. The view often presented in professional literature on mental health epitomises this relationship: 'Emergence of depressive symptoms in a patient indicates a fourfold increased threat to fall ill with depression, as compared to the ones without symptoms' (Tamminen, 2001: 52). Such a fact cannot be embedded solely on the clinical experience but requires epidemiological risk assessment and knowledge on depressive illness on the population level. Moreover, the above sentence expresses the idea of depressive disorder as a potentiality, i.e. as a possible or probable incidence. Thus, symptoms are considered as indications of *possible or probable* depression, as indications of a risk.

Risk rationale entered in the Finnish psychiatry and directed the formation of depression awareness most significantly through the *project for prevention of suicides*. The project in question was a large-scale national research and development project, launched in the mid-1980s under the direction of the National Public Health Institute and professor Jouko

Lönnqvist as its *primus motor* (see Lönnqvist 1988). At that time, it was the most significant preventive mental health care campaign in Finland. The project for prevention of suicides was essential in pursuing The Finnish mental health professional to see depression as a public health problem and in moulding depression into the hub of mental health care. This happened in two ways. First, the epidemiological studies of the project incontestably showed the very high suicide mortality in the Finnish male population as compared to other countries. Second, the studies also confirmed the results of a number of previous studies in other Western countries showing that acute depression was the most important risk factor for suicide. (Lönnqvist, 1987; 1988; Isometsä et al., 1994; Isometsä, Henriksson & Lönnqvist, 1994.)

The latter line of influence has been especially significant. The epidemiological studies of the 1970s and the early 1980s (e.g. Lehtinen 1977; Väisänen 1975; Lehtinen & Väisänen 1979) concentrated mostly on the prevalence of mental disorders. Instead, the epidemiological studies on suicide tematised psychiatric morbidity through the concept of risk; and the mental syndrome in which the idea of risk was primarily related was depression. Thus, the Finnish mental health reasoning became embedded in epidemiology in the 1970s and the suicide project directed it towards an approach of social medicine, in which the population based studies and statistical analysis of risk factors effecting health and illness are emphasised. The epidemiological gaze was directed not only to actual but also possible and probable incidences, and it implied a line of action in mental health care to anticipate the onset of illness.

General public health reasoning and policy-making prepared the ground for the breakthrough of risk rationale as the framework of health policy in Finland in the 1970s. The North Karelia Project, a massive campaign for study risk factors of cardiovascular diseases with extensive health promotion and disease prevention programme, had a pivotal role. It is a bit surprising how similar the results of the suicide project were with the ones of North Karelian Project. Depression was related to suicide with the same statistical logic as the high blood pressure and blood cholesterol level to cardiovascular diseases: all of them signified an increased risk of death. The risk group was also the same: working men, with low level of education.

Originally, it was emphasised in the discussion on suicides and their prevention that the

relationships between depressive illness and suicide is such that depression causes the most significant risk, or 'predictive factor', of suicide. Thus depressive illness or severe depression symptoms formed the the most important risk. (E.g. Lönnqvist, 1988.) At the turn of the 1990s, the focus started to change so that factors increasing statistical risk to fall ill with depression or show severe symptoms were analysed more and more in epidemiological studies. General surveys on mental health began to emphasise the prevalence of certain groups of disorders in the population, and with neuroses conditions of depression, phobia and anxiety were particularly addressed. Further, the studies presented a specific analysis of the prevalence of depression and anxiety symptoms in the population, and the background factors like gender, social status, age and place of living started to appear as risk factors. As if undeliberately the researchers began interpreting the factors which correlated intensively with the prevalence of mental disorders as risk factors. In addition, studies emphasising psychological and psychiatric factors in defining depression symptoms and risks were launched – the most well-known is probably the Tampere Depression Study, TADEP (see Helén, 2007a: 157-158).

In the 1990s, psychiatric epidemiology became tightly entwined with the concept of health risk and was re-focused in a manner described above. With this development, psychiatric morbidity which in the 1970s and 1980s appeared as neurotic and psychosomatic symptoms condensed into depressive disorders – and in this light depression was a public health problem.

At the same time as depression became to be seen as a public health problem it became gendered. Depression handbooks for mental health practitioners deploy epidemiological risk estimates when stating that depression is particularly a women's problem. "The risk of women to fall ill with depression is twofold as compared to the risk of men" (Tamminen 2001, 52) – this fact, crystallized especially by the Anglosaxon epidemiology, is repeated time and again in the depression literature and it is presented even in the treatment guidelines of the Finnish Medical Association (Käypä hoito ... 2004, 747-748). This fact prevails in the discussion even though it is somewhat disputed, as the Finnish studies present results both supporting the gender difference (e.g. Lehtinen & Joukamaa 1994, 8) and opposing it (e.g. Poutanen 1996, 81, 91). From this perspective, attention is paid to a risk group different from

the primary risk group of the suicide epidemiology; and thus the opinion of psychiatric epidemiology is the following: being a woman makes the person vulnerable to depression while being a man increases the probability of self-destruction.

As such, there is nothing peculiar in the concept of risk in this context. It is a concept of statistics by which the relationship between an individual case and a population is established in terms of probability. Through this, the relationship between the individuals and the population can be conceived of as a combination of calculable risk factors. This type of assessment is a routine operation in social medicine and even in wider medical discourse. Similarly health risk and life expectancy are the forms in which health and illness is discussed professionally nowadays. As well known, the idea of risk moulds medical gaze and reasoning predictive, and it transforms dangers and threats into definable or even calculable objects, thus implying preventive procedures. (On the concept of risk, see Ewald 1990, 141-147; 199; Castel 1991; Garland 2003). However, the idea of prevention is hardly a novelty in the Western medicine.

Peculiarities of discussion on depression risks are derived from the equivocality of the concept of risk and the fact that its meaning and uses change from one context to another (see Dean 1999, 181-182; Garland 2003). For this reason, there is a possibility in the risk rationale to transform morbidity on the population level – i.e. health risk – back to the personal level. Such a reduction is quite typical in current discourse on mental health.

When problematisation of depression in the current professional literature moves from the level of population and epidemiology to clinico-therapeutic context a clear tendency to *personalise risks* appears. Discourse on risks is detached from the rigid context of statistics, personal susceptibilities to mental disorders are emphasised, and the predictive approach is reinforced. The mentioned common estimation that ‘emergence of depressive symptoms in a patient indicates a fourfold increased threat to fall ill with depression, as compared to the ones without symptoms’ reflects the notion that depressive symptoms are an indication of the increased personal risk to fall ill with depression.

This slide is facilitated by the compatibility of the epidemiological and diagnostic equipment.

The DEPS scale exemplifies well the match between symptom lists of clinical manuals and the diagnostic devices of epidemiological studies, since the scale that was originally developed as a diagnostic tool for the GPs served also as an epidemiological assessment device in the study (Salokangas, Poutanen & Stengård 1995; Poutanen 1996). Through this double role clinical and epidemiological interpretations of the depression symptoms start to mingle with each other. In clinico-therapeutic context, answers and the figures provided by the rating scales are considered symptoms of depressive disorder, whereas in epidemiological context they are indications of an increased likelihood or susceptibility, i.e. risk of the onset of depression. Mental health discussion in Finland and elsewhere is characterised by the confusion of these dimensions. As a result, discourse on risks is primarily associated to individual cases and persons and, at the same time, symptoms are seen as indications of a potential, possible or probable condition or disorder.

#### *From care to governing of the living*

What is depression as an object of mental health care? What do mental health professionals treat when they treat depression?

To exaggerate a bit one may claim that according the present mental health care rationale professional help of the patient does not aim at treating depressive illness nor mood disorder but essentially is *risk management*. The emphasis of symptoms in the treatment standard has situated the focus of depression treatment in the zone between normal sadness and severe depression, in the grey area of 'mild' and 'moderate' depressive conditions. This is the case especially with the so called primary care depression. Furthermore, when physicians conceive of symptoms as indications of the increased risk of depressive illness, they do not see deep dejection, overwhelming sadness, low spirits or similar conditions as expressions of an actual illness. Rather, the latter are signs of possible and forthcoming disturbance of mind and behaviour, danger or susceptibility of the person's inner life to become disordered. Accordingly, diagnosing a patient, intervention into his or her mood disorders or restoring of normalcy with the help of drugs, talk or both is an anticipatory and preventive procedure aimed at an onset illness the patient might possibly face. Psychiatric intervention,

psychotherapy or psychotropic medication is thus not a device of medical care but of control of living.

Undoubtedly, psychiatrists, psychotherapists and nurses working at mental hospitals and outpatient clinics and taking care of people who suffer from severe or chronic depression would not readily accept this view of the object and objective of depression treatment. Also the wide autobiographical literature in which people tell about their personal struggle with depressive *disease* can be seen as a testimony against what I said above. A more ‘balanced’ view of the object of depression treatment (and of mental health care in general) would be a continuum extending from severe pathological conditions to symptoms and prodromal signs and further to risks and susceptibilities. All in all, the way depression is constituted in the current mental health thought and practice is characterised by duality: on the one hand, the gaze and practices are primarily focused on symptoms and risks and, on the other hand, mood disorders are defined in the framework of the disease model as independent psychopathological entities.

To a great extent, this double exposure is due to the classificatory equipment. The DSM and ICD manuals define mental disorders independent clinical entities without limiting the range of psychopathologies in a rigid manner. As the manuals offer clinical descriptions of disorders purified from the causes and explanations, they provide the psychiatrists, other mental health professionals or the GPs opportunities to diagnose a great variety of phenomena – from bad behaviour of a child to temporary erectile troubles of men – as mental disorders. (Rose 2006, 476.) The limitless nature of mental disorders is even more paramount in the expanding culture of self-help mental health care. Popular literature, patients’ guidebooks, websites and even psychopharmaceutical advertising offer easily accessible devices of self-diagnosis to the public. With such devices, symptoms and susceptibilities of depression and anticipatory detection of risks are highlighted. Furthermore, the advice literature and websites also show the path from the mapping of personal symptoms and risks and personal life situation to the care of the self in which the personal conduct of living is embedded in a pharmaceutical and/or psychotherapeutic treatment of potential depression. (Hautamäki 2006.)

What is the context for the development by which psychiatric knowledge and techniques of psychotherapy and psychopharmacology have entered into the service of risk management and personal life management? Historically, this development has been enabled by the metamorphosis of the nature of and focus in the management of mental health problems in the West during the past half of a century. The change is characterised by reduction of incarceration and a growing emphasis on out-patient care, community psychiatry and prevention, and an increasing blending of mental health care into many branches of medicine and social work. Compared to the USA, Britain, and other Nordic countries, reduction of hospitalisation and reorganisation of mental health care were limited and delayed in Finland until the early 1980s. Then the rapid change of orientation and reorganisation took place throughout the mental health care system. (Ref)

With this fundamental restructuring of psychiatry, the treatment of mental illness, the control of the persons considered mentally abnormal and the personal care of the self have fused together epistemically, practically and even institutionally. An area of mental health care has resulted out of this incorporation. In the framework of the Finnish public welfare system the area of mental health care can be outlined in the following way (**figure 4**). This development has been described as a dissemination of psychiatry into the society and its transforming into therapy markets (e.g. Castel, Castel & Lovell 1982, 256-295), and some scholars have seen a therapy culture to emerge (e.g. Furedi 2004).

Regardless the name we call the current assemblage of mental health care, two of its features are particularly noteworthy. First, mental health care is primarily practiced by experts other than psychiatrists within this assemblage. The fact that depressive illness is mostly treated by the GPs reflects well the more general state of affairs. Second, expertise and professions have dispersed and multiplied in the field of mental health care. This change has been accompanied and reinforced by a sort of democratization and popularisation of expertise, epitomised by the vigour of self-help groups and networks and the expansion of lay expertise which the patients' organisations and peer support networks have generated. The Internet has been indispensable for this development. In addition, direct-to-consumer model, originated from the U.S. pharmaceutical markets, has encouraged and spread lay expertise on depression and other mental problems in its own way. This type of marketing encourages people not

only to ask their physician to prescribe a certain drug but to suggest a particular diagnosis to themselves. Although direct-to-consumer marketing of drugs is currently prohibited in the EU, information about different types of mental disorders, their symptoms and pharmaceutical cures are shared to the customers through the company websites and leaflets available at the pharmacies.

The equipment of mental health developed during the past three decades – the classification of mental disorders which is both expanding and becoming more dense, epidemiological data and devices of statistical analysis, practices of screening and risk assessment, new drugs, automatic devices for self-assessment in the Internet, pharmaceutical marketing becoming evermore sophisticated – has lowered the threshold to define a person an object of mental health care. For this reason, the number of people whose life, personality and moral career are defined by suffering from and treatment of a mental disorder is increasing day by day.

## Figure 1. Emerging of depression in Finland

- suicide prevention project
- introduction of classificatory (DSM, ICD) 'language' and neokrapelinian reasoning
- PTD committee and creation of professional consensus
- psychiatric epidemiology
- introduction and marketing of the SSRI medication

### § OUTCOME: Depression management standard

- concept
- diagnostic practice
- treatment guidelines
- prevention/control policy

Figure 2. The DEPS scale (Salokangas, Poutanen & Stengård, 1995: 11)

During the last month, I have	Not at all	A little	Quite a lot	Ex- tremely
Suffered from insomnia	0	1	2	3
Felt blue	0	1	2	3
Felt everything was an effort	0	1	2	3
Felt low in energy or slowed down	0	1	2	3
Felt lonely	0	1	2	3
Felt hopeless about the future	0	1	2	3
Not got any fun out of life	0	1	2	3
Had feelings of worthlessness	0	1	2	3
Felt all pleasure and joy has gone from life	0	1	2	3
Felt that I can not shake off the blues even with help from family and friends	0	1	2	3

Figure 3. Differential diagnosis of primary mood disorders  
 (*Depression in primary care*, vol. 1, 1993: 20)





Figure 4. Mental health care: the field of influence



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### **Time-scales of changing security technologies**

The maturing of “new” technology of sociology has led us to recognize some further challenges in longitudinal technology studies, particularly in regard to “spatial reach” and “time-scale” of inquiry. The series of studies on ICT design and uptake Williams and his co-authors (e.g. Pollock & Williams, 2008; Williams *et al.*, 2005) draws attention to the dominance of temporally limited snapshots of technology’s life-cycle. When design, development, marketing, implementation, appropriation, and domestication of technology are studied separately the models that emerge by default over-emphasize the particular moment of innovation under scrutiny over others and produce a “narrative bias” as Williams et al (2005) phrase it, leading to rather contradictory claims between studies on different moments and sites in innovation. Similar narrative bias results from resorting only to a singular time-scale of analysis. Time-scale and “grain size” of data and analysis in frames importantly what processes and issues can rise from the data. Determining “the correct unit of analysis” as in statistical or experimental inquiry is far from straightforward in studies of socio-technical change.

The presentation outlines a potential way forward in coming to terms with new health and security technologies by conducting studies that could cover the key events and sites in the “career”, “trajectory” or “biography” of technology in multiple scales of analysis. The core ideas of such ‘biographies of technology and practices’ approach can be expressed rather simply:

- a. Longitudinal analysis of the biographies of innovation from their inception to at least the early stabilization of their uses.
- b. Conducting this analysis and related data gathering at multiple scales of inquiry and granularity of data: Development of practices, biography of innovation and related activities, conduct of design and appropriation episodes at monthly, weekly and minute scales. These are further linked to more obdurate patterns in socio-techno-economic change.
- c. The focal points for more close-up inquiries are chosen so that they were likely to be informative in regard to broader scales of change in design-use relationship as indicated by previous studies, and likely to reveal patterns that are of special interest for the study, for instance in this book interaction and learning “in the wild”.
- d. Combining historiographic and ethnographic inquiries to accomplish the above.

Yet the ideas entail a less trivial task: intertwining diachronic and synchronic inquiry in a balanced manner—notoriously thorny task in social research.

Pollock, N., & Williams, R. (2008). *Software and organizations: The biography of the packaged enterprize system*. London: Routledge.

Williams, R., Slack, R., & Stewart, J. (2005). *Social learning in technological innovation - experimenting with information and communication technologies*. Cheltenham: Edgar Algar Publishing.

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### **Securing the health of the population: cardiovascular prevention between epidemiology and molecular medicine**

The paper presents an on-going research project on the introduction of the so-called risk factor approach into Finnish medicine and public health and its subsequent development. The risk factor approach aims at early identification and prevention of potential cases of illness. For this purpose it singles out a number of physiological, behavioural, social and hereditary factors that bear on the probability of the future illness of an individual, and tries to influence these multifarious factors in ways that reduce the risk levels of the population. Here it often builds on the co-operation and activity of the individuals. Cardiovascular problems have been regarded as the one disease group that has most affected the development of this approach. The paper follows the trajectory of these diseases from the introduction of epidemiological risk models into the governing of chronic disease to the current “molecularisation” of cardiovascular diseases and its (prospective) effects on their prevention.

The paper first links the problem of public health to security thought with the foucauldian concepts of biopower and mechanisms of security. The main part of the paper is reserved to the presentation of the risk factor approach in medicine and public health in the context of cardiovascular disease prevention. Lastly, the paper discusses the current influence of genomics on the framing of this group of diseases. The paper shows how molecular medicine both builds on previous modes of medical thinking and departs from them. The fast advance of molecular medicine and its forward-looking nature that predicts revolutionary effects on health care often obscure its debt to older medical rationalities and the fact that it has to deal with established fields of practice in its attempts to become stabilised.

Toomas Kotkas

### **Foucault on Law and *Homo Oeconomicus* – A Genealogy of Liberal Governmentality**

In the lectures of spring 1979, (*Naissance de la biopolitique*), Foucault changed his view on law. He did no longer consider law merely as something negative and restricting. Instead, Foucault now saw law in a more positive light. Foucault argued that law created a public space, i.e. market, where liberal political technologies could function according to their own logic – a space for *homo oeconomicus* to act according to his interests.

In my presentation, I will focus on three of Foucault's texts on law and its relation to *homo oeconomicus*. I start by analyzing an article/lectures called "Truth and Juridical Forms" (1973) and the book *Discipline and punish* (1975). In these texts, Foucault already touches the theme of liberal governmentality but does not develop it any further. It is only in his lectures of 1979, where he takes as his task to write a genealogy of liberalism. I am interested in analyzing, what made Foucault change his view on law in these late lectures.

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**SECURING FAMILY LIFE**  
**PROMOTING PRIVATE INSURANCE IN POSTWAR FINLAND**

Paper to be presented at the *Scales of Security*, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, 26–27 June 2008

**ABSTRACT**

This paper studies how insurance has been promoted as a tool for governing private economies. The research is based on historical archive data on the marketing of personal insurance, i.e. life, health and accident insurance and savings-related insurance policies, in Finland during 1945–2000, thus in the context of the Nordic welfare society. What is characteristic of the Nordic countries during this period is that instead of the private and public sectors having been simply antagonistic, defined against each other, their relationship was complex and constantly mobile. It is significant that during this period both social and private insurance institutions frequently emphasized, in their campaigns, family life as the core arena of intervention when trying to ‘mobilize the consumers’ (Miller & Rose 1997).

As a technology of risk, insurance translates the heterogeneity inherent in the everyday use of the word ‘security’ into something new, into a technical and economic thing. Interestingly though, in order to sell insurance products for potential customers, in their campaigns the insurance companies have, through the years, had to make systematically this translation back: potential customers have been led to believe that by taking care of security with insurance, one as a matter of fact takes care of security in its broader meaning, not only as an economic thing but also as a moral thing. In Finland, private insurance companies have routinely concretized the usefulness of their product by locating it within the family house and the caring relationships between family members. Thus, the basic uses of insurance – of securing economic value and of creating new capital in the form of saving – have been attached to concrete personal relationships, consumer dreams, and the sense of responsibility.

Abstract submitted to Scales of Security workshop, 26 - 27 June 2008,  
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### **Insurance and solidarity**

This paper examines the link between insurance and solidarity. The purpose is to problematise the dualism between the paradigms of liberal responsibility and social solidarity in the context of insurance. Usually the concept of responsibility is related to private insurance and the concept of solidarity to social insurance. Nonetheless, private and social insurance can't be separated strictly from each other. On the contrary, they form a continuum, which can be examined by analysing the form and the scope of responsibility and solidarity. All kinds of insurance are based on the general idea of risk spreading and certain kind of mutual solidarity, which draws on the combination of liberal and social forms of government. The primary questions of the paper are the following: How certain moralities and rationalities, especially with regard to risk, responsibility, and solidarity, are generated and redefined by private and public insurance technologies and discourses around them? How has the relationship between insurance and solidarity changed in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century?

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14 June 2008

# **INSURANCE AND SOLIDARITY**

## Reconfiguring the division of private and social security

(DRAFT)

Abstract:

This paper examines the connection of insurance and solidarity. The purpose is to problematise the dualism between private and social insurance and between the related paradigms of liberal responsibility and social solidarity. Usually the concept of responsibility is connected to private insurance and the concept of solidarity to social insurance. However, private and social insurance can't be separated strictly from each other. On the contrary, they form a continuum, which can be examined by analysing the mode and the scope of solidarity in different forms of insurance. All kinds of insurance are based on a general idea of risk spreading and a varying degree of reciprocity and solidarity, which draws on the combination of liberal and social rationalities of government. The paper discusses first the historical and conceptual relationship between insurance and solidarity. Secondly, the paper examines the possibilities to think responsibility and solidarity as concurrent and interlinked aspects of all forms of insurance. In the end, the changing relationship between insurance and solidarity is discussed through some current debates related to insurance and social policy.

### 1 INTRODUCTION

The conception about a new rise of individual responsibility has been quite unanimous lately in social sciences and in general public discussion. In this discussion the building of social insurance and extensive social security systems during the 20<sup>th</sup> century represents relatively short period of social solidarity which is already said to be eroding. The history of responsibility is often divided into two distinct periods: the age of "liberal" 19<sup>th</sup> century and "social" 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, the picture becomes more complex, if we examine studies on the genealogy of the "social" (e.g. Donzelot 1984; 1993; Ewald 1986; 2002; Castel 1991; 1995). One of the most influential contributions on this topic is François Ewald's work *L'Etat providence* (1986, in German 1993), in which he examines the moral, political, juridical and

epistemological foundations of the French insurance society and welfare state. Ewald emphasises the birth of statutory social insurance in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as the most important event which represents a historical border line between *a paradigm of liberal responsibility* and *a paradigm of social solidarity*. Although this division is illuminating, it is often presented surprisingly strictly (e.g. Ewald 2002) compared to Ewald's detailed historical analysis about the entanglement of liberal and social rationalities and different forms of insurance. Although he illustrates elaborately that voluntary and mandatory forms of insurance have common and interlinked roots, he still affirms – among many others – that voluntary private insurance belongs clearly to the first paradigm and mandatory social insurance to the latter, both historically and conceptually.

The purpose of this paper is to problematise and rethink this kind of division and distinction between liberal responsibility and social solidarity in the context of insurance. This division is common particularly in the academic social policy discussion. However, as Dean (1999, 113) has noted, liberal and social forms of government are not contradictory to each other but fundamentally interrelated. In what follows I will ask whether it would be more fruitful to think responsibility and solidarity as concurrent aspects of insurance rather than strongly opposed to each other. Similar division that is possible to reformulate is the distinction between private and social insurance. It is somewhat misleading to link categorically individual responsibility to private insurance and solidarity to social insurance. This paper argues that private and social insurance can't be separated strictly from each other. On the contrary, they should be considered analytically as a continuum, which can be examined by analysing the mode and the scope of solidarity and responsibility in different forms of insurance.

Various arrangements of voluntary and compulsory insuring form the basis of the (social) security systems in contemporary societies. In this paper the purpose is not so much to examine the different institutions of insurance as to conceptualise, how insurance is, has been and could be perceived as a *technology of solidarity*, that is, as a mechanism of mutual risk spreading and joint responsibility. The idea is to focus particularly on the transformations of prevailing visions or images of insurance (see Baker & Simon 2002). This approach comes from Ewald's incitement that "the aim of

the sociologist, historian or political analyst should be to ascertain why at a given moment insurance institutions take one particular shape rather than another” (Ewald 1991, 198). For Ewald, insurance is “an art of combinations” whereby the *abstract technology* of insurance (actuarial calculation of risks) is used differently in a range of *institutions* and insurance *forms*; “[t]he particular form insurance technology takes in a given institution at a given moment depends on an *insurantal imaginary*: that is to say, on the ways in which, in a given social context, profitable, useful and necessary uses can be found for insurance technology” (ibid.). The history of insurance consists of various voluntary and mandatory arrangements, which embody different kinds of insurantal imagination. These arrangements can be mutual societies, private for-profit companies, group insurance organised by employers and trade unions, social security schemes and so forth.

In recent years there have been many insightful contributions in which Ewald’s account is elaborated (e.g. Knights & Vurdubakis 1993; Rosanvallon 2000; Baker & Simon 2002; O’Malley 2004). In addition to the historical and theoretical discussion, remarkable empirical studies on insurance have been made by Zelizer (1983), Ericson & Doyle (2004) and Ericson et al. (2003). Particularly the latter studies have emphasised insurance as a form of governance. Also in the Finnish discussion above mentioned approach to insurance has received more visibility recently (Helne 2001; Meskus 2002; Jauho 2004; Lehtonen & Meskus 2004). However, in this growing discussion about insurance the concept of solidarity has been much less salient than for example risk, security or uncertainty.

In the following the aim is first to analyse the historical and theoretical connection between insurance and solidarity and secondly to conceptualise insurance as a mixture of responsibility and solidarity. After problematising *the division of responsibility and solidarity* as well as *the division of private and social insurance* I will examine the changing relationship between insurance and solidarity in the recent discussion focusing particularly on the claim that the connection of insurance and solidarity has become an obsolete idea. Accordingly, *the separation of insurance and solidarity* forms a third division I want to take issue with in this paper.

## 2 INSURANCE AS A TECHNIQUE OF SOLIDARITY

Historically, solidarity is one of the key concepts in the discussion on the collective nature of insurance, referring both to voluntary and mandatory insurance.

Etymologically the term solidarity stems from the Latin expression *in solidum* in Roman law, which referred to joint responsibility for debts of each person in a group (Euzéby 2004, 109). Later the term received notable significance particularly in France, the actual birthplace of the term (*solidarité*), where it was used as a legal term (in a similar sense as in Roman law) from the 16<sup>th</sup> century onwards, also in Napoleon's famous legal code, the *Code civil* in 1804 (Stjerno 2004, 27). In France, *solidarité* reached dominance as an influential sociological (Leroux, Comte, Durkheim) and political concept during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. One of the most important uses of the term in the 19<sup>th</sup> century France was to designate *the principle of insurance*, that is, association of common interests by distributing risks of economic losses. According to Rosanvallon (2000, 12) already in the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century insurance "acting as a kind of invisible hand of solidarity" formed a new (and third) model – alongside with the social contract and the market – for understanding the social bond. Little by little insurance became both a *metaphor* and an important *technique* for a new kind of solidarity.

In this context it is important to distinguish solidarity clearly from altruism and such motivations. To give money for a beggar is not necessarily solidarity, unless the benefactor can imagine that the situation could be other way around. Thus, solidarity refers to the idea that "if I help you then you will help me, if and when the need arises" (Stjernø 2004, 25). The core of the term is that it refers to solidity, unity and cohesion of a group of people, but not necessarily to certain motivations, moral intentions or practices through which this soli(dar)ity is achieved. Most of the early social theorists, such as Leroux, Comte, Durkheim and Weber, emphasised solidarity more or less as an idea connected to the inevitable *interdependence* of individuals and hence the foundation for all collective action (see Stjernø 2004, 28–39). Solidarity is at the same time both a descriptive and a normative concept (similarly as the concepts of normal or social). It is a prerequisite for the integration and cohesion of any society or association of individuals. Insurance as a mechanism of solidarity has proved to be successful particularly because it combines joint responsibility with self interest,

collective action with individual freedom. In France in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the radical (and middle class) advocates of *solidarism*, who tried to promote social insurance, had “their hearts on the left and their wallets on the right” (Spicker 1991, 32). As a political movement solidarism was based on the effort to find alternative ideology both to liberalism and socialism as well as to create social ethics between liberal-individualist and collectivist outlook (Stjernø 2004, 149). Indeed, Ewald (1993, 467) emphasises that solidarism doesn’t require us to renounce our egoism, because “[t]he pursuit of my own well-being obligates me to want well-being for the other”.

In this paper the concept of insurance is understood not only as an institution and a technique of economic compensation, but above all as a general *principle* of reciprocal risk spreading and shared responsibility within a certain group. Deborah Stone (2002, 54) has emphasised insurance as an institution that enlarges public discussion both on private and social responsibility. As Baker (2002, 34–36) emphasises, on the one hand insurance creates (individual) responsibility, on the other hand it socialises and redistributes responsibility. For instance life insurance is not only about being prudent and taking care of the family and oneself, but also about joint responsibility among other insurants (Lehtonen 2003), although the latter aspect is not very visible. Baker has pointed out that in the western world insurance is usually considered as a bilateral contract between a customer and an insurance company. Such individualistic vision of insurance hides the collective basis of all kinds of insurance, whether voluntary or mandatory, private or public. Baker writes that “[s]o hidden is this collective dimension in the American perspective toward insurance that many, perhaps the majority, in the United States never realize that, if they are lucky, most of their premiums for most forms of insurance will go to pay other people’s claims” (Baker 2002, 36). This vision or image of insurance is valid everywhere in the western world, although, at least historically, the link between insurance and solidarity might have been more familiar in Europe.

Contrasted to the above described way of thinking, an interesting case is the Islamic world where commercial insurance is prohibited according to the Islamic law, *Sharia*, because it violates Islamic rules regarding interest and gambling. Islamic version of insurance, *takaful* (meaning literally joint venture, shared responsibility or solidarity),

is based strongly on the idea of mutual solidarity. Insurance is considered not a bilateral contract, but a charitable collective arrangement to aid each other; the premiums collected from the policyholders are considered as donations or gifts (see Vogel & Hayes 1998, 151-152; Maysami & Kwon 1999). One of the largest *takaful* companies in the world has a name that is hardly thinkable in the Euro-American private insurance business: Solidarity. However, Baker (2002, 37) points out that the main difference between Islamic and western conceptions of insurance “is one of perspective, not economics”.

In analysing the connection of insurance and solidarity I will next focus particularly on some notions of Ewald’s insightful work. As already mentioned, Ewald divides the history of economic security into two fundamentally distinct political rationalities, “liberal” paradigm of responsibility and “sociological” or “social” paradigm of solidarity, even though this division appears not that clear, if his genealogy of *État providence* is examined more elaborately: Ewald searches the origins of the social paradigm already from the liberal political rationality. However, he argues that the former paradigm – which was dominant in the 19<sup>th</sup> century – was based on moral responsibility toward oneself (virtues of prudence and individual foresight or providence) and toward others (charity). Legal obligations were only marginal compared to moral responsibility, and both moral and legal accountability was based on the idea of *fault*. In fact, the principle of responsibility converted “any mistake into a fault” (Ewald 2002, 275).

According to Ewald “[t]he mechanism of responsibility was challenged, reformed, and replaced at the end of the nineteenth century, at least with respect to the coverage of certain types of events, by an arrangement based on solidarity“ (Ewald 2002, 277). The paradigm of solidarity was not based on fault and individual responsibility but on general and abstract concept of *risk* that converted individual accidents into social accidents in a new way. Between these two paradigms or diagrams of government, insurance (at the first place in its voluntary and mutual forms) formed an important mediating technology. This shift from responsibility to solidarity – from fault to risk – culminated in the birth of statutory social insurance (starting from the idea of professional risks and insurance against accidents at work), which broadened

significantly to role of legal obligations (see more thoroughly about Ewald's thesis also Liukko 2008).

Ewald's emphasis on this kind of paradigm shift affirms the common division: private insurance is usually associated with individual responsibility and private interests and social insurance with joint responsibility and solidarity. But the history of insurance shows, that the question is more ambiguous. If we ignore the question about legal obligations and consider insurance as a technology whereby a number of individuals share the economic risk of (and responsibility for) potential loss to any one in the same pool, it is possible to consider solidarity as a *structural* feature of all kind of insurance. In the context of insurance the concept of solidarity doesn't refer to solidarity as individual motivation or action, but to the structural dimension whereby solidarity can be understood as an institutionalised arrangement (cf. Trampusch 2007, 202). Although voluntary insurance arrangements might follow the basic virtues of the liberal diagram, it was exactly the voluntary forms of insurance that first began to undermine the liberal idea of individual responsibility and fault.

According to Ewald (1991, 202–203; 1993, 215–216) insurance has replaced fraternal aid, neighbourhood solidarity and moral responsibility relations with reciprocity based on contract law and certain kind of *abstract mutuality*, which made distribution of risk and responsibility possible without personal contacts among the insured. Insurance is based on the idea of *social risks*, which are considered more or less common to all in a given population and therefore can (and should) be shared. The idea of social risks was born in a close connection with the development of statistics and probability calculus, which helped to make social interdependence more visible and undeniable.

At the same time insurance is based on liberal and economic logic; it is a collective method of financing in capitalistic societies. Besides mutual aid, the roots of insurance can be traced to speculative profit seeking, banking, usury and gambling. Thus, insurance combines moral and economic aspects in a specific way. This is the place where the concept of solidarity appears peculiar: Ewald (1993, 227) claims that before all its other social meanings, the idea of solidarity belongs primarily to the *economics* of insurance. Insurance collects premiums from everyone in the same insurance pool and thus spreads economic risk with the help of actuarial risk

technology. What is essential here as regards the idea of solidarity, is the fact that insurance became quite early also a social and a political issue. Already in the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century Clavière, one of the advocates of life insurance, argued that insurance unites people by instituting a virtual social contract (Rosanvallon 2000, 12). In the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Edmond About (1865, 35; Ewald 1993, 227-228) wrote that “the one who doesn’t insure himself, is a double burden for the society. About was convinced that insurance is the best technique for collecting capital together and distributing it. He stressed that “through insurance we all become capitalists”, and this happens through “unconscious solidarity” which forms the basis of insurance. For Ewald (1993, 228), besides many other roots of the idea of solidarity, insurance technology represents the “capitalistic origin of the solidarity doctrine”.

To use the concept of solidarity for analysing insurance it is necessary to make a difference at least between two kinds of solidarity. Sometimes in the academic social policy discussion solidarity is considered as opposite to reciprocity. In this interpretation solidarity is associated with collective aid and unilateral support, such as social assistance, and reciprocity with two-sided exchange or mutual support, such as insurance (e.g. Leitner & Lessenich 2003). Instead of this opposition I would rather consider solidarity as a continuum between “balanced reciprocity” (precise exchange between two parties) and “generalised reciprocity” (exchange that is not based on straight returns from the recipients) (Sahlins 1974, 193; Spicker 1991, 22). As Spicker (1991, 17–19) suggests, solidarity has both individual and collective dimension. Spicker calls the individualistic dimension *mutualism*. It is based on *reciprocity of individual interests* and recognition of mutual responsibilities. In this paper the individualistic dimension is called *insurantial* or *mutual solidarity*. It is based on the idea that combining the interests (assets) of many individuals together creates collectively something greater than the sum of the assets. This kind of – possibly unconscious and hidden – insurantial and institutional solidarity or abstract mutuality belongs in theory to all kinds of insurance. The idea of mutual solidarity has helped to argue that voluntary insurance is not only about private responsibility, but that it has social significance as well.

When solidarity is viewed collectively, the emphasis is not so much in reciprocity between individuals but in group cohesion and social bond, in which case also unilateral support or generalised reciprocity becomes possible. Spicker (1991, 19-20) identifies this collective dimension of solidarity with the idea of *fraternity*. Instead of fraternity, I call it here *universal* or *social solidarity*. It is usually associated with statutory social insurance and social security in general, even though social insurance is rarely “universal”. However, social solidarity makes the idea of strict reciprocity indeterminate. As regards insurance associated with social solidarity, risk classification can be minimal compared to more individualistic forms of insurance as contributions don’t have to be actuarially equivalent to risks or benefits. Thus, the redistributive effects tend to increase.

It is important to notice that “pooling of risks on a solidaristic basis does not necessarily imply progressive redistribution” (Spicker 1991, 22). Furthermore, regardless of the form of insurance (voluntary or compulsory, private or public or something in between) the collective and solidaristic dimension of insurance might remain hidden. Understanding the collective nature of all insurance contributions – whether private insurance premiums or contributions for mandatory insurance – is not self-evident. Usually the insured individuals expect more or less that they will finally receive a financial return (Spicker 1991, 23), although in many cases the outcome is that the contributions end up for the benefit of other members of the risk pool. This expectation (and also the outcome) might apply surprisingly similarly to different forms of insurance: whether voluntary risk insurance against various accidents, unemployment insurance, voluntary or mandatory sickness insurance or statutory pension insurance, of which the latter are usually financed more or less on a ‘pay as you go’ basis (contributions go from the generation of working population straight for the benefit of pensioners of the moment). Thus, the actual mode and scope of (institutional) solidarity of certain insurance arrangement doesn’t necessarily equate the vision or image of solidarity connected to the corresponding form of insurance.

### 3 INSURANCE AS A MIXTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SOLIDARITY

If we follow Michel Albert (2004, 24–25, 39), modern insurance has two different foundations: *alpine model* and *marine model*. The alpine model emerged in the

continental Europe within associations based on mutual help. The aim of the associations was some kind of redistributive solidarity. The marine model, instead, emerged as an undertaking to manage risks in merchant shipping. Marine insurance came into being within more commercial environment than alpine insurance. Therefore, the essential element in the marine model was rather the efficiency of risk calculation than solidarity. Albeit the two models illustrated by Albert might be somewhat too simplified, they highlight two competing standpoints, which have both been stressed in the history of insurance. We can ask the following question: Is insurance considered primarily a utilitarian *risk management system*, which is based on private interests, or a *mutual aid system*, which is based on joint responsibility? These two ways of thinking are interestingly overlapping in the confrontation between private and social insurance but also in the internal struggles within these two categories of insurance.

In making difference between various forms of insurance in the scale of private and collective interests, the focal question is, how much and what kind of responsibility and how much and what kind of solidarity. The logic of solidarity is not only a feature of social insurance. Also private and voluntary insurance is fundamentally based on shared responsibility and risk spreading among other insurants. Likewise, individual responsibility is not only a feature of private insurance but also social insurance is in many respects based on the liberal virtue of responsibility. In the following I examine first the combinations of responsibility and solidarity in insurance focusing particularly on the forms of solidarity in voluntary insurance and on the forms of responsibility in mandatory insurance. The purpose is to rethink and obscure the division between responsibility and solidarity as well as the division between private and social insurance. Here, these two concepts appear not contradictory, but rather concurrent and interlinked rationalities of insurance.

In the 18<sup>th</sup> century and well into the 19<sup>th</sup> century insurance fitted together neither with the liberal paradigm nor with the social paradigm. Insurance was not yet considered as a crucial technology of social solidarity neither as a technology of prudence and individual responsibility. On the contrary, it was common to think that insurance undermines individual prudence and foresight and leads to immoral risk behaviour or even to deliberate insurance fraud (this idea is still valid in all forms of insurance in

the discussion about *moral hazard*) (see Zelizer 1983; Rosanvallon 2000, 13; Baker & Simon 2002). Little by little the situation was reversed as voluntary insurance started to fit with both of the above mentioned rationalities: insurance was considered to promote and advance both mutual solidarity and individual responsibility.

This ambivalence was evident particularly in the promotion of life insurance. As Zelizer (1983, 94–97) points out, in the United States in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century underwriters tried to emphasise life insurance as the noblest achievement of mutual benevolence. Compared to traditional charity, life insurance was promoted as technically more efficient but at least equally moral and altruistic institution, which maintains responsibility and solidarity in the society. This kind of promotion tried to reveal life insurance from the old prejudices of the 18<sup>th</sup> century according to which insurance was more or less a synonym for speculation and gambling (O’Malley 2004, 95–115; Clark 2002). In Finland, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, the promotion of life insurance highlighted four different levels of responsibility or concentric circles of solidarity. These were responsibility for oneself, for one’s family, for the collective of insurants, and for the nation (see Liukko 2005; 2007). Although the collective nature of insurance is often disguised, insurance has nevertheless been a special forum for discussion about mutual aid (Stone 2002, 54–55). Thus, if we look at the history of insurance, the question of solidarity becomes salient also in private insurance and particularly in voluntary life insurance.

What is then the role of responsibility in mandatory social insurance? Ewald’s conception of (social) insurance has been criticised for the emphasis whereby insurance is conceived of an exaggerated abstract and rationalising technology that diminishes the concept of responsibility. Baker (2000, 559-561) has questioned Ewald’s distinction between moral responsibility on the one hand and “objective” technique of insurance on the other; moral responsibility and technique of insurance are not contradictory. Furthermore, O’Malley (1996) has criticised Ewald for dismissing the individualising and disciplining side of social insurance and for highlighting too much the collective, technical and statistical side. Much more than Ewald, O’Malley emphasises the aspect of individual responsibility in social insurance: he calls into question the idea that social insurance would have broken the liberal paradigm of responsibility. O’Malley claims that particularly the

individualising features of social insurance – rather than the idea of social risk – made it attractive for liberals in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and later. The most important individualistic characteristics of social insurance is its *contractual form*, which guarantees a legal right to a benefit for those who (or whose employer) have contributed to the insurance pool. Thus social insurance – in contrast to benevolence or tax based social security – is considered more or less *earned* security. (O’Malley 2004, 42–46; see also Stone 2002, 59.) O’Malley stresses that social insurance was based on liberal political rationality and that it didn’t designate such a radical change as Ewald claims. It was not until the birth of universal social security (based on citizenship or residence) that the liberal paradigm was broken more thoroughly (though not completely).

If we look at the recent situation of social insurance, we notice that the emphasis on individual responsibility has remained (or increased). In an empirical study on Canadian insurance system Ericson & Doyle (2004, 27–33) have showed that for instance with regard to mandatory disability insurance there is a continuous debate about the definition and measurement of the limits of disability as the insured are claiming their compensation. In disability insurance individual control (e.g. insurance medicine and other efforts to return the responsibility back to the insured) is often more dominant aspect than solidarity. Similar features are evident also elsewhere: for instance in Finland, the legislation on the statutory accident insurance at work is relatively strict in regard to indemnity reductions related to carelessness or intoxication (though jurisdiction is often more lenient than the law) (Kukkonen & Karmavalo 2006, 133). Thus, social insurance promotes individual responsibility in many ways, which are only partly different from those deployed in voluntary insurance: through earnings-related contributions, by defining grounds for compensations, and by running education campaigns promoting a prudent, responsible and healthy way of life. These observations contrast with the Ewald’s account that the categories of responsibility and fault would be useless in social insurance.

Indeed, the distinction between the diagram of responsibility and the diagram of solidarity related to certain insurance forms is not unambiguous. It is more useful to conceive of these two rationalities of government fundamentally entangled with each

other than separate and historically successive. From this point of view it might be better to picture (social) insurance both as a technology of solidarity and responsibility. Of course the emphasis of both of these aspects varies, which depends largely on how and in what kind of political circumstances insurance is organised. In theory, this can vary from equal contributions and benefits based on maximal redistribution and zero risk classification to income related contributions and benefits or to strict *actuarial neutrality* (equivalence of contributions and individual risks). The latter is the case mostly in private insurance but as regards social insurance it is only a question of political decision making and legislation. Thus – as some recent developments have proved – actuarial neutrality can be considered relatively important feature in mandatory insurance as well. And vice versa, it is not impossible idea that (at least a vision about) solidarity – through legislation or not – would be a more dominant feature in voluntary insurance, than today.

Thus, the question is what grounds there are for moving beyond the distinction of private and social insurance? The first one might be that different forms of insurance have common roots: they were born “out of the same movement or philosophical conclusion: social reality started to be managed and governed through the concept of risk” (Ewald 2004, 63; Ewald 1990). However, this is not enough because statutory social insurance is often factually and philosophically quite distinct compared to voluntary forms of insurance. Ewald (1991, 210; 1993, 444) claims that insurance becomes social, not just because new kinds of risks – like professional or ‘social’ risks – become insurable, but because “societies come to analyse themselves and their problems in terms of the generalized technology of risk”. And according to Ewald, this generalisation of risk technology comes true only when the society and insurance (as a metaphorical and technical implementation of modern solidarity) unite with the help of the state.

Nevertheless, the concept of social insurance can have a broader sense than just mandatory and state-organised insurance. As Collier (2008, 245) points out, social insurance can mean any kinds of insurance “associated with particular forms of knowledge about collective life and concerned with events that are ‘pathologies of the social’”, such as accidents, diseases or losses that threaten the cohesion and solidity of the society. Thus, social insurance doesn’t necessarily have to refer to the legal

compulsion or to the organiser, but rather to certain socially important risks and their redistribution on a solidaristic basis: social insurance can be voluntary, like earnings-related unemployment insurance in many countries, or it can be mandatory but organised through private insurance companies like employee's pension insurance, accident insurance at work and traffic insurance (auto liability insurance) in Finland. Another example of voluntary social insurance is the role of American Blue Cross companies that are run on a non-profit basis whereby the company is understood to exist primarily for the benefit of the insured (Baker 2002, 48).

In the United States it might be self-evident that there is no clear border between private and social insurance, because, for instance in the case of compensating the victims of illness and injury, there is no coherent *system*, but “a set of different institutions that provide compensation” (Abraham & Liebman 1993, 75). But also in the continental Europe – the cradle of statutory social insurance – the situation is not unambiguous. Maarse & Paulus (2003, 586), who have studied solidarity effects of health insurance reforms of four continental countries point out that “the terms *social* and *private health insurance* suggest that both regimes have a homogenous structure and that a clear distinction exists between them”. They claim however that both suggestions are false.

An essential factor that undermines the distinction of private and social insurance is the role of *state regulation*. As Maarse & Paulus argue, regulation of insurance companies has two important goals: the purpose is firstly to protect the insured by controlling the solvency of insurance companies and by regulating the size of their reserves. Secondly regulation is also used to strengthen the “social” or solidaristic character of private insurance: for example in Netherlands The Access to Health Insurance Act is designed to ensure access to voluntary health insurance for those who for some reason have problems in purchasing a private insurance policy. This kind of insurance is considered as private insurance, although insurance companies have almost no own discretion about the plans because the state defines the benefits, premiums and eligibility criteria. Another example of state's effort to strengthen the social character of private insurance in Europe is the fact that so called ‘exclusion periods due to pre-existing medical condition’ are usually forbidden for newborns. (Maarse & Paulus 2003, 587.) An important question is: could voluntary insurance be

more regulated so that it would blur the border line between private and social insurance? As Radetzki et al. (2003) emphasise, one strong problem that hinders the possibilities of state regulation is the growing international competition of insurance companies as global regulation of insurance companies is yet utopian.

#### 4 WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE CONNECTION OF INSURANCE AND SOLIDARITY?

One of the arguments that could easily help to undermine the distinction of private and social insurance is the claim that insurance and solidarity should be separated (see Rosanvallon 2000, 43). This idea fits together with the general *solidarity-decline thesis*: solidarity is said to be weakening in every sector of the society, both in private and public spheres. It seems to be more and more obvious to claim that insurance and solidarity do not match together. And this relates to all forms of insurance. Voluntary insurance is not anymore connected visibly to the logic of mutuality or solidarity, and mandatory insurance is said to be losing touch to these ideas as well. During the last two decades insurance in all its forms has been criticised for two substantial reasons: its inability to solve new kinds of social problems and to work sufficiently as a mechanism of social solidarity (see Beck 1986; Rosanvallon 2000; Helne 2001; Castel 2007). However, both empirical researches and theoretical aspects support the idea that the issue is more complex.

I will first concentrate on Rosanvallon's critique on insurance society, for his insights are particularly important when examining the connection between insurance and solidarity. Rosanvallon (2000, 16) argues that insurance paradigm as a technical and philosophical basis of the welfare state is "currently wearing out". He emphasises that in the present situation social insurance – which is typically based on employment and employer's and employee's contributions – can't anymore be the *primary* mechanism of social solidarity at the level of nation-states. He declares that "with the decline of the insurance society the very foundations of social solidarity must be redefined" (Rosanvallon 2000, 6). Before analysing this claim, we have to remember that Rosanvallon, as well as Ewald, examines particularly France where social insurance (and the principle of insurance) has been more central part of the social security system than for example in the North European countries or Great Britain. It can be

argued that in the Nordic countries the birth of more universal, largely tax financed and strongly redistributive social security systems during the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was already decades ago a significant defeat for insurance mechanism as the most important technique of social solidarity.

Rosanvallon (2000, 41) predicts that a shift from insurance contributions to taxes will be a precondition for the maintenance of social solidarity also in France. This development is furthered by the fact that the number of beneficiaries of social security (pensioners, single parents, long-term unemployed, students) increases in relation to the number of payers. And this undermines the principle of reciprocity usually related to insurance. According to Rosanvallon the most important challenges for social insurance as a mechanism of social solidarity are *social differentiation* and *increasing knowledge*. Differentiation refers to problems which polarise the society, such as exclusion, long-term unemployment or fragmentation of families. These problems erode the solidaristic unity of the society. They are also difficult to outline with the concept of social risk “common to all” (and also if risk is understood as a clearly defined risk of temporary income loss). Increasing knowledge – for example developments in genetic knowledge and medicine in general – has improved the ability to find out whose way of life is more risky than others and who have susceptibility to certain diseases. And this makes it possible for insurers to form more and more specific risk classifications and thus individualise contributions, or even refuse to insure certain risks at all (see also Radetzki et al. 2003, 63).

The individualisation of risk classification is clearly most evident in voluntary insurance, but Rosanvallon (2000, 16) claims that it undermines significantly also the (philosophical, moral and political) support for mandatory social insurance, which is based on the idea that different kind of situations (and citizens) can be put together under a more or less homogenous risk category: “social risk”. It is often argued that social insurance as a mechanism of social solidarity included the idea that the risks can face “anyone” in a certain collective or society. But it is relevant to ask, whether social insurance has ever worked as a mechanism or even as a metaphor of this idea of solidarity for “anyone”. Risk has been a collectivising and individualising concept ever since insurance was born. Additionally, in many forms of social insurance the purpose (following the common perception) has always been predominantly to

distribute risks between the phases of life of one and the same person (see Fölster 1999, 14–15). An essential challenge for insurantal solidarity has also been the fact that insurance implies always some kind of exclusion. As Julkunen (2001, 207) points out, social insurance – as all forms of insurance – is a “club”, which is based on employment and contributions.

Recently there has been a lot of discussion on the shift from the idea of spreading (bad) risks towards the broader idea of “embracing risks”, whereby risk is considered not only as a threat but more and more as an opportunity as well (see Baker & Simon 2002; Ericson & Doyle 2004, 31; Lehtonen & Liukko 2007). As risk is understood more favourable than before, the justification of its individualisation becomes easier. Furthermore, there have been accounts of the death of the “social” as a territory and a target of government (Rose 1995). Particularly in the field of academic social policy it has been common to stress the decline of social solidarity in general. With regard to social insurance, for example the reduction of redistributive features of statutory pensions and the increasing equivalence between contributions and benefits (Julkunen 2004, 259) reflect the breakage of a homogenous risk category, that is, the idea about an all encompassing social risk. The trend seems to be to divide social security beneficiaries into insiders of employment-based social insurance on the one hand and (more and more often means-tested) receivers of tax-financed social assistance on the other hand, while universal national insurance shrinks into marginal role between these two opposites (Jordan 1996; Julkunen 2001, 205–233; Julkunen 2004, 259).

A good example of the new thinking in social insurance is the discussion about individual pension accounts. Actually, pension accounts are not anymore *insurances* – if we understand insurance strictly as collective risk spreading – but a method for pure saving, or even investing. The same can be said about voluntary pension insurances or other savings-oriented “insurances”. The pension reforms in Chile and Sweden are prime examples of the implementation of individual retirement accounts (see Edwards 2000; Palmer 2000). In Finland, pension accounts have received relatively little attention apart from a few brief reports (Lassila & Valkonen 1999; Knuuti & Vidlund 2006; Huopaniemi 2007). However, a popular claim across Europe is that in regard to social insurance the idea of generalised and “hazy” reciprocity is shifting more and

more towards actuarial neutrality or pure individual saving. Clearly, social insurance is not so much a metaphor anymore, but a form of insurance and saving among others.

With regard to the changing insurantal imaginary, Julkunen (2004, 263) writes sceptically about the possibilities of social insurance: “Probably the most subversive question that we have to pose is: if insurance that originally was a technique of solidarity, in its perfected and clarified form leads to more unsolidaristic and reversed social policy, do we have to abandon or exceed insurance, in order that we could pursue unexclusive and socially insurable society.” On the grounds of many recent studies, the answer is ambiguous. Many reports and studies stress that social insurance reforms have had contradictory effects as regards solidarity in most European countries. Essential features in measuring the degree of solidarity are the connections between 1) contributions and benefits, 2) contributions and actuarial risks and 3) risks/life choices and benefits.

The first example is the pension reform in Finland in 2005. It has had contradictory effects on the equivalence of contributions and benefits, although in total the connection seems to have strengthened (Lassila & Valkonen 2005, 8). However, it is good to remember that already in the first decades of the employee pension scheme in Finland the emphasis was in the individual aspects stressing the connection of one’s pension and the last years’ salary. With regard to the last feature, an important part of the 2005 reform was linking the amount of one’s pension to the salaries of one’s entire career instead of ten last years. This change increased the (redistributive) social solidarity effects in a certain sense, because it enhanced the redistribution from white collar workers (whose salaries tend to increase during the career) to blue collar workers (whose salaries tend to stagnate). But on the other hand, the inclusion of one’s whole career into the calculation of one’s pension decreased the solidarity effects for those who have long unemployment periods, parental leaves or study times (despite of the fact that after the reform personal leaves were included for the first time into the pension calculation). All in all, the determination of pensions by the whole career increased the emphasis on individual risks, incentives and life choices.

The contradictory solidarity effects of social policy reforms seem to be most obvious in the continental Europe. In Germany, the reforms of social insurance system

(particularly the reform of old-age insurance and the introduction of long-term care insurance) have had two-way implications for the logic of solidarity within the insurance programs: some changes have increased the idea of “balanced reciprocity” and contributory insurance logic while others have enhanced stronger and broader redistribution and inclusion and the logic of assistance (Leitner & Lessenich 2003, 342–343). Also statutory health insurance reforms in many European countries, at least in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, have had mixed consequences for solidarity, as solidarity is measured by the degree of risk classification (risk solidarity), income redistribution (income solidarity) and the content of entitlements as well as the extent of inclusion (the scope of solidarity) (Maarse & Paulus 2003).

All in all, the scepticism towards the solidarity-decline thesis is increasing. Hyde et al. (2003) criticise strongly many social policy analysts who emphasise too simply the significance of anti-collectivist neoliberal ideology behind the privatisation of social insurance. They conclude in contrast to the usual accounts with regard to pension reforms that “Western European public pensions privatisation reform initiatives have been informed by values that are, to varying degrees, distinctively collectivist” (Hyde et al 2003, 196). Additionally, also the role of collective agreements between labour unions and employer’s associations have been emphasised as a factor that makes the solidarity-decline thesis more complex (Trampusch 2007).

From theoretical and conceptual point of view, the argument about the separation of insurance and solidarity seems to be questionable as well. Two points are important here: firstly, the relevance of the concept of (social) risk in governing contemporary social problems, and secondly, the theoretical connection between insurance and solidarity. The concept of risk is not anymore so self-evident in the social policy discussion. Perhaps the key concept today is not so much risk, which is associated with statistical probabilities and insurance techniques, but rather *uncertainty*, which might be described as a way of governing unique cases through non-quantitative methods (see O’Malley 2004). Theorists of risk society have claimed that old risk techniques, such as insurance, don’t work well enough with new kind of social problems and with events which cannot be statistically anticipated. Beck’s famous claim is that particularly private insurance is unable to cover all the risks and

uncertainty produced by contemporary societies. Beck's "risk society" begins where Ewald's "insurance society" – or its perfection "Vollkasko-Gesellschaft" (full comprehensive insurance society) – ends (Beck 1993, 556). Also Ewald (2002) has pointed out that we might be at the threshold of a new paradigm. The bases of this new paradigm would not anymore be liberal concept of individual responsibility neither insurantal solidarity, but rather the *precautionary principle*, with which it becomes possible to govern uncertainty more prudently. According to this principle it is accepted to prohibit certain practices, without having adequate scientific knowledge about the possible consequences or harms.

However, this expanding scepticism for insurance and risk technologies can be criticised, because insurance (and insurantal solidarity) is factually not so bound to the strictly defined concept of risk, as for example Beck, Rosanvallon and Ewald seem to think. Insurance technology has learned to manage more and more "uncertain" risks, because calculation or assessment of risks can be based also on other techniques than on the conventional "archival-statistical" methods (Collier 2008). Thus, the above mentioned changes toward more individualised risks don't necessarily undermine the connection between insurance and solidarity, if we imagine insurance not only as risk spreading but also as management of uncertainty. Understanding insurance through the concept of uncertainty, instead of risk, would move the vision of insurance toward assurance against non-specific and indefinite social problems, in a way, towards the idea of basic income or back to the idea of insurance as a metaphor of "universal" social security.

However, Rosanvallon emphasises that although the separation of solidarity and insurance is currently a popular idea, it doesn't stand up to a closer examination. Behind the distinction of insurance and solidarity there is a utopian idea "that the spheres of society and politics, the market and citizenship, commutative justice and distributive justice might all be clearly separated" (Rosanvallon 2000, 43). As Rosanvallon stresses, from the *economical* point of view, insurance is always a mechanism of redistribution and solidarity. From the *moral* point of view, the question is not so clear, although all forms of insurance do have a collective dimension.

## 5 CONCLUSION

Insurance is never strictly a bilateral contract, even though this is the prevailing image. By examining insurance as a polymorphous technique of solidarity, it is possible to find ways to reconfigure the dualistic division of private and social security as well as the division of solidarity and responsibility in the context of insurance. After the above discussion about the changing relationship between insurance and solidarity, three general conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, it is deceptive to divide insurance strictly into private or individual insurance and social insurance. Instead, insurance forms a continuum that could be examined by analysing the scale, mode and conditions of responsibility and solidarity. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the birth of mandatory social insurance would not have signified a substantially new period in the history of insurance. Secondly, neither the concept of responsibility nor solidarity can be unambiguously used to characterise a certain form of insurance, because all forms of insurance are based on some kind of mixture of responsibility and solidarity. Thirdly, the claim that current changes in welfare systems are moving farther from the paradigm of solidarity is problematic in many ways. We are certainly not returning back to the paradigm of responsibility, if it is understood in the Ewaldian sense. Insurance will undoubtedly remain as a salient mechanism of many kinds of *mutual* solidarity (both voluntary and mandatory), although it is – and has always been – questionable as a technique of universal and comprehensive *social* solidarity in the national or global level and will be questionable as a solver of contemporary forms of social uncertainty.

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## *Calculating security: the agencement of industrial branch life assurance*

*Liz McFall*

Agencements are arrangements **endowed** with the capacity of acting in different ways depending upon how they are configured. In advocating the term ‘agencement’ Callon’s aim is to signal the close interweaving of words and actions and thus jettison the troublesome Austinian associations of performativity. Agencement calls attention to the various processes by which economic actors, both human and non-human, are endowed with the fixtures, fittings and devices necessary to conduct themselves in particular ways. Thus depending upon how things are arranged or configured, disinterested or selfish, calculative or non-calculative, individual or collective agencies become possible. This model works well to describe the emergence of markets for industrial branch life assurance in the UK from the nineteenth century. Companies like the Prudential and the Pearl reacted to the conflicts, crises and controversies in the commercial market and the resultant competition between socialised and prudentialist insurance models with industrial branch insurance. Industrial branch insurance claimed to provide security for the thrifty poor by employing an army of agents whose weekly premium collections helped impose the discipline of thrift and security. Through the notion of agencement, the particular ways in which this form of security became calculable through the performative combinations of human bodies, tools, equipment, technical devices and algorithms is opened up.

SCALES OF SECURITY  
INTERDISCIPLINARY WORKSHOP

Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland  
26–27 June 2008

**Being at-risk or taking risks? Electricity blackouts through sociological theories**  
Abstract (310 words)

This paper, which is a draft for my PhD dissertation, will look at the subject of electricity supply failures, or blackouts, through sociological and organizational theories of *risk*. Risk is the possibility that something unexpected, unlikely or unpleasant will happen (Luhmann 1993). My presupposition is that infrastructure risks – that is, the possibility that something unexpected, unlikely or unpleasant will happen to the infrastructure technologies – has been constituted a pressing contemporary problem, as exemplified by the powerful new security concepts “critical infrastructure protection” and “vital systems security” (Collier & Lakoff 2008; Collier 2006; Dunn forthcoming). However, different disciplines hardly agree what to make of the term of risk, which motivates my literature review of risk in the context of infrastructure failures.

My starting point is that it is not analytically productive to separate a “physical” side of infrastructure risks from some “socially constructed” element like trust (Giddens 1991), group relations (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Adams 1995) or cultural narratives (Alexander & Smith 1996). Instead, I claim the risky infrastructure technologies themselves and their production by experts should be scrutinized along with the risks' practical effects and consequences. Keeping this in mind, I shall review three influential theories of risk. First, Ulrich Beck (e.g. 1992; 1995; 2006) links his “risk society” and “reflexive modernization” to expertise, globalization and individuation in the industrial society. Second, Frank Furedi (e.g. 2006; 2007a; 2007b) connects a “culture of fear” with a moral climate that sees people as vulnerable. Although Beck and Furedi have diagnostic strengths, in the third section of my paper I will move onto less general, organizational and science and technology studies approaches on infrastructure risks (Schulman & Roe 2007; Schulman et al 2004; Vaughn 1996; Silvast 2006). I claim that in studying infrastructure risks, it is analytically productive to frame risks as concrete problems which deal with practical matters of uncertainty.

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# **Being at-risk or taking risks? Electricity blackouts through sociological theories**

Manuscript for Scales of Security Workshop.

Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland 26-27 June 2008.

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## **Abstract**

This paper, which is a draft of a chapter for my PhD dissertation, will look at the subject of infrastructure failures through social theories of risk. Risk is the possibility that something unexpected, unlikely and unpleasant will happen. My assumption is that infrastructure risks – that is, the possibility that something unexpected, unlikely or unpleasant will happen to the infrastructure technologies – is a pressing contemporary problem. This is exemplified by the powerful new security concepts “critical infrastructure protection” and “vital systems security” as well as the public anxieties of infrastructures being used as a terrorist weapon and the world-wide concern over the Y2K bug in 1999.

Hence, a serious dependency on functioning infrastructures has been realized and the experts seem to agree that people have not been prepared enough for infrastructure failures. However, the present discussion of infrastructure risks has in almost every respect been lacking more analytical attempts to explain and understand the phenomenon, which motivates this literature review of risk. More specifically I shall employ three distinct theories to understand the production of infrastructure risks. First, Ulrich Beck writes about “risk society” and “reflexive modernization”, which he links to the transformations of the whole industrial society, especially in the spheres of expertise, globalization and individuation. Second, Frank Furedi makes

a diagnosis about a present "culture of fear", which is a pervasive moral climate that renders both technologies and people as vulnerable. In the third section of my paper I will move onto less general and more empirical approaches on infrastructure risks. My strategy is to focus on the theories' ontological selections, use of concepts and the perception of social and historical transformations.

## **Introduction**

My sociology PhD dissertation deals with the changing expertise on the security of infrastructure technologies like energy, water, heat, traffic and telecommunications. The possibility that infrastructure networks fail is a pressing contemporary problem. However, there have been little in terms of social theoretical attempts to understand and explain the phenomenon. In this paper, I address the problem of infrastructure failures with one much-discussed social theoretical concept: *risk*.

Risk at the most general level can be defined as the possibility that something unexpected, unlikely and unpleasant will happen (Eräsaari 1997). My objective in this paper is to review different theories of risk and employ them in the case of infrastructure failures, with a specific focus on the expertise that governs electricity supply failures (*blackouts*). The theories will be exemplified with Finnish policies that deal with electricity infrastructure failures.

As Randall Collins (1998, 1) puts it, intellectual life is first of all about conflict and disagreement. Then it is no surprise that there are also various warring theoretical camps also on the question of risk, and it is indeed productive to scrutinize in more detail into the philosophy of science distinctions between them. My focus shall be on the theories' following aspects, whose selection has been inspired from Ian Hacking's (1990, Lehtonen 2003) research apparatus of *style of reasoning*:

1. CONCEPTS. How does the theory understand the concept of risk, and what are the other interrelated concepts that are used with it?

2. ONTOLOGY. How are the relationships and properties of societies, communities and individuals constituted whilst using the concept of risk and which aspects of reality are left out of the theory?
3. TRANSFORMATIONS. What are the novel social and historical transformations that the theories lay claim to whilst employing the aforementioned choices?

Using this approach, I will review three distinct theories:

1. In Ulrich Beck's theory of the *risk society*, catastrophic "modernisation risks" are seen as rendering the industrial society and its institutions helpless, whence a reflective politics of mitigation needs to be introduced.
2. In Frank Furedi's theory of the *culture of fear*, there is a pervasive Western cultural mood that exaggerates problems facing society, and an enlightened humanistic project of politics needs to be introduced.
3. Organizational theories of *accidents and risks* focus on the actions and routines of organisations and on the organizational and interorganizational structures which facilitate risks.

It should be noted that these are not the only social theories about risk. Most notably this chapter will *not* handle in any great depth the psycho-anthropological studies of a cultural "risk selection" (e.g. Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Douglas 1985; Adams 1995) or Anthony Giddens's (1990) work on late modernity and personal risks. The Foucauldian/governmentality approaches to risks (e.g. Hänninen & Karjalainen 1997), Niklas Luhmann's (1993) notions of risk and decision-making, and Ian Hacking's (1990) and François Ewald's (1993) genealogies on the formation of probability and risks are also not reviewed, although all of the latter four have served as an inspiration especially through my use of Stephen Collier, Andrew Lakoff and Pat O'Malley as accounts of risks and security.

What motivates the selection of Beck and Furedi is that they first of all handle processuality and change: much like classical sociology did in the 19th and 20th century, these theories of risk aim to reflect and diagnose upon contemporary societal and cultural transformations. Beck and Furedi were also selected to illustrate that the issue of risk is controversial and the borders of theories are often debated: the writers frequently disagree with each other, and Furedi targets many of his criticisms towards Beck. Finally, as a practical point, both theorists have been used to analyze or have written themselves about critical infrastructure protection, which makes it a good starting point for this study. However, my aim is not to retort to the rather general characterizations Beck's and Furedi's theories, but in the third section, the metadiscourses of risk society and risk culture are downgraded to the practical levels of organizations.

### **Being at-risk in the risk society**

German sociologist Niklas Luhmann had distinguished between hazards and risks in his lectures already in the early 1970s. Anthropologist Mary Douglas had also devoted several books to risk and culture in the early 1980s (e.g Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Douglas 1985). Yet, up until 1986, the theme of risk had remained the preserve of insurance experts and specialists in the field of risk assessment (Adam & van Loon 2000, 12). It was the highly influential literature on a new "risk society" that opened up the issue of risk for wider social science debate.

The theories of risk society have been led by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, who released his most influential book *Risikogesellschaft* (Beck 1986) right after the Chernobyl nuclear accident. The book sold in its first five years 60 000 copies, which only a very few post-war social scientific books have accomplished. *Risk Society* also played a leading role in the recasting of public debates in Germany on ecological politics and it captured the public imagination during catastrophes like Chernobyl, Bhopal, Exxon Valdez and more recently the BSE outbreak. (Lash & Wynne 1992, 1; Adam & van Loon 2000, 12.)

According to the theory,

we are now said to live in a changed world. This is the world of new, incalculable, unpredictable and catastrophic 'modernisation risks' such as global warming, depletion of the ozone layer and nuclear contamination. These emergent risks are held to have been created by the very success of modernity: its scale of production, its pace of innovation and its compression of time and space. (O'Malley 2004, 2.)

The risk society has two kinds of impacts (see Beck 1992). First, according to Ulrich Beck, risk experts like scientists, insurance companies and governments are still clinging to the old world, asserting that risks are knowable and governable. Here Beck is referring to the risk calculation of insurance, which did several assumption on the quality of events: first, that the probabilities of accidents are indeed calculable; second, that the risk is calculated at the level of population (all the workers of a factory, for instance); and third, that by relying on statistical methods risk has the kind of objectivity that descriptions of isolated bad events lack (Ewald 1993, 18). To these experts Beck (1993, 541) has a determined answer: the new atomical, chemical, ecological and genetic risks are not restricted in time and space, not accountable to the rules of causality, blame, or control, and not compensatable or securable. In fact, probabilistic predictions deliver insecurity rather than security, for the more that science discovers, the more it demonstrates that life is saturated with risks (O'Malley 2004, 2). Furthermore, the catastrophes of risk society frequently prove that scientific predictions were wrong, and the authority of scientific expertise is beginning to be undermined. Lately Beck (2002) has also extended these claims to encompass natural catastrophes and terrorism.

Inside what Beck (1995) calls *reflexive modernization*, the dissolution of scientific expertise is accepted and risks become a question to be solved politically in the "world risk society" (Beck 1999). Global interdependencies cause risks, which then cause the compulsion to – but also the opportunity at – arriving at

“cosmopolitan” solutions (Beck 2006, 22). This does not mean just more room for traditional parliamentary and trade union politics, but rather a categorial transformation of “politics” to “subpolitics”. The latter encompasses the private sector, business and science as well as for example non-governmental organizations, citizens’ initiatives and the public sphere (Beck 1995, 18-19; 22). In Beck’s (1995, 18) own words, “the political breaks open and erupts beyond the formal responsibilities and hierarchies”.

Secondly, as for normal people, Beck’s notion is that “(w)hen modernization reaches a certain level, (social) agents tend to become more individualized, that is, decreasingly constrained by (social) structures” (Lash & Wynne 1992, 2). The crises of industrial society implicate that new opportunities for action open up, as the certainty that was once connected to the industrial society dissolves – like trust in scientific expertise, tradition, one’s social class position or the normal life conduct. Living and acting in uncertainty becomes a basic experience and “who can do this and learn this, how and why, becomes in turn a key biographical and political question of the current era” (Beck 1995, 12). More and more areas of life become dependent on individuals’ decision-making, and dangers are also experienced as personal risks relating to one’s way of life (ibid, 14; see also Luhmann 1993, 44). Moreover, the individualization does not remain private, but becomes subpolitical in the sense that was described before. In Beck’s (1995, 18) view, we are experiencing a renaissance of political subjectivity in the risk society.

As can already be seen, Beck’s concept of risk is very broad, some claim up to the point of being inconsistent (Campbell & Currie 2003, 152). When one talks about risk in the Beckian sense, one deals with technological hazards as well as scientific expertise, politics, globalization and individual decision-making and life conducts. Indeed, the function of the concept of risk for Beck is not to be analytically exact. Rather, by turning his attention into the problem of risk, Beck aims to warn the society of dangerous modern technology and environmental damage (Luhmann 1993, 5). In doing this risk is also a normative concept, which is meant to lead into new political action under Beck’s idea of reflexive modernization.

One well-known example of Beck's type of thinking is the *precautionary principle*, which claims that certain technologies, like high-voltage electricity lines which cause electromagnetic fields, should be proscribed even though no conclusive scientific evidence exists to prove that they are harmful. The fact that many Western governments have taken the precautionary principle aboard suggests that waiting until the level of risk has been determined is itself today often considered an "unacceptable risk" (O'Malley 2004, 3). Like Beck's risk, precautionary principle is also a politically normative concept, which aims to warn people about unforeseen events and regulate the ways in which they are handled. And it has an individualized element in-so-far as more and more risks of technology are attributed to decisions – one can for example always decide to proscribe high-voltage electricity lines near dwellings even without conclusive evidence to back this up.

These ideas can now be applied to the security of electricity supply. One could begin by asserting that electricity blackouts are rarely as serious events as the "modernisation risks" of the risk society. Even the long electricity outages that have been experienced for example in Sweden and Canada cannot be empirically compared to global warming, depletion of the ozone layer or nuclear contamination, as it is suspect whether blackouts and also water supply disruptions cause as major societal, political and personal shifts as Beck envisions (Silvast 2006; Lahti 1998). Still, the notion of risk society holds some promise in the case of electricity blackouts when one does a downgrade on it: the question of risks is not necessarily about the macro-sociological change of the whole industrial society, but rather of changing mechanisms of knowing and assessing risks. This approach has been developed by anthropologist Stephen Collier (2006; 2008), who uses the side of Beck to study critical infrastructure protection and risks which are deemed uninsurable.

As we recall, the formula of the "risk society" was as follows: First there are routine ways of calculating and governing risks. Then something new and unpredictable happens. The event is not necessarily an accident: on the contrary,

maybe the previous ways of governing have been too *successful*, becoming too specialized to notice novelties. Finally the knowledge and action of those who manage uncertainties is taken to a very different direction from before. This new direction is fused with subpolitical conflict, ambiguity and more individualized decision-making than before.

The order of events seems to hold true to the more serious disturbances of the electricity supply. For example, Western security experts had been advocating for the awareness of electricity as a "critical infrastructure" at least since the 1970s (Collier & Lakoff 2008), but it was a major storm in 2001 that made the subject actually manifest in the electricity market regulation in Finland. The storm with its material consequences for the electricity network led to an official investigation into blackouts and later the inclusion of a "standard customer compensation" in the Finnish Energy Market Act. According to this new piece of legislation, the electricity network companies should always compensate for their customers outages which last longer than 12 hours. In 2008, number of blackouts also entered as a parameter to the official regulation of electricity markets. In similar vein, in the light of the recent bank service failings in Finland, a standard compensation legislation was proposed for the outages of banks' web services.

These legislations posed a new style of knowing about security of electricity supply. It is a different matter to define a storm as a *risk* towards electricity users than to define it as a natural disaster, as the risk-based thinking builds a new type of relationship between the electricity companies and their customers. The arguments that were given in favour of the standard compensation legislation declared that customers should "receive compensation" and "get the harms repayed" from blackouts – which accordingly had not properly taken place before. The law proposals also had an emphasis on steering the operators to acknowledge future events.

Completely uninterruptible electricity supply is not possible, but the proposed standard compensation method tries to influence the distri-

bution system operators' actions by steering them to prevent interruptions from happening and to fix in interruption situations the damages that caused the interruption as fast as possible. The proposal strives especially to influence upon minimizing the number and duration of interruptions caused by weather conditions. (Parliament of Finland 2002.)

The newest policy initiative in Finland (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006) also includes a precautionary idea, which suggests that there could be a maximum yearly level of blackouts, which should never be exceeded. In Sweden, the Government has all the more decided that there will not be blackouts longer than 24 hours after 2011. At the same time the risk is being individualized, with personal emergency power generators recommended by the authorities to those customers who suffer very much from blackouts (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006, 74).

It is likely that none of these shifts would have taken place without the blackouts whose impacts came as a surprise to the prevailing expert reasoning. What's more in a Beckian style, the new approaches shift the focus of reasoning about infrastructures: from providing the "goods" (universal infrastructure for mass consumption) to distributing the "bads" (the just compensation of infrastructure failures).

But as tempting as Beck's well-known models may be, I should still point out that they center on the macro-sociology of social, cultural and political change. Beck's theory stems from his experience as a sociologist of industry, labour and family, and its target is nothing less than industrial modernization itself. This is exemplified by the *Risk Society's* subtitle, *Towards a New Modernity*. Yet it is problematic, at least from a general theoretical perspective, to downgrade these grand ideas to certain situated styles of reasoning. I shall return to Beck's current, more empirically oriented research project in my conclusive subchapter. But before that, another approach to risks is introduced. It is as general in scope as Beck's, but almost opposite in its attitude on future uncertainties.

## **Exercising choice through risk**

In the classical sense, the formulation "to take a risk" contains the assumption that individuals can exercise choice: people are seen as active subjects who explore and experiment and control their own destiny (Furedi 2007a, 79-80). This kind of account was exemplified by the economist Peter Bernstein (1996) in his hugely successful book *Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk*. Another significant writer to mention here is the influential and frequently media-covered UK sociologist Frank Furedi, whose various books span for instance the culture of fear, the politics of fear and terrorism. In the following, I will focus on Furedi's theories on the ground that he is a sociologist, but also draw from some of Bernstein's views.

I shall start with a fundamental difference to the previously reviewed theories. In the theories of the "risk society", the unknown future was a vast problem for decision makers. Peter Bernstein's view is however diametrically the opposite: he asserts that "tremendous idea lies buried in the conclusion that we simply do not know. (...) (W)e are not prisoners of an inevitable future. Uncertainty makes use free." (Bernstein 1996, 229.) He also maintains that "the capacity to manage risk, and with it the appetite to take risk and make forward-looking choices, are key elements of the energy that drives the economic system forwards" (Bernstein 1996, 3).

The appetite to take risks is the kind of spirit Frank Furedi also supports (Furedi 2007a, 79). Yet he sees today's culture to have much lower expectations:

This worship of safety has influenced attitudes towards all aspects of life. It has fostered an inclination to continually exaggerate the problems facing society, which in turn has encouraged a cautious and anxious outlook. (...) The outcome of these developments is a world-view which equates the good life with self-limitation and risk aversion. (Furedi 2006, 153.)

Ulrich Beck in Furedi's view (2006, 63) is the most articulate proponent of the "model of a society which is continually under threat from technological development", whence risk is associated with the advance of knowledge and marks an aversion to technology – a viewpoint also supported by the influential sociologists Anthony Giddens and Niklas Luhmann according to Furedi (ibid). Furedi's view on risks is however different, which can be told from the above use of the concepts like "attitudes", "outlook" and "worldview" in his diagnosis about modern-day risk culture. Furedi does not connect the growth of risk consciousness with technological advance or a growing number of dangers. Instead, risk reflects for him a "moral climate" where traditional values have weakened. In Furedi's view, there is hardly any consensus anymore on the basic questions facing people, which used to be answered by the nation state, traditional authority and one's own community. Also politics becomes futile – once again in contrast to the theories of risk society, which were optimistic about the renaissance of political subjectivity because of risks. In Furedi's mind, "the very idea that anybody could achieve any positive results through political action is often dismissed as naive or arrogant." (Furedi 2006, 174.)

In this vacuum of generalized values, it is normal for risk-aversion, self-limitation and the exaggeration of problems to prevail (Furedi 2006, 153). The lack of consensus about values also reinforces the individuation of risks – a process which the theories of risk society noted, but for different reasons. As the perception of being at-risk influences action in general, many people are literally on their own with their insecure feelings (Furedi 2006, 75).

Furedi could have left his diagnosis at this grim point, but he also has a solution which is unusually normative for a sociological theorist. In the book *Politics of Fear*, there is a concluding chapter on "humanizing humanism", which aims to found a new *humanist paradigm* to replace the *vulnerability paradigm* of the culture of fear. According to Furedi (2007a, 159), people need "the freedom to engage with new experience, not just the formal right to choose but cultural support for experimentation and individual choice making". To put it differently, this

project ought to mark a return to the classical meaning of risk.

An evident similarity between Beck and Furedi is the use of the concept risk in the broadest manner. Furedi (2006, 25) admits that “(n)o definition (...) can exhaust the meaning and usage of the risk concept”. The concept of risk is based on the difference between reality and possibility, and the meaning of risk shaped by how “society regards its ability to manage change and deal with the future” (Furedi 2006, 26). Furedi’s own interest is on the contemporary discussions, which he expresses through the conceptualization of being “at risk”. It is a pervasive, but an ambiguous concept that denotes certain types of people who are vulnerable like children and heavy smokers, and certain situations like walking out at night or living near power stations. Being at risk implies the autonomy of the dangers that people face: those who are at risk face hazards that are independent of them (ibid, 27). The most usual thing to do with these risks that are seen as minimally subject to human intervention, Furedi (ibid, 27) criticizes, is to avoid them altogether. Accordingly the decision to take a risk has been replaced by the emphasis on avoiding dangers.

I will now move back to the security of electricity supply. It is easier than with Beck as Furedi has commented infrastructure security in several occasions. Two sources are used here: Furedi’s (2007b) newest book, *Invitation to Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown*, and an article which deals with Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s new security policy initiative in the UK. The former piece takes on the subject of technological systems early on: Furedi (2007b, 12–16) notices how the same technological systems which were seen as a source of strength in technologically sophisticated communities are now symbols of vulnerability, like in the concern that aeroplanes or the electricity grid could be used as a terrorist weapon. Inside emergency management, the being at-risk is further illustrated by the new concept *resilience*, which means the ability of technological systems to withstand or recover quickly from difficult conditions. In Furedi’s (2007b, 18–19) view, resilience implies that *little can be done* to prevent destructive events. In fact, resilience’s tracks lead back to the generalized feeling of vulnerability:

“Vulnerability is perceived as the norm and resilience is presented as a potential counter-trend against it.” (ibid, 18.)

Furedi has spotted an important shift, but one could also take another direction with the concept of resilience in regards infrastructure risks. Aaron Wildavsky, most known for founding the cultural studies of risk with Mary Douglas, has been very affirmative of the concept of resilience, and appreciates its concrete policy implications: “The experience of being able to overcome unexpected danger may increase long-term safety; but maintaining a state of continuous safety may be extremely dangerous in the long run.” (Wildavsky 1988, 79.) Instead of “maintaining a state of continuous safety” failure should be seen as central to engineering and “(f)ear of failure inhibits learning” (ibid, 83).

Let’s use Wildavsky’s argument here and connect it with Furedi’s value of individual choice making: inside electricity supply security, the shift towards resilience can be seen as paving way for more risk-taking and experimenting than before, especially when particular individuals and situations are concerned. One Finnish example of a new, more experimenting and individuated stance towards infrastructures are the personal emergency power generators, which are meant to function when the main electricity distribution fails. A recent Finnish initiative (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006, 56) says that the “quality of electricity distribution has to be improved optimally in regards the society” and “it is not acceptable that all the customers of a distribution company pay for the improvement of one customer’s quality”. Hence, particular critical customers are encouraged to make investments for their own emergency power systems in order for the whole system to be more resilient, or to phrase Wildavsky: by being able to overcome “unexpected dangers” one increases “long-term safety”. This is the kind of “appetite to take risks” and “forward-looking” action that Furedi could well support.

Of course the fostering of a situated awareness through risk is not recently developed. One is especially reminded of Joseph Schumpeter’s and Frank Knight’s characterizations of entrepreneurship as propensity for risk-taking behaviour. I will next use this framing to interpret the relationship between risks and the market re-

forms of the electricity sector in Finland.

In the Finnish electricity market reforms of the 1990s, competitive markets were encouraged for electricity generation, selling and exporting. Electricity distribution and transmission – the so-called “natural monopolies” – have also been established more regulation in order to promote fair competition and protection of consumer rights. Especially central for our handling is to notice how there has been a new emphasis on an unknown future. Planned economics, the main method for managing electricity infrastructure in Finland in the 1980s, were not seen as feasible providing for “functional markets and healthy competition, which guide the resources in the economy in the most efficient way” (Parliament of Finland 1994). It was predicted that after the reforms, “the electricity system will become much more dynamic than before. The need to foresee future events grows, which pushes for several contracts between the new stakeholders. With these contracts, the sufficient security of electricity production and distribution can be provided for in the markets.” (Parliament of Finland 1994.) So, not only market relations, but more specifically also the predictability and kind of resilience of market relations has acquired more importance than before.

All of this is not to say that the shift towards resilience in supply security is practically the same thing as neoliberal market thinking. But they seem to encompass similar styles of expert reasoning. Indeed, from Furedi one can infer that perhaps the market reforms and seeing electricity users as consumers have not only represented one-sided marketization (cf. Graham & Marvin 2002; Collier 2005): on the contrary, they can encompass styles of reasoning that foster the *value* of engaging with new experiences and individual choice making.

A second question that one needs to address while using Furedi’s concepts is the following: is the domain of “being at-risk” expanding in the infrastructure supply security? Furedi seems to think this when reviewing PM Brown’s new security policy. Accordingly, the government policy is based on the idea that

in the absence of clarity about the nation’s adversaries, it is best to

treat any source of insecurity as a security problem. As a result, there's little to distinguish a "security threat" from something that is just "uncertain". This erosion of the distinction between insecurity and uncertainty has led to a situation where the meaning of security expands and expands until it encompasses virtually any ambiguous or risky human experience. (Furedi 2008.)

It is hard to disagree with Furedi about the expansion of the domain of security. For example, Finland's new Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (2006) lists "society's vital functions" to be the management of government affairs, international activity, national military defence, internal security, functioning of the economy and infrastructure, the population's income security and capability to function and psychological crisis tolerance. The new Finnish proposal for a programme on internal security also mentions preventing cybercrime as one of its key areas. It is a distinct contrast from before the 1980s when the domain which is now called "vital systems security" was understood not more than as the planning of economic military defence (see Seppinen 1996). These kind of lists would then have been considerably shorter.

However, the criticism that "the meaning of security expands" is not very original. Like Collier and Andrew Lakoff (2004, 17) have noted in their study on vital systems security from the 1960s onward, it has been a traditional for the critics on the left to link any effort towards security with the militarization of civil society, the repression of individual freedom, and the expansion of empire. In the Finnish history of critical infrastructure protection, this has been pervading: many attempts to introduce new protection of civil infrastructural systems were faced with hostility from the leftist parties, who saw it as militarization against the Soviet Union. For example, in 1966 when Finnish security officials had pressed leaflets for home dwellers on preparedness for crises, the Government proscribed their distribution on the ground that it would be creating a "war hysteria" (Seppinen 1996, 63).

Here instead of taking Furedi's already tried road, I shall go along with Collier's

and Lakoff's idea and develop it further in the following subchapter:

Our suggestion is that it might be more analytically productive not to ask how much or how little security is appropriate, or whether security must at the expense of other values such as liberty or welfare. Rather, it is more appropriate to ask which forms of collective security are in question, what kinds of expertise are being mobilized to provide security, and how the politics of security are changing? (Collier & Lakoff 2004, 17.)

Finally a critical note that is similar to Ulrich Beck. As compelling as some of Furedi's views may be, it is worth remembering that they are very all-embracing, similarly to Beck's older work. Furedi takes one guiding principle – that people are able to take risks and advance their destinies, but a pervasive mood of fatalism prevents this – and applies it to almost all aspects of life. Most likely this is his critical strength: the drawing together of a number of loosely connected themes, which have diagnostic insight in-so-far as they are familiar to people. But it also lacks analytical clarity and is in fact very much disconnected from everyday life situations. Particular situations are simply unimportant for the theory: Furedi (2006, 28) suggests that in the “free-floating anxiety” of the culture of fear, risks exist independently of any particular act or individual (ibid, 28). But as criticism (Tudor 2003, 245-246) has pointed out, this runs the risk of reifying the “pervasive mood”, “moral climate” and also “society” (e.g. “*society's* disposition to panic”) which Furedi says are causing peoples' actions to be fearful. Furedi's is a culturalist account, which leaves much questions about the link of culture and everyday activities.

### **Towards a pragmatic picture**

In this subchapter, I shall build the theory for my dissertation. The chief aim is not to abandon the aforementioned sociological theories and their many critical

strengths. But I want to keep away from their tendency collapse the diverse situations and technologies of risk into one undifferentiated category (O'Malley 2004, 6), whether it is a "risk society", "culture of fear" or "free-floating anxiety".

Here one can take conduct from pragmatist John Dewey's (1930) well-known work, *The Quest for Certainty*. Let's start by connecting results from empirical research of infrastructure risks (e.g. Lahti 1998, Silvast 2006; Schulman & Roe 2007; Schulman et al 2004) and Dewey's pragmatism. First, it has been empirically pointed out that every uncertain situation is not pervaded by the risky character of a "moral climate" or a "society". Also, every action as a whole is not dubious or problematic. It is much more productive to look into concrete *problems* and objects of inquiries that locate what the trouble is and facilitate methods to deal with them (Dewey 1930, 223). To frame things in this way, "(u)ncertainty is primarily a practical matter. It signifies uncertainty of the issue of present experiences; these are fraught with future peril as well as inherently objectionable" (Dewey 1930, 223).

In order to do this, I need to return to the concept of risk and shift its common social theoretical understanding. Very often risks are understood as acts of destructions and hazards – unfortunate events which can and ought to be prevented from happening. But infrastructure risks, when they are understood as concrete problems in infrastructural organizations, are not realized only once the lights go out, the tap water turns brown or the traffic is congested. To put it the other way around, infrastructures are not reliable until they fail (Schulman & Roe 2007, 43). On the contrary, it is a routine result of organizational studies that infrastructures are "balky systems": "Their behaviour cannot be taken for granted with stable managerial protocols, but they have to be 'nursed' with constant adjustments in strategy, updating of previous understanding of how they work and improvisational behaviour among operators." (ibid, 44). It is useful to draw an analogy here from a very different territory of expertise, that of professional boxing, which Loïs Wacquant (2004, 237-238) researched in a participatory fashion. Where as training in the boxing gym happens in a "very time-tested and nearly scientific

manner”, “(e)veryone knows intimately, from having suffered in his own flesh, that you hardly have time to step back and reflect in the ring, where everything takes place based on reflex, in fractions of a second. The head is in the body and the body is in the head.”

So, risk as a potential breakdown is an integral part of operating infrastructure technologies. Electricity grids, for example, can assume a huge number of states through their diverse components with different age, reliability, capacities and start-up times. The operation of the grid requires real-time management of risks, and the need is intensified by the unpredictable effects of weather, the behavioural patterns of the electricity users and the competitive electricity markets with their regulation, as well as the arrival of infrastructure service systems which extend across single organizations and agencies and also across nation states. In other words, the infrastructure has to be actively achieved in order for it to function (see also Lehtonen 2004, 195; Callon 1991, 144-145) and the utility organizations are constantly being constructed and reconstructed in an ongoing process (Scott 2004, 13). Breakdowns, then, can be understood not merely as irregularities of the systems, but also as being “embedded in the banality of the organizational life and facilitated by (...) routinization (and) organizational and interorganizational structures” (Vaughn 1996, xiv) like the Challenger explosion was according to Diane Vaughn (1996; see also Reason 2000, 1998).

It is interesting to notice that Ulrich Beck has also shifted his theory of reflexive modernization recently towards an empirical research program. It now deals with more concrete problems than before, like the taking of action and making decisions, and problems faced in terms of attributing responsibility (Beck & Lau 2003, 531; see also Silvast & Virtanen 2008). Viewed in the light of empirical research, the problem with Beck’s older work was that he was always referring to the crisis of scientific calculation of risks *in general* (Collier 2008, 230, original emphasis), while there are many specific practical situations which can be different from that. Even in his newer more empirically qualified work, Beck still insists on the erosion of legitimate expertise as a “structural logic that can be ‘demonstrated’

Style of reasoning	The concept of risk	Related concepts	Ontological choices	Perceived transformations
the risk society	A warning sign of modern technology and environmental damage, and lately also of terrorism and natural catastrophes	reflexive modernization, subpolitics, globalization, cosmopolitanism, expertise, individuation	The objectification of the transformations of society	The arrival of incalculable, unpredictable and catastrophic “modernisation risks”, the globalization of these risks, increasing individuation
the culture of fear	The marker of how society regards its ability to manage change and deal with future	mood, values, world-views, free-floating anxiety, vulnerability, individual choice-making	The objectification of values, moods and worldviews	A moral climate where traditional values have weakened
organizational accidents	An integral part of the operation of infrastructure organizations	balky systems, routinization, banality of organizational life	Organizations as processes which are created and recreated actively	The arrival of service systems which extend across organizations and agencies

Table 1: Distinct theories of risk as styles of reasoning

in domain after domain” (Collier 2008, 245) – a research strategy which is not unlike of Frank Furedi’s diagnoses. One can, however, be more specific as regards the level of analysis when the results and starting points of empirically and pragmatically oriented research are addressed.

The different theories that were reviewed are summarized in table 1. My main conclusion of this review is the following: *The empirical case of infrastructure failures in utility organizations can usefully shift the social theoretical understanding of the concept of risk. Instead of risk warning the society about all the unwanted side-effects of modern technology or marking how different societies and cultures regard their ability to manage change and deal with future, risks can be seen as practical problems to do with human doubts and beliefs. The taking of risk, and hence risking breakdown, is then in point of fact an integral part of operating infrastructure technologies. Risks understood in this sense can be embedded in the banality of the organizational life and facilitated by routinization and organizational and interorganizational structures. If infrastructure technologies are providing some of the critical ingredients in making the stability of communities and societies, then this new understanding of risk is important to acknowledge for social theory.*

## **Acknowledgements**

This paper has benefitted from commentaries and discussions with Janne Hukkinen, Marja Häyrynen-Alestalo, Turo-Kimmo Lehtonen and Veli-Pekka Nurmi.

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