

”Ge-stell: Enframing as the Essence of Technology”

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In his address to the tenth annual meeting of the Heidegger circle in America in 1976, Heidegger contributed a short piece of writing, one of the very last by his hand. In this memorandum he raised again a question, which by then had become perhaps the most persistent concern during the last decades of his life, namely the question of *technology*. By this he meant the need to understand and critically reflect on the sense and significance of the increased technologization of the world in modernity. He writes there, that a world stamped by technology is also a world characterized by a forgetfulness of being, and he urges the participants to ponder its significance and effects. The most important concept in this context, and that by means of which he sought to capture the essential character of this momentous transformation, was that of *Gestell*, normally translated as “Enframing”. Its common lexical meaning in German is “frame” or “rack”. But as a philosophical term it is a neologism, which draws its meaning from a series of related concepts built around the root-verb *stellen* (to place or put), such as *herstellen* (make) and *vorstellen* (represent), but also of *Gestalt*, figure. In his 1953 lecture “The question concerning technology”, one of the most widely read and discussed essays from his post-war period, he writes: “We now name the challenging claim that gathers man with a view to ordering the self-revealing as standing-reserve: Ge-stell [enframing]” (VA, 23).

In order to understand this enigmatic statement, and in order to grasp the meaning and significance of the notion of *Gestell* in Heidegger’s thinking as a whole, we need to consider it in the context, not only of his thinking on technology, but also in the context of his understanding of the meaning of being, and its historical transformations. The goal here is to recall this context, through a summary of some of the most important texts and passages that lead up to the forging of this new concept. In the course of this analysis it will become clear that the theme designated by *Gestell* is not something entirely new, which emerges only in the post-war writings. On the contrary, it is important to see how and to what extent it is in fact rooted in his very earliest phenomenological attempts to elucidate the meaning of being and human existence, as this is first articulated in his critical elucidations of the philosophy of Aristotle.

A key text in this context, and one to which Heidegger would always return, is the sixth book of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*. This is a good point to start from, as it is also the most detailed attempt by a Greek writer to define the sense of *techne* in contrast to other human capacities. Aristotle here defines *techne*, the latin translations of which is *ars*, as one of the five principal intellectual capacities or virtues. It is an intellectual capacity which has to do with making or creating (in Greek *poiesis*) something new in accordance with a reflexive rational capacity. As such it also has to do with truth and falsity. Indeed, at the very outset of the sixth book of the *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle writes that there are "five ways in which the soul achieves truth, namely through art (*techne*), scientific knowledge, prudence, wisdom, and intelligence". Among the many works and passages in Greek philosophical writings that Heidegger would explore in his critical appraisal of Western metaphysics, this line holds a singular importance. It contains the kernel not only of what he will later claim to be the "Greek conception of technology", but also of the genuine ontological meaning of the phenomenon of technology as such, as well as of the phenomenon of truth. We shall come back to it also towards the end of our discussion, as it surfaces in a key passage in the essay on technology.

Heidegger's most intense interpretative confrontation with the writings of Aristotle takes place during the formative years of the early twenties. From this period we have the famous text submitted to Paul Natorp in 1922, the so called "Natorp-report", or as its full title reads: "Hermeneutic interpretations of Aristotle. Directives for the hermeneutical situation". This report contains not only the outline of his own basic philosophical orientation, as this is systematized in *Being and Time* some years later. It also contains the first decisive formulations for understanding his thinking on technology, and the anticipation of the concept of Ge-stell. For here Heidegger asks how the being of life, of human existence, is grasped in Greek thinking. He stresses here the importance of attending to how the vocabulary of early Greek metaphysics is forged, and of question the guiding models and motives for its ontology.

How then could we understand critically what Aristotle means by substance, Greek *ousia*? In designating the most fundamental nature of being by this term, Aristotle has been guided, Heidegger argues, by an understanding of being as something fabricated, in *poiesis*, and thus as something placed at hand, as a *Hergestelltsein*. The German word is important here, for it marks the first in a long sequence of concepts forged around the root verb *stellen*, to place or put. In Greek metaphysics being is thought, in its general essence, as something produced and grasped in language through its *eidos*, its visibility. And this way of making being appear, to stand forth, and thus to be true, Heidegger continues, is the way of

techne, or technics. So the technological understanding of being is in fact what we could call the basic model of understanding being, the one according to which Greek metaphysics built its fundamental conceptual structure. Only by becoming critically aware of what we could thus call a certain technical bias in the very construction of metaphysical language, can we also engage in an exploration directed toward other, complementary, and supposedly also more fundamental senses of being. Metaphysics understands and thus conceptually constructs being along a model of what it means to make something. This conclusion is not simply a descriptive hypothesis which concerns the first emergence of a metaphysical conceptuality. It also holds a critical potential. For in questioning the validity of the original conceptual configuration a space for critical reflection on the inherited understanding and meaning of being is also opened up.

When Heidegger publishes *Being and Time* five years later, the core of its argument is the critique of a substantialist metaphysics, which understands being along the line of what is present-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*). The connection to the earlier analysis of the “technical” roots of metaphysics is not, however, obvious at first glance. For in *Being and Time*, the explicit theme of technology and *techne* hardly appears at all. Heidegger’s critical understanding of the technical only surfaces in a brief remark in the introductory sections, where he discusses his phenomenological method, and emphasizes that it should not be understood along the lines of a “technical manual” (BT 27). In *Being and Time* the critique of a substance ontology, takes its starting point not in the greek “technical” sense of being, but rather in the modern, Cartesian construction of the meaning of being as pure extension in space, meditated by the example of an object (the famous piece of wax), taken out of its context. This category of being presupposes a distanced perspective, which contemplates nature simply as a calculable material extension.

In order to deconstruct this understanding of thinghood, Heidegger takes a step which is a bit surprising in view of the earlier analysis of Greek metaphysics. For in searching for a different conceptual avenue for thinking the being of objective reality he turns instead to the Greek word for thing, which is *pragmata*, signifying etymologically “that with which we are concerned”, in praxis. These entities are not meaningless extensions, but always contextually meaningful, in terms of a whole surrounding world of concerns. They are, as he says, “readiness-to-hand”, *Zuhandenheit*. Their understanding and meaningfulness presupposes precisely that they are not objectified, but rather lived through in a spontaneous referential context. From this perspective it is also possible for him to develop his analysis of “world” as something more than simply a constellation of material bodies. The primary

phenomenon of world is a meaning-context, into which we are always already thrown. The objectified world of calculable entities as represented in natural science, is in fact a secondary phenomenon, which grows from within the more original lived world, as its theoretically mediated modification. What makes this analysis a bit confusing from the perspective of the early critique of substance metaphysics is that here it is not the Greek instrumental and technical understanding of being that explains an original forgetfulness, but on the contrary it is the artifact, the tool or equipment, in the form of the Greek *pragmata*, that is brought forth as a critical lever against the distanced and objectifying Cartesian understanding of nature in modernity. This is what permits Heidegger to speak of readiness-to-hand, *Zuhandenheit*, as a more original manifestation of being than present-at-hand, *Vorhandenheit*.

From one perspective the ontology developed in *Being and Time* could thus be described as an ontology of the artifact and the tool, since the being of readiness-to-hand is argued to be more fundamental than the secondary and theoretically mediated present-at-hand. Heidegger even argues in *Being and Time* that the original manifestation of nature is also as such a readiness-to-hand, since nature first appears to man as a meaningful-something in relation to the overall concern of Dasein. And in *Being and Time* this destructive retrieval of a more original source of manifestation along the model of the equipment or artifact is not criticized, but rather presented as a positive finding. Even though the reason behind this analysis was clearly to critically reflect on the form of objectification of nature, which emerges with modern science and its metaphysics, still the implications of it becomes problematic, not least for Heidegger himself. For if nature is understood along the model of an equipment or readiness-to-hand, then the phenomenological analysis would seem to reinstall precisely that subjectivist and anthropocentric determination of the world which it also sought to transcend. If we read *Being and Time* from this angle we can also see why Heidegger subsequently will take a certain distance toward its analysis.

An important text in this regard is the essay “On the Origin of the Work of Art” from 1934, which also marks a further step in the genealogy of the technical in Heidegger. In conjunction with his attempt to develop a phenomenological analysis of the artwork, he here also expands his earlier critique of substance ontology. He states that the being of the artwork can not be grasped along the model of objective entities, present-at-hand, as *Vorhandenheit*. But, and this is a notable step, neither can it be understood along the model of the tool or readiness-to-hand, as *Zuhandenheit*. Furthermore, nor can nature in the end be understood, along any of these models. For natural being is rather characterized by an elusive way of self-containment (*Eigenwuchsig*), a kind of auto-emergence. When we turn to the artwork it turns

out that it is different from all of these three types of being. Instead it is a very special way of bringing together and letting appear this being of nature, by not consuming it as a raw material for the purpose of its own utility, but rather by letting it appear, to come to presence. It is in this sense that the artwork is a “happening of truth”. In clear contrast to the analysis in *Being and Time*, the mode of equipmentality is here what lies in the way of grasping the genuine phenomenon of nature, which on the other hand can be discerned through the event of the art-work. The artwork, as a work of truth, is what reveals the deeper meaning of nature which is concealed as long as nature is interpreted only through the traditional – technically inspired – matrix of matter and form. In this way the artwork essay marks a new step in Heidegger’s thinking which raises to a whole new level the role and significance of art and the poetical. However, it thereby also leads to a more complex picture concerning the genuine meaning of Greek *techne*. For as Heidegger himself also notes, the Greek word for art (German *Kunst*), is also *techne*, and the artist is a *technites*. So, from the point of view of the Artwork essay, there is indeed a positive tradition to be had from the Greek understanding of *techne*, not as the instrument of immediate life concern, but rather as the poetic bringing forth of something into its presence.

While *techne* in the sense of art is given an increasingly important role in Heidegger’s continued critical assessment of the Western metaphysical tradition and its substantialist understanding of being, *techne* in the modern sense of technology becomes a theme of increased critical concern from around the same time. If we take the liberty of generalizing, Heidegger’s development from around the time of the artwork essay could in fact be described in terms precisely of the two divergent meanings of *techne*. *Techne* in the sense of the fabricated artifact functions from the inception of metaphysics as the matrix for thinking being as a disconnected entity, in a way that comes to the fore definitively in modernity, where the truth or event of being is covered over and domesticated in a representational and objectifying understanding. At the same time, *techne* as art emerges as a unique avenue toward thinking the event of truth, in a way that does not objectify being, but rather permits it to prevail in its own essence, in its dual nature as presence and absence at once. As we shall see subsequently, the essay on technology marks in a way the most explicit contrastation of these themes later on.

The more “negative” side of the technical, and Heidegger’s emergence as a thinker of modern technology, is not something that belongs only to his post-war period, as was often believed to be the case. The decisive confrontation with technology is of an earlier date, and more or less simultaneous with the composition of the Artwork-essay. For this was

also the time when he read and initiated his critical dialogue with the thought of the contemporary writer Ernst Jünger. In 1932 Jünger published a much read and discussed dystopic essay entitled *The Worker*. In this text Jünger ventures to think modernity in the wake of Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism, as the loss of a transcendent source of meaning. Jünger, who was a decorated war hero from the first world war with profound personal experience of the new technical warfare, here sees the emergence of a new type or configuration (of *Gestalt*) of man, "the worker", who has entered into a symbiotic relation with the machine and with technology in the form of laborer or soldier, and as a completed manifestation of a will to power. Jünger's book is an attempt to articulate a distanced and objective analysis of a transformation in man's relation to nature, mediated through technology. He describes what he sees as the essence of modernity, where a technically mediated will to power has made it its task to shape the world according to its own vision and for its own purpose.

The material from Heidegger's early and intense preoccupation with the writings of Jünger was made available only recently, which is why the full significance of the latter's analysis for Heidegger's own thinking on technology and the *Gestell* has not been fully recognized. In the relevant volume from the *Gesamtausgabe*, Heidegger writes that with the character or figure – the *Gestalt* - of the worker the subjectivity of man reaches its completion, as a domination or mastery of the earth (GA90 40). And in the very notion of *Gestalt*, which for Jünger served as a kind of optics or eidetics, by means of which he sought to capture the essence of the historical present, Heidegger traces an inheritance from the Platonic *idea*, that which visualizes being in a fixed figure or essence. It is in these both sympathetic and critical reflections on Jünger's thought of the worker and its *Gestalt*, that the thought of *Gestell* is first conceived, even though the word itself appears only later. In a *Festschrift* to Jünger, published in 1955, Heidegger contributed a piece entitled "Over 'the line'", which was later republished under the title "On the question of being". In this text he picks up his earlier analysis of *The Worker* and Jünger's understanding of the *Gestalt*, stating explicitly that the essence of the *Gestalt* should be understood as emanating from what he himself in the meantime had thought as *Ge-stell* (sv 65).

Heidegger's relation to Jünger, and in particular to his style of thinking and writing, is very ambiguous, and precisely as such it is important to consider its role for how he comes to develop his own concept of *Gestell*. On the one hand Heidegger is very approving of Jünger, whom he interprets in a similar vein as he does Nietzsche, i.e., as a writer who has seen and diagnosed his time in its fundamental character. Jünger's distanced

and lucid-oracular style also obviously had impact on Heidegger's own writing. This comes forth not least in the very aspiration to identify and designate, from a perspective of maximal intense overview, the essential nature of the present, its hidden and yet in many signs manifested essence. In this respect the very project to identify and designate the essential determination of modernity as a *Gestell*, and thus to forge a concept which should permit us to hold it before us, marks a kind of rival elaboration of Jünger's analysis of the *Gestalt* of the worker.

On the other hand, and similar to how he proceeds in his reading of Nietzsche, Heidegger sees Jünger as ultimately unable to transcend this very present in his attempt to come to terms with it. The very analysis of the present as *Gestalt* and as a will to power, in the end confirms the inner logic of subjectivity, which is to create the world as an image for itself to master. In the aspiration to grasp the essence of the present in a figure, essence or *Gestalt*, the domination of subjectivity in the end only comes to the fore. For Heidegger, the task instead becomes that of thinking being in such a way as to release thinking from its own compulsion to dominate being in the very process of bringing it to articulation. In other words, it is to think the will to power, while avoiding to propagate this will to power onto being. The critical confrontation with Nietzsche reaches its apex precisely in this point, namely in the conclusion that Nietzsche, in his very attempt to grasp reality as eternal recurrence and will to power, does not escape the Platonic-metaphysical matrix, but only brings it to its most radical conclusion.

From Heidegger's remarks on Jünger, from the early lecture notes to the elaborated essay "On the question of being", we can see that he looks upon and judges his attempt in a similar vein. It is only when we take this critical ambition into account that we can also understand the full meaning of the term *Gestell* as this is eventually elaborated. Namely, as an attempt to think the nature of being, so as to release thinking from the compulsion to dominate it in the very act of articulating its essence, while seeing this compulsion to dominate as part of its essence. Heidegger's own radicalized attempts to abandon the confines of Western metaphysics is manifested most consistently in his secret writings from the mid-thirties onward, in *Contributions to Philosophy* and *Besinnung*. In these, only posthumously published works, we find the first steps in his critical assessment of technology as a world shaping power, a power that is about to transform the sense of nature, leading to a forgetfulness of being (GA65 277). Here he also tries to develop new modes of thought, as well as a series of new concepts. Central for the former attempt is to shape a mode of thinking which avoids the objectification of conceptual thought, by including its own

“belonging” to that which is thought. For the sake of brevity we cannot, however, go deeper into these writings in the present context.

As the most important published text in the context of the genealogy of the *Gestell* from pre-war period we can look instead to “The Time of the World-Picture”, a lecture presented in 1938 in the context of a conference on the contemporary world-image, *Weltbild*, and later published in the collection *Holzwege*. This lecture starts by establishing a position around which he will circle for the rest of his life: namely, that what is today in need of a special reflexive meditation (*Besinnung*) is science and machine technology. He then elaborates the basic argument that machine technology is not a consequence of science, but that both science and machine technology are rooted in a more fundamental sense of technology, which he equates with modern metaphysics. In this metaphysical constellation, being is understood as something represented (*vorgestellt*) and visualized so as to be made available for manipulation and domination by a subjective will. In the technically characterized metaphysical constellation even art and the humanities tend to be drawn into the same orbit. Art becomes a source of aesthetic pleasure and the humanities are organized according to the same pattern of production of results as in the natural sciences. The researcher, Heidegger writes, becomes a technician, that works by means of experiments to produce results that can be measured in terms of their effects, for the academic establishment.

This whole development and transformation in the way being comes to presence is here dated back to the inception of modern philosophy, the Cartesian conception of certitude, in which man emerges as a subject which projects the world before it as an object, represented and explained. Thus the very question posed by the conference, concerning the emergence of the “modern world picture”, becomes in itself the symptom for how the world appears in modernity, namely precisely as a picture or image, a projection of representing vision. In this new constellation, man loses contact with that which cannot be calculated, it withdraws into the shadows, and the world will appear as a scene of loss of meaning and transcendence.

Such an awareness easily leads to escapism, an urge to reach back into the past or into the tradition. But Heidegger’s remedy to this situation, is not to escape it, but rather to confront it as such, to develop an experience of technological modernity as “destiny”, as a “sending” (*Schicksal, Schickung*) of being, within which we stand. It does not imply kneeling before it, but rather confronting it philosophically through a new mode of questioning, and also of listening, through a “poetic questioning” and a “genuine mindfulness” (*Besinnung*). The task of such a reflection is also to recall man to his own finitude, and the finitude of the

way the world presents itself in this totalizing view. If we read Heidegger's critique of cartesianism, modernity, and technology simply as an attempt to distance himself from this whole constellation, his thinking easily takes on the appearance of a dystopic flight from the present, a somewhat arcane and pathetic critique, which can easily be countered by recalling the many remarkable benefits for humankind that have come out of this modernity, in terms both of political liberties and of improved material living conditions. But what he is pointing toward is rather a non-evaluative, or extra-moral perspective, in which we can begin to sense in which both the enormous benefits and the huge calamities of modernity emerge as two sides of the same underlying movement, as the tragedy of modernity.

At the end of the printed lecture Heidegger added a series of notes, one of them specifying the sense of "re-presentation" (*Vorstellung*), describing it as "a placing something out from oneself, and thereby securing it" (HW 106). In German, the words used are *vor-stellen*, and of *das Gestellte*, and of a *sicherstellen*. Being is thereby no longer that which is present, but instead obtains the meaning of that which is placed before a subject as an object, or *Gegenstand*. With this analysis, the foundation for his later thinking on technology and of the *Gestell* is essentially in place, even though the actual concept or philosopheme is still not forged as such. This only takes place in a text which he composes ten years later, in 1949, with the title "Ge-stell", a text to which we now turn.

After the war, during the years when Heidegger was not permitted to teach at the university, he was invited to give lectures in various public places. In a cultural club in Bremen he gave four such talks in 1949, under the general title "Insight into what is", the second of which was the "Ge-stell". This is the first version of the text that was later to be presented as "The question concerning technology". Here he builds on the analysis in "The time of the world-picture", developing the semantics of *stellen*, in a depiction of nature and man as placed before an exploiting demand. Nature is presented as a source of materials and energy, and integrated into a larger system of usefulness. In a famous image he describes the modern water plant in the river Rhine, as having the effect of building the river into the plant. In this situation the role of man also obtains a new meaning, as the one who has to enact this demand or command, this *Bestellen*, but also as the one exposed to it, as himself also something commandable. It is not incidental that it is in this text that Heidegger makes the only explicit philosophical remark that he ever made concerning the Nazi death camps, whose industrialized way of disposing of human lives and bodies are likened to the way in which nature is also exploited in modern technological society (GA 79, 27). In the later, published version he took away this remark, exactly for what reason we do not know, but its initial

presence in this context clearly indicate that it was through his understanding of the technical and of the *Gestell*, that he, in his own thinking, tried to come to terms philosophically with these unspeakable atrocities, executed by a well organized, modern industrial society.

These various collections of “placings” - of *stellen* and *bestellen* – can now, Heidegger writes, be gathered in the concept of *Ge-stell* (GA79, 32). This is the first definition of this term, which in a somewhat modified form appears in the printed lecture four years later, and which was quoted at the outset. And this *Ge-stell*, he adds further, is in fact the essence of technology, *Technik*, an essence that has its historical origin with the rise of modern science of nature at the end of the sixteenth century. With the forging of the concept of *Ge-stell*, as a way to summarize and bring to awareness a whole constellation of phenomena circled around how beings present themselves to man, Heidegger has reached a means, or perhaps an optics in Jünger’s terms, by means of which he can claim to have thought the essence of modernity. It is an optics that can permit us to see how nature comes forth as a resource to exploit, but also how human beings are conceived as entities, as resources in themselves. It is a kind of paradigm of instrumentalism, in which everything is potentially a resource to be used for the benefit of a rational will. As such it is not only a way to describe a tendency in how things present themselves, but – and perhaps more importantly- about how man, in his individual orientation is called to present them for himself in such a way. For the *Gestell* is not something external to man and his free will, but a way in which this will orients itself. It is, as the definition reads in the essay “The Question of Technology”, which was quoted at the outset, as a “challenging claim”, a claim on man of ordering that which presents itself as a standing-reserve.

The insistence on seeing and experiencing the *Gestell* as a demand is crucial. For it is in and through this way of phrasing the analysis that Heidegger also distances himself from, e.g., the analysis of Jünger, which is still primarily oriented toward grasping, in a totalizing vision, the essence of modernity, in other words to bring it under the mastery of a theoretical gaze. What Heidegger has been working toward, at least from the mid-thirties, but in some ways from the beginning of his path, is a mode of thinking which can something incorporate the *how* of thinking into its what, to bring thinking to a thinking awareness of what it accomplishes in its very way of conceptualizing being. To think the *Gestell* in the way indicated by Heidegger is therefore also to bring to awareness the technical in thinking itself, the inner urge toward mastery, so as ultimately to release us from this urge, and in this way also perhaps to be more free. This strategy is very much present in the opening lines to the essay “The Question of Technology”, which begins by saying that the task for thinking in

regard to technology is “to build a way toward technology”, a way through language, which will lead to a new relation to that which is thought, which Heidegger explicitly defines as “free”. To think technology through the optics of the *Gestell* is thus to make us more free *for* and thus in the end also *from* technology.

The way to this realization goes by means of addressing the question of the essence of technology in a new way. Unlike the common approach to this question, Heidegger holds that the essence of something is not simply the answer to its fundamental *what*. In the case of technology the standard answer would be that technology is a means to an end, an instrument for action. But against this standard response Heidegger suggests that we look instead for *how* technology brings about truth. We ask then not simply for the truth about technology, but for the truth of and by technology. And it is at this stage in the analysis that he recalls again the passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* mentioned at the outset, using it to convey the point that *techne* has to do with bringing about the true, in the sense of letting something come into its appearance, of disclosing it. And the way that technology discloses nature is as an “exploitation”, or a “commanding”, an *Herausfordern*. It discloses nature as that which can and should be commanded. But not only that, it also discloses man to himself as “commanded to command nature”, *herausgefördert die Natur herauszufördern* (VA 21). This is the concentrated formulation for the thought discussed earlier, that *Gestell*, as the essence of technology, manifests itself as a demand inherent in man himself, as an aspect and a consequence of his freedom. It is not a destiny in the sense of being something ordained by some superior power, nature, or by being itself, but a way in which man encounters nature, and himself.

As such a destiny it is not definitive, but something toward which we can establish a more free relation, by listening to its claim or demand (*Anspruch*), and permitting it to resonate precisely as such, as a claim, indeed in a “freeing claim” (VA 29/BW 331). Precisely for this reason the *Gestell* marks in the end a very ambiguous situation. From a superficial perspective the concept and diagnose itself may appear as only a dystopic resentment visavi modernity. But Heidegger’s point is that it also contains new possibilities. In the obvious danger inherent in contemporary technologically defined modernity, also lies a saving potential. In his later writings Heidegger would often quote the lines from Hölderlin’s *Patmos*, “But where danger is, grows the saving power also”. In the essay on technology this holds a very special place, for it also summarizes the way in which he wants *Gestell* to be understood, namely as an “ambiguous” situation of danger and saving at once. The latter possibility rests, however, on the condition that man can reach a thinking, reflective relation to

that which is, as it is disclosed in the *Gestell*. And at the very end of the essay he explicitly takes up this ambiguity precisely in terms of the aforementioned double inheritance of the Greek *techne*. Once, he says, *techne* also meant the “bringing forth of the true into the beautiful” (BW339, VA 38). To the hope of technology belongs this possibility of bringing it back to a sense of a poetic disclosure, first carried forward in the arts, which were known by the Greeks also as *techne*.

We have seen how the thought and concept of *Gestell* thus constitutes a kind of micro-cosmos, in which many of the most central themes from throughout Heidegger’s works come together, not simply in a summarizing and totalizing claim about the fate of modernity, but rather as an critical indication in language of a path of thinking to follow.

Suggestions for further reading :

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Short CV

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Inledning till Heideggers Varat och tiden (2006). Edited books: *Fenomenologiska Perspektiv* (with A. Orłowski) 1997, *Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation. Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries* (with D. Zahavi och S. Heinämaa) 2003, *The Past's Presence* (with M. Cavalcante), 2006. Translated several books and articles, from French, German, English, notably two books by Derrida, *The Origin of Geometry* and *Schibboleth* (with A. Fioretos), and the Heraclitean fragments from Greek (with H. Rehnberg).